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 Introduction 
Rethinking the topoi of normativity 
 
 
 
Biology, technology and society – or should we say biotechsociety? 
 
A conference arranged by The Research Council of Norway in June, 2001, invited 
scientists, politicians, representatives of industry and commerce, scientific and public 
administrators and others to discuss the future of molecular biology in Norway.  The 
conference was titled: “The biotechsociety – where are we heading?” and was intended 
as a discussion of how Norway should respond to the massive international investments 
being made in molecular biology following the completion of the Human Genome Pro-
ject. 1  The discussion at the conference was intended to explore the future of molecular 
biology from a broad scientific, social and political perspective.  This no longer seems 
to be a particularly unusual or controversial strategy.  At least when it comes to bio-
technology related research, the traditional ideal of scientific autonomy has been called 
into question by many scholars, politicians and scientists.  It has often been maintained 
that society should welcome new strategies for the assessment of biotechnology, 
because the field is economically and environmentally risky and because it involves 
values that are highly contested.  Many now recognize that choices concerning biology  
need to be assessed in a wider political and social context.   
The problem, however, is that we do not quite know how such assessments should be 
carried out, because more unified evaluations challenge existing divisions between sci-
entists, engineers, and politicians.  The situation calls for a discussion of how these 
kinds of scientific and technological changes should be theorised.  We need to rethink 
                                                 
1"Bioteksamfunnet – hvor går vi?" Conference arranged by the Research Council of Norway. Oslo, 
Blindern. 5. June 2001. 
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prevailing theoretical models because these models legitimise established professional 
identities of scientists, engineers and politicians.  My analysis builds on Charles 
Taylor's cultural analysis when I claim that our prevailing ways of modelling desirable 
pathways of scientific and technological developments have been shaped in a culture 
that has given primacy to particular epistemological questions.  In general, Western 
legitimising discourses tend to be “epistemologically modelled”, in Taylor’s words.  
The epistemological tradition has become an unfortunate barrier for normative reflec-
tion, Taylor's argument goes, because we do not recognise how it has influenced our 
thinking and staging of the normative problems at hand.  In this work I shall discuss this 
matter with reference to the normative challenges that accompany biotechnological 
development.    
I argue the case for an alternative.  We will be better off, I believe, if scientific and 
technological developments are framed by a perspective that considers science, technol-
ogy and society as “co-produced”.  The conference title: "The biotechsociety – where 
are we heading?" express the crucial idea of this perspective quite nicely.  The three 
areas, science, technology and society, were here compressed into a single word 
followed by a question that one could read as: where are we heading as a collective?  
Decisions and actions made in one of these areas affect decisions and actions made in 
the others.  The activities we recognise as scientific and technological are from this per-
spective not conceptualised or investigated as independent of the ones we recognise as 
political.   
It has, however, turned out to be difficult to clarify the normative implications of co-
production perspectives.  Co-production, as Sheila Jasanoff (2004b) and others have 
argued, may be taken as a heading for a number of different constructivist approaches 
within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS).  In course of the develop-
ment of the STS field, mainly during the 1980s and 1990s, its proponents have tended to 
bracket off normative questions.  Given Taylor’s analysis, we may better understand 
both why this happened and how the co-production perspective may provide an alterna-
tive normative perspective.  Developing alternative models has been difficult because 
the epistemological model is embedded in the practices and constitutive self-
understandings of practitioners of science and politics.  The practice of analysing 
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 science and technology is itself no exception; it has also been marked by the epistemo-
logical tradition. 
Scholars within the STS field have recently sought to find ways to “bring back” or 
restore a normative perspective in the field.2  I want to contribute to this work by 
providing philosophical and empirical arguments for why and how the co-production 
perspective should be seen as an improvement with regard to normative discourses 
regarding science and technology.  This introduction presents the co-production per-
spective by clarifying what questions I find the perspective to be a proper response to.  
This discussion also clarifies the challenges I have faced in advocating this perspective 
as a proper response to these questions.  To do this, I discuss the connections that I have 
indicated exist between dominating models of change, the epistemology’s tradition and 
prevailing normative discourses.   
 
 
Centre of control vs. co-production 
The co-production perspective may be introduced as a polemic contrast to three differ-
ent models for what constitutes a “centre of control” in determining the direction of 
history: is it science, technology or society?3  What we have are three versions of what 
comes first and what is derived from it.  In introducing the new perspectives of STS to 
Ph.D. students, Andrew Pickering referred to these three different models as three types 
of determinism; scientific, technological and social.4  I shall clarify the three models 
with reference to three fields, namely philosophy of science, philosophy of technology 
and social constructivism.   
Two main topics of debate between the three fields are instructive.  One is the phi-
losophy of science vs. philosophy of technology, while the other is the philosophy of 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Guston (2000a), Nowotny et al. (2001), Barrry (2001), Longino (2002), Fuller (2002), 
Latour (1999, 2004a) as well as contributors to Jasanoff (2004). 
3 I have borrowed the notion of centre of control from Nick Lee and Paul Stenner (1999). 
4 Andrew Pickering.  2000  “New Perspectives in Science and Technology Studies.” Ph.D course at 
Vatnahalsen, Norway.  11-16 may 2000.  Arranged by SVT, UiB. 
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science vs. social constructivism.5  At stake is the normative order as expressed by the 
tradition of conceiving scientific, technological and social activities as three independ-
ent and successive arenas of activities.  There is science (producing knowledge), there is 
technology (applying knowledge) and there is society (assessing knowledge).  This tri-
partite division sends the message underscoring the primacy of science: Science ought 
to be privileged since science makes it possible to do things.  The philosophy of science 
has lent support to this normative order by translating the question of the authority of 
science into an epistemological question of the status of theoretical knowledge claims.  
The philosophy of technology and social constructivism have represented two critical 
responses to the epistemological focus pursued in the philosophy of science.  In both 
cases, the normative order of producing, applying and assessing knowledge has been 
questioned.  Technology was said to be inadequately described as applied science, while 
scientific activity was said to be essentially social from the very start.  Two alternative 
models of change appeared as a result of the shift of scholarly interest from “science” to 
“technology” or “society”.  The shift articulated a way to confront the hegemony of 
science.  Technology was seen as a driving force of history on the one hand and essen-
tially shaped by social processes on the other.6   
The co-production perspective represents a liberating alternative to any form of 
determinist models of change.  To understand the strengths of the co-production 
perspective, and develop it further, it is important to avoid being trapped by classical 
epistemological debates.  The argument I want to make in favour of the co-production 
perspective does not hinge on a philosophical analysis of flawed epistemological 
reasoning of previous generations.  The co-production perspective, I will argue, needs to 
be accepted because it provides the best tool for the jobs to be done, given the experi-
ences and challenges of our generation.  
  
                                                 
5 See Don Ihde (1991) and Ian Hacking (1999) for a balanced discussion of the relation between philoso-
phy of science and philosophy of technology on the one hand and the relation between philosophy of 
science and social constructivism on the other. 
6 Various forms of determinist lines of thought may be expressed in debates, pamphlets and scholarly 
writings, as found in the following examples: scientific; Capasso (1997) and Popper (1992); technologi-
cal, Ogburn (1938) and Postman (1992); social, Bloor (1976). 
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 The problems of our generation 
Words such as the biotechsociety, as well as familiar buzzwords as “socioscientific”, 
“sociotechnical” or “technoscience”, I believe, reflect a growing discontent with these 
three models of change.  It is difficult to adopt a balanced perspective if we are confined 
to the concepts, perspectives and arguments from the proponents of scientific, technologi-
cal or social determinism.  Scientific determinism is suited to defending the priority of 
science, technological and social determinism is suited to staunching the hegemony of 
science.  The problem is that these models are mutually exclusive.  We cannot simultane-
ously adopt concepts and perspectives derived from three different types of deterministic 
approaches without running into difficulties.  As a result, people often pick the model that 
best helps to clarify or articulate the problems related to their concern.  When different 
stakeholders with differing concerns meet, such as in a biotechnological controversy, 
prevailing analytical tools tend to result in a polarised discussion and irresolvable contro-
versies appear. 
We find, as Latour seems to suggest, that the strategies of previous generations are 
unsatisfactory simply because the tools offered have been shaped by these earlier 
generations and do not address our generation’s experiences and difficulties.  Latour 
discusses the matter in We Have Never Been Modern, where the notion of co-production 
appears for the first time.  
 
We were born after the war, with the black camps and then the red camps behind us, with 
famines below us, the nuclear apocalypse over our heads, and the global destruction of 
the planet ahead of us.  It is indeed difficult for us to deny the effects of scale, but it is 
still more difficult to believe unhesitatingly in the incomparable virtues of the political, 
medical, scientific or economic revolutions.  Yet we were born amid sciences, we have 
known only peace and prosperity, and we love - should we admit it? - the technologies 
and consumer objects that the philosophers and moralists of earlier generations advise us 
to abhor.  For us, technologies are not new [...] they have always constituted our world.  
More than earlier generations, ours has digested, integrated, and perhaps socialised them.  
Because we are the first who believe neither in the virtues nor in the dangers of science 
and technology, but share their vices and virtues without seeing either heaven or hell in 
them, it is perhaps easier for us to look for their causes without appealing to the white 
man’s burden or the fatality of capitalism [...] or universal rationality (Latour 1993:126). 
 
The tools we have inherited from our forefathers need to be understood in light of the 
situations and corresponding problems that they themselves faced, which changed radi-
cally during the 20th century.   
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During this century, science changed its position from being a comparably weak 
institution to become the dominating legitimising source for public decision-making.  
The first half of 20th century was marked by intellectuals promoting the virtues of 
science.  The first generation promoted, as was described in the famous manifesto of the 
Wiener Circle, a new spirit – the "spirit of a scientific conception of the world" (Neurath 
et. al. 1929).  They argued against a background of ignorance or indifference regarding 
the true potentials of science.  In contrast, intellectuals who were critical and sceptical 
about technoscientific developments dominated the second half of the 20th century.  
They directed attention to the problems created as a result of technoscientific develop-
ment, and argued against a background of success and optimism that had established 
science as the centre of our culture.   
The generations before us were first occupied with conceptualising why science 
should be granted a privileged position before they turned to investigations regarding 
the problems with such a hegemony.  In our generation however, there is no corre-
sponding dominating background of optimism, scepticism or indifference that needs to 
be challenged, addressed or unveiled.  The old discourses seem to have served this 
purpose; they addressed pressing questions such as what are the benefits of science or 
why does it create problems?  When there was a general agreement regarding the 
virtues of science, critics served the purpose of adjusting or modifying the picture with-
out having the power to undermine it.  But there is no such background of optimism or 
pessimism in our generation to engage our attention.  Our generation has been born into 
a world permeated by science and technology – we know nothing else.  It makes no 
sense to talk about science and technology as something we are for or against, or as 
something we would consider in need of being promoted or combated.  Science and 
technology are not alien to us, they do not challenge or address our identity in one way 
or another as they understandably would do for earlier generations.   
The three models of change we inherited from our forefathers, then, should not be 
discussed as correct or wrong in and by itself.  We should be careful with attempts to 
resolve the matter by resorting to a pure theoretical-philosophical analysis.  The three 
models, and the work of articulating them, may not only have served important func-
tions for earlier generations.  The models may also provide points of reference that may 
be useful for us as we seek to clarify how to deal with the problems of our time.  In light 
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 of the problems we face, we may want to reconsider some of our forefathers’ assump-
tions and analytical strategies.   
 
How and where is our biotechsociety constructed?   
I believe Latour is essentially right in claiming that our generation recognizes that we do 
not wish for – indeed cannot wish for – a society not imprinted by science and tech-
nology.  Our problems are of another kind, as scientific and technological projects now 
seem to outdo earlier ones with regards to scale, importance, risk and speed.   
I take the conference on the future of the biotechsociety as an expression of our 
generation’s way of posing the question of how to understand and deal with the powers 
of science and technology.  The question in the title was not posed with an underlying 
tone of fear of scientific or technological domination, nor in a tone of unlimited opti-
mism about the blessings of scientific advancement.  The tone of the question was 
rather sober-minded, posed by a generation that sought new ways of posing questions 
and seeking solutions to them, as if the conference title really was: "When producing 
reliable knowledge and constructing functional technological devices, public and 
private as well as economic and social incentives are woven into each other.  Scientific, 
technological and social changes come together, there is no privileged centre of control 
- what do we do about it?"   
The conference represented an attempt to deal with the matter.  At the core of the 
conference was a national plan designed to empower Norwegian society as it entered 
the biotechsociety.  The message of the conference announcement was quite clear: Like 
it or not, biotechnology has come to stay, we are heading for a biotechsociety.  The 
question was not whether or not society would be marked by biotechnology, the ques-
tion was rather: what direction would we like our biotechsociety to take, where should 
the decisions be taken and who should take them?7  To discuss how Norway might best 
enter the new biotechsociety that conference organizers saw coming, a broad spectrum 
of questions had to be raised at an early stage.  What sector could Norway compete in, 
                                                 
7 ”Bioteksamfunnet – hvor går vi?”, a folder inviting participants to the conference.  Further discussions 
and reports about the conference are found in Forskning (9) 2001 nr 3, as well on the Research Council of 
Norway’s web pages (http://www.forskningsradet.no).   
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what kind of expertise did our nation need, what was ethically questionable, politically 
feasible and industrially realizable?   
Our common future was presented as critically dependent on our nation’s involve-
ment in the coming field of “functional genomics” that followed the Human Genome 
Project.  Combined scientific, technical and social issues had to be addressed from the 
start.  The conference promoted functional genomics by addressing the challenges 
posed by fields such as medicine, the fish industry and food production sector.  These 
areas could benefit from this emerging technology on their own terms if they changed 
or reoriented their practices towards genes, and invested in the people and machinery 
needed to liberate the genes potential for their respective practices.  The attempts to 
coordinate the development patterns of different research fields and activities were 
supplemented by a call for a corresponding sensitivity to social, ethical and political 
concerns.  The innovative biotechnological research in question was expensive, 
economically and environmentally risky and politically controversial.    
A robust scientific, technological and social package had to be constructed in order 
to ensure scientific reliability, scientific and industrial competitiveness as well as politi-
cal acceptability.  These issues could not easily be separated, definitely not in the 
normative successive order of science, technology and society.  The scientific commu-
nity, along with the science administrators that arranged the conference, had an idea of 
what the constituents of such a package would be, and they tried to argue the case in 
public.  One could say the conference was a site for co-production where a possible 
scenario of what a Norwegian biotechsociety would be was put on trial, and possibly 
negotiated, in a melting pot of scientists, politicians, scientific and public administra-
tors, representatives from industry and commerce as well as non-governmental organi-
sations. 
What we have here, I believe, are attempts to stage normative discourses on techno-
scientific developments in a novel manner.  It is a strategy of the sort being discussed 
and scrutinised from the co-production perspective; how are the patterns of co-
production ideally monitored?  The co-production perspective then, as my line of argu-
ment goes, needs to be taken into account because it addresses the problems we 
encounter in our times better than the dominating epistemologically modelled perspec-
tives does.   
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 The argumentative structure of this work is further marked by the challenges I faced 
in arguing that the co-production perspective needs to be understood as a non-
epistemologically modelled perspective.  I believe the co-production perspective 
challenges commitments that are put at play when choices of analytical strategies for 
evaluating science and technology are made.  These commitments are not resolved at an 
individual level, as the assumption goes; they have become an integral part of the way 
we have come to organise western societies.  These commitments are, however, not 
clearly in view, a process of forgetting has taken place in our culture, as Taylor puts it – 
a forgetting that needs to be undone in order to evaluate them.  The STS tradition has 
induced a process of undoing the forgetting by developing the alternative co-production 
model, which in turn has made it difficult to articulate the co-production perspective as 
a normative perspective.  I shall discuss this matter with reference to the recent call for a 
rethinking of the established social contract between science and society. 
  
 
The social contract between science and society 
The social contract is a partnership between science and society established in western 
democratic societies, in which science offers society knowledge and technological 
possibilities, and in return, science is given autonomy and grants.  The social contract 
has been called into question during the last decade by various scholars, who have 
called for renegotiation of the contract.8  These scholars have questioned whether the 
contract really does serve the purpose it was carefully designed to do, namely to unleash 
the powers of science while simultaneously preventing abuse of power.  A normative 
diagnosis, then, generally motivated scholarly attempts to articulate the commitments 
which are underlying the contract and which are taken for granted.  Such articulations 
would in turn make it possible to discuss the commitments.  I will use David Guston’s 
(2000a,b) presentation of the social contract as a point of departure for my discussion of 
these commitments.   
                                                 
8 See for instance Winner (1993), Guston and Keniston (1994), Lubchenco (1997), Gibbons (1999), 
Demeritt (2000) and Gallopin, Funtowicz, O’Connor and Ravetz (2001).   
 9
The partnership between science and society raises an immediate problem of delega-
tion, which could in turn represent a democratic problem for our society.  The scientists 
are the ones who have expert knowledge, and their work and products cannot be 
reviewed by non-scientists.  How then, can public authorities guarantee that science will 
be reliable, efficient and socially acceptable?  Guston pinpointed three elements that 
may explain how this problem of delegation has been handled under the terms of the 
social contract.   
 
 
  
 
 
  
Self- 
Regulation 
 
 
Science 
Money 
Politics 
Research 
Linear model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig I.1.  Guston’s (2000a:70) visualisation of the elements of the social contract. 
 
 
First, the partnership is based on mutual trust.  The scientific community has to trust the 
integrity of the politicians and their ability to provide a just and enlightened deliberation 
process.  Likewise, in order to delegate to the scientific community the power to set 
parameters for these important matters, the political community has to trust scientists’ 
integrity and their ability to maintain and assure reliable self-regulating mechanisms 
(such as peer review).  Second, a linear model of change is assumed.  This model shows 
why science may be a legitimate centre of control.   The linear model assumes that 
research results are easily translated into economic and other benefits; if money is 
invested into research and development, the assumption is that the output will be, by 
and large, beneficial for society.  Third, the partnership relies on an institutional and 
conceptual separation between politics and science.  The reliance on self-regulating 
mechanisms on the one hand and confidence in the utility of research on the other hand 
is strengthened by the belief that science is a self-vindicating enterprise.  Science works 
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 best if it is left alone; it maintains its self-regulating mechanisms from within, which in 
turn ensures the integrity and reliability of research.  As such, scientific activity needs to 
be understood as having intrinsic value; only if science is granted autonomy can the 
results of science be beneficial to society.  
The social contract needs to be understood as a historically established agreement 
that has basically been found acceptable and favourable for everyone affected by it.9  
The three elements of the contract clarify how it can ensure reliable science and 
legitimate politics.  The sustainability of the contract hinges on the common agreement 
that the contract brings as a lucky coincidence: Good science as well as just and wise 
politics are both best safeguarded if interest, values and political hopes are cordoned off 
from the sphere of research.  
The contract implies that everybody endorses the same ideals and accepts the same 
commitments.  Everybody should make certain that the world of research and fact are 
kept separate from the world of politics and values.  Politicians and administrators 
should control their temptations to interfere if they want to reap social benefits and 
reliable advice from research.  In return, researchers need to curb the temptation to 
manipulate the political process.  Basically then, political communities ought to consti-
tute the legitimate centre of control vis-à-vis scientific communities.  But society, under 
the logic of the contract, grants science an autonomous position because it believes that 
science thereby can produce goods and provide enlightening premises for political deci-
sion-making.  The contract relies on mutual trust in the willingness of the other partner 
to stay true to the pact of mutual non-intervention.   
The philosophical discourse that serves in the investigation of the rationale behind 
the fortunate coincidence of the social contract has itself been organised according to 
the boundaries constituted by the contract.  Two separate lines of investigations have 
often been conducted.  On the one hand are epistemological discussions, aimed at 
                                                 
9 Guston demonstrated the plausibility of speaking about a historic established social contract by tracing 
the origin of the elements.  The contract appeared as a result of informal and formal negotiations of 
professional identities within scientific as well as between scientific and political communities.  The letter 
from US president Roosevelt to Vannevar Bush (1945) and Bush’s subsequent report to the US govern-
ment has become a standard example of the latter.  In this report, Bush argues that funding for basic re-
search was needed if society was to continue to exploit the potentials of science in peacetime as it did 
during World War II.   
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clarifying what genuine science is; on the other hand are political discussions aimed at 
clarifying the characteristics of a desirable deliberative procedure for assessing 
scientific results and technological products.  The co-production perspective I advocate 
challenges the sharp separation of these two theoretical pursuits.  Given the co-
production perspective, the scientific activity of clarifying why things are as they are is 
intrinsically linked to the political activity of determining how human beings should 
accommodate to the order described and shaped by science.  At the heart of the matter 
lies the co-production perspective’s understanding of the dynamics of science and 
technology, which should become clear when we consider the question of how the 
contract should be renegotiated.  
 
Renegotiating the contract 
Given this description of the social contract, the stability of the partnership between 
science and society seems to be seriously threatened because the terms of the contract 
now appear to be violated on a regular basis.  This is probably most visible in biotech-
nological research rather than in any other research area.  It is not by chance that hybrid 
words, such as biotechsociety, appear and thrive in the vicinity of modern biology as 
traditional boundaries between scientific, technological and political activities have 
eroded.  Researchers complain of lost freedom, due to increasing linkages between 
industry and research on the one hand and politicians’ increasing eagerness to regulate 
research practices on the other.  For their part, politicians are not prepared to grant 
scientific communities autonomy due to strategic, ethical and economic reasons.   
The problem at hand, as Guston seems to argue, is not a particularly new problem.  
The situation calls for yet another period where boundaries are negotiated and new ways 
of safeguarding them are established.  Because the world changes, much hard work has 
always been invested into negotiating who should do or decide what, how it should be 
done, where and at what time.  The work has included institutional efforts such as 
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 establishing research institutions, adjusting industrial terms of conditions, the initiation 
of research councils as well as ethical research committees.10   
The question that becomes pertinent in the call for a rewriting of the contract, I 
believe, is the question of how the process of mutual shaping and adjustments to politi-
cal and scientific activities are to be theorised.  The difficulty of rewriting the contract 
draws attention to the question of how the dynamics of science and technology are 
ideally modelled.  It makes a crucial difference here whether change is theorised in 
terms of power struggles between centres of control or in terms of a co-production 
model.    
I find two influential scientific responses of the 1990s illustrative; these are the 
responses referred to as "science wars" and "science literacy programmes".  These 
strategies seem to assume that there is basically only one answer to the various prob-
lems scientist encounter; namely education, whether it concerns the problem of recruit-
ment to the natural sciences, public scepticism, or politicians eager to regulate the 
internal affairs of science.11  The call for enlightening education is shaped by the tradi-
tional accounts of change, that science should constitute the centre of control and that 
the uninformed social power centres attempting to undermine the authority of science 
should be counteracted.   
I do not believe these responses rely on an adequate analysis of why the stability of 
the social contract is threatened.  The problem concerns the way scientific and social 
challenges are linked together in modern scientific projects.  Two themes in the schol-
                                                 
10 Guston (2000a:Chapter 3) provides examples of circumstances that have affected these boundaries, 
which have called for rethinking and negotiations. These include the demand for a pledge of loyalty from 
scientists in US during the McCarthy era, the rapid growth of the research and development sector of the 
post-war period, as well as worries about the risks and unanticipated consequences of research.   
11 One may understand these responses as attempts to restore the social contract and secure democratic 
processes by strengthening the educational sectors of the natural sciences.  The proponents of science 
literacy programmes have argued that, since decisions about the future of science are to be made by 
political institutions, politicians and science administrators need to have a basic knowledge of science.  
And symmetrically, if the political institutions are not to be overruled by the judgements of scientific 
experts, politicians need to be scientifically literate.  While the science literacy programme calls for 
enlightenment outside academic circles, “science wars” is a heading that describes various attempts to 
debunk the ignorance of scholars who are seen as having invoked a war against the natural sciences.  
Scientists within the humanities and social sciences are the ones who have come to provide the public as 
well as science administrators with flawed understandings of science.  These scholars have been accused 
of systematically undermining the authority of science, which in turn has been partly blamed for the crisis 
in recruitment, the rise of irrational public distrust and lack of willingness to stake a lot on science (Gross, 
Levitt and Lewis (1996), Gross and Levitt (1994), Ross (1996)). 
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arly debate of the 1990s underscore these issues.  First, modern societies have come to 
be risky and morally controversial due to the way our society has come to be marked by 
science and technology.  Second, novel decision-making structures have emerged due to 
changes in the means of knowledge production.   
The first theme has been explored by Silvio Funtowitz and Jerome Ravetz (1990).  
Funtowitz and Ravetz have drawn attention to research fields where decisions have to 
be made even though facts are uncertain, values are in dispute and risks are high.  These 
situations do not fit the normal conditions of the social contract, and should therefore 
not be treated normally either.  The spheres of politics and science are then often 
blurred to such an extent that the ideal of the separation of the two is counterproductive.  
This is not a marginal phenomenon, they argue; instead, society must accustom itself to 
making decisions under such conditions.  Our life conditions are increasingly bound by 
situations where entry words as uncertainty, values, risks and the urgency of decision 
have become predominant.12   
Michael Gibbons and his colleagues (Gibbons 1994, Nowotny 2001) have explored 
the second theme.  They have drawn attention to changes in the knowledge producing 
processes that have occurred in recent decades.  The standard contract relies on the 
ability to assign professional identities in accordance to some stable and well-defined 
boundaries within disciplines, between public and private research institutions and 
founding agents as well as between pure and applied research.  The trend now, however, 
as in molecular biology, is that fields are developing in between disciplinary and insti-
tutional boundaries.  Traditional institutional boundaries have eroded, as bonds are 
formed that cut across the boundaries of industry, research and politics.  The old ideals 
embedded in the social contract, Gibbons and his colleagues argue, cannot apply, and 
attempts should not be made to apply them in this situation.   
                                                 
12 The threat of global warming has become a paradigmatic case as it brings out a fully fleshed out 
combination of the four.  The field of biotechnology suits demonstration purposes as well because values 
are often at dispute in the field even with regards to research methods as well as research goals.  This has 
become evident in the controversy over stem cell research or in the controversies following the rapid 
advancement of diagnostic tools that are unaccompanied by any therapeutic counterpart. The intrinsic 
value of knowledge has been questioned in these cases.  Do we want to know about our predisposition to 
certain diseases or disorders?  Do we want to realise the technological opportunity afforded by the clon-
ing of a human being?  The risks of the outcome of research are likewise often discussed within the field, 
as in xeno-transplantation or in the controversies about genetically modified organisms.   
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 The exploration of these two themes has resulted in a call for a rethinking of the 
terms of the social contract that, I would say, draws attention to the need for an 
adequate theoretical understanding of the temporal relation between scientific and 
political practices.  If the two practices are intrinsically linked, we need to understand 
the dynamics of their interaction in order to be able to rewrite the terms of the contract.  
Observations that scientific and political activities are intrinsically linked may provide 
good arguments for the need to do “something else”, but such arguments do not point to 
an alternative (except for making it likely that some “democratisation” of science be 
welcomed).13  
  
Normative discourses and models of scientific and technological change 
The constructivist perspective explored in the STS tradition makes a crucial difference 
here.  The difference it makes has been clarified in Latour’s We Have Never Been 
Modern.  Given Latour’s analysis, we may understand how the forgetting of the 
rationale for the social contract comes together with a systematic intellectual down-
playing of the question of what the temporal relation between the scientific and political 
activities are.  In Latour’s (1993) analysis, the crucial commitment of the standard 
contract, that the two activities are to be separated, merely articulates the visible and 
explicitly acknowledged part of what Latour described as the “modern constitution” or 
the “modern settlement”; that is, how we have come to organise modern societies.   
The ideals of the social contract correspond to what Latour describes as the "work of 
purification": The realm of fact and value, nature and society should carefully be puri-
fied, separated and subsequently treated in different realms.  Everybody should see that 
this is done properly.  But the modern settlement is not understandable without seeing 
how the work of purification relates to the "work of translation".  The work of transla-
tion is the work that creates, sustains and transforms the blending of science, technology 
                                                 
13 Funtowitz and Ravetz, and partly Gibbons et al., as far as I can see, have difficulties with alternatives 
because they do not pay enough attention to the question of how socio-scientific changes come about.  
The problem, I suggest, is that they do not analyse or challenge the theoretical understanding of change 
embedded in the social contract.  On the contrary, their rhetoric seems to hinge on the legitimacy of the 
contract in normal cases, although it is sometimes hard to see what remains of their respective under-
standing of the “normal” or “mode 1” situations, which contrasts to the “post-normal” or “mode 2” 
situations.   
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and society.  The conference of the future state of our biotechsociety demonstrates a 
situation where such complex associations were being negotiated, sustained and possi-
bly reshaped.  The dynamics of socio-scientific developments that take place as a work 
of translation, have not commanded our attention precisely because of our common 
focus on the work of purification.  In Latour’s analysis, the work of purification facili-
tates translation by rendering it invisible.  The proliferation of hybrids like the biotech-
society may go unnoticed because everybody is obliged to make sure that the work of 
purification is performed properly.  
The crucial commitment of the social contract was called into question by the con-
structivist tradition’s description of how scientific results and technological products 
came into being.  Through these descriptions, the problem that initiated the search for 
articulating the social contract has been better articulated: The commitments of sepa-
rating science and politics draw attention away from practices of crucial ethical and 
political relevance.  The epistemic assumptions embedded and maintained by this 
commitment have been seriously challenged by constructivist case studies of scientific 
activity.  The process where reliable knowledge is produced, as these case studies 
demonstrate, is dependent on a successful integration of what we are accustomed to 
think we should keep detached.  “[T]he more connected a science is to the rest of the 
collective, the better it is, the more accurate, the more verifiable, the more solid" as 
Latour (1999b:18) put it.   
There is a serious moral lesson to be learned from constructivist analysis and 
conceptualizations of scientific activity.  The ideals of the social contract hide the effect 
of the work of translation and may thereby conceal the most important aspects of what 
we need to take into account in order to take responsibility for our future common 
condition.  Our well-intended efforts to fulfil our moral obligations may in fact hinder 
us as long as we are committed to the ideals of the social contract.  It is not only our 
will, then, but also our practices and the lines of reasoning we attend to that hinder us.  
What we have to do in this situation is to work ourselves out of the practices, conceptu-
alisations and patterns of reasoning that have been handed to us.  I believe this has been 
done, to a great extent, within the STS tradition as its proponents came to articulate the 
co-production perspective.  The pioneers of the field managed to pave the way for an 
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 alternative because they paid attention to, and sought to articulate, the dynamics of the 
work of translation. 
The co-production perspective is a challenging perspective because it invites us not 
to base our analytical work along traditional divisions we presuppose and use all the 
time in our daily lives.   We cannot do without these distinctions; any effort to do so 
would miss the point as well.  The point is to focus on what theoretical grip on the 
world we are developing in order to illuminate changes brought about in the world.  We 
are invited not to put objects like "science" or "society" at the centre of our analytical 
attention, but instead to turn our attention to the processes where science and society are 
simultaneously shaped.  The call for this shift carries an invitation to rethink why we 
find it important to make and safeguard distinctions of this sort and pursue them the 
ways we are accustomed to.  The invitation also carries a promise.  As soon as we 
realise the hidden work of translation that comes along with the work of purification, as 
Latour (1993:11) explains in his introduction to We Have Never Been Modern, our 
minds and patterns of obligations are no longer bound by modernity.  At the same time 
that we become aware of the work of translation, we will, in retrospect, understand that 
we were in fact never actually modern because the two sets of practices have always 
been at work. 
Scientific and political activities have always been intrinsically linked, in Latour’s 
analysis, an approach I also take to be Taylor’s position.  It might still be, even if we 
were never modern, that the standard contract of modernism was sound under other 
conditions.  The contract may have functioned well in times before scientific and tech-
nological innovations were allowed their rapid proliferation, in times when the work of 
translation was slower and less penetrating - allowing us time to think, re-think and 
digest the changes generated by scientific activity.  The contract was possibly well-
adjusted to times when research was confined to a few small-scale research institutions 
where the distinction between public and private, pure and applied research were well 
defined.  It does not really matter whether the contract once was in order or not, after all 
the problems of yesterday are not the ones under discussion.  The importance of 
Latour’s philosophical argument does not hinge on the evaluation of whether the 
contract served the generations before us well or not.  Latour’s analysis of modernity 
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provides a way for us to reflect on what science has come to be, and what we want it to 
be in light of the problems we confront.   
The co-production perspective then, which I take as my point of departure, is an 
important and exhilarating perspective because it promises to provide a theoretical basis 
for an enlightened activity of reshaping the social contract and renegotiating profes-
sional identities.  I believe it is possible to redeem the promises of the perspective, and 
want to contribute to the attempts to do so.  The perspective should be measured against 
its ability to release the powers of science while simultaneously preventing the abuse of 
power.  
  
    
 
Objective, structure and argument of this work 
 
My goal is to articulate a normative perspective based on a co-production understanding 
of the dynamics of science and technology.  What I offer, which to my knowledge has 
not been done before, is an attempt to co-think STS insights and Taylor’s perspectives 
and ideas.  The work is organised in two parts, one theoretical and one empirical.   
The question of what a normative perspective on science and technology should be 
will be formulated as a question about the methodology of such a perspective: how 
should normative investigations of science and technology be performed?  In doing so, I 
address and call for a reconsideration of the assumed commitments of my own field, 
that is, the broad field of science studies that sets out to enlighten our perspectives of 
science and technology.  This methodological focus provides a way to work myself out 
from dominating practices using the premises of the STS tradition.  My reading of the 
STS field and the scholars that I find central to the field, as well as my criticism, will be 
informed by Taylor’s analysis of the epistemological model.    
The hallmark of the STS tradition, as argued by Steven Woolgar, resides in the 
field’s ability to revise itself by paying reflexive attention to its own methodology.  In 
my reading, a branch of the field has worked along lines recommended by Woolgar, and 
in doing so it has created a pathway out of epistemologically modelled science studies 
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 through a series of methodological shifts.  My argument for integrating Taylor’s ideas, 
in particular his philosophical anthropology, will be formulated as a call for another 
methodological shift. Taylor's perspective implies a critique of the STS field’s meth-
odological downplaying of normative questions.  My Taylorean version of the co-
production perspective that follows will be put to the test in the empirical section of Part 
II. 
Part I consists of three chapters.  I present Taylor’s epistemological model in Chapter 
1.  I argue that the philosophy of science tradition has been marked by the model with 
reference to the tradition’s main questions, lines of conflict and tendency towards 
naturalism.  The chapter also presents my understanding of the argumentative strengths 
of the empirical approach of the STS tradition.  Chapter 2 summarises my discussion in 
chapter one by discerning six methodological traces of the epistemological model in the 
doings of the philosophy of science tradition.  The chapter further discusses how the 
first version of the co-production perspective emerged through the two successive 
methodological platforms that were developed in the so-called British (SSK) and French 
(actor-network) schools of STS. The French school, the chapter concludes, needs to be 
taken one step further if an alternative non-epistemological modelled co-production 
perspective is to be reached.   
In Chapter 3 I harmonize the works of Taylor and Latour, presenting them as two 
scholars that have come to criticize, and search for alternatives to, the same culture of 
modernity.  While Latour and his colleagues re-articulated science and prevailing 
understandings of epistemic practices, Taylor conducted a parallel work of re-
articulating human agency and prevailing understandings of ethical and political 
practices.  The co-production perspective, I propose, should be articulated at the inter-
section of the works of Latour and Taylor.  The chapter recapitulates the different 
elements such a co-production perspective should contain by introducing the notion of 
an “ethos of an actor network”.   
Part II pursues the theoretical discussions of Part I in an empirical context for two 
reasons.  First, I seek to demonstrate that the analysis of the epistemological model 
provides a useful frame for analysing and discussing how normative evaluations of 
science and technology are to be performed.  Second, the co-production perspective is 
put to the test by discussing its illuminating potential in a normative controversy.  I 
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compare two ways of scrutinising the legitimacy of biology's influence on non-
biological fields, a discussion that often has run under the heading of “biologization”.   
Part II consists of three chapters as well.  In Chapter 4 I provide a literature analysis 
of what I identify as epistemologically modelled analyses of biologization.  In Chapter 5 
I present an analysis of a particular process of biologization as it appears through the 
lenses of co-production.  My analysis here is based on fieldwork.  I analyse how func-
tional genomics emerged in Norway from 1997-2002, as seen from the point of view of 
a pioneer project in functional genomics at my university in Trondheim.  I discuss the 
two analytical frames in Chapter 6 and argue that the co-production perspective 
provides a more informative, richer and balanced normative perspective.  My case study 
also provides material for further clarifications of my version of the co-production 
perspective as well as a discussion of its methodological implications. 
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 Chapter 1 
Normative discourses epistemologically modelled 
 
 
 
Staging normative discourses  
 
The co-production perspective, discussed in subsequent chapters, suggests alternative 
ways of staging normative discourses with respect to the ones we are accustomed to.  
This chapter allows an understanding of the co-production perspective by clarifying 
alternatives to this approach.  I present an analysis of the epistemological model and 
discuss how it has staged or modelled normative discourses about science and tech-
nology.  I also lay the groundwork for the next chapter’s discussions of how an 
empirical tradition of science studies has created an escape route from the 
epistemological modelled practices of studying science.   
I will begin with a story of a scientific controversy in order to provide a sense of the 
problems that arise in the way normative evaluations are performed if scientific, 
technological and social activities are seen as independent activities.    
 
 
Cloning of what?  
The cloning of the first human embryo was announced in late 2001.  Scientific 
American14 reported that an American biotechnology company, Advanced Cell 
Technology (ACT), had created “the first human cloned embryo” which implied that the 
“goal of therapeutic cloning now was within reach”.  The announcement appeared the 
following day as headline news in Norway and many other countries.  The possibility of 
                                                 
14 "The First Human Cloned Embryo." Scientific American (24. 11.01). 
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cloning a human being did not come as a surprise.  It had been considered possible ever 
since the cloning of the first mammal, a sheep named Dolly, in 1997.  But the 
announcement attracted the attention of the international press because it stated that 
someone actually had done it.  Scientists had created a human embryo carrying a copy 
of the genetic makeup of another human being.  And furthermore, the embryo had even 
been created in qualitatively new ways, without fusing a sperm and an egg.  The 
announcement provoked considerable anger in many circles.  How could anyone actu-
ally be “fiddling with life”15 in such ways?  It was particularly provocative that ACT 
had cloned an embryo in spite of the fact that many countries were about to pass legis-
lation regulating the technique (as was the case in the US and Norway).  The 
announcement affected the ongoing political debate in many countries as it triggered 
heated public debates.   
The revived debate seemed to be welcomed by ACT, as it suddenly found itself at 
the centre of worldwide attention.  The President of ACT, Michael West, took the 
opportunity to communicate a clear message to the public in the political firestorm that 
followed the announcement: A boundary had to be drawn between good and bad inten-
tions for cloning.  The bad intentions were those of reproductive cloning (creating 
embryos that would be turned into human beings).  The good intentions were those of 
therapeutic cloning (creating embryos in order to harvest non-specialised cells, stem 
cells, which were to be used in different cell replacement treatment).  The announce-
ment then, played a role in enforcing the reproductive/therapeutic distinction that was 
about to be established as a crucial moral distinction in the cloning debate.  This 
distinction could reopen the debate on the morality of cloning human embryos, allowing 
the cloning technique to be understood in a setting that more easily allowed moral 
acceptability.  “There are people out there”, as West said, “people we all care for, who 
are suffering and dying and need therapies now”.  Given this setting, he could also put 
his opponents in an unfavourable light.  He said they actually threatened to block this 
development by putting a “little ball of cells” on par with human beings.16   
                                                 
15 "Tukling med livet." Bergens Tidende (28.11.2001 my translation). 
16 "West: ' I'm just trying to help people who are sick'." CNN.com. (26. 11.01). 
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 Cloning, whether it was of the reproductive or therapeutic kind, was a technique that 
was considered highly dubious in the political domain.  Kant’s moral philosophy played 
a crucial role here because of his influential moral dictum that provides guidelines for 
how one should treat individuals in order to respect their human dignity.  You should, 
paraphrasing Kant, always act so that you treat other persons as an end and never only 
as means.  Therapeutic cloning, from this perspective, represented a clear violation of 
Kant’s dictum.  The term described an activity where embryos were to be created for 
the sole purpose of research.  It implied the treatment of beings (with a human touch) 
only as means.  The notion of therapeutic cloning that was constructed in order to draw 
attention to the positive medical potentials of cloning, appeared from a Kantian 
perspective as a practice that could threatened our readiness to protect humanness in the 
first place.  The Kantian dictum marked the Norwegian debate and was publicly 
exposed in support of the Norwegian government’s ban on cloning as well.17  Kant’s 
argument also appeared to be one of the most forceful arguments against therapeutic 
cloning in many other countries (see for instance Dickson 2000).   
The rhetoric of West highlighted an important issue here that I shall pursue further.  
The discussion of the morality of cloning is critically dependent on the choice of 
descriptive language.  The issue would already be settled if one chose to refer to the 
cloned beings as “balls of cells” or, as other participants did, as “human germinates” or 
“spare-part humans”.  Calling the cloned embryos “balls of cells” would make it possi-
ble to settle the entire issue with reference to the obligation to “help people who are 
sick”.  “Spare-part humans” would likewise make it possible to settle the matter with a 
passing remark to the horror of World War II experiments on humans.18  None of these 
extreme references to the beings in the laboratory seemed to clarify the moral issue 
adequately.  The question of how to refer to the beings in the laboratory was intrinsi-
cally linked to the question of what moral stance one would take.    
In the public sphere, however, the beings generally were referred to as human 
embryos. The metaphysical status of the new beings was hardly questioned; it seemed 
to have been determined in the public sphere that the clones were human embryos with 
                                                 
17 Dagfinn Høybråten. ”Nei til terapeutisk kloning.”  Aftenposten (9.2.02). 
18 Jan Helge Solbakk argued along these lines in "Menneskekloining, retorikk og etikk." Aftenposten 
(29.3.01). 
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no difference between these embryos and any other human embryo. This was not a 
trivial similarity for the scientific communities that created these beings.  From the 
scientist's point of view, it was less evident that it was appropriate to talk about these 
laboratory-created beings as human embryos.  A strategy of the biotechnological firm 
Geron (which held important patents on stem-cell technologies) is illustrative.  Geron 
wanted to develop the cloning technique in order to bypass American resistance towards 
harvesting stem cells from already fertilised embryos.  The clone was to be presented as 
an alternative stem cell source that avoided the question of humanness; the clone was to 
be presented as if it was a human embryo (Franklin 2001).   
The laboratory bench seemed possibly far from any context where the embryos could 
be implanted in a woman, and the notion of human embryos appeared quite misplaced.  
And in the heated debates around the announcement of ACT, several scientists seemed 
quite uncomfortable with addressing the beings as clones.  To be “more precise”, a 
Norwegian biology researcher explained, “nuclear-DNA from a human egg was 
replaced with DNA from a body cell”.19  Or as an American researcher said to The 
Scientist: “Let’s call these things what they really are [..] They’re the products of 
nuclear transplant, and they’re some sort of activated cells.  They’re not embryos” 
(Agres and Russo 2002).  We may understand these responses better if we consider the 
reception of the announcement by ACT.   Since ACT actually claimed they had cloned 
a human embryo, scientists soon responded by investigating the validity of the claim.  
Such investigations called for criteria; how stable should the set of laboratory practices 
be before one can describe the successful activation of a nuclear transplanted cell as a 
human embryo?  Technical criteria were needed in order to settle the question of when 
it was reasonable to assign humanness to the beings.  Was it reasonable to say that a 
potential human being had been created as soon as the nucleus was transplanted?  Or, 
on the other extreme, would it actually be necessary to demonstrate that it would be 
possible to actually grow the embryo into a person?  What if it turned out that the tech-
nique was not able to result in a human being?  What if it lacked some of the character-
istic features we recognise as part of normal human development?  Could one still think 
of the ball of cells as a (full-blown) human embryo?   We should keep in mind that the 
                                                 
19 ”Kloning og nytteetikk.”  Aftenposten (4.12.01 my translation).   
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 beings under discussion were laboratory beings in the sense that they could not exist (at 
least initially) outside of a laboratory setting.  And these beings were first reported as 
actual beings by the announcement of ACT, that is, in a setting where the judgement of 
whether or not one could reasonably talk about human embryos was a technical ques-
tion.  At what point were the scientists dealing with beings that were to be assigned 
some of the rights that we assign to persons?  
The identification of the beings in the laboratory as human embryos was possible 
because successful cloning of other mammals had been carried out.  The picture of 
Dolly that had been run in newspapers made her look like any other sheep.  The clone-
type-embryo as an alternative human embryo had already been partly articulated during 
the production of Dolly.  The production of knowledge, or the creation of Dolly, had 
already interfered with our conceptualisation of humanness.  We had had the chance to 
digest the idea that a human being could possibly result from a process of non-
fertilisation, as we had had time to digest that it could be fertilised in a tube.   
The activity of creating Dolly, then, was a highly political activity.  It was, however, 
not really treated as a political activity at the time because cloning of adult mammals 
was for a long time considered to be impossible.  Scientists claimed such beings could 
not be created.  Dolly came as a surprise even to the scientific community.20  The 
researchers who found a way to create Dolly had done so secretly.21  They had created, 
without consulting anyone, the laboratory practices that made it possible to talk about a 
ball of eggs in the ACT laboratory as a possible human embryo.  The Dolly creators put 
the world in a new situation.  It was difficult, if not impossible, to undo what was done 
and erase the problems and opportunities that followed.   
The work of creating Dolly should be understood as a work of creating a new set of 
linkages between non-human, humans and discourses.  It was not simply Dolly, the 
particular sheep that was created; a re-shaped world came along with the creation of 
Dolly.  And the work of creating Dolly also interfered with established moral orders.  
                                                 
20 It had been thought that in mature cells, some genes necessary for development were permanently 
turned off, even lost.  The creation of Dolly therefore came as a big surprise to the scientific community 
(see for instance ScienceNow (24.2.1997) or New Scientist (1.3.1997).
21 The matter has for example been discussed in a section on cloning of the April 1998 issue of  the 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.  Dolly was 8 months before the public became aware of the 
research. 
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The very possibility of cloning Dolly had an impact on how we should understand our-
selves as human beings.  We were now a kind of being no longer had to come into being 
as a result of a fusion of an egg and a sperm from a female and a male.   
Everybody seemed to agree that reproductive cloning was a bad thing.  It seemed 
sufficient to invoke the dignity and personal integrity of Norwegian researchers in order 
to brush aside any suggestions that someone would actually do it.  At one point, for 
instance, Arne Sunde, a researcher at the university hospital in Trondheim, found it 
necessary to assure the public that: “No responsible research communities will promote 
the practice of cloning human beings, and that is of course not what we want to do”.22  
It was not quite so evident why no responsible researcher would ever think of realising 
these beings while at the same time pursue a strategy of therapeutic cloning.  Was it 
only because of the unavoidable experimentation failures needed in order to do so?  
What would be the crucial difference with respect to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) if the 
laboratory practices turned out to be as robust as existing IVF practices?  Could the 
resistance to reproductive cloning be linked to a disapproval of the idea that an off-
spring would appear as an identical twin of the parent?  Or was it seen as unacceptable 
that humans were to be created in a qualitatively new way, assuming that we as a soci-
ety were not yet prepared to adjust or compromise our identity as human beings by 
allowing them to be realised as full-grown human beings?   
The research process, then, had interfered with, and were still interfering with our 
constructions of human identity, but this worked the other way around as well.  This 
becomes more evident when we consider the search for alternative stem cell sources.  
Stem cells that could not be linked to “human embryos” would bypass the whole issue.  
Thus “adult stem cells” would probably be the ultimate alternative as they would be 
non-controversial and socially acceptable.  These cells exist naturally in adult humans, 
or may behave as stem cells, with some indicating that adult stem cell could represent 
an alternative to therapeutic cloning (Westphal  2002).  Given alternative sources, we 
would not need to compromise our understanding of what it is to be human and the 
research process would be stimulated to take this route.  The use of “adult stem cells” 
                                                 
22 ”Vil bruke ubefruktede egg.”  Adresseavisen (9.12.00 – my translation). 
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 would easily win public acceptance, and even a ban on human clones would not stand 
as an obstacle.  
An illustrative case of the search for alternative stem cell sources is described in an 
article in The New York Times.23  A researcher, Jerry Hall, was questioned about his 
work on a technique that formed an “embryo” that would not be able to turn into a 
child, but could still produce stem cells.  The technique, as he described it, was to use 
“chemicals to coax an egg to grow into an embryo of sorts without being fertilised by a 
male’s sperm”.  But the issue of humankind could not completely be eliminated.  One of 
the crucial issues Hall pointed out, regardless of the success of the technique, was the 
question of the embryos’ nature.  “The fact that these beings would not survive to birth 
does not answer the questions”, he said.  What would the status for such beings be?  The 
question appeared to be crucial for the researcher’s understanding of himself as a 
responsible researcher.  He seemed uncomfortable with being one of those who did 
research on what could be called human embryos.  It might be that he would even be 
more disturbed by the idea of having created a being that could not fit into any category. 
Normative discourses on science and technology are often staged in ways that draw 
attention away from the way moral problems are constructed and reconstructed as 
problems, due to the way technological, scientific and social activities are linked.  The 
role that Kantian arguments sometimes played in the debate may be illustrative here, 
since they tended to enforce an understanding of there being a sharp boundary between 
scientific and political activities.  Some philosophers argued as if the whole matter 
could be settled through Kantian exegesis, or through “exclusively philosophical” lines 
of argument.  Such attempts to frame the discussion could be seen as attempts to 
exclude a complex set of considerations linked to the social and technological setting in 
which these beings came into existence.24  Moreover, the clear-cut Kantian-framed 
discussion, that presupposed sharp boundaries between the non-human and the human, 
tended to conceal the fact that the boundary between humans and non-humans were 
under discussion here.  For instance, should the laboratory beings that Jerry Hall said he 
had created be included in the expanding category of embryos, as some sort of highly 
                                                 
23 “May Provide Stem Cells While Taking Baby From Equation.“ The New York Times (06.11.01).  
24 Lars Johan Materstvedt. ”Kan et menneskeliv klones og deretter avlives?” Aftenposten (30.7.03). 
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disabled human embryos, or should we settle for an understanding of them as a ball of 
cells?  The question of where to draw the boundary could not in this case be seen as 
strictly non-technical or non-scientific question.  The boundary between the human and 
the non-human were negotiated in the scientific activity of creating such beings.  And 
when we pass judgement on how to treat these laboratory objects we may simultane-
ously restructure our identity as human beings, even when a Kantian line of argument is 
pursued.  Therapeutic cloning made it possible to pursue a clear-cut Kantian approach 
that hardly could have taken place in the debates over the morality of harvesting stem 
cells from already fertilised embryos (from in vitro fertilised or aborted embryos).  In 
the case of the novel cloning technique there was no moral resistance from practices 
already linked to these objects, the embryos were to be created for the sole purpose of 
research.  In this situation, it seemed, the real test case for our willingness to safeguard 
human dignity hinged on how we treated these laboratory created newcomers in the 
family of embryos. 
It is difficult to get a grip on what the moral problem consists in here, due to the 
nature of the object being shaped.  The cloned beings need to be understood as “bound-
ary objects”.  Boundary objects have a “cyborg” or “hybrid” nature that does not fit into 
established categories in which the moral debate in question would be based, put in a 
pure Kantian frame.  The controversy of cloning human embryos involved elements of 
moral confusion that would not easily go away as there were twists of genuine novelty 
in the problems being discussed.  This confusion should be seen in light of how the 
discourse on therapeutic cloning emerged, namely at the intersection of the work of bio-
scientists, medical doctors, patient groups, ethicists, priests, politicians and biotechnol-
ogy companies that enrol or exclude different things like eggs, DNA, nuclear transfer, 
Dolly, media, public opinion, God, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s decease, laboratory 
techniques, Immanuel Kant, patents and industrial potentials.  The challenge is to per-
form normative investigations that clarify rather than conceal what is at stake in the 
course of techno-scientific developments.  In order to do so, we need to recognise and 
take into account the fact that scientific and political activities are internally related.  
The question of good politics and good science should therefore not be discussed in 
isolation. The announcement of ACT is a particular interesting case in this regard, as it 
received harsh criticism from the scientific community.   
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 The claims by ACT did not meet scientific standards, and the critique concerned the 
company’s decision to make a public announcement.  Scientific American reported the 
news, but the documenting details were published on the following day in e-Biomed, a 
new and less well known online journal (Cibelli et. al. 2001).  The work, according to 
the critiques, had a preliminary character.  The results were not well grounded, not 
something a responsible researcher ought to go public with, and certainly not something 
a responsible journal should accept for publication.  The ball of cells had not passed 
through many stages of division (there were only six cells in the ball), which under-
scored the fact that the transcription process, in which the transferred genes began to 
produce proteins, might not have been triggered.  The paper was only accepted for 
publication, the critics said, because human embryos were the subject.  Rudolf Jaenisch, 
a biologist from M.I.T, articulated what was at stake here: “In a controversial area” he 
stated, “you should have at least one part clean and scrutinised, which is the scientific 
part, and then you can go to the public and discuss all the other considerations like 
ethical and moral, ideological and religious” (Stix 2001).  An epistemic focus on 
certainty should in other words be the number one concern for the scientists, because of 
the need to distinguish clearly between the clean and rationally scrutinised (scientific) 
debates and the muddied (political and economic) ones.   
This is a type of argument that appears when science is shown to be bad science.  
Such cases reveal how a number of highly political practices may be legitimized, with-
out explicit discussion, when practices are judged as good science.  There were 
probably no human embryos in the laboratories of ATC, by any reasonable standards.  
However, the political and ethical dimensions of the laboratory’s work would not be 
eliminated if the results had been scientifically robust.  The early publication just made 
them more visible.   
The editors of e-Biomed and Scientific American actually agreed with the critique 
that the work the ACT lab reported was of poor quality.  Although the criticism worried 
them, they did not regret that the report was put in print.  The editor of Scientific 
American referred to the “likelihood of intense public interest” in the preliminary 
results, and the president of ATC also spoke about the need for openness and public 
debate on the issue as being part of the rationale behind the publication (Stix 2001, 
Agres and Russo 2002).  These reasons make sense in light of the moral issues at stake.  
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The question of what should be accepted as part of humankind did not seem to be well 
enough clarified, and one could consider the publication to be some sort of social 
experiment that aimed at better understanding the moral effect of the practice of cloning 
human embryos.  The philosopher Jens Saugstad’s proposal for what the Kantian 
dictum implies with respect to the cloned embryo is interesting here.  I believe his pro-
posal could be understood as a call for such experimentation.  We should not allow the 
technique, Saugstad said, if it would “weaken our emotional state of readiness against 
the use of people for purely instrumental reasons”.25    
The response to ACT’s announcement might have contributed to a clarification of 
how or if therapeutic cloning could weaken our respect for fellow humans.  The public 
interest could then be seen as functioning as a reviewer not of the quality of the scien-
tific craft, but of the worth of the scientific work that in fact does have an immediate 
effect on public interests.  One could see the publication as a part of the experiment of 
what the beings in the laboratory were.  What would happen in the public sphere if these 
preliminary results were thrown into the public domain, what would such a publication 
bring about?   
A scientifically robust publication would not take away the role of the “general 
public” as a counterpart, as an unpredictable and collective faceless reviewer that the 
scientific community has to relate to.  But a late publication would most likely reduce 
the potential of the public review’s influence on the course of the events, as might be 
taken as the lesson from the secrecy surrounding the work of cloning Dolly.  It is from 
this perspective then, not unreasonable that public review even influences the practice 
of publication.  If one understands political issues as being entangled in the very process 
of research, it is hard to find a clear-cut boundary between illegitimate scientific and 
legitimate social reasons for early publication. The political firestorm might even have 
enforced the democratic process of decisions about these issues since it increased the 
number of voices being engaged.   
I find it hard to think of ACT as an acceptable role model for how to conduct good 
science.  The political agenda of the publication seemed clear, as West indicated when 
he summarised the outcome of the publication. "This article has certainly made it clear 
                                                 
25 Jens Saugstad.  “Har befruktede egg sjel?” Aftenposten (16.03.02 my translation). 
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 to the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public in general that there may be therapeutic use for 
nuclear transfer [cloning] that's entirely distinct from cloning a human being.  One does 
not make a pregnancy" (Stix 2001).  It seems that ACT deliberately played a political 
game while disguising it with the rhetoric of the production of scientific facts.  But even 
though it is hard to think of ACT as a role model, it is at the same time not evident what 
a good role models is in this case.   
We have to keep in mind that ACT is not a traditional academic institution, but a 
private biotechnology firm. They are also dependent on getting funds, building alli-
ances, breaking alliances, having a good reputation and were in various ways trapped by 
the dynamics of economics.  There would be a battle for the legal control of the proce-
dures for producing stem cells, as one of the promising new areas in medical therapeu-
tics.  Geron had, for example, made claims to the rights for almost all commercial 
applications of human embryonic stem cells.  According to The New York Times, scien-
tists feared Geron would shut other actors out of the research.26  One cannot ignore the 
fact that patents have become important in the biosciences in evaluating what good 
science is, nor can one ignore the fact that the dynamics of research have actually 
become entangled in “muddied” issues.   
It is hard to describe a story of the kind told here as an isolated science story, or as 
being about the world of technological private firms, or politics.  It is hard to analyse 
the course of history in terms of three different power centres of the kind that we need 
to regulate.  I think the discussion of how the process should work would be more help-
ful if it recognised these power centres as intertwined, and the present work seeks to 
argue this case.  The recommendations of Jeanisch, which I believe articulated the 
spontaneous response of many scientists and politicians, would be counterproductive in 
this setting.  His approach represents a normative strategy that is staged as guarding the 
borders of scientific and political power centres in ways that conceal how they interact, 
thereby endorsing the effects of these mutual forms of interaction.  
Given the assumption that underlies my work, one of the main difficulties concerns 
the way the epistemological model is at play in western intellectual cultures.  Episte-
mologically modelled normative discourse counteracts such a shift in strategy.  This 
                                                 
26 “Geron Narrows Stem-Cell Focus.” The New York Times (14.01.02). 
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background order needs to be challenged before the perspective of seeing scientific and 
political activities as internally related can win general support.  At stake here, as I have 
indicated in the story, are not only the practices of professional studies of science.  The 
larger issue concerns the strategies being part of the different professional identities of 
actors engaged in the process of establishing therapeutic cloning as a practice.   
  
 
 
The epistemological model 
Epistemology [ ... is the] Hydra whose serpentine heads wreak havoc throughout the 
intellectual culture of modernity – in science, in ethics, in political thinking, almost 
anywhere you look (Taylor 1995:vi). 
 
 
I shall explain the notion of the “epistemological model” in four steps.  First, I will 
focus respectively on “epistemology” and “model”, then I will move to the ontological 
status of the epistemological model and finally, I will review the model’s knowledge 
claims.  Does the epistemological model give a true account on how it really is?  
1) Epistemology.  Taylor draws attention to the way epistemology and epistemolo-
gists have dominated western intellectual cultures, and an epistemological foundation-
alist posture has been at work.  Epistemological questions have been portrayed as 
fundamental in the sense that they have tacitly been treated as questions one “must” 
answer before turning to other matters.  Richard Rorty (1980) has provided a clear and 
influential analysis of how and why this came to be the predominant approach.  Because 
Rorty’s analysis is well known, it provides a useful point of departure for presenting 
Taylor’s epistemological model.   
There are three interconnected elements in Rorty’s analysis.  First, knowledge once 
came to be conceptualised as true representations of the world.  Second, this concept 
was articulated in an ontological construction in ways that portrayed man as the knower.  
Third, this ontological construction framed epistemology as a fundamental activity.  
This representational account of knowledge has had an immense impact on western 
intellectual cultures through the way epistemology came to be recognised as the queen 
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 of philosophy.  The three elements and their relationships are sketched out in the open-
ing passages in Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
 
Philosophy can be foundational to the rest of culture [...] because it understands the foun-
dations of knowledge, and finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the 
‘mental process’ or the ‘activity of representation’ which make knowledge possible.  To 
know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility 
and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct 
such representations.  Philosophy’s central concern is to be a general theory of represen-
tation, a theory which will divide culture up into the areas which represent reality well, 
those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their 
pretence of doing so) (Rorty 1980:3). 
 
Rorty unraveled the genealogy of this construct.  The modern ontological construction 
of the “mind”, in Rorty’s reading, appears as an extension of the old Greek conception 
of the “inner eye”.  In Platon’s scheme, one acquires knowledge of universals with 
one’s inner eye, as one acquires knowledge of particular objects by perceiving them 
with one’s physical eye.  The capacity of the inner eye was identified as reason, which 
distinguished humans from non-humans.  The Mind’s Eye, because of its capacity to 
grasp universals, was immaterial and eternal.  An important transformation appeared in 
the work of the Renaissance philosophers.  This was a turn towards inward states, 
articulated as a Cartesian “change from mind-as-reason to mind-as-inner-arena”.  
Through this shift, the “triumph of the quest of certainty over the quest for wisdom” 
was established (1980:61).  
A modern experience of ourselves and our place in the world emerged as a result of 
this transformation.  Rorty traced this experience in the questions that were considered 
crucial in the works of Anglo-American analytical philosophers.  What appeared as 
immediate in the modern experience was the idea of the mind; nothing appeared closer 
to the mind than the mind itself, and everything that bodies do not have, such as feel-
ings, reason and sensations were packed into the concept of the mind.  The mind then 
came to encapsulate what was conceptualised as personhood, or what was taken to be 
the essence of being human.  The world that the mind reflected on, however, was of a 
completely different character.  While the mind appeared as glassy or mirror-like, its 
counterpart, whatever was outside the mind, appeared to the mind to be strange, and 
possibly even as something inaccessible.  Under this ontological construction, a specific 
notion of knowledge-as-representations of the world followed.  Epistemology then 
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appeared to be a fundamental activity staged as a mind-world problem: How can you 
know that your ideas of the world are correct? 
Philosophy of science (which often identified itself with epistemology), could, in this 
construct, be thought of as foundational to the sciences because it articulates the foun-
dations of knowledge.  Epistemology could for the same reasons be understood as 
foundational with respect to knowledge claims made by religion, politics, art and 
morality.  Thus, in dealing with any of the different problems that brought us to 
philosophical reflections in the first place, we do not only have to pass through episte-
mology, but through an epistemology framed within a particular ontological under-
standing of man and it’s relation to the world.   
2) The model.  Taylor (1984) introduced his notion of the epistemological model in 
“Philosophy and Its History”. 
 
Let us take first of all a cluster of assumptions much attacked these days (and justly 
attacked), which I will call the epistemological model.  The underlying notions defining 
this are that our awareness of the world, whether in the organised, regimented form we 
call science, or in the looser forms of common everyday awareness, is to be understood in 
terms of our forming representations – be they ideas in the mind, states of the brain, sen-
tences we accept, or whatever – of ‘external’ reality.  A corollary of this view is that we 
can construe our awareness of and understanding of each other on the same representa-
tional model, so that we can, for instance, cast light on my understanding your idiolect as 
you speak by describing it in terms of a theory that I hold about you and the meanings of 
your words.  If we look for an outstanding example of an influential philosopher cleaving 
to this epistemological model, Quine naturally comes to mind (Taylor 1984:18). 
 
This passage from Taylor may in many ways be read in line with Rorty’s analysis. 
Taylor’s focus however, lies in how modern identities have been construed in western 
societies dominated by the epistemological tradition in question.  A range of different 
questions about our concerns, along with the ways we have come to pursue these ques-
tions have come to be, one could say, epistemologically modelled.   
The notion of the epistemological model is not a notion Taylor has used extensively 
or consistently.  The term only appears, to my knowledge, in “Philosophy and Its 
History”, and even in this article several notions such as “epistemological perspective”, 
“epistemological prison”, “epistemological paradigm” or “representational model” seem 
to carry the same meaning.  In “Overcoming Epistemology” (1995:Chapter one), which 
is the other central article where Taylor has discussed the issue, notions like the 
“epistemological tradition”, “epistemological construal”, “modern epistemological 
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 project” or the “epistemological enterprise” seems to carry the same meaning.  I prefer 
the notion of epistemological model because it invites us to consider the model from the 
point of view of the practices being modelled by the model.  It draws attention to ques-
tion of why one would find the model attractive, as seen from the point of view of a 
wide variety of different practices.  
Human practices have a point.  The analysis of the epistemological model is an 
articulation of a background order against which the point or worth of a range of differ-
ent practices has been formulated.  The analysis shows how intellectual cultures in 
western societies have come to be marked by the epistemological tradition being framed 
by the representational account of knowledge.  Moreover, this analysis shows how the 
epistemological oriented tradition has been sustained through the practices western 
societies has been organised by.  Taylor’s analysis is not primarily formulated as a 
philosophical critique of misplaced Cartesian-type of philosophical positions, but as a 
cultural analysis of the effect Cartesian epistemological perspectives has played in the 
formation of personal and professional identities in western cultures.  To better under-
stand this Taylorean reading , we need to turn to a discussion of the ontological status of 
the epistemological model.   
3) The ontological status of the epistemological model.  Some preliminary remarks 
regarding Taylor’s philosophical anthropology are an appropriate beginning.  A central 
theme in Taylor’s philosophy is the question of how to understand human agency and 
its relation to the world humans inhabit.  I shall return to a discussion of Taylor’s 
anthropology in Chapter 3.  At this point I want to show how Taylor’s understanding of 
man-as-an-agent implies that the epistemological tradition has become embedded into 
practices that we live by and put our trust in.  In short, I want to understand the episte-
mological tradition as part of what has constituted how we judge the worth of a given 
practice.  
In “What is Human Agency”, Taylor identified the characteristics of human agency 
in moral terms.  The human “capacity to evaluate desires is bound up with our power of 
self-evaluation, which in turn is an essential feature of the mode of agency we recognise 
as human” (1985a:16).  In characterising man as a self-evaluative animal, Taylor sought 
to capture the nature of what our humanity resides in.  According to Taylor, our human-
ity resides in our capacity to evaluate our desires.  One may differentiate between first 
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and second order desires.  While animals may have desires, and may even possibly be 
said to deliberately choose between desires, we have the power to evaluate our desires.  
To choose between a holiday in the north or the south of Thailand is to choose between 
desires (beauty of the wild landscape and exotic cultural expressions in the north or the 
comfort and relaxation of the beach-life in the south).  But the choice made, for exam-
ple, travelling to the south, may itself be susceptible to evaluation of the relative worth 
of the exhilaration of the north versus the relaxation of the south.  Our personal identity 
and understanding of who we want to be affects the choice.  To give an account of 
human agency, one needs to consider how humans reflect “about their desires in terms 
of the kind of being we are in having them or carrying them out” (1985a:26). 
To emphasise that the essential feature of human agency concerns the judgement of 
the qualitative worth of different desires, Taylor differentiates second order desires as 
“weak” and “strong” evaluations.  According to this view, humans make weak and 
strong evaluations, whereas animals only have first order desires.  The point is that the 
evaluation of the choice of spending one’s holidays in the north or in the south may be 
weak or strong, but never totally non-reflective.27  Such choices may furthermore be 
seen as more or less authentic as they may be based on choices for which a rationale 
may be more or less articulated and apparent to the human agent.  The better the motive 
powers are articulated, the better the agent can truly reside in the choices made and 
defend them for themselves.  Strong evaluations then are the type of evaluations we 
should seek in making moral decisions, as these evaluations are the ones most likely to 
stand against a challenge.  ”A test of whether an evaluation is strong”, Taylor stated 
(1987:523), “is whether it can be the basis for attitudes of admiration and contempt”.   
The important thing here, and where the discussion of the epistemological tradition 
enters the picture, concerns the argument that the choices humans make are always 
made against a background of historically established identities.  This background may, 
however, be more or less articulated and explicitly reflected in the choices made.  
Moreover, the background for the choices made is not something one can reconstruct in 
terms of contemporary reasons, nor articulate through the tracing of individual histories. 
                                                 
27 I rely on Grimen’s and Fossland’s (2001:78) reading of Taylor here.  It appears to be unclear whether 
Taylor actually states that weak evaluations are of second order.     
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 To argue the case, Taylor asked us to enter into the context where we experience the 
need to formulate the point and purpose of a given practice. 
 
The context in which this need arises is the fact that a basic way – I want to argue, the 
basic way – in which we acknowledge and mark the things that are important to us in the 
human context is through what we can call social practices.  By this I mean roughly: ways 
that we regularly behave to/before each other, which (a) embody some understanding 
between us, and which (b) allow of discrimination of right/wrong, 
appropriate/inappropriate.  Now, social practices can be largely inarticulate.  This is not 
to say that we carry them on without language.  There is almost no practice one can 
imagine which does not require some verbal exchange.  Rather I mean that the good, the 
value embodied in a practice, its point or purpose, may not be formulated.  The people 
engaged in the practice have to have some sense of the good or the purpose, and this 
emerges, for instance, in the ‘fouls’ they call on each other when they deviate (or the 
‘fairs’ they call when people do well).  But they may have no way of saying what this 
good consists in (Taylor 1984:22). 
 
Judgments of worth are embodied in a practice qua human practice.  We may, given the 
philosophical anthropology of Taylor, speak of the ethos of a practice without which the 
practice can be understood as a practice (even if this ethos is not well articulated by its 
practitioners - I shall further discuss this in Chapter 3).  When criticizing or praising 
how a practice is performed, one can address immanent norms of the practice being 
historically embedded into it, even though one may not be able to articulate it in a satis-
factory way.  When the practice is in the process of being improved, one often needs to 
understand the past better in order to better articulate what is at stake in current 
controversies.   
Taylor claims that the epistemological tradition needs to be seen as part of the back-
ground that has staged the discussions of the point or worth of various practices.  The 
tradition may be traced through discussions regarding the nature of what their respective 
crucial challenges are, and consequently what one should do in order to improve the 
field’s state of the art.  For instance, the image of the mind-in-world has affected 
internal discussions in quantum physics, the understanding of the identity and role of 
fields such as medicine, psychology and psychiatry, and framed discussions about the 
plausibility of computer modelling of intelligent performance.  This image has likewise 
framed problems in social and political science.  When the subject was perceived as a 
“mind-in-world” subject, the perceived challenges of these fields tended to be marked 
by an understanding of man as “disengaged”.  Man’s action in the world was under-
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stood as disengaged from the world.  Consequently, the challenges of explaining society 
appeared as a problem of explaining the play between individual actors with individual 
purposes (or adjacent problems as the ones of understanding the relation between the 
individual and the social, actor and structure).   
Epistemology, then, connects some of the most controversial themes in a range of 
different fields.  In this sense, one may say that epistemology is, as Taylor put it, a 
“hydra whose serpentine heads wreak havoc throughout the intellectual culture of mod-
ernity”.  One should thus think of the epistemological model, as Taylor put it, as an 
“organising principle for a wide range of practices in which we think and act and deal 
with the world” (1984:20).  This also means that it is difficult to challenge the model 
since this would simultaneously challenge different established discourses about what is 
important to pay attention to in different practice fields.  To challenge the model is to 
challenge a complex network of institutionalised practices where professional identities 
and commitments are articulated.  A critique of the epistemological tradition will, citing 
Taylor (1995:8), “sooner or later to run up against the force of this tradition, which 
stands with them in a complex relation of mutual support”.  
The claim that western societies is marked by the epistemological model should not 
be understood in “world-view” terms, as if the model articulated a particular way of 
understanding the world or articulated practice independent ideals.  It is not a model 
one could dissolve and replace with a clever argument, leaving everything else as it is.  
In talking of an epistemological model, Taylor makes visible a particular epistemologi-
cal tradition that is based on a representational account of knowledge.  This tradition 
may be traced in science, politics and ethics in general and can, as I shall soon describe, 
be traced in the practice of philosophy of science in particular.  
The epistemological model has partly shaped practices we have lived by, put our 
trust in and wanted to stay with.  The model has therefore become an integral part of the 
identity, the goodness and perceived integrity of a wide range of practices.  Because of 
this it has actually often sunk to the level of an unquestionable background assumption 
of the practitioners in ways that has made it hard for them to conceive alternative 
approaches.  This also goes for the practice of studying science that I shall focus on.  
Given that the dominating practices of the trade needs to be improved upon, such work 
of improvement will benefit, as my suggestion goes, from a critical rethinking of the 
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 way the practices have been epistemologically modelled.  Referring to dominating 
practices here, I do not only have in mind the approaches dominating within philosophy 
of science, but also the ones dominating within the STS tradition.   
In order to clarify this point further I shall turn to a discussion on the epistemic 
claims of the model.  The point to be made here is a crucial one, as this analysis has 
marked the way I have chosen to construct the lines of argument for this work. 
4) The epistemological model’s own epistemic claims.  Does the analysis of the 
epistemological model give a true account of how it really is?  The answer calls for a 
clarification of how philosophical activity is understood here.  Philosophy is also a 
practice, the analysis of the epistemological model is the result of such a practice, and 
the question one needs to ask is the question of what the point of such a practice is.  As I 
read and find Taylor’s view attractive, philosophy, in this context, is a matter of articu-
lating how truths are expressed and established as truths by people, given the estab-
lished practices by which they live and in which they put their trust.  Philosophical 
activity is in this setting understood as being an integrated part of the practice it articu-
lates.   
 
Philosophy is an activity which essentially involves, among other things, the redescrip-
tion of what we are doing, thinking, believing, assuming, in such a way that we bring our 
reasons to light more perspicuously, or else make the alternatives more apparent, or in 
some way or other are better enabled to take a justified stand to our action, thoughts, 
belief, assumption.  Philosophy involves a great deal of articulation of what is initially 
inarticulated (Taylor 1984:18). 
 
The analysis of the epistemological model is a creative redescription of how we tend to 
reason, stage and justify a number of practices we live by.  The analysis addresses what 
Taylor (1995:Chapter 4, 1984:21) describes as prevalent or common sense lines of 
reasoning we tend to spontaneously adhere to.  It is illustrative that the Cartesian line of 
thought is immediately understandable for students, while it takes years to understand 
the alternatives (such as the alternatives offered by Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty or 
Heidegger).  “Powerful philosophical arguments”, as Taylor (1995:68) put it, “have to 
be marshaled to convince people to think differently about these matters, to shake them 
out of what seems obvious”.   
Taylor searched for the historical contingent origins of the epistemological tradition 
in order to retrieve what truths it once articulated.  In his view, the construct arose in the 
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Renaissance as a response to the rise of modern mechanistic science.  The exclusivity of 
the epistemological model, in Taylor’s words, exposes a “forgetting” of why the model 
once appeared as “an important polemic instrument in the establishing of new forms of 
scientific thought, and technological, political, ethical practices” (1984:30).  The for-
getting implies that the epistemic model has not appeared as a model with a contingent 
character, but as the only conceivable option constituting a necessary foundation for a 
range of different practices.  The forgetting of this historical context then, has led to a 
tendency of “overdetermination” of the validity of the model (1995:4-6).  The lines of 
reasoning we tend to spontaneously adhere to are flawed, and we need to reason better. 
The argument is historical.  “The original theory cannot be understood by practitio-
ners today in the same way as by their predecessors; the attempt to do so results in 
confusion and muddle.  It badly needs reformulation. […] The society is out of true with 
the original” (1984:25).  Taylor’s intuition, as he calls it, is that modern society is 
different from those of preceding ages (with respect to ethical, political, economic and 
scientific institutions and practices) in ways that make a crucial difference for the valid-
ity of the model (1995:x).  Such intuitions do not carry much argumentative force unless 
one shares the intuition, and wants to participate in the project that is set by Taylor’s 
notion of the epistemological model.  The statements Taylor makes however, may 
provide a key to an understanding of the epistemic pretensions of his notion of the 
epistemological model.  The historic argument of Taylor is conducted differently, as a 
work of “undoing the forgetting”.  “The whole strength of the epistemological model 
lies in the supposed unintelligibility of a rival account”, as Taylor said (1984:29), “[I]t 
is this presumption which a less distorted account of history explodes”.  
Given the nature of the forgetting of the model, the first step (in convincing oneself 
and others) was to display the model as a model.  “We very often”, Taylor (1984:24) 
stressed, “cannot raise a new issue really effectively until we have re-articulated our 
actual practices”.  Taylor argued that this called for a historic or genetic account, where 
the model, once itself a creative redescription, itself would be redescribed.  What we 
needed, Taylor argued, was “some perspicuous redescriptions which will show the 
epistemological model as one possible construal among others, rather than as the only 
conceivable picture of mind-in-world” (1984:18).  We needed to retrieve the past in 
order to understand ourselves, as the model appeared as a background for a wide range 
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 of practices in which the background tended to be “constantly projected for the mem-
bers as the way things obviously are” (1984:21).   
Rorty’s work has been important because it managed to disclose the model as a 
model, possibly more forcefully than any other work, by unravelling the genealogy of 
how and why epistemology became the queen of philosophy.  The effect of this tracing 
was that it showed the contingency of the epistemic-centred philosophy, as Rorty’s 
work displayed taken for granted assumptions as optional.  As such, we may understand 
Rorty’s argument, as he also described it, as a “therapeutic” type of argument 
(1980:xiii).  It may be illuminating as well to place the argument in the tradition of phi-
losophical pragmatism as Bjørn Ramberg has argued.   The philosophical pragmatist 
understanding of philosophical activity is well described by Ramberg:   
 
By redescribing the role of the target terms, tracing their genealogies, drawing perhaps 
surprising connections to modes of thinking we may already find problematic, the prag-
matist philosopher tries to make visible and discredit the vehicles of what has passed for 
literal trivialities.  When successful, this work makes it difficult for us with respect to the 
terms at issue, to carry on doing the sort of things that is sometimes characterized as 
manifesting mastery of a concept (Ramberg 1999:65).  
  
The target term in question is knowledge.  By redescribing the role the concept plays in 
different practices, we may pave the way for better ways of expressing ourselves as we 
are engaged in these practices.   
I read Taylor’s analysis in the tradition of philosophical pragmatism as well.  His 
analysis, given such a reading, should be seen in light of the real life problems that 
induced Taylor’s philosophical inquiries in the first place, or as Ramberg more gener-
ally put it: “At the heart of the work of a pragmatist philosopher, there will be a norma-
tive diagnosis.”  The work of re-description starts with the diagnosis of there being a 
mismatch between important human interests and some of the tools with which we 
pursue them.  “[B]y transforming our discursive selves in a certain way, the pragmatist 
philosophers ventures, we will be able to come closer than we are now to something 
worth becoming” (Ramberg 1999:65-66). 
It seems however, that Taylor’s and Rorty’s attempts at redescription (as captured in 
historic works of tracing the genealogy of our epistemologically oriented culture) first 
of all were concerned with the first step: of displaying the model as a model.  Having 
the analysis of the epistemological model at hand, we may now be in a better position to 
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take the next step and search for an alternative.  Given Taylor’s analysis, we may return 
to the different practices that induced the work of articulating the epistemological model 
in the first place.  In my case, I will return to the practice of studying science, which is 
what brought me to Rorty’s and Taylor’s analyses of our culture as being epistemologi-
cally oriented.  I have set out, in Part I of this work, to enter into a particular branch of 
science and technology studies and redescribe its appearance as ordered and intelligible, 
as well as desirable, in light of the analysis of the epistemological model.  The aim of 
this work is to articulate an alternative way of performing normative studies of science 
and technology.  My claim is that the analysis of the epistemological model provides a 
way of redescribing a branch of science and technology studies in ways that lead 
forward in interesting ways.    
It is in this kind of practical context that we should look for the real arguments for 
the validity of the analysis of the epistemological model as well.  The epistemological 
model does not pretend to give a true account of how the world really is in terms of a 
representation of it.  Instead, attention is turned towards the problem field that analysis 
of the model is supposed to highlight, which in my case is the way normative discourses 
of science and technology are performed.  The worth of the analysis of the epistemo-
logical model depends in general on its power to lead to an alternative new and desir-
able stance towards our practices.  
Understanding philosophy as an inherently historical practice, then, has certain con-
sequences regarding methodology, validity and argumentation in philosophy.  The 
epistemological model, being understood as an articulation of a particular historical 
response, may be judged as inadequate or misplaced, but hardly as simply wrong, as 
something one could simply repudiate all together.  “In some circles”, as Taylor 
(1995:2) wrote, “it is becoming a new orthodoxy that the whole enterprise from 
Descartes, through Locke and Kant, and pursued by various nineteenth- and twentieth-
century succession movements, was a mistake” (1995:2).  This attitude is sometimes 
expressed among science and technology scholars who are hostile to philosophy alto-
gether.  If the model is inadequate, we need to be engaged in the philosophical work of 
articulating an alternative, and not disregard philosophy as such.  The question is how 
this should be done, given that the analysis of the epistemological model is accepted.   
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 I shall in the following focus on the field of the (normative) philosophy of science 
that has structured the dominating approaches to "ought" or "should" questions regard-
ing science and technology.  Crucial features of standard approaches have been articu-
lated by scholars like Paul Feyerabend and Ian Hacking.  Through their analyses, we 
may depict the approaches of philosophy of science as modelled by the epistemological 
model.  The point of the following, I would like to stress, is not to critically debunk the 
field as such.  The point is rather to prepare the argument in the next chapter by rede-
scribing the performance of philosophy of science as epistemologically modelled.   
 
 
 
Epistemologically modelled philosophy of science 
 “The events, producers and results that constitute the sciences have no common 
structure, there are no elements that occur in every scientific investigation but are missing 
elsewhere” (Feyerabend 1993:1).   
 
 
By defending the thesis cited above, Feyerabend pinpointed and challenged a question 
that has long been considered a crucial one for philosophers of science: What are the 
essential features of science?  In as much as this question has been critical for philoso-
phers of science, as the harsh reception of Feyerabend’s work shows, his analysis 
displays important aspects of how the practice of philosophy of science had been mod-
elled as a desirable practice.   
The philosophy of science, I suggest, should be understood as a field that has sought 
to articulate and secure the conditions of the social contract.  Its practitioners have 
attempted to reflect and articulate how truths have been expressed in the scientific and 
political practices that have been established and adjusted to each other.  With knowl-
edge at hand, as the terms of the contract went, political authorities would be well 
equipped to find good and useful solutions to urgent matters.  But since many commu-
nities presented themselves as scientific, one would need criteria for credentialing indi-
viduals in these communities.  If what was being done was not real science, however, 
one would not want to delegate the work of preparing political debate to these 
communities.  
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The main purpose of the philosophy of science could then be seen as certifying when 
scientific activity was actually engaged in seeking the truth.  The way that this task 
tended to be articulated as a search for the essential features of science, however, 
revealed a practice that found its identity under the framework of the epistemological 
model.   
 
 
Fig. 1.1  An intertwined double representational structure was built into the practice of philosophy of 
science that Feyerabend challenged.  
 
 
In the epistemological tradition in question, science would be seen as a mapping or 
mirroring of the world in a more or less truthful fashion.  The crucial point was that the 
conceptualisation of knowledge was something that could be treated as an isolated 
object, which in turn could be analysed in isolation from the world it reflected.  The 
number one question that appeared in this construal, then, was the question of the nature 
of the linkage between knowledge and the world.  I shall refer to this as the “linkage 
problem”.  And the search for the special element of science, which Feyerabend force-
fully questioned existed, was the element that would make it possible for science to 
bridge the gap.   
Given the epistemological tradition, the question of the legitimacy of the authority of 
science could be translated into the problem of accounting for the nature of the linkage.  
The question at hand is important: If one were to grant science some extraordinary 
position in relation to other organised knowledge producing activities, which most 
people found reasonable, how could one justify it?  When this question was epistemo-
logically modelled, it was framed in an intertwined double representational structure.  In 
Essence of science 
Representing the world   Representing science
Linkage problem 
Theory in 
science 
Foundation 
Theory of 
science 
Object of 
theory 
   Science 
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 questioning what genuine science is, a theoretical representation of science was sought.  
This representation of science would in turn capture what made science special, that is, 
it would explain how science could produce reliable representations of the world (as the 
question was framed in the linkage problem). 
Three levels of validity discourses appeared in this construal.  First, there were ques-
tions concerning the quality of the work of scientists on a daily basis.  These were first 
of all considered to be practical methodological issues that could be addressed by scien-
tists’ expertise.  Second, there were the questions of what good or genuine science 
ideally would be.  These questions called for a philosophical clarification of what make 
good science possible.  The real key to success could be hidden from the scientists 
themselves.  Philosophical reflections, however, could articulate these conditions and 
thereby also provide ideals for scientists to reach for.  Such philosophical reflections 
could possibly be even more important for politics as their goals was the separation of 
real expertise from pseudo expertise.  Third is the need to question the validity of the 
philosophy of philosophy of science; how is the distinction between the first two levels 
of validity discourses established?  This distinction is crucial because it constitutes the 
working style of philosophers of science in terms of what questions are raised and how 
the practitioners in the field go about their work in order to clarify what good science is.  
One needs, in other words, to find ways of validating the methodology used by philoso-
phers of science.  
In as much as the practice of philosophy of science has been shaped against a back-
ground of a double representational scheme, the practice may be seen as having been 
epistemologically modelled.  This background became visible in Feyerabend’s criti-
cism, and it became even more visible in Ian Hacking’s critique of the questions and 
focal points that have dominated the discipline.   
 
 
The linkage problem and its associated challenges  
Probably more than anywhere else, the epistemologically oriented approach towards the 
philosophy of science is revealed in the type of concepts and questions that occupy the 
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proponents of the field.  The dominant focus of attention has been “theory oriented”, as 
has been extensively reviewed in Hacking’s Representing and Intervening.   
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Fig. 1.2.  The central linkage problem has constituted crucial questions in philosophy of science, and 
framed three different models for understanding scientific change.   
 
 
Hacking argued that the interest of the enterprise of philosophy of science has typically 
been connected to notions like “discoveries”, “facts”, “theoretical entities”, “scientific 
objects”, “theory choice” or “observations”.  These concepts have been central to phi-
losophers of science because the field has tended to conflate knowledge with the written 
products of science, that is, scientific theories.  By putting theory on one side and 
nature, or facts about nature on the other side, the central linkage problem concerning 
the nature of the relation between the two was constituted.  Could facts, reports or 
observations allow for a theory that represented, reflected or reconstructed nature?  The 
linkage problems were typically articulated in terms of problems of language, since 
theories and theoretical entities are expressed in language, symbols or signs.  An 
ahistoric picture of science followed, which Hacking made evident by drawing attention 
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 to the philosophers neglect of the experimental work of science.  The work of 
experimentation has not captured the interest of philosophers, instead they have had a 
theoretical interest primarily in “observations” (for example, as in the focus on the dis-
cussion of whether or not facts are “theory-loaded” or not).  The quest for the logic of 
observation appeared as a search for a crucial element to be found in the nature of 
experimentation (like a certain method, procedure or rational principle), which in turn 
ought to account for how the linkage could be established.  Since the linkage problem in 
this way structured the question field, these concepts and practices of science were typi-
cally investigated in an abstract mode as non-temporal phenomena.  The philosophical 
linkage problem did not make processes relevant in the field.   
We may now also understand how the three different models of scientific change (as 
discussed in the introduction) fit this picture.  Epistemologically satisfactory accounts of 
how science acquires knowledge about nature would strongly support the claim that 
history should be driven by the scientific advancement of knowledge.  On the other 
hand, satisfactory accounts of how history could be seen as driven by technology or 
shaped by social institutions would support critical responses to the idea that science 
should be given a privileged autonomous role.  The three models of change, however, 
all bear the marks of being framed in the epistemological tradition, as they provide 
different responses to the linkage problem.  
 
Two categories of normative questions  
A theory-oriented philosophy of science also underscored a strict separation of two 
types of normative discussions:  The “internal” discussion of the epistemic quality of 
research, and the “external” discussion regarding what practical or political conse-
quences such theoretical insights should have.  Given a representational account of 
knowledge, an isolated discussion on is and ought followed.  The internal/external 
distinction has also been reflected in professional boundaries between students of 
science (reflecting primarily on either epistemological or ethical-political issues) as well 
as professional boundaries between scientific and political communities.  In both cases 
the discussion of scientific internal affairs was to be given primacy over the discussion 
of scientific external affairs.  The scientific communities, possibly aided by epistemolo-
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gists, were supposed to pass judgement on truths about the state of affairs.  The politi-
cians, possibly aided by professional ethicists, were supposed to clarify what alternative 
actions allowed by science would be the best.  Science’s job was to produce possibili-
ties, politic’s job was to judge actualities.   
The epistemological tradition then, as I suggest, may be traced via interconnected 
methodological traits of how science and technology have been studied, discussed and 
evaluated.  The practitioners of the field have primarily pursued epistemological ques-
tions, been theory-oriented, substantiated an ahistoric conception of science and sepa-
rated the discussions of scientific and political activities, facts and values.  These set of 
connections, as I shall further discuss in the following chapter, were simultaneously 
challenged when students of science began to investigate science by empirical means.  
Empirical studies created a crisis that revealed what could be said to be a “philosophi-
cally oriented” tradition of studying science and technology.  Given the epistemological 
tradition, empirical studies of science and technology had been downplayed as such 
activities were generally not understood as philosophically relevant.  This would change 
in the 1960s.  
  
 
The empirical challenge and the crisis of rationality 
Philosophers long made a mummy of science.  When they finally unwrapped the cadaver 
and saw the remnants of an historical process of becoming and discovering, they created 
for themselves a crisis of rationality.  That happened around 1960.  It was a crisis because 
it upset our old tradition of thinking that scientific knowledge is the crowning achieve-
ment of human reason (Hacking 1983:1). 
 
An intellectual crisis arose in the 1960s, as Hacking stated in the quotation above, when 
science, the exemplar model of rationality, was conceptualized in historic terms.  This 
“crisis of rationality” emerged as scholars like Thomas Kuhn forcefully argued the 
historic and social character of scientific knowledge.  The crisis set an agenda for 
philosophers of science which has remained until today, at least according to Helen 
Longino’s (2002)  analysis.  A particularly compelling dichotomy, the “rational and 
social” dichotomy, has structured the work of philosophers of science during the last 
decades, Longino has argued.  The two appear mutually exclusive.  If an epistemic 
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 activity is cognitively rational, then it cannot be social and vice versa.  And since it has 
proven difficult to articulate science in pure rational terms, the rational-social dichot-
omy has appeared as an unresolved tension in the enterprise through several decades.  
The field was left, so to speak, in a continuous state of crisis.  
Philosophers of science still find their main identity, Longino argues, in the pursuit 
of “saving” or “restoring” rationality, given that the somewhat social character of scien-
tific knowledge could not be wiped away.  She argues the case by considering people 
like Philip Kitcher, Alvin Goldman, Susan Haack and Larry Laudan as leading contem-
porary philosophers of science.  As Longino stated (2002:43), they “all seem to assume 
that Western science represents the pinnacle of human intellectual achievement and that 
treating it as anything other than the expression of a rationality guided by sound epis-
temic norms is to open the gates to the barbarians”.  
The crisis of rationality seems to have been communicated as a rational-social 
tension in the teaching practice of philosophy of science as well.  Introductory text-
books have tended to be structured around the works of Popper and Kuhn (see Chalmers 
(1999, first ed. 1978), Brown (1977) and Couvalis (1997) as examples of some of the 
works used in Norway during the last decades).  Popper and Kuhn appear to have func-
tioned over the years as paradigmatic cases for what is considered to be “rational” and 
“social”.  Popper described the rationality or logical principles of true science, whereas 
Kuhn displayed science as historical, socially and locally conditioned.  Both perspec-
tives have been presented as important, but at the same time they were presented as 
mutually exclusive.  The textbooks then seem to bear witness to the rational-social 
tension as the number one problem among philosophers of science.   
Instead of trying to restore rationality by finding ways of bracketing off the social, 
Longino argues, we should instead seek to conceptualise science as rational and social.  
I believe the co-production perspective I will defend in this work complies with 
Longino’s call for such a social-and-rational perspective.  In order to understand how 
such a perspective may be articulated however, I believe we need to be more sensitive 
to the methodological challenges of such an undertaking.  Hidden behind the tension 
between the social and the rational, we find the tension between what may be identified 
as an empirical and philosophical style of work. 
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Philosophical-empirical rather than social-rational   
The crisis of rationality could also be expressed as a methodological crisis.  The crisis 
revealed a tension between what were taken as philosophical and empirical working 
styles.  This tension has become more and more pertinent in science studies, although 
the tension is not explicitly discussed often enough.  This philosophical empirical ten-
sion has probably been masked by a distinction between a “normative” and “descrip-
tive” philosophy of science that has appeared in teaching practices in the philosophy of 
science.  With this distinction at hand, there was no tension between the empirical and 
the philosophical style of working, only different job descriptions.  The prefix norma-
tive could serve the function of isolating what philosophers regarded as the specific 
philosophical questions of interest (which in turn tended to be conflated with the prob-
lems of epistemology).  In contrast, the notion of a descriptive philosophy of science 
described a field that pursued non-philosophical questions with historical, anthropologi-
cal or sociological research agendas.  Descriptive studies could be important for 
philosophy by commenting, criticising or generating hypothesis for it.  When the 
normative/descriptive distinction was established in this way, it substantiated a clear cut 
conceptual and institutional distinction between philosophical and empirical investiga-
tions of science.  
The mixed reactions as well as ambivalent reception of the work of Kuhn could be 
seen as expressions of the philosophical-empirical tension.  Hacking (1983:243) com-
pares Kuhn with the little child in the fairytale who revealed the embarrassing fact that 
the emperor wore no clothes.  The philosophers’ stories of science, for all of their phi-
losophical refinery, did not deal adequately with the science it pretended to enlighten.  
The empirical approach then, disturbed a taken-for-granted judgement of worth of the 
way philosophy of science was done.  
So, on the one hand there was excitement about the comprehensible and recognisable 
picture of science Kuhn and others described by appealing to the history of science.  On 
the other hand, however, there was anger about the relativistic consequences that 
seemed interlocked with the perspective.  Kuhn’s work created an immediate urge on 
the part of philosophers to somehow save rationality or objectivity of science.  Such a 
call for saving rationality contained an appeal to a return to philosophy.  Popper’s work 
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 could in turn demonstrate what kind of questions one then would need to be involved in, 
and the style of work that would accompany such an undertaking.   
The Popper-Kuhn axis then, did not only communicate a philosophical or theoretical 
social-rational tension to newcomers, it also communicated a parallel methodological 
philosophical-empirical tension.  It is this latter tension that I shall focus on.     
 
Empirical studies have a life of their own 
Hacking’s well known slogan “experiments have a life of their own” can be equally 
applied to empirical studies of science, I will suggest.  Science studies have a life of 
their own.  They are not there for philosophy, any less than experiments are there for 
theory.  Case studies present themselves as relatively independent of philosophy in the 
sense that they are not there primarily for philosophy, as a test, an exemplification or 
comment of philosophical standpoints.  Although this is often recognised, few scholars 
pay attention to the characteristic features of empirical approaches through which force-
ful empirical arguments are formulated.  I think it is equally important to understand the 
integrity of the life of science studies (by understanding its relative independence from 
philosophy), as it has been to understand the life of experimentation (as being relatively 
independent of theory).   
The philosophical-empirical tension is primarily a methodological tension.  The 
effect of empirical studies was that methodological questions were stated up front; how 
should philosophy of science be done?  A methodological focus, as I shall pursue, 
stages the accompanying theoretical or philosophical discussions differently.  I shall 
take a discussion of naturalism as my point of departure for the discussion of how we 
may understand the nature of the empirical working style.  I think it is safe to say that 
naturalist approaches have appeared as the most attractive methodological response to 
the crisis of rationality.   
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Philosophy by empirical means 
[W]hat has been going on in science studies in the last fifteen years can be best under-
stood and made most sense of by relating it to the naturalistic turn in the philosophy of 
science (Callebaut 1993:1). 
 
Naturalism became a powerful movement during the 1980s and continued into the 
1990s.  Werner Callebaut reviewed this movement in a series of interviews.  Natural-
ism’s dominating motive power, as Callebaut summarised, was to “save ‘rationality’ 
and ‘objectivity’ by redefining them appropriately […] and make sure that the high 
standards of clarity and rigour” from the positivistic tradition of philosophy of science is 
kept up” (Callebaut xv).  The crisis of rationality, I would say, was here quite clearly 
expressed as a methodological crisis.  Taking the Naturalistic Turn, the title of 
Callebaut’s book, was a matter of drawing attention to methodological issues as the rest 
of the title strongly indicated: or How Real Philosophy of Science Is Done.   
Naturalism arose from a discomfort with epistemological foundationalism, that is, 
approaches that assumed that epistemology understands the foundations of the sciences.  
Naturalism represented an alternative methodological approach that did not, so to speak, 
rely on the grounding arguments behind the arguments.  Saving rationality and objec-
tivity consisted in not denying that rationality and objectivity existed and were identifi-
able, but in denying the capital letters.  There might not be Rationality or Objectivity, 
but there certainly was rationality and objectivity, which were to be found where 
arguments were produced most properly, systematically, convincingly and rigorously, 
namely within the sciences themselves.  In Callebaut’s (xv) words, naturalism appeared 
as a movement that claimed “that whatever exists and happens in the world is suscepti-
ble to explanations by natural scientific methods; it denies that there is or could be 
anything which lies in principle beyond the scope of scientific explanation.”  The rescue 
operations, then (aiming at saving rationality), seemed to have strong affiliations with a 
materialist ontological posture.  As the naturalists committed themselves to “the best 
arguments” (with a small a), they most often committed themselves at the same time to 
the ontology of the natural sciences.  These sciences simply provided the best 
arguments for what entities one should take into account when explaining phenomena in 
the world.  
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 When scholars who sought to save rationality turned to the sciences, then, they 
tended to turn to fields like physics, biology and experimental (cognitive) psychology 
rather than history, sociology or anthropology (cf. the list of scholars Callebaut inter-
viewed).  But some scholars turned to these fields as well, although often motivated by 
the need for questioning the authority of science rather than by an urge to save its 
rationality.  David Bloor’s line of argument, as he introduced his influential “strong 
programme”, reveals a naturalist temper.  No one has undertaken the task, Bloor 
claimed, to “bring science within the scope of a thorough-going sociological scrutiny” 
because of a “lack of nerve and will” to side-step “a priori and philosophical argumen-
tation” (1976:4). 
 
The sociologist is concerned with knowledge, including scientific knowledge, purely as a 
natural phenomenon.  The appropriate definition of knowledge will therefore be rather 
different from that of either the layman or the philosopher.  Instead of defining it as true 
belief – or perhaps, justified true belief – knowledge for the sociologist is whatever 
people take to be knowledge.  It consists of those beliefs which people confidently hold to 
and live by.  In particular the sociologist will be concerned with beliefs which are taken 
for granted or institutionalised, or invested with authority by groups of people (Bloor 
1976:5). 
 
One could, then, say there were two naturalist responses to the crisis of rationality, one 
that turned to the natural sciences and one that turned to the social sciences.  I shall 
discuss the latter strand in this work.  It is not my intention to try to attach the label of 
naturalism to the sociology of science tradition that Bloor represents, as I do not think 
the label sticks very well.  Rather, I will understand the philosophical positions scholars 
adopted within this tradition as their “springboard for sociological research”, as Lynch 
(1993:159) put it.  Naturalism, I shall claim, represented a springboard for developing a 
non-epistemologically modelled alternative way of doing philosophy of science.  The 
naturalist strand that turned to the social sciences was able to do so because they criti-
cally reflected on their own methodological assumptions as they developed new 
approaches.  
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Standards of critique 
Naturalist postures have often been born out of a disappointment with (or a celebration 
of) the failure of the grand project of epistemology.  Given such a point of departure, 
naturalism often seems to drift into a general call for “abandoning foundationalism”, 
which in turn governs a widespread notion of what philosophy as such is up to.  Episte-
mology, foundationalism and philosophy tend in such discussions to be taken as inter-
changeable notions.  And when philosophy is identified as epistemological foundation-
alism, naturalism seems to be the only option of choice that remains (cf. for instance the 
"chicken" debate in Pickring (1992)). 
Replacing epistemology with a straightforward naturalist small e epistemological 
posture appears as a hasty if not an irresponsible strategy, at least if the posture is non-
reflexive in the sense that its practitioners avoid questioning the very rationale of the 
predominant role epistemology has played in their own approach.  Epistemology comes 
first, even in the naturalism movement (whether one has turned to the natural or social 
sciences).  Naturalism is situated in the tradition whose discussion centres on knowl-
edge or rationality (although without capital letters).  It hinges on the tradition of under-
standing scientific reasoning as the crowing achievement of human reason since the 
outcome of this discussion is considered to be of crucial importance.   
Reflexivity is an important methodological requirement of naturalist postures 
because it concerns the question of how one may criticize naturalist approaches using 
the movement’s own standards (as will be further discussed in the next chapter).  It 
appears to be the case however, that reflexive issues have been taken far more seriously 
among naturalists who turned to the social sciences than among naturalists who turned 
to the natural sciences.  Two aspects may explain why.   
First, reflexive issues immediately became a pressing issue for naturalists who turned 
to the social sciences.  Attention was soon turned towards methodological aspects of the 
movement’s own work in the form of questions such as:  Should not the movement’s 
own account of how scientific knowledge is socially constructed itself be treated as a 
social construction?  Such questions were considered important because naturalists who 
turned to the social sciences delivered arguments that were seen as undermining the 
possibility of maintaining a distinction between true and false.  “As they see it”, as 
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 Larry Laudan (1996:23) for instance stated, “science is simply the sacred superstition of 
recent Western cultures”. Naturalists who turned to the natural sciences, on the other 
hand, were not challenged in a similar manner.  There was, one could say, no equivalent 
"normative tension" in their approach.  A normative tension, as I shall use the term, 
appears as a normative uneasiness in a particular approach that cannot address issues 
that are commonly regarded as being critically important.  Naturalists who turned to the 
natural sciences could easily avoid taking reflexive issues seriously by simply resting on 
or hiding behind some honourable goal of saving rationality.   
Second, naturalists who turned to the natural sciences did not find ways to perform 
naturalism, as was the case with naturalists who turned to the social sciences.  While the 
former mainly worked out a naturalised philosophy, the latter worked out methodologi-
cal programs for doing sociological investigations.  Naturalists who turned to the social 
sciences could therefore adjust their approach through an ongoing methodological 
discussion of how to improve their work.  Naturalists who turned to the natural 
sciences, on the other hand, tended to surrender to the natural sciences, to a scientific 
activity that took place somewhere else, and was conducted by other people and by 
other means.  
In the following I shall clarify the reflexive posture I find important here, as well as 
how this posture makes it possible to speak of an empirical rather than a philosophical 
style of work.  The reflexive strategy I refer to here could be called a “normative 
reflexive strategy”, to borrow a term from Hans Radder (1992).  However, this is a 
posture I find better articulated by Steven Woolgar.   
 
 
Normative reflexivity and iterative reconceptualizations 
Woolgar has presented an interesting account of the self-critical potentials of empirical 
science studies. 
 
[T]he particular research practices, schools, perspectives, and so on through which we 
reckon to find out about research are themselves temporary social phenomena.  This 
means of course that no current perspective is immortal and that current orthodoxy can 
furnish the grounds for its own criticism in successor perspectives.  In social studies of 
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science, for example, criticism of preceding perspectives is commonly used as the basis 
for moving to a new stance.  The social study of science thus contains within itself the 
capacity for redefining the major issues and methodological questions in virtue of atten-
tion to the nature of its practice.  There is, in other words, a critical dynamic – we can call 
this the ‘dynamic of iterative reconceptualization” – (Woolgar 1991) whereby practitio-
ners from time to time recognize the defects of their position as an occasion for revisiting 
its basic assumptions (Woolgar 1992:333).   
 
There is in this view nothing wrong in having a stance, a theory or a truth-seeking 
philosophy.  But one needs to recognize the temporal and fallible character of such a 
stance.  This is where reflexivity becomes important; one should invent approaches that 
are open to criticism and that make it possible to scrutinise or revise one’s own assump-
tions by one’s own standards.   
 
[T]he whole point of reflexivity is that it urges reassessment of the value of the task.  It 
asks that we reconsider whether digging the ground is the only task to which we should 
be devoting our attention; that we explore possible reorientations of our theoretical and 
methodological commitments (Woolgar 1992:337).   
 
The value of the task concerns the point of investigating science in the first place; what 
makes us invest all this time and effort in the field?  These commitments are certainly 
not to be confined to the work of “digging the ground” for epistemology, they are rather 
of moral charter.  The notion of iterative reconceptualisations then, suggests ideals for a 
normative reflexive practice.  It suggests a dynamics in which improvements may take 
place in light of the value or the point of the activity of doing science studies.   
In mathematics, where one usually talks about iteration, iterative methods are used 
when the problems do not allow for clear-cut analytical treatment.  One approaches the 
problem by repeating the calculation, and in every new calculation the previous out-
come constraints the new calculation.  Iterative procedures allow for calculations that 
narrow the range of uncertainty estimates.  "Iterative reconceptualisations" then, invite 
us to regard every new standpoint as relying on the previous, and every new conceptu-
alisation of it has to take into account lessons learned from the previous steps.  Preced-
ing standpoints are not primarily understood as errors one has to debunk or refute by 
seeking conclusive arguments but as unavoidable starting points for one’s own work of 
reconceptualisation.   
I suggest we understand the notion of iterative reconceptualisation as another way of 
articulating what Taylor calls creative redescriptions, and that it provides a different 
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 way of, in Taylor’s words, undoing the forgetting of the contingency of the epistemo-
logical model.  The dynamics of iterative reconceptualisations points to a different 
practice than creative redescriptions does.  Taylor recommended a re-reading of histori-
cal texts of the history of philosophy in order to undo the forgetting.  Woolgar’s call for 
reflexivity, in my reading, provided a way to become aware of the (forgotten) philoso-
phical commitments of a particular contemporary practice – the one of doing science 
studies.  These commitments are expressed, or played out in guiding rules or norms for 
the practice of studying science.  The dynamics of iterative reconceptualisations then, 
becomes a term that articulates how the norms or rules of the epistemologically 
modelled practice of studying science can be adjusted through reflexive judgements of 
the point or value of the practice.   
The most interesting aspect of the dynamics of iterative reconceptualisations is that 
two things were simultaneously done in the process.  On the one hand, iterative recon-
ceptualisation represented an activity that could undo the forgetting of how the practice 
of studying science has been modelled.  On the other hand, an alternative way of 
performing science studies was simultaneously established.  In my reading, a new field 
appeared that represented an alternative way of performing the work of redescriptions.  
It may be recognised as a way of doing philosophy using empirical means.   
A crucial challenge of this practice, which I would like to draw attention to, is 
captured in the tension between existing ways of conceptualising philosophical and 
empirical styles of work in science studies.  According to Latour, the problem at hand is 
a problem the field in general has had difficulties in coming to terms with.   
 
The link between field studies and the big questions must be entirely remade because of 
the notion of locality, [and ...] precisely, because of the notion of history.  We have no 
idea, yet, what the link between philosophy and empirical studies is, precisely because we 
have lived for so long with this idea that empirical studies are just there like small locali-
ties that the theories and the models have to recognise (Latour in conversations with 
Callebaut 1993:113). 
 
However, Woolgar’s notion of iterative reconceptualizations does offer an interesting 
frame for discussing the link between philosophy and empirical studies.  To get a better 
understanding of how this may be the case, I have found Hacking’s renewed reflection 
on his notion of “styles of reasoning” useful.   
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Historical epistemology and styles of reasoning 
Hacking first presented the notion of styles of reasoning in his classic article "Language, 
Truth, and Reason" from 1982.  This article first appeared in a collection of papers 
about rationality and relativism edited by Martin Hollins and Steven Lukes and was 
reprinted in Historical Ontology (2002), along with a development of the ideas in a 
chapter called "'Style' for Historians and Philosophers".  What is particularly interesting 
is the way Hacking now put the style of philosophical reasoning itself under discussion, 
as he regarded philosophy itself as historical.  To discuss rationality, given a historical 
posture, is a matter of paying closer attention to the self-critical dynamics of philoso-
phy. 
The notion of styles of reasoning draws attention to the question of how reason 
works correctly in different domains (as in different sciences).  Every style of reasoning 
has different standards of reasoning because such standards cannot be seen in isolation 
from what one reasons about (in this case techno- or socio-scientific practices).  A style 
of reasoning includes an ontological posture (what one includes in the list of what one 
reasons about) as well as notions of truth (validating criteria), which have been con-
stantly under discussion in the field of science studies.  Reasoning appears in Hacking’s 
account as a contingent matter, with truth being what we find out to be true with refer-
ence to a style of reasoning.  A style emerges as the domain or the field it works within 
emerges.  There is no yardstick outside the style, but the style may develop and change.  
The question of what is meant by the “right” reasoning in a domain relies on the vali-
dating process that forms the style.  Convincing arguments must be performed within 
the construction that establishes the argument.  Additionally, every established style of 
reasoning has its own characteristic, what Hacking calls “self-stabilizing techniques”, 
that is, ways of performing self-critical discussions that enable the style to persist.  My 
goal is to understand the normative reflexive strategy as a self-stabilizing or “self-
authenticating” technique of the empirical style of reasoning that has emerged in the 
study of science.   
Part I of this thesis seeks to provide an outline of how a mature empirical style of 
reasoning about science and technology has emerged, and should be further developed, 
under the heading of co-production.  A style of reasoning cannot be seen in isolation 
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 from what it reasons about and science has been the primary target for the STS tradi-
tion.  This is, however, an overly narrow focus.  
 
 
Science and human agency 
Taylor’s critique of the epistemological tradition appears as a result of his engagement 
in ethics.  He saw the need to rearticulate the features that framed the dominating and 
flawed ethical-political discourses.  A problem appeared when the criticism of episte-
mology was turned into a question of how to abandon foundationalist ambitions, since 
naturalistic postures then appeared as the only defensible option.  But naturalist 
postures, as Taylor forcefully argued, could not adequately account for moral actions 
and moral phenomena.  In criticising the epistemological tradition, Taylor suggested, 
we should not pay attention to the question of epistemological foundationalism as such, 
but should rather pay attention to the representational account of knowledge that made it 
possible to understand epistemology as foundational.   
 
The reason why some thinkers prefer to focus on this interpretation [that linked the prob-
lems to the representational account of knowledge that made epistemological foundation-
alism possible] rather than merely on the foundationalist ambitions that are ultimately (as 
Quine has shown) detachable from it, is that it is bound up with very influential and often 
not fully articulated notions about science and about the nature of human agency.  
Through these it connects with certain central moral and spiritual ideas of the modern 
age.  If one’s aim is, in challenging the primacy of epistemology, to challenge these ideas 
as well, then one has to take it up in this wider—or deeper—focus, and not simply show 
the vanity of the foundational enterprise (Taylor 1995:3).   
 
If the point of challenging epistemologically modelled practices of studying science is 
to improve upon these practices, one needs to discuss the matter with a wider focus than 
the ones provided by the critique of epistemological foundationalism.  Given Taylor’s 
focus on the representational account of knowledge, we may trace how knowledge-as-
representations has marked legitimising discourses in a wide spectre of modern intel-
lectual cultures.  This point of departure may provide better understandings of how 
dominating ethical and epistemic discourses relate to each other.  In this perspective, 
two notions appear as particularly important; “science” and “human agency”.  Through 
theses notions the representational account of knowledge "connects moral and spiritual 
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ideas of modern age".  The epistemological model underscores commonsensical notions 
of “science” and “human agency”.  These concepts are operative crucial concepts in 
which urgent problems are stated.  The two concepts need to be jointly rearticulated.  
Naturalist strategies, even if they only are used as a springboard, stand in danger of not 
being able to adjust their validating discourses to this wider – or deeper – focus.  The 
problem occurs when the analyst focus are confined to the study of scientific activity.    
While Latour and his colleges have undertaken important work in articulating the 
prevailing epistemologically modelled notion of “science” (as well as re-articulating it), 
Taylor has conducted parallel work on the notion of “human agency”.  The epistemo-
logical model then, does not only frame the influential notion of science, with all its 
epistemic discussions, but also the notion of human agency, with its associated ethical-
political discussions, which will be discussed respectively in chapters two and three.  
Both discourses need to be taken into account if a mature alternative way of performing 
science and technology studies is to be established.  
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 Chapter 2 
Rethinking science 
 
 
 
Challenging epistemologically modelled approaches 
  
The field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), as I suggest in this chapter, leads 
forwards towards alternative and improved ways of staging and performing a normative 
philosophy of science.  The field’s potentials in these regards lie in the way three differ-
ent normative concerns have been interconnected.  There are epistemic questions con-
cerning the authority of science (debates on truth, rationality and objectivity).  There are 
ethical-political questions concerning the legitimacy of action (debates on good, justice 
and rightness).  And there are metaphysical questions concerning how to frame these 
issues (methodological debates on how to actually pursue epistemic and ethical-political 
questions).  The field, as the argument in this chapter goes, has developed an empirical 
style of reasoning about science and technology that made it possible to co-develop 
these three discourses.   
Because they worked differently, the pioneers in the field came in conflict with pre-
vailing epistemologically modelled ideals about how to do philosophy of science.  To 
install a new methodology, STS scholars needed to justify the new methodological 
approach as better.  But re-drafting prevailing epistemologically modelled methodolo-
gies was not possible without simultaneously re-drafting the terms of the debates 
regarding the authority of science and the legitimacy of action.  Methodological ideals 
for how one should go forth when pursuing these two normative discourses were 
captured in the methodological approach that was re-drafted.  Through reflexive meth-
odological scrutiny of their own approach, the leading scholars in the field simultane-
ously put epistemic and ethical-political normative discourses at play.   
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Given this analysis, it will not come as a surprise that the field of STS has experi-
enced difficulties in conceptualising normative issues within the field’s perspective.  In 
suggesting alternative ways of investigating science, the two normative discourses (the 
epistemic and the ethical-political) were cast into confusion.  But, as this chapter argues, 
the history of the field can be understood as a history of how the proponents responded 
to the problems this created.  The confusion created what I shall refer to as normative 
tensions, which in turn, called for further methodological improvements.   
My argument is formulated through a discussion of the formation of two successive 
empirical methodological platforms, the "strong programme" (from the British schools 
of Edinburgh and Bath), and the "sociology of translation" (from the French school of 
Paris).  I read the British programme as a first step to the French programme, which 
itself needs to be taken one step further (as will be discussed in chapters to come).  I 
shall start by clarifying central features of what I take as the epistemologically modelled 
approach that was challenged by these two schools, which will be referred to as the 
"standard approach".   
 
 
 
The standard approach  
 
As already indicated, I have characterized the STS field in a negative way.  It is a field 
that has found its identity in opposition to the prevailing practices of investigating 
science and technology that have been dominated by the epistemological model.  This 
calls for some justification.  In spite of the growth in both the scale and influence of 
STS during the 1990s, there is still no introductory text, nor assembly of articles that 
have gained canonical status.  The editors of the Handbook of Science and Technology 
Studies (Jasanoff et al. 1995:xi) considered the field not ready for a treatise-like presen-
tation of the field, because it "had not yet achieved the hoary respectability that merits 
such dispassionate, and unimaginative, treatment".  They could not even find a historian 
of science willing to survey the field (Pinch 2002).  David Hess (1997) has provided 
one of the few systematic presentations on the subject, and it is symptomatic that he 
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 primarily provides a long list of approaches and discussions.28  The field, as Hess 
(1997:1) put it, appears as a heterogeneous "intellectual field that is bubbling with novel 
research and ideas".  
A minimum characterisation of the field may, however, be found in a common 
understanding of what one should not do.  At the heart of the field, I would say, there is 
a normative diagnosis of the shortcomings of dominant ways of performing science 
studies.  The field, in Hess’s words (1997:1), has provided a forum for people who are 
concerned with the place of science and technology in a democratic society; "it holds 
out a vision of greater public participation in technical policy issues".  This vision has 
motivated scholars in the field to search for novel modes for the investigation of 
science.  The field’s identity, I suggest, could be understood as shaped in opposition to 
the way prevailing normative discourses have been staged.  STS scholars found it 
important to explore activities that the epistemological model did not allow empirical 
investigation of, or which did not give incentives for paying attention to.   
Scholars active in the field have also had a hard time communicating their message.  
One would expect this, given a reading of their work as a challenge to the normative 
order of the epistemological model.  As David Edge (1995) observed, the insights and 
arguments of STS scholars are widely disregarded, in spite of the fact that scholars out-
side the STS community are constantly rediscovering the problematic social status of 
science and technology.  Following this rediscovery, Edge sadly noted, scholars "rein-
vent the wheel" without being aware of the body of insights that have already been 
articulated in science studies.  These scholars keep pursuing analyses where science is 
conceptualised and investigated as an autonomous epistemic activity. 
 
For the "wheel" that is continually rediscovered and reapplied is the "received view" of 
science and technology as asocial, impersonal activities – a positivistic, even mechanistic, 
picture of an endeavour that defines its own logic and momentum, its own values and 
goals, and legitimates its progress of appealing to the assumption that the authority of 
nature is independent of, and prior to, the authority of society (Edge 1995:5). 
 
                                                 
28 Hess’s introduction seems to have been the dominating, if not the only, book of the sort that has been 
used for teaching purposes.  However, two other introductory books have recently appeared, Sismondo 
(2004) and Yearley (2005). 
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Such analysis are, in contrast to the STS analysis, understandable from day one because 
they rely on a received ideal understanding of what science is, as well as what the rela-
tion between science and society should be.  The rediscovered wheels carry the received 
view that, given the analysis of the epistemological model, is found intelligible and 
important, as it addresses ideals embedded in the practices we live by in our western 
cultures.  Such reinventions appear sometimes as suggestions for adjustments, and 
sometimes as a call for confirmation of the ways that we have chosen to live in the 
world.   
Suggestions for adjustments may come as a call for a need for greater public under-
standing of science, a moral response to science, public discussion of the impact of 
science on society, or the need for imposing values on the autonomous knowledge 
production process.  The STS field, as I understand it described in Edges’ article, has 
developed novel approaches because proponents of the field could not see how received 
or reinvented wheels could be capable of carrying the strain its constructors wish to put 
upon them.  I want to read the field along these lines, as a field that has from the very 
start searched for better ways of conducting normative discussions about science and 
technology.  This may also be understood as a suggestion for how the field should be 
understood, which in turn needs to be evaluated in light of how such a reading leads to 
improvements.  My discussion in this chapter should not be read as a rational recon-
struction of the history of field, unless rational reconstruction is understood, as I believe 
it should be, as creative redescriptions of the past performed in light of a particular 
purpose.   
 
 
Philosophy embedded in methodology 
Chapter one focused on the representational account of knowledge in order to describe 
the field of philosophy of science, not in terms of philosophical positions (on reality, 
rationality etc.), but in terms of a set of commitments, questions and styles of work.  I 
will summarize six points that I believe are crucial features of what has come to be 
(epistemologically modelled) standard approaches in the field.  These points order a set 
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 of questions and methodological guidelines that carry ideals for how to go to work and 
where to turns one's attention when studying, evaluating and assessing science and 
technology.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Left outs 
1. Ahistoric conceptions of science 
2. Theory-oriented 
3. Epistemological discourse 
4. Philosophy-oriented 
5. Separation of fact and values 
6. Separation of scientific and political 
activities  
1. The temporal character of science 
2. Experimental work, laboratory life 
3. Ontological/metaphysical discourses 
4. Empirical investigations  
5. Relation between facts and values 
6. Linkages between scientific and political 
activities. 
Standard approach 
 
Fig 2.1. Left: The standard approach captured in six phrases.  Right: Six corresponding areas that show 
omitted activities, questions and concerns. 
 
 
First, investigations of science have been dominated by ahistorical conceptions of 
science.  The linkage problem (of how to understand the linkage between worldly 
matters and representations of them) turned the attention of students of science towards 
a search for essential science-specific ahistoric elements.  Investigations of the temporal 
character of science have consequently been left out, that is, studies of why and how 
scientific practice, theories, institution, instruments, goals and aims change through 
time.  
Second, the representational account of knowledge fostered a theory-oriented 
discourse where the questions of the significance of experimentation were typically 
translated into a question of the nature and logic of instantaneous human observations.  
The temporality, instrumental and social character of the work of experimentation 
generally tended to be considered as theoretically unproblematic or uninteresting.  The 
work of experimentation then, the pride and hallmark of the natural sciences, conse-
quently escaped scholarly analysis and scrutiny.    
Third, epistemological topics were given priority with respect to 
metaphysical/ontological topics (and involvement in such topics has been met with 
great scepticism).  It is knowledge, not the world, which has been in focus.  This should 
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not come as a surprise, considering the way epistemological discourses substantiated the 
experience of the "glassy" mind.  In this experience, the content of the mind, our beliefs 
of the world, is taken as the familiar and given and the external world is perceived as 
strange and even mysterious.   
Fourth, case studies have not been allowed "a life of their own" with respect to 
philosophy. Since theories of science have been treated as representations of science, 
studies of actual scientific practices have tended to be allowed into the discourse only as 
examples, demonstrations or tests of philosophical theses.  
The fifth methodological trait, as seems to be a pattern, also draws attention away 
from the material objects and technological machinery of science.  It concerns the 
methodological implications of the way human action is conceptualised within the 
epistemological model.  The mind-in-world experience of the subject substantiated a 
strict fact-value distinction.  In this view, values represent something that we generate, 
while facts, on the other hand, represent nature’s testimony.  This distinction provides 
little incentives to investigate the nature of the relation between values and technology 
and values and knowledge.  These relations has typically either been seen as theoreti-
cally clarified and unproblematic or discussed under the heading of technological or 
social determinism.29   
Sixth, epistemological considerations have justified and enforced the ideal of separa-
tion of scientific and political activities.  Good science and good politics have been 
considered to be jointly safeguarded by a strict conceptual and institutional separation 
of the two.  These distinctions were accompanied by a scholarly division of labour 
between "internal" epistemic and "external" ethical-political normative affairs.  There 
have not, in this context, been many incentives for the questioning of how scientific and 
political activities interact. 
The importance of seeing the epistemological model as an ordering principle appears 
when one notices the range of important practices, questions and challenges that have 
been left out of the activity it models.  The six different common places for students of 
science overlap in the sense that they seem compatible. They may even be seen as 
                                                 
29 The point to be made here is an important one, but it calls for a more careful discussion, which I have 
postponed to Chapter 3. 
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 mutually supportive of one another, which makes evident the scholarly difficulties 
involved in turning to some of the questions and topics that have been left out.  The 
intelligibility and coherence of working differently presupposed some well-articulated 
alternative from which alternative approaches could be made intelligible and desirable.   
Ian Hacking's Representing and Intervening (1983) provides an illustration.  Hacking 
approached questions about the legitimacy of the authority of science (which was seri-
ously questioned in the 1960s) by proposing a realist stance based on reflections about 
the experimenter's ability to intervene.  He thereby turned to two arenas that had been 
left out, by paying attention to the nature of experimental work as well the question of 
what exists (rather than what is true, cf. point 2 and 3 above).  To make this move 
legitimate, however, he first reviewed the entire literature of philosophy of science as a 
blind alley in Part I of Representing and Intervening.  Given this excursion, he could 
invite the reader to "try something else" and take a second look at the work and working 
places of the experimentalist. 
Similarly, the tradition of empirical science studies has, by virtue of its empirical 
methodological approach, allowed for the development of philosophical perspectives on 
science without the developments being constantly judged as to whether or not they 
delivered adequate answers for epistemologically oriented questions.    
 
 
 
The British methodology  
 
Towards the end of the 1960s, scientific institutions had become very influential, in part 
as a result of the growth of technological and scientific institutions after the Second 
World War.  As Andersen and Sørensen (1992, see also Edge 1995) have pointed out, 
three successive phases of public response to science and technology followed.  While 
the 1950s and early 1960s were marked by an unambiguous optimism about the future 
prospects of science and technology, a critical and sceptical mood emerged in the late 
1960s, which lasted into the 1980s.  The last decade has been marked by a more 
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ambivalent attitude, however.  Science and technology are neither praised as the solu-
tion to all our problems nor are feared as the creator of them.  
Empirical science studies appeared in the second phase, where the research and 
development sector had become a worrying fact in its own right.  Critical questions had 
become unavoidable, such as: What do we actually get in return for the massive invest-
ments in science and technology?  When is it wise to delegate problem-solving matters 
to scientific and technological communities, and when is it not?  How can one under-
stand the extension of research activities, what shapes and direct them?  A discipline (a 
"science of science") addressing such questions was needed. 
The attempts to establish such a discipline, however, faced methodological obstacles 
that were fundamental in the prevailing concept of science, which became particularly 
visible in the notion of the "content of science".  I shall illustrate this point with refer-
ence to the six methodological traits listed above.  First of all, the way the term “content 
of science” was used indicated that the product of science could be identified with 
"justified knowledge".  The content of science was used as an epistemic term (cf. point 
3).  The notion of content further suggested a container where the content was to be 
contained and stored, like in a written form in a library (cf. point 2).  Such a view 
implied that the true content of science could  be stored independently of how science 
was produced or emerged (cf. point 1).  In speaking of the content of science, science 
could be depicted as something that had little potential to affect humans in and of itself.  
Science could only affect us when its content was put into play in the context of appli-
cation (cf. point 5).  Content also suggested the existence of a crucial ideal borderline 
between scientific and political activities.  It was the status of the content of science that 
legitimized the privileged position of science in society.  The content of physics or biol-
ogy was of a different kind with respect to the content of astrology or witchcraft, which 
normally would be taken as non-scientific activities.  Attempts to account for witchcraft 
by sociological means were not considered particularly controversial, while it was gen-
erally seen as highly questionable in the case of physics.  In the latter case, the notion of 
the content of science functioned as a reminder of the need for philosophical clarifica-
tions of the difference between the content of physics and witchcraft in the first place 
(cf. points 4 and 6).     
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 When the British pioneers of STS (who founded the "Edinburgh" and "Bath 
schools") are introduced, they are often presented as scholars who set out to study the 
content of science empirically (like in Hess 1997:81).  In the mind of most philoso-
phers, such a call for empirical studies of the content of science immediately suggested 
a form of intervention, a sociologisation of philosophical/epistemic subject matters.  
What first of all engaged the sociologist, however, was the new empirical subject field 
that resulted from the notion of content.  As Lynch and Woolgar recalled, empirical 
studies concerning the details of the technical aspects of production of knowledge had 
for long been unthinkable. 
 
Until the 1970s sociologists had little incentive to investigate such matters as how scien-
tists construct models, enact experimental runs, design and interpret data displays such as 
bubble-chamber tracks or autoradiographs, publicly report upon methods and findings, 
and assign credit for discoveries.  These were assumed by most sociologists to be the 
province of epistemology, or, on a more specific level, of the specialized sciences them-
selves (Lynch and Woolgar 1990:2). 
 
As soon as this empirical subject field was opened, however, a number of young schol-
ars started to explore the potentials of entering the forbidden land (see Collins (1981) 
for an overview). 
Sociological investigations of the content of science presupposed another notion of 
science.  It was a question of methodology, of how to study whatever this thing called 
science was.  The work of Thomas Kuhn offered an important gateway for establishing 
a justifiable image of science that could legitimise a (naturalised) sociological pro-
gramme of science studies.  Kuhn had forcefully demonstrated the sensibility of recon-
struing the image of science (and thereby also the need for studying it differently) by 
introducing the notions of "normal science" and "paradigms". 
 
 
Naturalised sociology as a springboard 
In speaking of paradigms, Kuhn conceptualised scientific knowledge as historic and 
social; it was like language, "intrinsically the common property of the group or else 
nothing at all" (1970:210).  Kuhn thereby paved the way for sociological studies of how 
knowledge was produced, reproduced, adjusted, replaced or disregarded.  The concept 
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of paradigms offered a way to think about sociological investigations of scientific 
knowledge production.  And moreover, the concept provided a clue for how the 
dynamic relations between scientific and political activities could be investigated 
(which appeared to be an important question, given the historical context of the 1960s).  
But the notions of normal science and paradigms did not provide guidelines for how 
investigations of scientific and social changes should be carried out.   
As much as Kuhn’s account should be read as a sociological theory, according to 
Barry Barnes (1982:120ff), his work would need to be inscribed into a Durkheimian 
functionalist tradition, assuming autonomous social variables that constrain the mind of 
the scientist.  Barnes and his colleagues did not find Kuhn’s theory of scientific change 
(through scientific revolutions) interesting as a social theory.  They were primarily 
interested in Kuhn’s account of how scientific knowledge was transmitted and main-
tained during periods of normal science.  Barnes argued that Kuhn’s perspectives 
needed to be pursued further under a constructivist frame, which could account for how 
science changed and had been shaped in a larger social context.   
The work of extending Kuhn to a constructivist methodological platform for science 
studies came to be marked by the epistemological tradition as the proponents of the 
field were caught up in the epistemological problem of relativism.  This happened as the 
epistemological tradition came to frame the question of how empirical studies of 
science were to be validated.  I will use Feyerabend’s early criticism of Kuhn as my 
point of departure for a discussion of the matter.   
 
Dealing with relativism from a theoretical or methodological approach 
In Feyerabend’s (1970) view, Kuhn’s model of scientific activity was problematic 
because it could not clarify the normative difference between science and non-science.  
For example, Kuhn’s model (the scheme of normal science-crisis-revolution-normal 
science), did  not exclude activities like organised crime from being described as a 
scientific activity.  This was a misplaced critique of Kuhn’s model, one could possibly 
argue, as Kuhn pretended to provide a correct account of what science is – not what it 
should be.  Such a reply, however, would presuppose the idea that the work of articu-
lating what science is could be seen as sharply separated from the work of articulating 
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 what science should be.  This idea would in turn reflect the epistemologically modelled 
ideal of how the work of the scientists they studied should be seen as sharply separated 
from political activities.   
Feyerabend drew attention to the question of how Kuhn’s own account of science 
should be validated by questioning what the point of science should be, given Kuhn’s 
account of it.  This primarily represented a methodological critique, I would say, not a 
theoretical one.  The question of what the point of the activity of science was, as 
described by Kuhn, should be questioned when validating Kuhn’s account.  Kuhn how-
ever, had totally by-passed the issue, Feyerabend noticed.    
The problem of understanding Kuhn’s work as purely descriptive appeared because 
such an understanding presupposed a concept of science that had been undermined by 
Kuhn’s own work. The truth accumulating image of science, which Kuhn’s model 
challenged, could take for granted the answer to the question of what the point of 
science was.  From this perspective, the point of science was seen as truth-seeking, and 
true models of science would disclose how science could be seen as truth-seeking (cf. 
the double representational structure displayed in Fig 1.1).  If Kuhn’s model was to be 
presented as a correct or a true model of scientific change, however, the model would 
have far reaching political implications because the model could not account for the 
normative difference between organised crime and science.  The seriousness of the 
problem at hand was clearly expressed by Imre Lakatos: "Kuhn’s position vindicates, no 
doubt, unintentionally the basic political credo for contemporary religious maniacs" 
(1970:93).  Observations like this one have often lead to a theoretical focus on how or if 
Kuhn’s model avoids epistemological relativism or not.  
Kuhn’s descriptive account of scientific activity accommodated a redescribed notion 
of science.  The normative content of this notion of science, as I interpret the lesson of 
Feyerabend’s critique, should have been rearticulated in the process as well, and this 
could have been done if Kuhn had posed the question of what the point of scientific 
activity was.  One way of approaching the matter, as I shall argue in later chapters, is to 
abandon the sharp descriptive-prescriptive distinction and develop ways to simultane-
ously perform descriptive and prescriptive science studies.   
The pioneers of the British school, however, did not question the descriptive-
prescriptive distinction of the epistemological tradition.  On the contrary, they enforced 
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the distinction as they promoted empirical science studies with reference to the possi-
bility of establishing a philosophical "tenable" relativist position (see for instance 
Collins and Yearly 1992a).  A (tenable) relativist posture then could pave the way for 
alternative ways of conceptualizing and investigating science that were not to be meas-
ured against how well they answered the problems of epistemology.  The point of 
science, one could say, was not to be seen as truth seeking, at least not in terms of how 
truth-seeking activities were conceived within the tradition of epistemological founda-
tionalism.  The methodology of the British school, then, came to be justified with refer-
ence to a naturalist turn to sociology.30   
 
A constructivist platform and tenable relativism  
The relativistic implications of Kuhn’s descriptive model, according to many critics, 
followed from the fact that his model could not account for the rise and fall of para-
digms.  Barnes (1982) presented a response to this criticism as he proposed ways of 
accounting for scientific changes by means of sociological explanations.  In his view, 
Kuhn's model of science had to be adjusted by taking into account the interest or goals 
of the scientific community.  By speaking of the interest of a group, one could deal with 
the problem of relativism and simultaneously depict science in ways that could make it 
possible to empirically investigate it.  Scientific knowledge was to be conceptualised 
and investigated in terms of the social characteristics of the community in which scien-
tific practices were shaped, performed and maintained.  The process of producing 
knowledge was to be investigated in terms of how the social orders that gave knowledge 
its stamp of legitimacy were constructed. 
 
Science is not a set of universal standards, sustaining true descriptions and valid infer-
ences in different specific cultural contexts; authority and control in science do not oper-
ate simply to guarantee an unimpeded interaction between "reason" and experience.  
Scientific standards themselves are part of a specific form of culture; authority and 
control are essential to maintain a sense of the reasonableness of that specific form […].  
The continuation of a form of culture implies mechanisms of socialization and knowledge 
                                                 
30 Their way of justifying their strategy as a proper way of doing science studies, then, came to be marked 
by the epistemological tradition.  Even though I shall argue that the proponents of the field were not 
committed to such a naturalist posture, the naturalist point of departure for the field appears to have been 
hard to eliminate.  The naturalist turn could close, or at least postpone, the question of what the normative 
content of their redescribed notion of science was.   
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 transmission procedures for displaying the range of accepted meanings and representa-
tions, methods of ratifying acceptable innovations and giving them the stamp of legiti-
macy. […] When there is a continuing form of culture there must be sources of cognitive 
authority and control (Barnes 1982:9-10). 
 
The importance of Kuhn’s work, in Barnes’s (1982) reading, was captured in the notion 
of paradigms-as-model-exemplars.  It is the understanding of paradigms as "universally 
recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions 
to a community of practitioners" (Kuhn 1970:viii).  The radical and important aspect of 
exemplars, in Barnes’s view, was that exemplars were not understood as secondary, as 
illustrations or examples of general laws.  Knowledge was seen as transmitted and 
sustained through the presentation of model problems and solutions; it was embedded in 
the exemplars being expressed in a given situation and time.  Knowledge could be trans-
ferred to other situations, but not because man had grasped what was universal in the 
many different applications.  Some other reasons had to be given.  David Bloor sug-
gested we could answer the question by turning to a discussion of how an adequate 
understanding of a situation was formed and transformed during practice.   
Bloor (1983, 1992) argued the case by relying on a particular reading of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's (1958:§185-242) analysis of rule following.  Wittgenstein's analysis of 
simple rule-following cases, Bloor argued, demonstrated that the relation between a rule 
and its application cannot be determined by an explicit description of the rule.  Wittgen-
stein displayed a paradox here because we very often act with a sense of certainty when 
following rules; we are not bothered or cast into confusion by the spectre of possible 
applications.  The paradox appears as a paradox, Bloor maintained, if we think that we 
first need to establish a mental representation of the rule in order to understand the 
conditions for correct rule-following actions.  The meaning of the rule was to be under-
stood as given in its use in a situation.  We simply do whatever the situation demands if 
we are competent practitioners.  We act as if rules are clear and well-defined, since we 
know what the right meanings are in a given situation.  It is at this point that Bloor’s 
tendencies to defend a naturalised sociological epistemology become clear.  In response 
to the paradox, Bloor presented a social reading of Wittgenstein where the "mental" was 
substituted with the "social".  Knowledge was not to be understood as confined to the 
mind of the person who knows, but to the social community of competent practitioners.  
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This perspective allowed for interesting and challenging empirical studies of the 
process whereby knowledge claims were constructed.  The social researchers, one 
should note, were not simply searching for social variables that could explain consen-
sus.  The focus was on a more challenging task, on the details of the process where 
social orders were created and consensus was maintained.31  The "strong programme" 
explicated the methodological principles that these investigations needed to adhere to. 
 
The Strong Programme 
To reiterate, the rapid growth of science and technology raised questions that called for 
a science of science.  In order to create such a field, "science", as well as guidelines for 
how to study it, had to be rewritten since the operative notion of science appeared to be 
an obstacle for empirical investigations.  Bloor’s strong programme suggested a meth-
odological platform where science could be conceptualised and investigated differently.  
The methodological platform for a "science of science" was based on a constructivist 
theory of meaning formation, and the methodology was prescribed in four points; it 
should be causal, impartial, symmetrical and reflexive. 
 
1.  It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or 
states of knowledge.  [...] 
2.  It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, suc-
cess or failure.  Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation. 
3.  It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation.  The same types of cause would 
explain, say, true and false beliefs. 
4.  It would be reflexive.  In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be appli-
cable to sociology itself.  [...]   (Bloor 1976:7).   
 
                                                 
31 The British school has often been attributed with a simple relativist position, which in turn has led to a 
misunderstanding of its position and methodology.  Bloor has often tried to correct this misunderstanding.  
Simple short presentations of relativist doctrines, as Barnes and Bloor (1982:22) themselves presented 
them, take as their point of departure the observation that beliefs on a certain topic actually vary.  This 
variation is then explained with reference to the circumstances of the users.  The challenge of relativist 
accounts is to explain how convictions about the truth of certain belief, found in a particular social group, 
need to be analysed as dependent on, or relative to, the range of contexts where the users rely on the 
belief as a true belief.  Explanatory references to “social variables”, however, as Bloor has stressed, 
should not be understood as explanatory “factors” that may fill in the gap between rules and their appli-
cation.  The process of socialisation, or the formation of consensus is “far from being outside the internal 
relationship between the rule and its applications”, the processes are “actually constitutive of it” 
(Bloor1992:272). 
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 Bloor’s constructivist theory of meaning formation became visible in the call for causal 
explanations for how belief about nature was formed.  In the case of technology, as 
Pinch and Bijker later suggested (1987), the constructivist theory became visible in a 
call for causal explanations of how common understandings of technology were 
brought about.  The challenge in both cases was to link these discussions to the dynam-
ics of other related social activities.  Collins (1983) suggested that this could be done by 
first documenting the flexibility of interpretations that appeared in a controversy, and 
then tracing the process whereby a single authoritative interpretation emerged, given a 
particular socio-historic context. 
The search for causal explanations of how scientific beliefs came about revealed how 
the strong programme partly remained within the boundaries of the tradition to which it 
appeared as a critical response.  The proponents of the programme adopted a represen-
tational concept of knowledge that was inscribed in the discourses that discussed 
knowledge in terms of justified true beliefs.  Its preoccupation with epistemological 
problems followed from the attempt to respond to the standard view that it opposed.  As 
several scholars have pointed out, the philosophical standpoint found in the strong 
programme displayed striking similarities to familiar realist standpoints (see for exam-
ple Rouse (1996), Woolgar (1988) or Laudan (1996)).  Knowledge was still understood 
and treated as beliefs about nature.  In the strong programme, however, scientific beliefs 
about nature were to be explained in light of the process of constructing meaning where 
these beliefs were formed.   
The perspective, then, mirrored a straightforward realist posture, as Harry Collins 
(1985:148) explicitly stated: "It is not the regularity of the world that imposes itself on 
our senses but the regularity of our institutionalised beliefs that imposes itself on the 
world".  In other words, nature was substituted for culture and the natural order was 
replaced by social order.  The crucial linkage problem of representationalism still domi-
nated the order of the day.  The problem of the relation between words and objects was 
shifted to a problem of the relation between words and culture.  As Feyerabend (1993:x) 
once put it, “finding that science had been freed from the fetters of a dogmatic logic and 
epistemology they tried to tie it down again, this time with sociological ropes”.   
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 Nature Beliefs   Culture 
Realism Relativism 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. The relativist position mirrored the realist position; two symmetric linkage problems framed their 
respective approaches. 
 
 
Even though the two postures mirrored each other in terms of philosophical positions, 
there were crucial differences in terms of how validity discourses were to be performed.  
This is where the importance and liberating potentials of the emergence of empirical 
styles of reasoning become evident.  The strong programme was first of all a pro-
gramme for doing empirical science studies, and the critical internal discussions did not 
primarily evolve around philosophical discussions regarding disagreements about what 
one might possibly learn from Wittgenstein, but rather around methodological discus-
sions of how to do better.   
The importance of the methodological prescriptions of impartiality and symmetry 
(second and third point above), should be understood in light of the difference they 
make in the field.  The importance of the two points (that Barnes and Bloor (1982) 
jointly referred to as the norms of "disinterest") lay in how they committed students of 
science to stick to the descriptions of the process of knowledge production.  One could 
miss out on important historical issues if the history of science was to be accounted for 
in light of retrospective judgements of success or failure.  And furthermore, asymmetri-
cal forms of explanations would face serious methodological difficulties in accounting 
for ongoing research.  The outcome of research in terms of success or failure would not 
be given in the course of investigations of ongoing science, but only in retrospect.  The 
call for causal explanations (the first point), however, played a more important role in 
constituting what the object of study was.  This point has also been the most controver-
sial one within the field itself (Lynch 1993:74).  The demand for causal explanations 
constituted science as something one could (and should) study by tracing the process of 
meaning formation.   
How then, were these methodological prescriptions to be criticized by their own 
standards?  As a proposal for a methodology, they should be discussed as a meth-
odology.  This makes the reflexive requirement (the fourth point) an "obvious require-
ment of principle because otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own 
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 theories" (Bloor 1976:7).  The demand for reflexivity appeared, as Bloor put it, as "a re-
sponse to the need for seeking general explanations".  The critique, to put it differently, 
should not focus on the general theoretical level, but on the particular level of descrip-
tive adequacy of the empirical studies.  I shall turn to a discussion of how the French 
school criticised and modified the British methodology as they took the reflexive 
requirement seriously while at work.   
 
 
 
The French methodology  
 
Reflexivity resembles in many ways the norms of consistency or self-reference that 
philosophers of science often emphasize.  The main concern of such norms (whether 
expressed in terms of "you should be reflexive", or "consistent") concerns the trustwor-
thiness or validity of a theory that claims to have something important so say.  If we are 
to base our decisions on matters concerning science and technology in a particular case, 
we need to be convinced of the virtue of the perspective.  There must be ways of inves-
tigating the validity of the arguments for the claims given.  Reflexivity primarily draws 
attention to questions of methodological validity, it concerns questions of methodologi-
cal standpoints of critique; that is, how to make one’s perspective susceptible for criti-
cism by its own methodological standards.  
In order to discuss the methodological drift from the British to the French school, I 
have found it useful to distinguish between "epistemic" and "ethical-political reflexion".  
An epistemic point is made when one calls for epistemic reflexion, one draws attention 
to one’s understanding of what conditions truth-seeking forms of investigations.  
Ethical-political reflexion makes visible the good/bad concerns we have when ques-
tioning the desirability of an approach.  If one understands the point of a theory of 
science to be the one that clarifies the truth conditions of scientific investigations, 
reflexive concerns may be reduced to epistemic reflexion.  This holds true if scientific 
investigations are conceived as a practice that seeks to produce true theories (that mirror 
the world), as would be the case in epistemologically modelled forms of conceptualising 
 77
and studying science.  When epistemologically modelled ways of investigating science 
were challenged however, the idea of reducing reflexive concerns to epistemic reflexion 
was simultaneously challenged.   
I shall discuss these matters by juxtaposing two scholars that both may be said to run 
op against the epistemologically modelled tradition in science studies, Karl Popper and 
Harry Collins32.  The works of these two scholars demonstrates important aspects of the 
difficulties of handling epistemic and ethical-political reflexive demands simultane-
ously.  A comparison of the reflexive strategies of the two provides a way to display 
how the epistemological tradition framed the validity discourse of the British school.  
The two scholars, I argue, came to reproduce the rational and social dichotomy that has 
marked the philosophy of science after Kuhn (discussed in Chapter 1) because they 
framed their respective reflexive discussion with reference to the distinction between 
the philosophical and the empirical.  As a result, normative tensions appeared in the 
British school.  The French school, I further argue, managed to improve on the perspec-
tive of the British school as they paid attention to these normative tensions and avoided 
having to frame their reflexive posture within the philosophical and empirical 
distinction. 
 
 
Normative tensions in the British methodology 
Popper’s reflexive challenge concerned the question of how his falsification principle 
could itself be falsified.  Popper drew attention to the distinction between philosophical 
and empirical levels of argument.  His demarcating proposal could not be falsified by 
empirical means.  A correct theory of science would display genuine science, which in 
turn called for philosophical inquiries of how his proposal could elucidate the problems 
of epistemology.  Popper could not think of any other intellectually responsible way to 
keep alive a critical discussion of his proposals.   
                                                 
32 Harry Collins, as far as I can see, has provided the most thorough and clear answer to the reflexive 
challenges of the British school.  Collins (1981, 1985) articulated an "Empirical Programme of 
Relativism" (EPOR), a sister to the strong programme which also framed the empirical investigations 
within a naturalist sociological frame. 
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 There is only one way, as far as I can see, of arguing rationally in support of my propos-
als.  This is to analyse their logical consequences: to point out their fertility - their power 
to elucidate the problems of the theory of knowledge (Popper 1959:37-38).   
 
However, there was no way one could provide a conclusive philosophical argument for 
such a critical strategy.  Popper claimed that it was a matter of choice, ultimately, 
whether one believed one could and should try to settle the problems of epistemology or 
not.  One was, in principle, free to choose to "believe in reason" or not.  Popper made a 
moral argument for the case of reason, as it committed the actors to settle disagreements 
by means of argument instead of lapsing into (ab)use of power (1957:Ch. 24).  Given 
Popper’s choice, which was established by an appeal to ethical-political reflexion, epis-
temic reflexion captured all there was of importance in the demand for reflexivity.  The 
distinction between the philosophical and the empirical level of argument then played a 
crucial role in Popper’s framing of his answer to the reflexive challenge of his falsifica-
tionism.   
Collins’s reflexive challenge concerned the question of how the work of producing 
empirical claims could be scrutinized by means of its own methodological standards.33   
Collins’s answer to his reflexive challenge mirrored Popper’s.  Collins also appealed to 
the difference between philosophical and empirical levels of argument.  Popper argued 
one would miss a philosophical point if one criticised his theory of science from the 
descriptive level of particular case studies.  Collins symmetrically argued one would 
miss an empirical point if one criticised the findings of case studies from the philoso-
phical level of methodology critique (Collins (1982) and Collins and Yearley (1992 
a,b,)).  Empirical studies, one could say, should not only be considered to be of interest 
for philosophy; they had a life of their own. 
Although Collins’s methodological approach expressed an epistemological relativist 
position, the point was not to demonstrate or test such a philosophical stance.  His rela-
tivism was not to be taken seriously as a philosophy, but as a posture that made empiri-
cal studies possible.  Collins was primarily a sociologist searching for ways of doing 
                                                 
33 One of Andrew Pickerings's provocative conclusions in Constructing Quarcs may illustrate what was at 
stake here: "There is no obligation”, as Pickering went, “upon anyone framing a view of the world to take 
account of what twentieth-century science has to say" (1984:413).  The reflexive response amounts to 
raising the question of why anyone should, in framing a view of science, be obliged to take into account 
what Pickering had to say.  Are not claims of social construction of natural facts, of say the existence of 
quarks, not themselves to be treated as other socially constructed (contingent) facts?    
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sociology.  His "Empirical Programme of Relativism" pictured the work of science 
within the social arena in ways that made scientific activity empirically accessible.  The 
relativist methodology, as Collins and Yearley (1992a:302) stated, allowed for "new 
ways of knowing nothing", meaning, not contributing to the discussion of truth or 
falsity as such, but on the detailed steps where knowledge obtained the status of being 
true or disregarded as false.  One would achieve more in the empirical setting, the claim 
went, if one took a disinterested posture towards truth and falsehood.  Such a claim 
however, had to be validated in the empirical setting – does one actually achieve more 
by pursuing a relativist empirical programme? 
What then, should be the measure of validation?  In Collins’s view it should be the 
good rather than the true, a choice that could be made cogent under the anti-
epistemological foundational posture Collins adopted.  Like Popper, Collins (together 
with Yearley (1992a:308)) claimed one was in a position where one ultimately had to 
choose one’s epistemological stance: "In the absence of decisive epistemological argu-
ments, how do we choose our epistemological stance"?  With respect to Popper, how-
ever, Collins and Yearley shifted their attention from the philosophical to the empirical 
level of argumentation as they (with an implicit reference to Wittgenstein) continued: 
"The answer is to ask not for the meaning but for the use".  One should turn one’s 
attention to the use of the perspective, that is, what the empirical case studies revealed.  
The use of the studies was here read into a political discourse on what power structures 
the studies revealed or possibly deconstructed.    
The basic naturalist turn to sociological and empirical investigations was made by an 
appeal to epistemic reflexion.  The case studies were to be carried out within a "tenable" 
relativist position (of the sort that Bloor and Barnes had established).  Given the shift of 
focus in empirical studies, however, ethical-political reflexion captured all there was of 
importance in the call for reflexivity.  Collins’s posture should be evaluated according 
to how the case studies (that Collins’s posture prescribed) actually could improve upon 
science and technology assessment.  Seen from Collins’s point of view, Popper’s model 
of science was undesirable, as it sustained the privileged authority of science.  His own 
relativist posture was desirable, however, because it put science on a descriptive par 
with other social institutions, placing it within rather than outside the realm of inspec-
tion and democratic control.   
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 The symmetry between Collins’ and Poppers’ reflexive responses demonstrates the 
rational and social axis in the philosophy of science.  Collins and Popper both gained 
strength in their own line of argument by reference to the fallacies of the alternative (in 
which there was only one conceivable option).  In Popper’s case, one had to chose 
between rationalism and irrationalism (1957:chapter 24); in Collins’s case one had to 
chose between an explanatory reference to either natural or social orders.  Furthermore, 
their symmetric attempt to challenge epistemologically modelled science studies was 
constrained by the epistemological tradition’s ideals for how to carry out a self-critical 
discussion.  This became evident in the central role the philosophical and empirical 
distinction played in their respective reflexive responses.  Given this distinction, Popper 
and Collins slipped into two symmetric positions.  Popper appealed to philosophy, that 
is, to the need to transcend the empirical and sort out the truth about epistemology.  
Collins appealed to the empirical case study, that is, to stay put in the plane of small-a 
arguments.   
One could question their common assumption that one is free to choose one’s epis-
temetic stance, which many have done.  The French school also provided a critique of 
the sort, not by pursuing the philosophical questions of epistemology, but by searching 
for ways to better perform empirical studies.  I believe the normative tensions that 
appeared in Collins’s approach, but not in Popper’s, displayed why such improvements 
were needed.   
Collins’s attempt to establish an alternative to epistemologically modelled science 
studies did not work as well as Popper’s.  Collins’s pathway resulted in a model of 
science that did not fit the normative order of the epistemological model.  This norma-
tive order could be captured in the notion of "politics of nature" (to borrow Latour’s 
book title (2004a)).  Science should first get nature right.  Politics should then enter and 
pass judgement on what is left to decide when factual matters are settled.  In Collins’s 
mirror, the normative Archimedean point appeared to be moved from nature to society.  
This might become clearer if we consider Latour’s illustration of the British schools’ 
principle of symmetry.  
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Fig 2.3.  Latour’s (1993:95) figure illustrating the principle of symmetry of the British schools.  Asymmetric 
explanations of true and false (with reference to nature and subject/society poles) were to be avoided by 
explaining everything by reference to the subject/society pole.   
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Fig. 2.4  Inscribing normative issues into Latour’s (1993:95) figure shows normative tensions in the British 
school.  These tension appeared because the approach of the school was framed by the epistemological 
tradition.   
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 Normative tensions appeared in Collins’s posture because in crucial ways it remained 
within the epistemologically modelled tradition it criticised (while not being truthful to 
its methodological ideals).  This normative tension simultaneously displayed crucial 
aspects of how the epistemological tradition had modelled science studies.  The per-
spective was to be endorsed by ethical-political reflexion, but ran into problems when 
authoritative recommendations for science policy were called for.  The French school 
can be read as a result of a work of trying to do better by resolving the normative 
tensions that had appeared in the British school. 
 
Truth, the social, and standpoint of critique 
I do not think the British pioneers managed to theoretically avoid the fallacy that 
Jasanoff (1996b) speaks of as a "not-but" fallacy (that is, to try to depict science as not 
discovering necessary truths about nature, but as contingent social constructions).  At 
stake was the question of whether one was willing to accept the British school’s analy-
sis of science a basis for our ways of dealing with urgent and often risky questions on 
science policy.  I shall point to three related issues that became urgent; the notions of 
truth, the notion of the social, and  the question of validation.    
Jasanoff (1996b) claimed that the "not only-but also" posture better captured what 
scholars in the field were committed to.  Most social constructivists will agree "if pres-
sured", Jasanoff claimed, that the central aim of empirical studies "is not to deny that 
science is about a search for truth".  Its task is rather to "explain in detail what the 
search looks like, and what it means in social terms, that truth has ever been found in 
particular cases."  What, then, was implied in not denying that science was about 
searching for truths?  And what was implied in the proposal that truths were established 
in social terms?   
The proponents of the strong programme set out to study how truths became socially 
endorsed.  But the programme had to reconceptualise the notion of truth in order to do 
so; truths could not be seen as something that was excluded by the notion of the social 
(as when truths about nature are what appears when social influences are avoided).  
Thus they reconceptualised truth as something social.  To speak of truth, as something 
one should not deny but should still describe in social terms, called for another recon-
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ceptualisation of truth as well as the social.  This was done in the French school.  Their 
reconceptualisations were accompanied by another understanding of how the claims 
regarding how truths were established in social terms were to be validated.  These three 
issues could not be separated from each other; the notion of truth and the notion of the 
social and the question of how to validate the two notions were simultaneously estab-
lished as epistemology came to be re-drafted by the French school.  These entangled 
shifts were carried by a discourse that did not appeal to the distinction between the 
philosophical and empirical level.   
 
 
Truth not denied 
I have thus far discussed two different meaning-centred methodological approaches that 
mirrored each other.  In these two approaches, scientific activity was conceptualised and 
investigated as an activity that was to produce beliefs that were either seen as rational 
(like "justified true beliefs" about nature) or as social (where beliefs are seen as con-
structed and endorsed within a community).   
In Laboratory Life, Latour and Woolgar investigated science in a different way, an 
approach that also led them to conceptualise science differently.  Laboratory Life drew 
attention to the striking mismatch between reports of how knowledge is produced (as 
presented in articles, textbooks and bulletins) and how knowledge is actually produced.  
Scientific communications of "ready-made science" conceal the very nature of "science 
in action".  In order to get a better understanding of the nature of ongoing science, 
Latour and Woolgar set out to describe the research process as a stepwise process 
where, as they put it, "the realties of scientific practice become transformed into state-
ments about how science is done"(1986:27-29).34  The research process was depicted 
as, what Latour (1999b) later called, a "chain of translations".   
                                                 
34 More specifically, Latour, who did the fieldwork, studied biochemists at work investigating the chemi-
cal structure of a particular hormone.  Laboratory Life was the first published ethnographic study of the 
sort (1979). 
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 Their constructivist approach carried an invitation to discuss the epistemic questions 
differently.  The question of the conditions for the truth of scientific results (being 
reported in scientific communications) was not staged and analysed in terms of one 
huge gap (between world and word), but rather in terms of many small successive steps 
by which scientific results were shaped.  They did not set out to study the formation of 
beliefs.  Their methodology was not informed by the philosophical discourse on mean-
ing (as this discourse appeared and was found important given the representational 
account of knowledge).   
Their draft of an alternative methodological approach for studying knowledge pro-
duction carried a draft of an alternative epistemology that was to be further articulated 
as the approach was established.  Latour and Woolgar worked their way towards a pos-
ture where philosophical and empirical claims were to be simultaneously discussed and 
validated.  Their approach connected two types of questions that tended to be treated 
separately in the epistemological tradition.  Was their particular story of how the chemi-
cal structure of the hormone came to be established as a fact historically correct?  And 
were the accompanying suggestions for a more general image of science philosophically 
correct?  The philosophical and empirical distinction came to be side-stepped in the 
epistemic reflexive posture they adopted.  
The method of the students of science, Latour and Woolgar stated, should be re-
garded as "essentially similar to those of the practitioners which they study" (1986:30).  
Their own approach (being an epistemic approach) should reflect their account of the 
epistemic activity of the scientist they were studying.  
 
By paying more attention to the way in which we, as observers, produce the account you 
are now reading, we hope to gain an insight into some of the techniques used by scientists 
in their attempts to produce ordered accounts (Latour and Woolgar 1986:36). 
 
When Latour and Woolgar depicted the scientist’s work as a work of constructing 
chains of translations, the same analysis should apply to their own approach.  Labora-
tory Life represented itself as a report of a scientific activity.  Latour’s and Woolgar’s 
report from the laboratory should be validated along the same lines as the scientist they 
were studying validated their reports.  As was the case in the work of the scientist they 
studied, the work of constructing truthful accounts of their object of study was played 
out in a work of constructing reliable methodological approaches.  Critical questions 
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should thus be framed in terms of methodological questions, as Latour and Woolgar 
stated in the closing words of Laboratory Life:  "How much further research, invest-
ment, redefinition of the field, and transformation of what counts as an acceptable 
argument are necessary to make this account more plausible than its alternatives?"  
Laboratory Life became important, I would say, because of the way it represented a 
joint empirical and philosophical undertaking. 
   
Best account; re-descriptions by empirical means 
It is not something behind the proof, but the proof, that proves (Wittgenstein (1967:II-
§42). 
 
The general claims of Laboratory Life were not established inductively in the sense that 
it drew general inferences from particular cases.  Laboratory Life created a line of 
argument that could transform our ways of presenting seeing and talking about science.  
The ideal type for thinking about epistemic activity here could possibly be clarified with 
reference to Wittgenstein’s reflections on how truths are established and maintained in 
mathematics.  Wittgenstein drew attention to the activity of constructing or following 
proofs.  When mathematical proofs are established, connections between propositions 
have been established, and these connections are held together by concepts created by 
the proofs.35   
Reports of empirical activities of science, when successful, may create philosophical 
concepts that may convince those who have followed the report.  As Latour (1988b) 
                                                 
35 Stuart Shanker argues (1987) that Wittgenstein’s (1967) understanding of the nature of mathematics 
may help us to understand the proper nature of epistemology.  The lessons followed, as Shanker argued, 
from Wittgenstein’s understanding of proof as an activity that establishes certainty, not as something that 
underwrites certainty.  As Wittgenstein directed attention to the activity of constructing proofs, he con-
ceptualised proofs in terms of rules.  Proof establishes constitutive rules that make no room for mistake.  
We follow constitutive rules of a square when calculating its area.  If someone makes a mistake, and finds 
it to be correct, we simply state that he doesn't know what a square of an area is.  There is nothing outside 
the rule that may be used as a yardstick for the rule, and the rule that excludes doubt is established when it 
is proven to be in order.  Successful proofs lead us to say, after having followed the steps of the proof, that 
it must be like this.  Sceptical objections simply vanish when the point of the demonstration is taken and 
the rules are established.  The important point then is that it is not the steps within the proof that matter – 
but the connections the proof establishes between the various propositions (Shanker 1987:85-87), or as 
Wittgenstein put it: “The proof changes the grammar of our language, changes our concepts.  It makes 
new connections, and it creates the concept of these connections (it does not establish that they are there, 
they do not exist until it makes them)” (Wittgenstein 1967:III-§31).  
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 argued, one should refer to the theoretical language of science as an "infra-language" 
rather than a "meta-language", if one was to understand the role that empirical studies 
should play in theorising science.  The crucial question one should ask when challeng-
ing a theoretical infra-language is of the sort: Do the crucial concepts fit well into the 
story, are they well-construed or well-chosen?  The result is, as in the natural sciences, 
an immense commitment to stay true to empirical realities, and to search for ways of 
producing empirical data and thereby possibly improve upon existing infra-languages.  
Laboratory Life has been important because it created new ways of speaking and 
talking about scientific activity, not because it represented scientific activity in recog-
nisable ways.  The difficulty of producing such works concerns the work of creating 
novel perspectives and concepts that were not previously established or recognized as 
interesting ways of talking about science.  Laboratory Life drew things together in 
genuinely novel ways.  In working out a convincing account of a particular historic 
event, Latour and Woolgar did not only create new connections, they also created theo-
retical concepts that were needed in order to 'hold' these connections together (like 
"black boxing").  The important case studies are typically the ones that offer illuminat-
ing crucial key concepts.36    
From this perspective, Laboratory Life may be understood as having a life of its own 
(with respect to philosophy).  Rather than testing or discussing philosophical questions 
of the epistemological tradition, Latour and Woolgar initiated a process of reformulat-
ing the problems of epistemology - a process that involved a reconsideration of crucial 
concepts through which epistemic discourses were discussed.  The notion of the "social" 
stood out in this context as particularly important.  
 
 
                                                 
36 Kuhn’s notion of "paradigms" is an obvious example (which was formulated in Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions but relies crucially on his historic work in the Copernican Revolution (1957)), as are Peter 
Galison’s (1987) "constraints" and "trading zone", Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s (1997) "epistemic things" 
and "experimental systems", the "theory-methods package" of Joan Fujimura (1996), Pickering's (1995) 
"dance of agency" and "interactive stabilization" or Karin Knorr Cetina's (1999) "epistemic machinery”. 
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Emptying the "social"  
In order to study "science-in-action", Latour and Woolgar argued (1986:31-32) that 
"social" and "technical" issues should be treated symmetrically.  They objected to the 
way the two notions had structured epistemic investigations.  While whatever was 
regarded as true was to be explained with reference to technical issues, social issues 
were only taken into consideration when one was to explain whatever was thought of as 
having gone wrong.  In other words, they adopted the methodological lesson of the 
symmetry principle of the strong programme as they argued that the social-technical 
distinction would hinder truthful investigations of ongoing science.
In contrast to the British school, as discussed, Latour and Woolgar did not frame 
their empirical approach in light of the epistemological question of causal explanation 
of beliefs. The study was set differently due to differences in their reflexive strategies.  
Given the reflexive strategy of Latour and Woolgar, the notion of the social did not 
from the very start play a crucial theoretical role in their work.  For example, symmetric 
treatment of technical and social issues did not imply, as it did in the British school, that 
everything should be explained by means of how beliefs were shaped in social interac-
tions.   
Latour and Woolgar nevertheless set out to perform "social studies of science".  In 
understanding their own activity as essentially similar to the practitioners they studied, 
however, they could avoid that a particular notion of the social appeared as a decisive 
demarcating concept for what they were to study.  The notion of "social construction", 
as Latour and Woolgar stated (even in their first edition), should be understood as a 
placeholder for the "process by which scientists make sense of their observations", and 
this definition should itself also be taken "as a working definition" (1986:30-32).  
Having worked their way through Laboratory Life, the "social" appeared to the authors 
as a rather empty theoretical notion.  In the postscript to the second edition of 
Laboratory Life (1986:281), the authors, appearing slightly puzzled and surprised, 
claimed they could simply erase the word "social" in the original subtitle (the social 
construction of scientific facts), and nothing would be changed.  
An important lesson of Laboratory Life was that the processes employed in produc-
ing knowledge were marked by their capacity to render themselves invisible.  Scientific 
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 knowledge producing processes were described as a process of "black boxing" the con-
text of production.  In the process of producing facts, reference to people, laboratory or 
machinery was gradually rendered superfluous.  The black-boxing process was seen a 
process of forgetting.  "[O]nce the end product, an inscription, is available; all the 
intermediary steps which made its production possible are forgotten"(1986:63).  When a 
fact was established as a fact, it appeared without context and this context was referred 
to as social, although with quotation marks; the "'social' factors disappear once a fact is 
established" (1986:23).  But as Latour (1993:53-55) later pointed out, the rationale of 
studying the social aspects of anything became questionable when everything was 
referred to as social (cf. fig 2.3).  In Laboratory Life, the word "social" appeared as an 
empty descriptive term as all interactions were referred to as social (it referred equally 
well to a pen’s mechanical inscription on graph paper as to the criticisms of a draft for a 
paper).37 
What, then, was the "social" that was forgotten or "black boxed" as soon as the writ-
ten reports about nature were available?  The notion of the "social" was hardly some-
thing one could "simply ditch" (1986:281) without creating a need for better articula-
tions of what one was talking about as being black boxed.  Moreover, the notion of the 
"social" was also used to draw some borderlines for what they were studying.  For 
example, studying the work of the scientific community was considered to be an ethno-
                                                 
37 The point here may be formulated differently with reference to the French tradition of philosophy of 
science that lurks in the background of Laboratory Life.  Empirical science studies have the potential for 
being an "open philosophy" of the sort Bachelard described as a characteristic feature of experimental 
physics. The natural sciences were for Bachelard sources of real epistemological novelty.  The philoso-
pher was supposed to learn epistemological lessons from the sciences rather than to seek to underwrite it.  
Science "creates philosophy" and the philosopher should try to articulate it (Bachelard 1984:3).  Experi-
mental physics was, in Bachelard’s account, an open philosophy because it had the potential to say “no” 
to earlier experiences.  In order to articulate a non-Newtonian theory, Bachelard argued, physicists had to 
deny crucial epistemological components of Newtonian physics.  They had to structure and organize their 
reasoning in non-Euclidian ways and adopt a non-Cartesian epistemology (Bachelard 1969 and 1984, 
Tiles 1984).  Empirical science studies, one could say, have likewise said "no" to commonsensical 
approaches to normative discourses on science and technology by finding new ways of working.  As the 
standard methodology of the philosophy of science was denied, one simultaneously denied the epistemo-
logical components of the approach.  One had to structure and organise the reasoning in non-epistemo-
logically dominated ways.  One of the most important lessons of Laboratory Life was that it demonstrated 
the inadequacy of existing theoretical vocabulary, starting with the notion of the social.  The work created 
an experience for the authors and many readers who said "no" to the notion of the social that has been 
deeply embedded in our ways of experiencing and discussing epistemic problems.   
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graphic study of scientists that "constitute a tribe whose daily manipulations and 
production of objects" could be investigated (1986:29).   
A series of conceptual innovations followed the emptying of the notion of the social 
as a theoretical notion.  The object that was under study, the scientific activity, was re-
conceptualised as different strategies for investigating it were invented.  A new empiri-
cal style of reasoning about science and technology was developed and came to be 
known as the “sociology of translation” or the “actor-network theory”. 
 
The Sociology of Translation    
A new problem arose following the emptying of the notion of the social.  How could the 
scientific knowledge producing process be articulated if one did not presuppose a social 
pole from which one could depict the process as goal-oriented (like the will or interest 
of the social community to produce facts)?  Ian Hacking’s (1992) description of the 
laboratory as a "self-vindicating" unit may demonstrate the problem at hand.  Hacking 
proposed that one could divide the inhabitants of the laboratory in three categories; 
"ideas", "data" and "objects".  Humans, in Hacking’s account, played an external role in 
bringing together the inhabitants in ways that together resulted in a stable constellation.  
Hacking presupposed that the process could be articulated in terms of the human (goal-
oriented) work of drawing together ideas, data and objects.  The French school objected 
to the usage of a social/subjective pole as an explanatory category.   
A methodological point was made.  Accounts such as Hacking’s should be measured 
primarily in terms of empirical adequacy, not philosophical soundness.  In order to 
account properly for the nature of ongoing science, as the proponents of the French 
posture went, one should not allow a subject or social pole to be used as an explanatory 
category.  In contrast, humans and non-humans should be treated symmetrically.  This 
move of the French school was a crucial and controversial move, and I shall discuss it in 
more detail in chapters to come.  To discuss this move however, one needs to under-
stand how, by denying the social/subject pole as an explanatory category, the French 
methodology took the British methodology one step further towards a non-
epistemologically modelled approach.   
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 Following the emptying of the theoretical notion of the social, the methodological 
principles of the strong programme were rewritten point by point.  The French approach 
did not seek casual explanations.  The approach was to be understood as a sociology of 
translation (Callon 1986), or "relationally materialist sociology" (Law 1994:95) where 
the relativism of the British school was replaced by "relationism" (Latour 1993:111-
114).  The French school came to be referred to as the actor-network theory (Law and 
Hassard 1999).  The "relational" account provided another way of understanding and 
investigating scientific activity.   
Michael Callon (1986) proposed three methodological principles that rearticulated 
the first three principles of the strong programme.  The first principle, referred to as the 
principle of "free associations", set the focus on the relations being formed between 
entities.  The scientific activity was understood and studied as a process where action-
mediating "associations" or "connections" between different entities were formed.  One 
should not search for causal explanations of action, one should rather focus on how 
action was mediated and performed in, by and through the relations being formed 
between different entities (Law 1999, Latour 1990).38   
What Callon called the principle of "extended agnosticism" imputed a radical contin-
gency of the standpoint and conclusions of the science observer.  This principle implied 
that one should be as agnostic towards the claims of the social scientists as one had been 
towards the claims of the natural scientists within the strong programme.  This princi-
ple, one could say, followed from a simple (epistemic) reflexive reflection of the second 
principle of the strong programme.  Nature, as the proponents of the strong programme 
held, could not appear as a yardstick by which consensus between experts was estab-
lished.  By explaining closure in terms of social variables, Callon argued, the propo-
nents of the British school acted as if their own claims were less susceptible to decon-
struction than the claims of the natural scientist.  The second principle of the strong 
                                                 
38 A dishwasher, to give an example of the perspective, does the dishes, but only as long as more water 
runs through power-generating turbines in the mountains and water can be drained out into the sewage 
system.  The leading question in investigating the activity of dishwashing is not captured in the question 
of who or what does what, but how the activity of dishwashing is mediated through the connections that 
are made between different entities.  How the “responsibility” for dishwashing is distributed among 
humans and non-humans becomes evident when something in the network breaks down. 
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programme (the principle of impartiality or neutrality) was thus extended to include the 
claims of the social scientists as well.   
The third principle of the strong programme, the symmetry principle, was likewise 
generalised with reference to a reflexive argument.  In the strong programme, the notion 
of "nature" had been emptied as a theoretical explanatory notion; the notion of the 
"social" should likewise be emptied as a theoretical explanatory notion.  If one were not 
to refer to states of nature in justifying the claims of natural scientist, one could not, at 
the same time, refer to states of society in order to justify one’s own claims.   
 
 Strong programme Sociology of translation   
1. Trace the translations/formation of 
associations.  
 
2. Agnosticism regarding truth-claims of natural 
and social science.  What nature and society 
is, is an open question. 
 
3. Nature and society are to be explained not 
used in explanations.  A symmetrical 
vocabulary of description of humans and 
non-humans are required.    
 
4. Reflexivity.  (A Standpoint of critique was 
established by reference to the principle of 
best account.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Causal explanation of belief. 
 
 
2. Agnosticism regarding truth-claims of 
natural science (neutrality). What nature 
is, is an open question. 
 
3 .Symmetrical explanations of true and 
false beliefs about nature are required. 
 
 
 
4. Reflexivity.  (A Standpoint of critique 
was established by reference to a 
philosophical-empirical distinction)
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 A point-by-point comparison of the methodological platform of the British and French schools. 
 
 
The fourth principle of reflexivity was simultaneously rewritten in ways that made the 
rewriting of the three other principles possible.  Callon did not put reflexivity on his list 
of methodological principles, but I think it is necessary to make it explicit in order to 
complement the discussion of the sociology of translation as a methodological alterna-
tive.  I suggest the notion of best account best articulates their reflexive posture.  This 
might become clearer if we return to the problem that followed the emptying of the 
theoretical content of the notion of the social.  How can one empirically investigate a 
process if the social/subject pole is excluded as an explanatory reference point for 
locating a goal-oriented will of the process?  The answer, given the actor-network 
approach, was not to discuss what ordered, but how orders came about.  This posture 
 92 
 resembled the British posture of not discussing truth as such, but accounting for the 
detailed steps where knowledge obtained the status of being true.  The French reflexive 
posture was probably most clearly articulated in John Law’s Organising Modernity.  
The actor-network approach should be understood as being, as Law (1994:97) stated, 
"committed to an ordering inquiry into ordering, rather than to an ordered inquiry which 
uncovers other root orders".  This commitment may be articulated in terms of the prin-
ciple of best account.  The actor-network approach carried a commitment to provide the 
best (ordered) account of ordering activity.  Or, one could say, it searched for the best 
account of the peculiar ordering powers of the natural sciences.39   
The actor-network approach, as Law (1994:97) further stated, "treats data, theory and 
method as all going together in some self-testing, self-exploring, but suitably modest 
from of inquiry".  In my reading, it is the commitment to provide the best account of the 
ordering activity that has made it possible for the activity to be a self-exploring activity.  
The point may be illustrated in the shift that occurred as the French school declared a 
commitment to account for the process of formation of actor-networks instead of 
accounting for the process of fact-production, or knowledge-producing processes.  The 
"social" that was seen as "black boxed" in Laboratory Life was now seen as better 
articulated in terms of "networks", "hybrids" or "quasi-objects".  This re-articulation, 
where networks were seen as the end product instead of facts, pointed to other arenas of 
production sites as well.  The wall of the laboratory, and the “tribe” working in the labo-
ratory, no longer appeared as the boundary where the students of science would go in 
order to account for the ordering process.  What was ordered by the ordering activity, 
                                                 
39 The activity of the natural sciences has generally tended, within STS works of the last two decades, to 
be studied as an ordering activity, that is, the epistemic activity has been understood and described as the 
one of creating orders, or “stability”. This process of stability formation processes is often, as Hacking 
(1992) explicitly stated, taken as a self-exploring or a self-vindicating activity.  The scientists’ methodol-
ogy was understood as established and adjusted in the process where stability is formed.  The notion of 
stability appears to have been the number one notion of choice for STS scholars who have tried to provide 
a process-oriented account of the epistemic activity of science (especially important works in this regard 
are Galison (1987), Latour (1987), Hacking (1992), Pickering (1995), Knorr-Cetina (1999) as well as 
Rheinberger (1997)).  A crucial differences between these authors, however, concerns the question of 
what they consider to be stabilised in the process.  The proponents of the actor-network approach repre-
sented the radical position that consistently refused to perceive their perspective as a theory of something 
in the world.  The question of what was stabilized had to be left as an open question, which was reflected 
by the strong reflexive commitment to a principle of the best account of ordering activity.  The posture 
strongly emphasised the fact that explanation needed to be avoided; instead, the posture was to answer 
"how" questions.   
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how to conceptualise the ordering activity as well as understandings of where this 
activity took place, were simultaneously reformulated in the shift from "fact-
production" to "network-formation".40   
 
Epistemology rewritten in ontological terms 
Perhaps the best way to express our position is by proposing a ten-year moratorium on 
cognitive explanations of science.  If our French epistemologist colleagues are suffi-
ciently confident in the paramount importance of cognitive phenomena for understanding 
science, they will accept the challenge.  We hereby promise that if anything remains to be 
explained at the end of this period, we too will turn to the mind! (Latour and Woolgar 
1986:280) 
 
The shift of focus from fact-production to network-formation implied a rewriting of the 
epistemic question field.  The shift has, however, often been articulated as a shift from 
epistemology to ontology, such as when the actor-network approach is presented in 
terms like "relational materiality" or "actant-rhizome ontology" (Law 1999 and Latour 
1999a).  Such notions, however, need to be understood in terms of the dominance of the 
epistemological tradition being rewritten by the French school.  I find the discussion 
found in the postscript of the second edition of Laboratory Life illustrative in these 
respects. 
Laboratory Life was often misread, Latour and Woolgar (1986:280) observed, 
because it was read as a book about epistemology.  The readers’ understanding of what 
they were studying, the "fact-production" process, was systematically misplaced due to 
ontological presuppositions at work in the dominant epistemological tradition.  The 
                                                 
40 In Laboratory Life, Latour and Woolgar depicted the laboratory they studied as a production-place with 
inputs and outputs (1986:46-103).  In the workplace they found entities like mice, pipettes, reagents, 
readouts, computers, discussions, drawings, refrigerators, researchers, secretaries, walls, benches, techni-
cians, instruments, textbooks, articles, faxes, telephones as well as a steady flow of inputs like financial, 
energy and water supplies.  During the research process new inputs were provided to the laboratory, items 
such as articles, guest researchers and new reagents.  Out of the laboratory went the written reports of 
what had been demonstrated inside the laboratory.  In Latour’s Pasteurisation of France (1988a), in con-
trast, Pasture’s success in demonstrating the existence of micro-organisms was seen in light of the process 
where stabilised laboratory creatures were made relevant for other groups outside the walls of the labora-
tory.  The existence of micro-organisms became hard to contest when industry managers, farmers and 
doctors (occupied with different practices as breweries, breeding or healing) could improve on their 
different practices by taking the laboratory creatures into account.  The production place then, was no 
longer confined to the laboratory, but was understood and studied in terms of the much larger context of 
French society. 
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 problem was so severe that Latour and Woolgar actually called for a ten-year morato-
rium on "cognitive explanations of science".  What was needed was an examination of 
the roots of its "deep-seated ontological commitments" (1986:280).   
The call for a moratorium appeared as an invitation to bracket off epistemic discus-
sions that took for granted what science ordered (namely "facts"), and questioned what 
science actually ordered instead.  It could be read as an appeal to do metaphysics by 
empirical means, instead of earlier, epistemology by empirical means.  Given such an 
ontological focus, the question of truth could be staged differently, as became clear in 
Latour’s Science in Action.   
 
[R]eality as the Latin words res indicates, is what resists.  What does it resist?  Trials of 
strength.  If, in a given situation, no dissenter is able to modify the shape of a new object, 
then that's it, it is reality, at least for as long as the trials of strength are not modified [...] 
so many resources have been mobilised [..] that we must admit, resistance will be vain: 
the claim has to be true (Latour 1987:93). 
 
The question of truth was here reconceptualised in terms of resistance of the large new 
object that had been shaped in course of the activity that was studied.   
In spite of the apparent shift to an ontological discussion, the perspective remained 
epistemic.  This becomes visible in the methodological continuity found in the shift 
from facts to networks.  The actor-network approach was, in Law’s words, "the methods 
by which the large and the powerful come to be large and powerful" (1994:95, see also 
Latour 1986, 1983).  The object of study (the scientific process), was articulated in 
terms of a process of power formation, which resembled a kind of directed process 
presupposed in the study of the process of knowledge production.  Fact-production as 
well as actor-network formation processes were both methodologically regarded as 
goal-directed processes.  The process of formation of power (that was to be described) 
had to be assumed to be a directed process if it was to serve as a methodological yard-
stick.  Epistemic reflexivity then, came to dominate the French school reflexive 
approach.   
I have tried to make this point evident by understanding Laboratory Life as a fore-
runner to actor-network theory.  Establishing a standpoint of critique, Latour and 
Woolgar, as I have claimed, appealed to the principle of the best account of knowledge-
producing processes.  This appeal reflected the activity of the scientists they were 
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studying (1986:30-31).  In a foreword to Laboratory Life, the head of the laboratory 
(that Latour and Woolgar studied) put it nicely: "[T]heir will to understand scientific 
work is consistent with the scientific ethos.  Their courage, and even brashness, in this 
undertaking reminds me of many scientific endeavours in which nothing stands in the 
way of the pursuit of an inquiry" (1986:12).  Latour and Woolgar had the same will to 
understand as the scientist they studied.  They were likewise prepared to make unusual 
methodological moves in order to provide accounts that could stand up against empiri-
cal scrutiny.  Latour and Woolgar’s "will to understand" was expressed in a commit-
ment to provide the best account of the chains of translations of the process in which 
reports of the scientific activity were created.   
As long as one had not emptied the theoretical notion of the social, one could assume 
an integrated research community where the will of the scientists was located, or gradu-
ally emerging.  By virtue of this will of the group, the knowledge-producing process 
could be assumed to be goal-oriented and as such also something for which one could 
be committed to provide the best account.  In the shift to actor-networks, the process 
was assumed to be goal-oriented even after the social pole was emptied as a theoretical 
notion.  The methods that committed themselves to the best account of the process by 
which the large and the powerful come to be large and powerful presupposed a "will to 
power" of the process.  As Nick Lee and Steve Brown (1994) have pointed out, there is 
a Nietzschean stroke of the actor-network worldview. 
My objection here is not that the process of actor-network formation is presupposed 
to be goal-oriented.  My objection concerns the lack of ethical-political reflexion of the 
point and purpose of such a goal-oriented activity.  Restricting the reflexive strategy to 
epistemic reflexion here, risks tacitly taking for granted that the point of the activity of 
studying science is primarily epistemic, and that the result of such epistemic activity in 
the next run would be important for political discussions.  Finding ways of including 
ethical-political reflexion into the French approach could hopefully take the perspective 
one step further towards a mature alternative, which will be discussed under the heading 
of "co-production".   
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 Towards a theory of co-production   
With the other contributors to this volume, I suggest that we have now arrived at a point 
at which we can usefully begin to pull together what has been learned in S&TS about the 
interpenetration of science and technology with culture expressions and social authority.  
While it may be premature to propound anything so ambitious as a theory of co-produc-
tion, it is not too soon to begin with more circumscribed steps (Jasanoff 2004b:18). 
 
 
The epistemological model is, in my reading of Taylor, a cultural analysis of how 
legitimizing discourses within a wide range of practices have been modelled.  I rely on 
Taylor’s analysis when discussing the activity of studying science.  The discussion is a 
discussion of the philosophy of the philosophy of science.  It is not primarily a discus-
sion of what good science is, but what good philosophy of science is.  Given this per-
spective, the STS field is particularly important because it has the potential of articulat-
ing an alternative (and improved) methodological platform through which normative 
evaluations of science and technology may be performed.  And, one should note, my 
Taylorean reading of the STS field has descriptive as well as prescriptive pretensions - 
it is a matter of re-describing the STS field in light of Taylor’s notion of the epistemo-
logical model.   
I have so far described the field of STS as a field that has evolved through the estab-
lishment of successive empirical "styles of reasoning" about science and technology.  
Within a style of reasoning (as described in Chapter 1), the object of study, in this case 
science, is constituted along with validating criteria, which in this case are captured in 
methodological prescriptions.  A style of reasoning is created around the object of study 
through self-stabilising or self-authenticating techniques created within the style of rea-
soning in question.  In this case the self-stabilising activity has centred on reflexive dis-
courses about how to improve the methodological approach.  Furthermore, the measure 
of improvement is basically cast in moral terms.  At the heart of the STS field, we find 
normative diagnoses of what have been experienced as the prevailing ways of concep-
tualising and investigating science, which, as I have suggested, should be described and 
investigated as epistemologically modelled perspectives.   
Understanding the STS tradition as standing in continuity with the epistemologically 
modeled philosophy of science tradition, I suggest, displays a shared unrecognised 
ethical-political component in the two traditions.  Science studies have, like the activity 
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they have studied, “never been modern” either.  Science studies were never modern in 
the sense that they could be described as an activity that pursued epistemological ques-
tions in isolation from ethical-political questions.  In establishing empirical styles of 
reasoning, as my analysis goes, the STS tradition has found a way to work itself out 
towards an alternative because it has focused on methodological issues. 
I have discussed three methodological platforms and understood them as successive 
replacements of each other.  What I called the standard approach was articulated in six 
epistemologically modelled methodological traits.  The strong programme pretended to 
offer a better platform for conceptualising and investigating science, given the various 
normative diagnoses that were captured in the critical-sceptical mood towards science 
and technology of the 1960s.  The programme appeared as a naturalist sociological turn 
towards investigations of how truth became socially endorsed.  However, normative 
tensions arose in the British school, because pertinent normative questions could not be 
dealt with by the approach.  The normative order of the epistemological model was 
disturbed by the emptying of the explanatory content of the notion of nature.   
The third methodological platform, the sociology of translation, pretended to offer 
another improved platform for conceptualising and investigating science.  The goal was 
still to improve upon the prevailing approaches handed over from our forebears; how-
ever, the strong programme was not satisfactory.  With an appeal to epistemic reflexive 
requirements, the programme was rewritten.  At the heart of the French school lay the 
claim that explanatory references to the social had to be avoided as well as explanatory 
reference to nature, if one was to fully understand the particular ordering powers of the 
natural sciences.   
The French perspective was not marked by the problem of accounting for relation-
ships between knowledge and nature or society.  The proponents of the school, to bor-
row a phrase from Pickring (1995:13), managed to escape from the "spell of representa-
tion".  Their ways of conceptualising and investigating science could not be understood 
as modelled by the epistemological model.  This is why, I suggest, that Jasanoff’s 
statement in the quotation above may be correct in suggesting that the field of STS now 
may finally have reached the point where it can perceive an outline of something as 
ambitious as an original and self-contained theoretical stance.  The field of STS has, in 
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 my reading, partly worked themselves out of the epistemological tradition towards an 
alternative normative perspective not marked by the tradition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical style II: How 
the large and powerful 
come to be large and 
powerful. 
• Emptying the notion 
of nature and society 
Empirical style I: How 
truth come to be socially 
endorsed. 
• Emptying the notion  
of nature   
Philosophical styles: The 
truth about epistemology. 
• Normative orders rely 
on a nature and 
society distinction. 
  
Style of reasoning  
Subject/ 
SocietNature Pole Lucky coincidence y Pole 
Ideals for good science: 
Ethical-political 
disinterested activity 
Ideals for good politics: 
Epistemic disinterested 
activity 
What are the ideals 
for good science? 
What are the ideals for 
good politics? 
Nature and society are to be explained - they are 
not to be used to explain anything.  Nature and  
society are co-produced. 
The question of good science and the question of 
good politics come together.  What then, are the 
ideal line of trajectory for the collective? 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.6  Three successive styles of reasoning about science and technology.  Normative tensions arose in 
the two empirical styles of reasoning following the emptying of the theoretical notions of nature and 
society. 
 
 
The lessons of the STS field could now be pulled together and stabilised, Jasanoff sug-
gested, under the heading of "co-production".  The notion of co-production emerged out 
of the French approach and was first discussed in Latour’s We Have Never Been 
Modern.  Latour’s notion of co-production stated, in short, that it is impossible to 
change the "social order without modifying the natural order – and vice versa".  Society 
as well as Nature should be seen as the "dual result of one single stabilisation process.  
For each state of Nature there exists a corresponding state of Society" (Latour 1993:42, 
94). 
In searching for ways of developing the co-production perspective into an alternative 
normative (non-epistemologically modelled) perspective, I pay attention to the norma-
tive tensions that remain in the French school and search for methodological ways of 
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overcoming these tensions.  The French school’s understanding of science as an epis-
temic activity implied that science also had to be understood and conceptualized as an 
ethical-political activity, which, as I have discussed, were not satisfactory done.  I will 
substantiate this point further by clarifying how Jasanoff’s notion of co-production 
implies a criticism of the British as well as the French school.  Jasanoff’s criticism pro-
vides simultaneously a point of entrance for my discussion on how the French school 
can be pursued one step further.  
 
 
Normative tensions in the French methodology  
[I]deas from science studies matter to political audiences and actors […] we may rea-
sonably be asked to cultivate a reflexive self-awareness of the ways in which our schol-
arly work may play out in the arenas of the ‘real world’.  In seeking to explicate the 
nature of science and the sources of its authority, all SSK [sociology of scientific knowl-
edge] scholars are necessarily engaged in an enterprise that is as deeply political as it is 
intellectual, even when their case studies or historical projects seem to be remote from the 
driving political concerns of late twentieth-century societies.  How could a branch of 
enquiry that takes as its central preserve the making (and unmaking) of human knowledge 
be anything but political to the core? (Jasanoff 1996a:409) 
 
Even if Latour "coined" the co-production term, Jasanoff is the one who has turned the 
term into a central theoretical term.  Jasanoff suggested in an article from 1996 
("Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the Politics of Science") that 
"co-production" replaced "controversy" as a heading for the field of STS.  The co-
production perspective, she claimed, captured the true commitment of the field being 
"deeply committed to seeing science as a dynamic an integrated part of society".  Given 
this commitment, the field should not settle for the study of how controversies were 
resolved (as was done in the British school), but rather how scientific and social orders 
were co-produced.  Jasanoff appealed to ethical-political reflexion.  The field needed a 
heading that recognised that the field was political at its core.  This implied that one 
should not leave the results of his or her work for some "instrumental use of others" 
(Jasanoff 1996a:409).  In other words, the strategy should not separate sharply the 
"political" work and the "scientific" work of accounting for how scientific truths 
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 became settled as truths - or one could add, how the large and powerful became large 
and powerful. 
Jasanoff suggested, it seems, that the British school had not taken seriously enough, 
or articulated clearly enough, the ethical-political reflexive requirement.  The British 
school based its work, Jasanoff argued, on an "incompletely worked out understanding 
of the implications of science and technology studies for social and political analysis" 
(1996a:395).  Jasanoff’s appeal here reveals the strong ethical-political commitment of 
the field.  In the end, the proponents of the field should be committed to search for ways 
of creating a good and just society, a commitment that, in my reading, should be seen as 
being marked by the epistemological model in the British school.  With the notion of 
co-production at hand, Jasanoff could ask her colleagues whether or not they really 
could accept their commitments being expressed under the heading of controversies.  
From the point of view the co-production perspective made possible, controversies 
appeared as an epistemologically modelled heading.41   
Suggesting the notion of co-production as a heading for the field called for further 
clarifications of the notion.  The notion of co-production should not only function as a 
heading for the French school, but the field in general.  Eight years after she first intro-
duced the concept, Jasanoff (2004b) analytically separated two theoreti-
cal/methodological strands of co-production.  There was the constitutive strand, which 
had been concerned with the emergence of novelty.  This strand had sought to articulate 
the patterns of creation and maintenance of stability.  I have concentrated on the practi-
tioners involved with this constitutive strand.  But, as Jasanoff made clear, this strand 
only represented one strand of the intellectual story of STS; what Jasanoff called the 
interactional strand represented the other.  While the constitutive strand has portrayed 
science as a vital driving force in social developments, the interactional strand turned its 
attention to the existing social and scientific orders being transformed.  In this view, the 
                                                 
41 The focus on controversies (of the British school), in Jasanoff’s analysis, was marked by “the 
preoccupation with epistemological issues”, which had “pushed to the sidelines of the field” the questions 
of how the field could provide “authoritative recommendations for social policy” (1996b:393).  The study 
of controversies, as was done in the British school, was framed as a relativistic methodological analysis of 
how disagreements were settled.  By appealing to the reflexive awareness of how the works of STS 
scholars actually have influenced social and science policy, she argued for a shift from a disengaged (or 
epistemological disinterested position) to a politically engaged posture.   
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interactional strand has been concerned with how these existing background orders 
again affected science (Jasanoff 2004b:18-19).   
I see the two strands as representing two opposite directed motions.  The first strand 
emerged out of the study of knowledge production processes, often through the detailed 
study of laboratory practices (like Latour and Woolgar (1986) Pickering (1984, 1995), 
Collins (1985), Galison (1987), Latour (1988a), and Knorr-Cetina (1999)).  The second 
strand emerged out of the study of the social structures in which science intervened (like 
Langdon Winner (1986), Jasanoff (1995), Brian Wynne (1992), Guston (2000a), 
Gibbons et. al. (1994) and Nowotny et. al. (2001)).  While the constitutive strand has 
drawn attention to the dynamics of the laboratorial extension into surrounding social 
territories, the interactional strand has drawn attention to the resistance by these social 
territories from being invaded, and how the laboratory would have to accommodate this 
resistance.   
In Jasanoff's vision, a robust theory of co-production will emerge out of a successful 
twisting, so to speak, of the insights from the two strands of co-production.  I have 
focused on the constitutive strand as I regard it as the most important theoretical strand.  
In my analysis, it is the constitutive strand that has managed to develop a self-regulating 
methodological discourse that created a trajectory out of the epistemological prison.  I 
therefore want to investigate the theoretical potentials of co-thinking the two strands of 
co-production from the point of view of the constitutive strand and ask whether it is 
possible to take the French methodology one step further.  In seeing the constitutive and 
interactional strands as focusing on two opposite directions of movements, we might 
better understand the ethical-political character of the interactional strand’s challenge to 
the constitutive strand.   
The interactional strand has raised questions that the constitutive strand (like the 
dominant actor-network approach) has no vocabulary to answer.  These are questions 
like: Why do products of science acquire such a deep "hold" on people’s identity build-
ing?  Why are some networks sustained, and why are some nodes in the network more 
important stabilisers than others?  A particularly important issue here is the role that 
values and ideologies (that mobilise and engage human actors) play in resisting or sub-
stantiating the stabilisation processes.  In the case of cloning, for example, the creation 
of a novel and stable procedure for cloning mammals (the sheep Dolly) could at the 
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 same time be seen as an intrusion into our established ways of conceptualising human-
ity.  The creation of a laboratory practice influenced an established moral discourse that 
was taking place outside the laboratory.  In turn, these moral discourses also influenced 
the dynamics of laboratory practices, like in the form of an inducement to search for 
adult stem cells.   
A sustainable account of the co-production process needs to find ways of conceptu-
alising the character of our moral engagement.  In the case of cloning, one needs to 
differentiate between how the work of creating these novel beings (the cloned embryos) 
immediately engages humans while involving non-humans.  We need an asymmetric 
descriptive language in order to account for the difference between mobilising or 
recruiting humans and non-humans.  Human identity is at stake in stem cell research.  In 
short, the moral asymmetry between humans and non-humans needs to be integrated 
into the French methodological approach. 
The call for morally asymmetric accounts of humans and non-humans has been made 
by many critics of the actor-network approach, for example Jasanoff herself (2004b).  I 
believe it is possible and constructive, as I shall discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, to 
integrate the philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor into the French school.  It is 
not a straightforward project of integration however, because one cannot simply settle 
the matter by relapsing back into the dichotomy of understanding (humans) and 
explaining (non-humans).  If one does, one is in danger of disregarding important and 
crucial insights of the co-production perspective.  Instead of pursuing the question as a 
philosophical challenge, I raise the issue as a methodological challenge in the form of a 
call for ethical-political reflexion.   
The methodological challenge to the French school was articulated quite forcefully 
by Collins and Yearley (1992 a,b) as they questioned the desirability of the perspectives 
of actor-networks.  Collins and Yearley’s critical questions echoed Feyerabend's cri-
tique of Kuhn discussed earlier in this chapter.  What is the point of the activities of 
actor-networks?  Is it enlightenment?  Should the activity seek to deliver insights that 
aim to improve the way administrators, scientists, politicians and activists may discuss, 
use, administer and cite scientific results and research projects?  Collins and Yearley’s 
critique displays the soundness and importance of the ethical-political component of 
reflexivity that seems to have been bypassed in the actor-network approach.  Their 
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methodological approaches were designed to display the patterns of formation of power, 
not to question the legitimacy of the process.  Understanding the co-production per-
spective as a non-epistemologically oriented perspective, we may now return to the 
ethical-political challenge of the French school without falling into the traps of relativ-
ism of the British school.  
How can one execute an ethical-political reflexive strategy within an actor-network 
approach?  Latour and Woolgar managed to initiate a school that re-articulated the dis-
cussions on the epistemic warrants of science.  They succeeded, as I have suggested, 
because they paid attention to the way they themselves produced ordered accounts of 
the scientific activity.  A new understanding of the epistemic character of scientific ac-
tivities evolved as they paid reflexive attention to the character of their own epistemic 
activity of investigating science.  I believe it is time to take the next move, to take a 
different approach to investigating the potentials of empirical studies to frame discus-
sions about ethical-political impacts of science.  Another understanding of the ethical-
political character of scientific activity may likewise evolve out of reflexive scrutiny of 
the ethical-political character of the activity of investigating science as it is executed in 
the French approach.   
This is what I have tried to do in this chapter.  I have read the French school as hav-
ing emerged out of an work of replacing epistemologically modelled approaches to the 
study of science and technology.  I have redescribed the French approach, in light of 
Taylor’s analysis of the epistemological model, in order to understand what the French 
approach should be seen as providing an alternative to.  Furthermore, such a reading 
simultaneously provides suggestions for how the French school may be improved upon.  
I shall discuss these matters further by a comparison of Latour’s and Taylor’s analysis 
of modernity.   
 
The modern constitution and the epistemological model 
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1993:138-141) provided a cultural analysis of 
modernity and presented it in terms of four "guarantees" of the "modern constitution".  
This analysis shares important features with Taylor’s analysis of the epistemological 
model.  The crucial difference concerns the way Taylor’s account accommodates ways 
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 of understanding his epistemological model as a normative model that addresses and 
commits the modern man.   
Latour’s analysis of the modern constitution (or what he sometimes called a "modern 
settlement") jointly facilitates and conceals the process of construction of big actor-
networks.  Latour decomposes the work of constructing actor-networks in the work of 
"translation" and "purification".  In the work of translation, large networks of associa-
tions between humans, non-humans and discourses are created, which is simultaneously 
grouped and ordered in the work of purification in light of the nature-social dichotomy.   
For instance, in order to realise the cloned embryo as a being in the world, a number 
of new associations needed to be established.  A robust laboratory system had to be 
constructed (with reagents, protocols and instruments) and the laboratory work had to 
be adjusted to economical realities (like patent rights, financial opportunities, and inter-
ests of the pharmaceutical industry) and social and moral realties (like legalisation and 
the procedures for establishing legislative decrees, Kantian understandings of life, 
patient groups and medical potentials).  The actor-network approach treats these differ-
ent types of entities (whether they are humans, non-humans or discourses) symmetri-
cally and studies the process of creating human embryos as a process of establishing 
dynamic actor-networks through which action (the practice of cloning human embryos) 
is mediated. In We Have Never Been Modern, this construction process was captured in 
the notion of the "work of translation".   
The work of purification however, has not been equally well described or empirically 
studied.  The effect of the work of purification, in Latour's picture, is the emergence of 
purified natural and social objects and objectives.  When several scientists argued that 
one should speak of cloned beings as "some forms of activated balls of cells", they 
could be said to be engaged in some work of purification.  With reference to "balls of 
cells", the work of creating the cloned embryo could more easily be decomposed into 
"pure" scientific, or laboratory internal considerations versus "pure" social considera-
tions regarding the morality of creating and using them.  What there was in the labora-
tory, as far as science was concerned, was "some form of activated balls of cells".   
Latour's modern constitution is an analysis of how the work of translation and purifi-
cation cooperate in ways that makes modern cultures effective constructors of big 
networks.  The constitution makes a double language possible.  Nature and society are 
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simultaneously seen as something one can and cannot transform, what Latour 
(1993:127-129) described in terms of a dual appearance of immanence; what one 
"resides in" and transforms, and transcendence; what "goes beyond" the given and what 
one may appeal to for explanatory purposes.  Nature and Society may both appear as 
transcendent and immanent, but they do not appear as transcendent and immanent at the 
same time – which is possible, only if we keep Nature and Society, Science and Politics 
separate. 
 
 
Sub specie aeternitatis 
1. Guarantee.  
Scientists make  
nature they do not  
Lucky coincidence 
make Politics. 
 
Society's transcendence 
legitimise science as 
pure nature  
construction (that do  
not affect Society). 
 
Nature Pole Subject/Society Pole  
 2. Guarantee.  
Politicians make 
society they do not 
make Nature. 
 
Nature's transcendence 
legitimise politics as 
pure society-
construction (that do 
not affect Nature). 
 
4. Guarantee.  
God made Nature and Man, 
politicians and scientists  
make nothing. Yet, politi- 
cians and scientists make 
everything, God makes noth-
ing, He has stepped back. 
 
God ensures arbitration be-
tween science and politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. Guarantee.  Science and politics are two distinct domains of work.   
 
The work of purification facilitates the politicians and scientists work 
of constructing collectives by rendering translations invisible.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.7 The modern constitution visualised in ways that facilitate a comparison with a Taylorean analysis, 
where normative discourses are seen as epistemologically modelled.   
 
 
It is possible that the modern constitution could justify the autonomy of the scientists 
work of cloning humans with reference to nature's immanence and society's transcen-
dence.  Scientists should be free to construct the "ball of cells" in question since this 
work would not change our social notion of humanity, since society is transcendent.  
Scientists do not make society – they make nature (as is the first guarantee of the con-
stitution).  The modern constitution may at the same time justify the autonomy of the 
politician's decision concerning what these beings were, and consequently, how they 
should be treated.  In this case, a combined reference to society’s immanence and 
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 nature’s transcendence could be made.  Politicians should be free to construct society by 
means of either banning "human clones" or applying "balls of cells" without changing 
(human) nature, since nature is transcendent.  Politicians do not make nature, they make 
society (second guarantee).   
The crucial feature of the constitution lies in the ontological nature-society distinc-
tion, with the third and fourth guarantee securing the distinction.  The third guarantee 
ensures that the activities we recognise as scientific and the activities we recognise as 
political remain as two distinct forms of activities.  And the fourth guarantee secures 
nature and society as two stable ontological reference points, as they are the work of the 
Creator.  God’s existence however, is also cast in a joint transcendence/immanence 
appearance in the modern constitution, which again makes the double language of 
nature’s and society’s immanence and transcendence possible.  Politicians and scientists 
have not created a human embryo in the laboratory.  God has made humanity as it 
appears in the natural and social world.  Yet, God has stepped back and makes nothing, 
politicians and scientists create and conceptualise what the beings in the laboratory are.   
In the figure above I have visualised the relation between the four guarantees in ways 
that make evident the similarities between how prevailing normative discourses on 
science and technology appear as epistemological modelled.  The function of the work 
of purification here resembles the function of the social contract’s legitimisation of the 
division of labour between scientist and politicians.  The crucial difference between a 
Latourean and a Taylorean picture here, however, becomes evident when one asks the 
question of why anyone would wish to perform the work of purification.  If we were 
"never modern", was there never any point in the modern constitution?  Latour 
describes the modern constitution without discussing the force of the commitments of 
the (human) actors to hold on to the guarantees of the constitution.  The question of how 
the modern constitution came to be considered desirable appears as a question one 
cannot ask within the French methodological approach (which does not accommodate 
means of discussing the moral asymmetry between humans and non-humans).   
Latour describes the modern constitution in terms that presuppose that it is valuable.  
He describes, for example, the fourth guarantee of the modern constitution as perhaps 
the most important one.  It installs God as the creator of natural and social order; that is, 
the nature and the social distinction has a divine and thereby an intrinsically valuable 
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origin (1993:142).42  Latour further claimed that the constitution even represents a 
reinterpretation of the ancient Christian theology.  Spirituality was reinvented (Latour 
1993:33).  Latour's account of the constitution then accommodates claims of how 
judgements of worth have been formed and changed in the form of a collective 
settlement.   
In light of Taylor’s epistemological model, Latour’s modern constitution appears as a 
normative order that cannot be articulated as a normative order on its own terms.  As a 
result, the two discourses we recognise as questions regarding the legitimacy of action 
and authority of science do not seem to be differentiated as two different discourses in 
Latour’s perspective.  I want to make the point clearer by taking a closer look at what 
direction Latour wants us to take, given his analysis of the modern constitution.   
 
The Parliament of Things 
Latour argued we should maintain the advantages of the modern constitution while 
avoiding its disadvantages.  We need to acknowledge, as I understand his closing re-
marks in We Have Never Been Modern, that sciences and societies have always been 
co-produced.  The moderns have conceived hybrid nature-societies by constructing 
clear and stable ontological boundaries between the two.  We need to take into account 
the fact that these boundaries are not stable but instead are constantly constructed, a 
problem Latour presented and discussed under the heading of the "Parliament of 
Things".  The notion was rudimentarily formulated in We Have Never Been Modern 
(1993), but the ideas it carried were further expanded on in Latour's next two theoretical 
books, Pandora's Hope (1999b) and Politics of Nature (2004a).   
The concept of "proposition" appears as an important theoretical innovation of 
Latour’s two later books (a notion borrowed from Alfred Whitehead's (1929) process 
ontology).  We are asked to think of the relations, the associations or connections, of the 
                                                 
42 Describing the modern constitution as relying on a divine nature and social distinction also indicates 
that it is very difficult for the moderns to articulate an alternative as well.  The modern constitution, one 
could say, does not appear as a historical contingent constitution or a settlement.  And furthermore, God 
has also withdrawn from creation.  We may thus not remember the reasons why this constitution has been 
installed and judged as a good constitution in the first place.  The constitution then, like the epistemologi-
cal model, may be understood as a tacit background order through which we formulate a responsible and 
preferable normative order.   
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 actor-network approach as propositions.  As described earlier, the actor-network 
approach conceptualises action as mediated through these relations, and the notion of 
propositions draws additional attention to what difference it would make if the "sugges-
tions" of a proposition were to be realised or not.  Latour argued that we should search 
for the construction of a due procedure where all the (uncertain) actors’ claims (through 
their representatives) of making difference, for better or worse, should be taken into 
account.  Propositions, then, adds a normative content to Latour’s relations (associations 
or connections) through which actions is mediated.  
"I offer the best stem cell source", claims the clone.  "We are hundreds of millions 
who will benefit from the cloning technique", add the patient groups.  "My research on 
stem cells is constrained by existing patents", complains the medical researcher.  "We 
need the patent in order to cover our costs", replies the biotechnological firms.  
"Allowing the technique of therapeutic cloning implies that one treat embryos as pure 
means", warns the Kantian discourse.  "We make it possible to bypass the ethical prob-
lems altogether", say the adult stem cells.  "We do not at any rate accept such fiddling 
with life", states a Christian community.   
The actors themselves are still not important or discussed as agents as such, instead, 
it is the various suggestions for how different connections between the actors should be 
formed that are the focus.  The Politics of Nature describes the Parliament of Things as 
a two-step idealised procedure where the collective first settles the question of what 
propositions are in play, and then discusses which of the propositions the different 
actors have brought to the parliament should be taken into account or rejected.  The 
Parliament of Things, then, represents the ideals for a due procedure where the collec-
tive as such (of humans and non-humans) should strive for improvements in being more 
refined and "articulate", and having more to say and including more aspects.   
The ideals of well-organised Parliament of Things appear to be an extension of the 
ideals of a Habermasian liberal procedural democracy.  What the Parliament adds, how-
ever, is the non-human actors that make language more esoteric.  The important point of 
the notion of Parliament of Things is to recognise the uncertainties of action that follow 
the recognition that powerful and controversial actions are very often mediated by non-
human agencies.  Political action is not only realised through a process of human mobi-
lisation; one also needs to mobilise non-humans.  Political discussions cannot be 
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confined and described in terms of an ideal discussion that takes place among humans 
alone; non-humans should be allowed as well.   
There is, however, a problem in Latour's extension of the ideal of the liberal democ-
racy that becomes clear as Latour refers to Kant.  Latour (1998:231) claims Kant’s dic-
tum fits well for non-humans as well: "Let us generalise to all the being of the creation 
the aspiration to the kingdom of ends".  By extending Kant's dictum, Latour makes it 
explicit that the methodology of actor-network theory is a complete methodology with 
no outside.  There is no other platform for the ethical-political debates where the out-
come of the stabilisation process could be morally evaluated (cf. also Pickering’s (1995) 
ambitions for a theory of everything).  The Parliament of Things is presented as secur-
ing a joint epistemic-ethical validating procedure.  Philosophically, it is hard to accept 
this line of argument, as it relies on the ideals of the liberal democracy which itself 
would lose its moral intelligibility if the Kantian dictum were to be extended as Latour 
suggested.  The intelligibility of the dictum is based on the analytical distinction be-
tween epistemic and ethical-political activities.  Such a distinction cannot be made in 
Latour’s perspective, where normative valuation are ascribed to the action-mediating 
relations.   
The discourse of actor-networks primarily maintains an ontological-epistemic dis-
course on the conditions of order formation.  The problem is not that the epistemic and 
political debates are considered intrinsically linked from this perspective, but that it is 
difficult to see how they may be understood as different at all.  At stake here is the pos-
sibility of differentiating between an actual and a legitimate process.  In Chapter 3 I 
shall argue that it is possible to integrate Taylor’s notion of human agency in ways that 
articulate scientific and political activities as two different activities, although intrinsi-
cally linked.   
The point is not, first of all, to side with Latour’s many critics regarding the problems 
of distinguishing political and scientific activities.  Philosophical arguments may too 
soon impose closure on the matter at stake as it is in danger of not incorporating the 
insights of Latour's perspective.  My goal is to contribute to the discussion of how the 
notion of the Parliament of Things may be better articulated.  At this point I shall briefly 
discuss Isabelle Stengers’ understanding of Latour’s concerns.  It may provide a clarifi-
cation of what moral lesson I find important to preserve in Latour’s perspective, and 
 110 
 why I find it necessary to incorporate a philosophical anthropology of the kind Taylor 
has articulated.43   
 
Problems engage humans while involve non-humans   
In Stengers’ (2000:153) view, the difference between Latour’s ideas and more conven-
tional ideas such as those proposed by Popper is not as large as one might think.  The 
ideas of the Parliament of Things could be compared to Popper’s ideas of public discus-
sions of "third world" objects.44      
 
In a sense, the Parliament of Things is Popperian.  It celebrates the emerging dynamics of 
these "third world" inhabitants, who are recognised by their capacity to sustain problems 
beyond beliefs, convictions, and plans.  Only humans have seats in it, are seated there, but 
these humans are defined not as free subjects, characterised by their convictions and 
ambitions, but as representatives of a problem that engages and situates them.  Only 
humans have seats in it, but these humans are not united by a dynamic of intersubjectiv-
ity.  On the contrary, they have to invent links within disparity, they have to bring into 
existence rhizomatic prolongations that refer not to a general interest stronger than any 
one of them but to new interest provoked by their coming together (Stengers 2000:154).   
 
What I find clarifying in Stengers’ comparison of Latour with Popper lies in her empha-
sis of how the representatives of the Parliament of Things together represent objectives 
or real problems.  The representatives of the Parliament are selected in light of the 
problem in question.  It is the problem that should be fully represented, or fully 
"articulated". 
"A problem" in Popper’s (1979:116) picture may be considered objective because it 
can be cast in non-anthropomorphic terms.  A problem is a problem-in-itself, regardless 
of whether or not it is being experienced as a problem by a human being.  The technical 
problems of cloning a human being would be considered objective because these prob-
lems exist independently of the existence of any human attempt to clone a human being.  
                                                 
43 I take Stengers’ reading of Latour as a particularly important reading.  She is a philosopher Latour 
highly appreciates; he has found her arguments important in trying to articulate the normative lessons of 
the actor-network approach (Latour 1997, 2004b).     
44 The inhabitants of the third world of Popper (1979:115ff) resemble the world of ideas of Plato.  The 
inhabitants are non-material; instead, this world is where objective arguments, problems and statements 
reside.  In contrast to Plato, however, Popper understood the third world as man-made, historic and 
changeable, they were not essentials.  The inhabitants of the second world are non-material as well, 
although subjective and personal.  The first world inhabitants, in Poppers account, are the material objects 
that are being thought, felt, discussed and represented in the two other worlds. 
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Problems, in Popper’s account, appear to be objective when they may be seen as inde-
pendent of the individual, subjective human sphere of second world objects.  The goal 
of Popper's (1979:114) third-world approach then, could be understood objective and 
scientific because it dealt with a world that could be regarded as scientific and non-
political because it was independent of the human world of feelings, personal responses 
and moral evaluations.   
In contrast, the goal of Latour’s Parliament of Things approach is both scientific and 
political.  There are no problems that are seen as non-political or purely scientific.  If 
the approach aims to be both scientific and political, it needs to incorporate a notion of 
human agency, because the problems that convene the Parliament of Things cannot be 
articulated in non-anthropomorphic terms.  Ethical-political problems come as part and 
parcel of the problems generated by questions such as those raised by cloning.  
According to Taylor’s argument (which will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter), one simply cannot account for the nature of such problems without reference 
to human agency.  Given the philosophical anthropology of Taylor, one could say that 
the human representatives in the Parliament of Things of, say, the problem of cloning, 
are representatives of problems that engage humans while involving non-humans.  The 
important point is that humans, in contrast to non-humans, are morally addressed by a 
situation that is created by scientific and technological developments.   
Without such an account of the character of the moral asymmetry between human 
and non-human agency, one cannot account for the temporal dynamics of the problems 
that are to be dealt with by the Parliament of Things.  Taylor’s understanding of humans 
who can be morally addressed by non-humans may provide an understanding of how 
novel ethical problems appear and old problems fade away in the vicinity of the devel-
opment of science and technology.   
 
Risky constructions and ontological politics 
The moral lessons of the French school that I find important to retain may be clarified 
through further reference to Stengers’ discussion of how Popper’s ideas need to be 
adjusted in light of Latour’s insights.   
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 Popper was basically right, the Latour-Stengers argument goes (Latour 1997, 2004b); 
good research strategies put themselves at risk of being destabilised.  The more the 
activity is at risk of being destabilised, the more scientific it gets.  In the Latour-
Stengerian picture however, it is not only words that are put at risk in genuine and good 
science, but the world as well, which adds an ethical point to the demarcation of science 
as risky.  Given this perspective one cannot, like Popper (1963:52) did, argue that it is 
possible to let our theories "suffer in our stead" by leaving mistakes, trials and errors to 
hypothetical experimental test situations.   
The difficulty at hand, if we are to grasp the lessons of the actor-network approach 
for ethics, is that we need to make sense of notions like "ontological politics", as 
Annemarie Mol put it:   
 
Ontologies: not that.  Now the word needs to go in the plural.  For, and this is the crucial 
move, if reality is done, if it is historically, culturally and materially located, then it is 
also multiple.  Realities have become multiple (Mol 1999:75).   
 
Ethical problems created by the development of science and technology need to be con-
ceived in ways that take into account how the world is being constantly re-made by 
science.  Such ethical discussions would not be reduced to an epistemic discussion of 
the correctness of our ways of perceiving the world, but would evolve around a discus-
sion of what world we would like to see realised, both materially and socially. 
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Chapter 3 
Rethinking human agency 
 
 
 
Rethinking human agency as well as science  
 
The French approach emerged, in my reading, as the proponents of the school opposed 
and sought alternatives to epistemologically modelled ways of performing science 
studies. The completion of such a move towards a non-epistemologically modelled 
alternative, as this chapter argues, requires a philosophical anthropology of the sort 
Taylor provides.  The chapter discusses the French school by mainly focusing on the 
works of Latour.   
Seen from the point of view of the analysis of the epistemological model, the works 
of Latour and Taylor supplement each other.  They questioned, and sought alternatives 
to, the same cultural construal of modernity, but from two complementary points of 
departure.  Latour focused on how representational accounts of knowledge have marked 
modern epistemic discourses along with the concept of science.  Taylor, on the other 
hand, focused on how representational accounts of knowledge have marked modern 
ethical-political discourses along with the concept of human agency.  Because they 
challenged the same normative order of modernity, I suggest, Taylor's and Latour's 
perspectives may complement each other.  I discuss the matter by searching for ways to 
integrate Taylor's perspective into Latour's.   
The first section of this chapter clarifies why a philosophical anthropology of the sort 
Taylor articulates should be integrated into Latour's perspective.  Such a clarification 
needs to take into account why human agency was not theorised in Latour's perspective, 
and what was gained in doing so.  Opening the brackets on the question of human 
agency imposed within Latour's perspective is a challenging task, as it needs to be done 
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 without compromising the insights of the perspective.  The second section discusses 
how Taylor's philosophical anthropology may be integrated into Latour's approach.  
Such integration has theoretical and methodological implications that will be clarified in 
the third section.  The chapter closes with a summary of the theoretical claims in part I, 
and how I intend to discuss the matter further in part II.   
 
 
 
For or against intentionality 
 
Latour’s new understanding of the activities we refer to as scientific and epistemic came 
at a price.  As the notion of human agency was bracketed off along the way, the activi-
ties we refer to as ethical and political simultaneously appeared as blind spots within the 
perspective.  These matters are well described in Sheila Jasanoff’s criticism of Latour.  
 
Latour’s networks exercise power while displaying curiously little of the moral and 
political conflicts that normally accompany the creation and maintenance of systems of 
governance.  He has little to say, for instance, about why the organization of technologi-
cal practices or the credibility of scientific claims vary across cultures; why some actor-
networks remain contested and unstable for long periods while others settle quickly; why 
work at some nodes stabilizes a network more effectively than at others; or what roles 
memories, beliefs, values, and ideologies play in sustaining some representations of 
nature and the social world at the expense of others. […] Put differently, when actor-
network theory confronts the nature of power, as it often does, it side-steps the very ques-
tions about people, institutions, ideas, and preferences that are of greatest political 
concern.  Who loses and who wins through the constitution of networks?  How are bene-
fits and burdens (re)distributed by or across them?  By downplaying such issues, actor-
network theory’s welcome attempt to reinvigorate the place of the non-human and the 
material in accounts of power entails substantial costs with respect to the treatment of 
human agency and human values (Jasanoff 2004b:23). 
 
Networks exercise power by virtue of the bigness and degree of stability of the 
networks formed, but the perspective has little to say about the role that moral and 
political conflicts play in the creation and maintenance of such networks.  The actor-
network approach has little to say about the dynamics of politics and culture.  These 
issues have been downplayed in the actor-network approach, as Jasanoff put it, in order 
to reinvigorate the place of the non-humans.  
 115
Given the analysis of the epistemological model, this does not come as a surprise.  
When Latour and his colleagues rearticulated science, they simultaneously came into 
conflict with the entire normative order of modernity.  It is understandable that it be-
came difficult to incorporate a concept of human agency in Latour’s perspective.  Ethics 
and politics could not remain unchanged through Latour’s rewriting of epistemology.  
What is missing in Latour’s perspective, I believe, are tools that can account for how 
humans are attuned to the world as the world changes.  Attempts to reinstitute a notion 
of human agency into Latour's perspective, however, would need to take into account 
why the notion of human agency was bracketed off in order to reinvigorate the place of 
non-humans in accounts of power.  The notion of human agency was bracketed off in 
Latour's perspective, I suggest, because his perspective came into conflict with taken-
for-granted understandings of human agency, or, how the notion of human agency had 
come to be epistemologically modelled.   
If the critique of Latour’s approach were marked by the epistemological modelled 
concept of human agency, given this analysis, one would expect a controversy to appear 
that would be difficult to resolve.  I believe this is what has happened, and the contro-
versy I suggest, may be presented as an unfruitful "for or against intentionality" debate.  
I shall present the conflict at hand in order to find a point of departure for discussing 
how Taylor’s perspective may be integrated into Latour’s.  The conflict may actually be 
clarified with reference to Taylor’s own work, since Taylor had to work himself out of 
the epistemological model himself.  His early conceptualisation of man was itself 
marked by the epistemological model, and his early conceptualisation of man has been 
very influential in many circles that have been critical to Latour’s perspective.  
Taylor, to repeat, has primarily been interested in modern conceptualisations of 
ethics and politics, rather than modern conceptualisations of science.  This brought him 
to reflect on the nature of human agency.  Taylor's philosophy, as clarified by Jørgen 
Fossland and Harald Grimen (2001:chapter 3), has been marked by his criticism of what 
he called the "naturalist bend" or "naturalist tendencies" of our time.  In particular, 
Taylor has focused on criticising naturalisations of the sciences of man (such as socio-
biology).  The problem was that ethical-political activities were bound to be misrepre-
sented from a naturalist perspective since such perspectives couldn’t account for what it 
is to be an acting and responsible person.   
 116 
 Taylor, however, initially pursued the critique of naturalism by trying to demarcate 
the social sciences from the natural sciences.  This provided, in turn, an epistemological 
frame for his conceptualisation of human agency.  The sciences of man were herme-
neutic, as Taylor argued in his influential article "Interpretation and the Sciences of 
Man" (1985a), because these sciences studied "self-interpreting beings".  The sciences 
of man therefore could not adhere to the same methodology as the natural sciences.  
Naturalised tendencies arose due to an illegitimate transfer of the methodological (and 
epistemological positivist) ideals that, according to Taylor, suited the natural sciences, 
but not the social sciences. 
 
The progress of natural science has lent great credibility to this epistemology, since it can 
be plausibly reconstructed on this model, as for instance has been done by the logical 
empiricists.  And, of course, the temptation has been overwhelming to reconstruct the 
sciences of man on the same model; or rather to launch them in lines of inquiry that fit 
this paradigm, since they are constantly said to be in their 'infancy'" (Taylor 1985a:20).   
 
Taylor, it appears to me, here articulated an early version of what later came to be called 
the epistemological model.  Back in 1971 (when this article was first published) Taylor 
suggested that naturalism was generally appealing because the natural sciences served 
as a model for the sciences of man.  At that time, Taylor did not provide an analysis of 
how western intellectual cultures in general should be analysed as epistemologically 
oriented.  In particular, he did not pay attention to how his own conceptualisation of the 
natural sciences was marked by the epistemological tradition.  Taylor's own modelling 
of the sciences of man therefore came to be marked by the way he contrasted the 
sciences of man with a positivist understanding of the natural sciences.  The representa-
tional account of knowledge was central to this conceptualisation of the natural 
sciences, which in turn also came to mark the way the sciences of man were conceptu-
alised.  The identification of man as self-interpreting beings appeared to be cogent in 
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light of the epistemological problem of how to get access to the human world of 
symbols and meanings.45   
Seen from Latour’s point of view, such an understanding of man sustained a flawed 
modelling of the natural sciences.  Fossland’s and Grimen’s presentation of Taylor’s 
demarcation between the natural and human sciences may clarify the point.  The base-
line for Taylor’s line of demarcation, they argued, concerns the fact that the object 
under study in the human sciences undergoes changes that have no correlate in the natu-
ral sciences.  The natural scientists therefore, in contrast to the social scientists, do not 
need to appropriate the actor's point of view.  Changes may appear in the object studied 
by the natural scientists (like a mutation), but such changes are not of a conceptual 
character since "natural researchers do not study self-interpreting animals; by definition, 
there may never arise new conceptual innovations in their field of study" (Fossland and 
Grimen 2001:224, my translation).  Seen from Latour's point of view, the difficulty of 
this argument lies in the understanding of the natural sciences that often follows such 
lines of argument.  The future course of a field like biology, as Fossland and Grimen 
concluded, may be considered open-ended - but the open character of the field lies in 
the "possibility of predicting the development of natural sciences qua human practice" 
(my translation).   
The point that genes or frogs do not talk or interpret themselves is an important 
point, although it is in danger of being a trivial point.  It is not difficult to disagree with 
the claim that novel conceptual innovations do not arise in the field, as if genes or frogs 
talk among themselves and reflect on how human beings interpret them and their 
                                                 
45 The distinction between the mere “hermeneutic" and the “double hermeneutic" sciences further 
enforced and strengthened the traditional epistemological framing of the philosophical discussions on the 
difference between the natural and human sciences.  The hermeneutic double hermeneutic distinction 
appeared as a reply to Kuhn (1991) and others who argued that the natural sciences were also hermeneutic 
sciences (see for instance Fossland and Grimen (2001:216-24) for a discussion of the matter).  The claim 
that the sciences of man have a double hermeneutic nature does not only reproduce the argument that 
humans need to be studied differently because they are self-interpreting beings.  The notion also carries a 
recognition of the claim that the natural sciences are hermeneutic, that is, that they may be investigated in 
terms of how people construct theoretical representations of nature.  The description of the human 
sciences as double hermeneutic seems to display an important effect of the unfortunate misplaced under-
standing of the natural sciences in the first place.  A flawed understanding of the natural sciences induced 
a flawed understanding of the sciences of man, which in turn struck back on the natural sciences in terms 
of claims that they were also hermeneutic. As a result, unfruitful dichotomies, such as realism vs. con-
structivism or objectivism vs. relativism, were further enforced. 
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 actions.46  On the other hand however, the opposite claim is also questionable; concep-
tual innovations could not be seen as arising outside the field either, implying some 
radical social constructivist position.  Fossland and Grimen’s argument begs the ques-
tion of what a proper account of natural sciences is.  The natural scientist’s work of 
conceptualisation could be seen as independent of genes or frogs and the whole experi-
mental setting in which these objects are studied.  The French school emerged as an 
attempt to understand how this could be done without relapsing into empiricism.  
The understanding of the temporal dynamics of research lies at the heart of the 
matter here.  The problem with conceptualising man as a self-interpreting being is that it 
tends to impose a lack of sensitivity to, or a forgetting of what Knorr-Cetina (1999) has 
called the scientists’ "epistemic setting" or "epistemic machinery", which needs to be 
constructed in order to bring forward and conceptualise the objects under study.  The 
work of articulating theoretical objects is intrinsically linked to the work of establishing 
the epistemic machinery of the laboratory.47  A focus on the contrast between explain-
ing things and understanding persons tends to draw attention away from material 
objects, technologies and the hardships involved in controlling them.  The point is not to 
erase the distinction between humans and non-humans, but rather to draw attention to 
the process where relations between humans and non-humans are formed. 48  In order to 
provide adequate accounts of the role technologies and material objects play in the 
process of becoming, in the process where novelty is shaped, the proponents of the 
                                                 
46 Latour does not claim that genes or frogs act as humans either.  One does not do justice to the actor-
network perspective if one explains the open-endedness of biology in terms of radical indeterminacy of 
the actions of non-humans since the perspective does not pretend to provide explanations in terms of 
agencies as such.  The proponents of the perspective seek to understand how something was done or how 
action was mediated.  The perspective does not pretend to provide a means of pursuing the question of 
who did it or why it was done.   
47 As I have indicated in the controversy on human cloning, the question of how to conceptualise what the 
beings constructed in the laboratory were, needs to be seen as a joint technical and social issue.  I shall 
further discuss the matter in Chapter 5 when analysing a process of rearticulating genes. 
48 It is symptomatic that Grimen and Fossland refer to mutations when discussing changes that occur in 
the field.  One could possibly have used examples of a volcanic eruption or particle decay to make the 
same point; sometimes things just happen in nature.  Such examples miss the point of why proponents of 
actor-networks have found it useful to speak of material agencies, and in doing so claim that the natural 
sciences are open-ended.  The point is not first of all to conceptualise the “resistance" or actions of the 
non-humans, the point is to trace the formation of relations shaped, among other things, between humans 
and non-humans.  The point is to articulate the process of research by focusing on relations shaped 
between entities, arguing that actions are mediated through these relations.  The challenge, then, is to 
understand and describe how action is mediated and to trace how relations between human and non-
human agencies are formed in order to create powerful structures through which actions are performed.  
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actor-network approach have claimed, one needs to leave the question of agency open, 
explaining why they have somewhat been "against intentionality".49    
The actor-network approach, as one cannot stress enough, does not ascribed agency 
to non-humans, but suggests that we should leave the question of agency open.  The 
point is not theoretical, but methodological, as Nick Lee and Paul Stenner expressed it: 
  
Actor Network Theory [ANT] de-centres.  Some understand post-structuralist 'de-
centring' as a slogan, commitment of ultimate goal of analysis [...].  But, as is evident 
from the studies influenced by ANT, de-centring is better understood as a method of 
analysis, which, given the observation 'something was done', systematically avoids the 
form of 'explanation', provided by grammar (which is at once fundamental and beside the 
point) that runs; 'some one must have done it.'  Rather than simply rejecting the notion of 
centres of control, ANT gives account of how control may, temporarily, become centred 
(Lee and Stenner 1999:92). 
 
We should understand agency as de-centred or distributed, the invitation goes, if we are 
to trace how powerful actions are performed through dynamic actor-networks.  The 
question of what or who is responsible for the action needs to be left open, as Callon put 
it (see also Latour 1986 and 1994). 
 
The most important is that ANT is based on no stable theory of the actor; rather it 
assumes the radical indeterminacy of the actor.  For example, the actor's size, its 
psychological make-up, and the motivations behind its actions – none of these are prede-
termined (Callon 1999:181).  
 
The actor-network approach, then, has bracketed off the question of agency as such in 
order to be better able to provide adequate accounts of the dynamics of the natural 
sciences.  The important achievement of this perspective concerns the way it makes the 
analyst more sensitive to the role material objects and technologies play in the research 
process.  If one does not bracket off the question of human agency, however, as when 
man is conceptualised as a self-interpreting being, the analyst tend to be stuck to issues 
like theory choices and discussions of human motive powers.  Arguments like the ones 
forwarded by Fossland and Grimen, that biological research needs to be seen as open-
                                                 
49 Latour (1994), for instance, has criticised the understanding of human agency that were expressed in 
what he called the “homo faber myth".  This myth pictured humans as the only real agents due to their 
extraordinary capacity ascribed to them qua tool-using beings.  Non-humans lack an essential feature that 
humans possess - a feature that enables humans to initiate change and to create at will.  Any changes will 
in this picture tend to be explained by attempts to trace changes back to the will or the intention of the 
human agent.   
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 ended qua human practice, enforce a tendency of the analyst to forget the experimental 
conditions in which the direction of research is set.  Such analytical strategies, as I shall 
try to make more evident in part II of this work (discussing the phenomena of biologi-
zation), not only provide thin and insufficient analysis, they even provide irresponsible 
accounts of the dynamics of biological research.  Important and powerful mediators of 
the biological research process are simply not given enough attention.   
The methodological point made by the proponents of actor-networks has, however, 
been highly overstated.  Possibly as a result of their posture of being against intention-
ality, the proponents of the actor-network approach have tended to render suspect any 
efforts to conceptualise human agency.  In the passage below, Callon and Law seem to 
state that it would be a philosophical mistake to even try.   
 
Are "humans" "like" "nonhumans", or not?  The question is undecidable.  Or perhaps it 
can sometimes be decided, but only locally.  So we can't in general prove that "humans" 
are like "non-humans."  Or that some "non-humans" are agents.  If we tried, we'd be 
wasting our time.  All we can do is make stories, which suggest that if you don't make 
such assumptions, then revealing things may happen, theoretically and empirically.  And 
that is what we'll to.  We'll adopt a methodological point of view: that it is interesting to 
leave the question of agency open (Callon and Law 1995:482). 
 
We may here, I suggest, find traces of a naturalist posture in the arguments of Callon 
and Law.  There is an important difference between a) an appeal to what the strategy of 
leaving the question of agency open may reveal, and b) the claim that we are better off 
if we do not question the nature of human agency at all.  The latter appeals to a philoso-
phical type of argument that may slip into a dogmatic posture (the question is in princi-
ple undecidable, it's "a waste of time" to even try).  Such a posture will in turn enforce 
some naturalised version of human agency, especially because Callon and Law’s 
perspective treats humans and non-humans symmetrically.  The former claim, however, 
appeals to an empirical type of argument that makes it possible to reopen the question of 
human agency with reference to empirical adequacy (which I take to express the true 
commitments of the actor-network approach).   
Further traces of a naturalist posture become evident in the proponents’ tendency to 
overstate their anti-theoretical posture.  Theories are not something one should wish for, 
as Callon (1999) and Law (1999) argued in their contribution to Actor Network Theory 
– and After; we should rather suppress any tendencies of fascination for theories.  It is 
 121
possible to understand their anti-theoretical posture in light of their attempts to counter-
act theory-biased criticism of their opponents (who discussed their theories rather than 
their empirical works).  Such theory-biased critiques tended to "fix" the identity of the 
actor-network approach in ways that made it possible to wander off along a theoretical 
tangent.  The danger here, however, as I suspect has partly happened, is that one may 
get trapped by the concept of theory of the epistemological tradition.  Callon and Law’s 
overstating of their anti-theoretical posture is in danger of lending support to the epis-
temological tradition, where the concept of theory is associated with the creation of 
fixing representations of science.  
At stake here are the questions of standards of critique of the actor-network 
approach.  Any theoretical critique might easily be dismissed as just another attempt to 
do the impossible, that is, to prove or ground a theoretical understanding of human 
agency.  Possibly more disturbing, such anti-theoretical postures may also counteract 
ethical-political reflexion.  When a theoretical perspective is not presented as a theory 
(but a craft, method or approach), the authority of the perspective is de-emphasised.  
The perspective may then stand out as less responsible as a result of its claims of being 
a method.  A non-theoretical theory, to underscore the point, does not itself pretend to 
be a guide that leads forward to the better.  Consequently, one cannot challenge it 
accordingly.  The question of what is preferable may be left to some other context 
where the outcome of the discussions does not challenge the approach.   
Even though the actor-network approach has made a strong empirical case for leav-
ing the question of agency open, the proponents of the approach simultaneously tend to 
overstate their case in ways that may enforce non-reflexive postures as well as natural-
ised versions of human agency.  This situation has appeared, I suspect, because propo-
nents of the actor-network constantly had to counteract the critics who maintained that 
one had to employ an asymmetric descriptive language for humans and non-humans.  
The problem, however, was that these critiques tended to be marked by the epistemo-
logically modelled notion of human agency that could not be integrated into the French 
school without compromising its central insights.  As a result, the proponents of actor-
networks came to express hostility towards any attempts to conceptualise human 
agency, which in turn enforced the criticism of the critics being concerned by the 
normative implications of the approach. 
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 Ethical-political reflexion 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Latour and Woolgar (1986:36) decided that they could 
probably better articulate how orders were produced in science if they paid more atten-
tion to how they themselves produced ordered accounts.  One should likewise expect 
that one could articulate the ethical-political character of the French school’s rewritten 
understanding of scientific research better if one paid more attention to how the propo-
nents of the school themselves developed and executed their actor-network theory.  I 
have tried to do so in Chapter 2.  Their activity, as I suggested, needs to be understood 
as having been shaped against the normative background order of the epistemological 
model.   
Latour himself came close to describing the modern constitution as a culturally 
integrated normative order when, in Pandora's Hope, he referred to the story of 
Pandora's Box.50  In the Pandora’s Box of modernity "epistemology, morality, politics, 
and psychology go hand in hand and are aiming at the same settlement" (1999b:13).  
Such discourses (in which we put our trust), were in Latour’s picture seen as internally 
related to each other - and the works of science studies challenged them all at once.  
When the students of science peeked into the forbidden black box of the scientific 
production of facts, they could not prevent the simultaneous escape of influential under-
standings of epistemology, morality, politics and psychology.  The entire settlement, 
passed on from our forefathers, carefully designed to avoid falling prey to "mob rule", 
crumbled away.  All the blessings (or alternatively, everything that is evil) escaped 
Pandora's Box.   
Reference to the story of Pandora here indicates an understanding of there being a 
normative order in play that somewhat escaped or crumbled away in the minds of the 
students of science who came to open the box.  Latour did not, of course, suggest that 
students of science themselves destroyed the normative order of modernity, or that they 
                                                 
50 Pandora was, in the Greek mythology, the first woman on earth.  Zeus created her, and there are two 
stories explaining why he created her and what happened when she was created.  In the first story Pandora 
was sent by Zeus as a punishment for man’s stealing fire from heaven, in the second story Pandora was 
sent as a blessing to man.  In both stories Zeus gave Pandora a container or box she was told not to open 
under any circumstances.  But Pandora, to satisfy her curiosity, opened the box.  In the first story all 
manner of evil flew out, in the second all the blessings escaped.  But, in both stories, all that remained at 
the bottom of the box was hope.   
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were somewhat empowered to do so.  The reference to Pandora’s Box carried a norma-
tive diagnosis of the modern settlement that did not seem to appear as a desirable 
settlement, at least not any longer.  The insights gained under the STS tradition only 
made this more evident, and seen from Latour’s point of view, there is no point of 
return to the modern settlement once the box has been opened.  There is only one thing 
to do, Latour stated, and that is to go "all the way deep into the almost-empty box, in 
order to retrieve what, according to the venerable legend, has been left at the bottom – 
yes, hope.  It is much too deep for me on my own; are you willing to help me reach it?" 
(1999b:23).   
Taylor provides a perspective that makes it possible to understand better what STS 
scholars challenged as they opened the box and what role they have played in doing so.  
A better understanding of these matters would put one in a better position to retrieve the 
hope of restoring a new normative order.  The history of the field of STS, as described 
through the lens of Taylor’s perspective, may be seen as a history of a field that has 
worked itself out of epistemologically modelled science studies.  As such, the history of 
the field may be (re)described as a goal-oriented field.  It is a field that has taken a 
normative analysis of the inadequacy of present methodological approaches as its point 
of departure for searching for better and improved ways of performing science studies.  
The modern constitution described by Latour should therefore from this perspective be 
seen as a normative order that also affected the pioneers of STS, as this normative order 
was embedded in the standard methodological approaches they challenged.  By paying 
closer attention to how this normative order has affected their work, I believe it 
becomes evident what is missing from Latour’s perspective, and additionally it becomes 
clear how one can improve upon the perspective.  
The modern constitution, to recall Taylor’s perspective, could be understood as a 
normative response of the kind humans construct as moral and political beings.  The 
commitments and self-understandings of the modern age have become too obvious for 
words during the course of history.  Taylor understands this "forgetting" in terms of 
how the commitments have become integrated into a range of different practices we live 
by.  This becomes clear in his discussions in "Philosophy and Its History". 
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 How does a model like the epistemological one move from being an exciting conquest of 
creative redescription to being too obvious for words?  How is the forgetting mediated?  
This comes about because the model becomes the organising principle for a wide range of 
the practices in which we think and act and deal with the world. The model is embedded 
in our manner of doing natural science, in our technology, in some at least of the domi-
nant ways in which we construe political life (the atomistic ones), later in various of our 
ways of healing, regimenting, organising people in society, and in other spheres too 
numerous to mention.  This is how the model could sink to the level of an unquestionable 
background assumption.  What organises and makes sense of so much of our lives cannot 
but appear unchangeable at first, and hard even to conceive alternatives to (Taylor 
1984:20). 
 
From Taylor’s perspective, what Latour refers to as the modern settlement arose 
because a range of different practices came to model their respective practices in light of 
the same epistemological model.  A crucial aspect of Taylor’s perspective concerns his 
analysis of how the forgetting has been mediated.  The model, Taylor argued, needs to 
be seen as having become part and parcel of a number of different practices in general, 
and science in particular, as it has become "embedded in our manner of doing natural 
science".51   
The work of opening of the Pandora’s Box, one could say, could be seen as a work of 
undoing the forgetting, of displaying the model as a model.  This undoing of the forget-
ting happened in the process of reshaping the practices of conducting science studies.  
The epistemological model became visible as students of science studies restructured 
their own professional identities.  Given Taylor’s perspective, the modern settlement is 
not something one can take away without changing the practice of doing natural 
science.  A critique of the settlement then, and attempts to rearticulate it, imply sugges-
tions for how the doing of natural science may be improved.  The account of Chapter 2 
suggests that this also applies to the practice of studying science; it has itself been epis-
temologically modelled in ways that have not been clear to practitioners themselves.  
                                                 
51 Latour’s analysis of the modern constitution cannot account for why or how the modern settlement 
arose and endured as a compelling settlement.  Why would anyone want to construct such a settlement in 
the first place, and how could one account for such an activity?  The question here also concerns the 
identity of the student of science, like Latour, who found it important to describe the modern constitution.  
How are we to understand and evaluate the normative diagnosis of Latour’s own analysis of the modern 
settlement?  Actor-network theory, as it has bracketed off the question of human agency, cannot itself 
provide a satisfactory analytical frame here.  The perspective even suggests that we are better off by not 
asking the questions of the sort raised here – at least not within the frame of the actor-network approach.   
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They simply could not work differently, as I have tried to make evident, without chal-
lenging the normative order.   
The account in Chapter 2 could be seen as an account of the STS field in which its 
proponents are asked to accept in light of how well the account addresses and deals with 
the theoretical and methodological challenges of the field.  Given this reading, that is, a 
Taylorean reading of STS, STS scholars have played an important normative role by 
displaying prevailing normative discourses about science and technology as epistemo-
logically modelled.  Far from undermining normative perspectives, the field has 
provided an important first step for restoring non-epistemologically modelled normative 
perspectives of science and technology.  This reading of the STS field implies that one 
needs to incorporate an adequate understanding of ethical-political activities that does 
not slip into some naturalised version.  Latour’s perspective needs some notion of 
human agency of the sort provided by Taylor, that is, a notion of human agency that can 
account for the moral character of the social reality that humans shape in responding to 
the world they remake through scientific and technological activities.  My reading of the 
STS field, as well as my discussion of how Taylor could be integrated into Latour's per-
spective, needs in turn to be evaluated in terms of how well it leads to a theoretical co-
production posture of the sort Jasanoff claims to be a unifying posture of the STS field.   
 
 
 
From self-interpretation to self-evaluation 
Through all this cross talk about 'hermeneutics', the question of what one means by this 
basic thesis, that man is a self-interpreting animal, and how one can show that it is so, 
may still go unanswered (Taylor 1985a:45). 
 
 
By taking a series of shifts in Taylor’s philosophy into account, I believe it is possible to 
by-pass the somewhat paralysing "for-or-against intentionality" debate.  An important 
drift seems to have taken place in Taylor’s reasoning that makes a difference in many 
respects here.  While he first investigated what it is to be a person under an epistemic 
heading, a moral heading is more pertinent in his later works.  Taylor’s later preference 
for a moral heading can possibly be seen as a result of his attempt to specify more 
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 clearly what it would take to demonstrate that the basic hermeneutic thesis was true (cf. 
the quote above from 1977).  Such a demonstration was better performed when Taylor 
scrutinised how one could account for moral actions.52
Taking his 1971 article on "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" as a point of ref-
erence, I will clarify a series of connected displacements in Taylor’s reasoning that 
make a difference with respect to the compatibility of Taylor’s and Latour’s perspec-
tives.  Five points are relevant.  First, Taylor came to provide a more specific analysis of 
how not to talk about human agency, that is, that it should not be cast in epistemological 
terms.  Taylor’s analysis here, I suggest, simultaneously clarifies which notion of 
human agency, along with understandings of the social world humans create among 
themselves, the STS tradition should concentrate on rejecting.  Second, Taylor came to 
conceptualise human agency in moral rather than epistemic terms as he came to speak 
of self-evaluating rather than self-interpreting beings.  It is possible to integrate Taylor’s 
understanding of man as a self-evaluating being into Latour's perspective as Taylor 
establishes the notion using the same type of argument that Latour adheres to.  The next 
three points provide a more specific discussion of the way Taylor can be seen to 
supplement Latour. 
Taylor’s shift was accompanied by an "ontological turn" analogous to the ontological 
turn of Latour.  Where Latour discussed the ontology of facts, Taylor discussed the 
ontology of values.  And social reality, earlier presented in the representationally loaded 
terms of a text analogy, now came to be discussed in terms of how social realities affect 
and are affected by human actions and practices.  Taylor displayed a richer world than 
what is displayed in the actor-network perspective and these realities need to be 
accounted for as well.  Additionally, this ontological turn fostered greater sensitivity to 
the temporal character of politics analogous to how Latour’s ontological move came to 
foster greater sensitivity to the temporal character of science.  In both cases, the shifts 
made counteract the epistemological tradition that "constantly nudges us towards a 
mistrust of transitional arguments", as Taylor (1989:73) put it, whether concerning the 
                                                 
52 The characterisation of the sciences of man as hermeneutics sciences fade away in Taylor’s later 
writings.  In The Sources of the Self (1989), as far as I can see, hermeneutics do not even appear as an 
analytical term at all.  Furthermore, Taylor’s analysis of how our western culture has been dominated by 
epistemology also became gradually more articulated during the years.  He may therefore also have 
become gradually more sensitive to how the epistemological tradition had affected his own reasoning. 
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evaluation of scientific or political judgements.  Seen in isolation from each other, the 
two shifts may be difficult to comprehend; seen together the two shifts stand in mutual 
support of each other.  Lastly, the joint articulation of scientific and political activities 
within a temporal frame provides a way to articulate science and politics as different 
intrinsically linked activities, which I believe should be the hallmark of co-production 
perspectives.   
 
 
1. How not to conceptualise human agency.  Disengaged vs. engaged agency 
Over the years Taylor no longer found it appropriate, or clarifying enough, to take the 
natural sciences as a point of reference for characterisations of the sciences of man.  In 
"Explanation and Practical Reason" he even stated that the epistemological tradition 
probably has been just as damaging for the understanding of the natural sciences as it 
has been for the social sciences (Taylor 1995:42).  Taylor no longer focused on how our 
understanding of man had been shaped by the methods and theories of the natural 
sciences, but how our understanding of man had been shaped by a particular epistemo-
logical tradition.  I believe this made him better able to articulate how one not should 
talk about human agency.   
Taylor traced a widespread modern self-understanding of man back to the Renais-
sance, where man’s reasoning came to be understood as "disengaged" from the world it 
reasoned about.  This widespread self-understanding has in turn lent support to natural-
ised modes of investigating human beings.  To clarify the notion of disengaged agency, 
Taylor (1995:chaper 4 and 9) referred to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin 
Heidegger.  When these two thinkers are mentioned in the same breath, Taylor stated, it 
is often to cite them as thinkers that "painfully and with difficulty have helped us 
emerge from the grip of modern rationalism" (1995:61).  What unites them, Taylor 
suggested, is their common criticism of a "kind of ontologizing of rational procedure", 
where rules of action were treated as if they had an independent existence.  Rules of 
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 actions are in this picture treated as representations of an activity which may or may not 
account uniquely for the actions performed.53   
The proper procedures of action, when understanding agency as disengaged, have 
been read into the constitutions of the mind or some underlying social order.  Because 
thinking became abstractedly treated, human action tended to be understood as its 
derivative.  The reasoning of the human agency was thus understood as disengaged in 
the sense that it was not conceptualised in terms of, or understood as formed or affected 
by, the world in which humans performed their actions.   
This understanding of man’s reasoning as disengaged has nurtured a sharp distinction 
between political and scientific judgements.  Two different types of constituents of the 
mind may be distinguished here, represented respectively under the heading of facts and 
values. The two types of constituents may be traced back to two different origins.  
While facts have an obvious external counterpart in states of affairs, values come from 
us.  From this perspective, scientific judgements are judgements that may be discussed, 
as they are based on facts grounded in an external objective reality.  When it comes to 
politics, however, judgements cannot be fully arbitrated by reason since values cannot 
be neutrally investigated (since they come from us).  Values, then, are established as an 
exclusive human category in the sense that human beings are understood as adding a 
human political dimension to the world as it is captured through the scientific activities 
we understand as epistemic.  This analysis, Taylor claimed, captures a widespread 
(often unreflected or spontaneous) understanding of what values and political activity 
are about.54
In this analysis, the work of clarifying the respective legitimate domains of science 
and politics comes down to a scrutiny of what comes from us as humans and what 
comes from the field of investigation.  The more necessary the outcome of research has 
                                                 
53 Michael Lynch (1992) has provided an illuminating critique of how David Bloor reasoned along these 
lines, a critique that demonstrates how Bloor’s reasoning is marked by the epistemological modelled 
notion of human agency criticised by Taylor.  
54 In arguing the case, Taylor draws attention to the tendency in our culture to take a stance of moral 
scepticism for granted (a fact that I suspect most teachers of introductory philosophy courses would 
confirm).  In "Explanation and Practical Reason", Taylor (1995) argued that his analysis explains why 
this may be the case.  The tendency to regard scepticism as the only respectable moral stance displays 
how prevailing notions of politics have been articulated or framed within an epistemologically oriented 
culture.  
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to be seen as a result of human activity, the more contingent and political the issue is 
considered to be.  The pure amoral cases are those where only technical or scientific 
issues remain.  These are issues that may appear as amoral because the influence of 
human agency has been reduced to a minimum.  The notions of science and human 
agency appear to be mutually exclusive in this construal.  In the ideal form, where we 
find science, we do not trace human agency and vice versa.  Scientific activities by 
virtue of excluding the interference of humans, provide objective understandings of 
states of affairs that should underlie political actions.   
Taylor and Latour both came to run up against this notion of human agency as they 
attacked the same modern constitution.  Latour bypassed the notion of human agency 
altogether (along with the ethical-political discourses it structured) in order to rethink 
the received view of science.  Taylor, however, re-conceptualised the notion of human 
agency in order to rethink a corresponding received view on politics.   
 
 
2. Human agency conceptualised in a moral rather than epistemological frame   
A person is a being who can be addressed, and who can reply.  Let us call a being of this 
kind a 'respondent' (Taylor 1985a:97).   
 
Taylor came to articulate a more vivid understanding of human agency by further 
"exploring the conditions of intentionality" as he stated in "Overcoming Epistemology" 
(1995:14).  A characteristic feature of human agency, as Taylor argued in "What is 
Human Agency" (1985a) and "The Concept of a Person" (1985a), concerns the way 
humans are addressed by, and respond to, situations they are engaged in.  It is not 
necessarily clear to humans what they are addressed by and find important, nor is it 
always clear to them what they should accept as an appropriate response to it.  How-
ever, the character of the human response needs to be understood in moral terms.  Man 
seeks to understand the situation as well as his own response to the situation he finds 
himself in, but we cannot understand the character of this activity or engagement if we 
do not understand its crucial moral component.  Humans do not only respond and try to 
make sense of their response; they evaluate themselves in light of how they respond.  
This self-reflexive act of evaluation is a motor of change for human identity.   
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 The activity of determining what is acceptable, good and desirable is situated in the 
human act of evaluating its own activity, and there is as such no external yardstick for 
determining what is really good and desirable here.  
 
[I]t is not exactly that I have no yardstick, in the sense that anything goes, but rather that 
what takes the place of the yardstick is my deepest unstructured sense of what is impor-
tant, which is as yet inchoate and which I am trying to bring to definition. I am trying to 
see reality afresh and form more adequate categories to describe it.  To do this I am trying 
to open myself, use all my deepest, unstructured sense of things in order to come to a new 
clarity.  Now this engages me at a depth that using a fixed yardstick does not.  I am in a 
sense questioning the inchoate sense that led me to use the yardstick.  And at the same 
time it engages my whole self in a way that judging by a yardstick does not.  This is what 
makes it uncommonly difficult to reflect on our fundamental evaluations (Taylor 1985a 
1-42). 4 
Human agents cannot escape from the existential character of the situation they are 
thrown into.  They may, however, be more or less present, true or open to the situation.  
They may exhibit different degrees of integrity or live more or less authentically.   
Taylor’s argument is formulated as a kind of transcendental argument in the sense 
that he questions the conditions of intentionality, or more specifically, what it takes to 
account for the mode of agency we recognise as human.  We simply cannot account for 
human action, Taylor argued, without recurrence to the self-reflexive judgement of the 
worth of its own actions.55   
 
We may understand this, if we examine more closely the range of human feelings like pride, 
shame, guilt, sense of worth, love and so on.  When we try to state what is particular to each 
one of these feelings, we find we can only do so if we describe the situation in which we feel 
them, and what we are inclined to do in it.  Shame is what we feel in a situation of humiliat-
ing exposure, and we want to hide ourselves from this; fear what we feel in a situation of 
danger, and we want to escape it; guilt when we are aware of transgression; and so on 
(Taylor 1985a:100). 
 
Taylor’s accentuation of man as a self-evaluating rather than self-interpreting being 
might appear as a small adjustment, but I believe it makes an important difference.  
Taylor and Latour may now be seen as having been engaged in the parallel work of 
reconceptualising received views of science and human agency, along with corre-
sponding understandings of epistemic and ethical activities.   
                                                 
55 Taylor demonstrates more clearly here, I would say, the basic hermeneutic thesis that man interprets 
himself – that is, why humans undergo changes that have no correlate among non-humans.   
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Taylor’s rewritten notions of human agency do not rely on or lend support to an un-
derstanding of science that undermines Latour’s insights.56  And furthermore, Taylor's 
suggestions may be discussed in the same vein as Latour's, as Taylor adheres to the 
same type of argument that Latour adheres to.  In The Sources of the Self, Taylor for-
mulated the methodological "principle of best account" that comes close to Latour's 
methodological commitments discussed in Chapter 2.  The principle complies with a 
pragmatic understanding of philosophical activity as work of re-description that aims at 
creating more "clairvoyant" concepts.   
 
How can we ever know that humans can be explained by any scientific theory until we 
actually explain how they live their lives in its terms?  This establishes what it means to 
'make sense' of our lives, in the meaning of my statements above.  The terms we select 
have to make sense across the whole range of both explanatory and life uses.  The terms 
indispensable for the latter are part of the story that makes best sense of us, unless and 
until we can replace them with more clairvoyant substitutes.  The result of this search for 
clairvoyance yields the best account we can give at any given time, and no epistemologi-
cal or metaphysical considerations of a more general kind about science or nature can 
justify setting this aside.  The best account in the above sense is trumps.  Let me call this 
the BA principle.  It seems to me that the various theories of moral judgement as projec-
tions, and the attempts to distinguish 'value' from 'fact', fall afoul of this BA principle 
(Taylor 1989:58). 
 
The methodological principle of adherence to the best available account counteracts the 
unproductive for-or-against intentionality debate.  No epistemological or metaphysical 
considerations of a more general kind can justify setting this principle aside.   
 
 
3. Values and social realities as something we have to deal with   
Taylor’s account of man as a moral respondent implied an interesting conceptualisation 
of the reality we think of as social.  Although humans respond qua individual persons, 
personal identity is not something one may formulate all by one’s self.  In "Social 
Theory as Practice", Taylor focuses on the set of practices we live by when discussing 
the nature of the human inter-subjective shared world.  These practices are not only 
                                                 
56 On the contrary, by not trying to understand the widespread naturalist understanding of human agency 
as due to the success and influence of the natural sciences, Taylor now could leave the question of how 
one should understand the natural science as an open question.  
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 meaningful practices, they also have a point.  Humans can’t totally escape evaluating 
the practices they live by as they conceptualise them as meaningful practices.  Estab-
lished practices consequently carry historical judgements of worth (which may be more 
or less well articulated and clear to view from the practitioners’ point of view).  A social 
theory that articulates the practitioner's self-understanding of this practice provides an 
account of how a given group of practitioners has chosen to perform their practices.   
 
In a sense, we could say that social theory arises when we try to explicate what we are 
doing, describe the activity which is central to a practice, and articulate the norms which 
are essential to it.  We could imagine a society where people decided things by majority 
vote, and had a lively sense of what was fair and foul, but had not yet worked out explic-
itly the norm of individual independence and its rationale in the context of the practice.  
In one clear sense, their doing so would amount to a step into theory.  But in fact the 
framing of theory rarely consists simply of making some continuing practice explicit.  
The stronger motive for making and adopting theories is the sense that our implicit under-
standing is in some way crucially inadequate or even wrong.  Theories do not just make 
our constitutive self-understandings explicit, but extend, or criticise or even challenge 
them.  It is in this sense that theory makes a claim to tell us what is really going on, to 
show us the real, hitherto unidentified course of events (Taylor 1985b:93-94).   
 
Social theories from Taylor's perspective are normative theories, because such theories 
simultaneously articulate and address the practitioner’s professional identities.   
We may here understand Taylor’s own philosophical theory of the epistemological 
model (as well as Latour’s theory of the modern constitution) as a social theory.  The 
theory claims to articulate a "background" for human actions, as Taylor often put it, 
something that is really there as part of what constitutes the practitioner’s personal and 
professional identities.57  Accounts of scientific practices are also social theories in this 
sense; these are accounts that simultaneously address the social background against 
which these practices are performed.  Such theories are normative theories.  The matter 
at stake here may be discussed as a reflexive question of what the measures of correct-
ness of the account of scientific activity should be.  
                                                 
57 We may here get a better picture of how Taylor’s philosophy, as I have discussed before, can provide a 
reflexive understanding of Latour’s philosophical reflections and normative diagnosis.  As one under-
stands the nature of the normative background order of the modern constitution better, one may also come 
to understand better one’s activity of doing (social) studies of science.  Furthermore, given Taylor’s per-
spective, we may modify Latour's slogan that “we were never modern".  Latour’s modern constitution has 
at least been a real constitution in the sense that the modern’s construal has affected the world and the 
construal has affected the modern’s commitments.  Latour himself had to deal with the reality of the 
constitution as he tried to find ways of convincing those who were committed to it.   
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A correct, or possibly better, a good social theory, does not only make such self-
understandings explicit, it provides a draft for how to improve upon the practice as well.  
A good theory leads forwards. 
 
What is it for a theory to be right?  We cannot just reply that it is right when it corre-
sponds to the facts it is about.  Because, to oversimplify slightly, political theories are 
about our practices (as well as the institutions and relations in which these practices are 
carried on), and their rise and adoption can alter these practices.  They are not about a 
domain of facts independent of, or resistant to, the development of theory.  Put testily, our 
social theories can be validated, because they can be tested in practice.  If theory can 
transform practice, then it can be tested in the quality of the practice it informs.  What 
makes a theory right is that it brings practice out in the clear; that its adoption makes 
possible what is in some sense a more effective practice (Taylor 1985b:104). 
 
Taylor was in the passage above discussing political practices, but the points made also 
apply to Latour's perspective, which displays "science as politics by other means", to 
use one of his slogans.  Given the background order of the epistemological model, 
however, science is portrayed as non-political.  The correctness of accounts of scientific 
activity, when the activity is not epistemologically modelled, needs to be simultane-
ously epistemologically and ethical-politically questioned; they need to be understood 
as having descriptive as well as prescriptive aspirations.  It is important here to under-
stand the ontological nature of the social realities that is to be accounted for.  In order to 
do so, we may benefit from comparing Taylor’s shift with Hacking's shift from repre-
sentation to intervention.   
Hacking (1983:146) suggested that "we shall count as real what we can use to inter-
vene in the world to affect something else, or what the world can use to affect us".  
Scientific reality, in Hacking’s conception, has more to do with our abilities to change 
the world than our ability to depict it.  We could achieve more, Hacking suggested, if 
we discussed reality under the heading of intervention instead of representation.  The 
STS tradition could be understood as having explored the potentials of discussing 
reality under the heading of intervention.  As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, different 
versions of what we could call a stability thesis illustrates how scientific truths have 
been expressed in terms of what we have to deal with, rather than what we may repre-
sent.  Latour, for instance, argued in Science in Action that we should understand and 
investigate reality in terms of resistance.  We consider something as real when phenom-
ena will not go away no matter how much we try to modify them (Latour 1987:93).   
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 Taylor appeals to the same type of argument as he asks us to turn to intervention in 
the domain of ethics and politics.  We may talk of two parallel movements.  Hacking 
and Latour were mainly concerned with scientific reality, that is, how to understand the 
reality of the objects and phenomena that natural scientist investigates.  Taylor was 
mainly concerned with moral realities or social realities, that is, how to understand the 
reality of the objects and phenomena that social scientists investigate.  In Sources of the 
Self, Taylor made a suggestion analogous to Hacking’s, that we understand and investi-
gate social reality in terms of how we affect it and how it affect us, an understanding 
that is rooted in Taylor's philosophical anthropology.   
  
What is real is what you have to deal with, what won't go away just because it doesn't fit 
with your prejudices.  By this token, what you can't help having recourse to in life is real, 
or as near to reality as you can get a grasp of at present.  Your general metaphysical 
picture of "values" and their place in "reality" ought to be based on what you find real in 
this way.  It couldn't conceivably be the basis of an objection to its reality (Taylor 
1989:59). 
 
Taylor’s shift is neither more nor less difficult to perceive than Hacking's.  However, 
considering the two shifts simultaneously may make it easier to perceive the two indi-
vidual shifts.  One cannot take away the reality of values any less than one can take 
away the reality of facts.  They both refer to realities we affect and are affected by.  
Given Taylor’s understanding of human agents as respondents, social realities appear to 
be a morally loaded reality that may be conceptualised and investigated in terms of what 
affects human agents and what human agents affect.  The actor-network approach has 
no means of taking this reality into account.  
A descriptive account of a scientific practice, from this perspective, will not be a 
complete account unless it also articulates what the practice is as a good practice.  Such 
descriptions need to articulate the constitutive norms of the practice, which is a matter 
of articulating what the practice is as a good practice.  These matters may be badly 
articulated or not clear to the practitioners themselves.  It may be insufficiently articu-
lated by the analysts as well.  Questioning the correctness of an account of scientific 
practice then, amounts to questioning how the description may improve upon the prac-
tice accounted for.   
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4. The temporality of ethical-political evaluations   
Taylor's insights may be integrated into Latour's perspective because he came to articu-
late ethical-political activities in temporal terms.  Taylor and Latour respectively chal-
lenged the atemporal conceptualisations of science and politics of the epistemological 
tradition.  David Stump (1996:439) pinpointed quite clearly the connections that have 
existed between atemporal conceptualisations of science and epistemologically oriented 
forms of investigations of science.   
 
Whig histories, realist explanation, and logical analysis of scientific practice are all mani-
festly atemporal, whereas the material practice, the institutional organisation, the content 
of theories, the methods of analysis, the aims of inquiry, and the ontology associated with 
scientific theories all change through time.  A major goal of science studies must be to 
account for the temporality of scientific practice, and a rethinking of philosophy is espe-
cially important in this area since traditional philosophy has never been able to deal 
adequately with temporal change.  Emphasis on temporal changes can also begin to 
dissolve the dualist representational account of knowledge if we deny that there is an a 
priori atemporal distinction between nature and mind or society (Stump 1996:449-450). 
 
Latour and his colleagues run up against the dualist representational account of knowl-
edge as they provided an alternative account of scientific activity that could express the 
temporality of scientific practice.  Taylor, on the other hand, called attention to the need 
to express the temporality of ethical-political practice as he sought alternatives to epis-
temologically modelled understandings of ethics and politics (or what the philosophical 
tradition discuss under the heading of practical reasoning).  The focus on the need to 
understand how moral judgments emerge and change though time is perhaps most 
clearly accentuated in Sources of the Self. 
 
Practical reasoning, as I have argued elsewhere,58 is a reasoning in transitions.  It aims to 
establish, not that some position is correct absolutely but rather that some position is 
superior to some other.  It is concerned covertly or openly, implicitly or explicitly, with 
comparative propositions.  We show one of these comparative claims to be well founded 
when we can show that the move from A to B constitutes a gain epistemically (Taylor 
1989:72). 
 
Taylor contrasted, following the passage above, two ways of investigating and explain-
ing judgements about the conviction of the superiority of B to A.  One may try to ar-
ticulate the "lived transition" or seek to understand the transition as an "error-reducing" 
                                                 
58 In a footnote, Taylor here referred to "Explanation and Practical Reasoning" (Taylor 1995). 
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 one.  In "Explanation and Practical Reason", he described the two strategies as "two 
different models of practical reason" that he respectively called the ad hominem (a call 
for a human tribunal) and apodictic (the calls for a higher tribunal) model (Taylor 
1995:36).  The latter is the bad model.  This model is marked by the epistemological 
tradition as it constantly tends to cast the understanding, investigation and evaluation of 
moral judgments in an atemporal setting.  In this model, the absence of ahistoric yard-
sticks leads to moral scepticism.   
 
The bad model of practical reasoning, rooted in the epistemological tradition, constantly 
nudges us towards a mistrust of transitional arguments.  It wants us to look for 'criteria' to 
decide the issue, i.e., some considerations which could be established even outside the 
perspectives in dispute and which would nevertheless be decisive.  But there cannot be 
such considerations.  My perspective is defined by the moral intuitions I have, by what I 
am morally moved by.  If I abstract from this, I become incapable of understanding any 
moral argument at all. You will only convince me by changing my reading of my moral 
experience, and in particular my reading of my life story, of the transitions I have lived 
through – or perhaps refused to live through (Taylor 1989:73). 
 
To account for the activity of determining good, one needs, in Taylor’s view, to take 
into account how humans are temporally situated when reflecting on the kind of being 
they are or aspire to be as their moral judgment of good evolve.  Taylor's call for a tem-
poral account of moral evaluations may be harmonised with a claim that the basis of our 
moral stance on an issue is not something one may conceptualise without reference to 
non-human "actants".  Taylor, in a passage from "Self-Interpreting Animals", even 
came quite close to describe situations as "talking" to the human respondent when clari-
fying what it means to be addressed as human beings. 
  
Experiencing an emotion is to be aware of our situation as humiliating, or shameful, or 
outrageous, or dismaying, or exhilarating, or wonderful and so on.  Each of these adjec-
tives defines what I would like to call an import, if I can introduce this as a term of art.  
By 'import' I mean a way in which something can be relevant or of importance to the 
desires or purposes or aspirations or feelings of a subject; or otherwise put a property of 
something whereby it is a matter of non-indifference to a subject (Taylor 1985a:48). 
 
The import is not something one can fully control, or treat as optional.  The human 
being is rather struck by something that it cannot escape from without responding in 
terms of responses like anger, delight, interest or shame.  We are often somewhat struck 
by something in ways that often throws us into ethical confusion.  The import is some-
thing one takes very seriously as it is taken to carry important truths, although often 
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insufficiently articulated or explicitly evaluated.  "Experiencing a given emotion in-
volves experiencing our situation as bearing a certain import, where for the ascription of 
the import it is not sufficient just that I feel this way, but rather the import gives the 
grounds of basis for the feeling" (1985a:49). What we find important then, is not neces-
sarily clear to us, what is put in motion is often some unstructured sense of what is 
important. To understand the character of our moral evaluations and sources of ethical 
confusion, we need to be constantly involved in a work of articulation and rearticulation 
since the world and the situation we encounter are constantly in transition. 
The social realities we have to deal with are in an important sense local and histori-
cal.  In order to come to grips with the nature of the temporality of ethical and political 
activities, we might therefore benefit from STS scholars' analysis of how science and 
technology can be said to be "motors" of changes of the world we live in.  Ethical and 
political evaluations need to be understood in light of the temporal history of the 
becoming of practices, technologies and objects that address us.  Or one could alterna-
tively say, such evaluations need to be understood in light of what STS scholars have 
dubbed as the "history of things".59    
The 'import' humans understand and re-cast their identity in accordance to has been 
marked, more than anything, by the development of science and technology.  The 
human agent is somehow itself historically shaped by the world it has transformed and 
is engaged in transforming.  It is therefore understandable that we often encounter 
                                                 
59 The notion of a “history of things" describes a historiography of science that characterise itself polemi-
cally in opposition to a historiography of the “history of ideas".  Such histories are theory-oriented and 
focus on crucial experiments and successive theory replacements brought about by extraordinarily bright 
individuals.  The history of ideas is a type of historiography that dominates the presentations of science in 
general, whether we turn to scientific textbooks or to popular or scholarly presentations of the history of a 
field (see for instance Krane 1983 or Judson 1995).  Although such stories serve important pedagogical 
functions (of introducing newcomers to the present state of the art of the field) a questionable picture of 
the dynamics of science is mediated in such stories (Graham et al. 1985).  In this picture the human agent 
carves out the direction of research as he raises ingenious questions which nature answers, given a proper 
experimental test situation.  As STS scholars paid attention to the experimental details, however, the 
image of science mediated though such stories seemed embarrassingly misplaced (cf. for instance 
contributors to Gooding et al. (1989) or various laboratory studies performed in the tradition).  The STS 
tradition has created alternative historiographies.  “Instead of reading a history of objectivity from 
concepts" as Hans-Jörg Rheinberger put it, “I embark on reading a history of objectivity from material 
traces".  He called the activity of investigating this history a "biography of things", understood as “records 
of the process of their coming into existence" (Rheinberger (1997:4), see also Daston (2000)).  
Rheinbeger himself set out to create a history of the different steps of transfer RNA.  This implied a trac-
ing of the steps (and contexts) of the life of the object.  Such approaches focus on how the world is 
remade in order to make it possible for transfer RNA to appear as a stable object called transfer RNA.     
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 severe difficulties with articulating a response that is based on a proper understanding of 
the situation as it has become.  Latourean archaeological surveys of the "history of 
things" may aid in the analysis of how and why new technologies often create severe 
new ethical problems.  The Taylorean perspective may in turn provide resources for 
understanding what role judgements of worth or desirability play in the stabilisation 
process where powerful actor-networks are formed.60   
Latour's and Taylor's respective search for ways of accounting for the temporal char-
acter of scientific and ethical-political activities may provide a point of entrance to their 
respective philosophies.  Their arguments, I would say, may be understood has having a 
transcendental character of the sort Taylor ascribed to Heidegger and Wittgenstein.   
 
The arguments that I want to call "transcendental" start from some feature of experience 
which they claim to be indubitable and beyond cavil.  Then they move to a stronger 
conclusion, one concerning the nature of the subject or the subject's position in the world.  
They make this move by a regressive argument, to the effect that the stronger conclusion 
must be so if the indubitable fact about experience is to be possible (Taylor 1995:20).   
 
Latour and Taylor both accounted for the indubitable features of the respective temporal 
character of science and politics.  However, they both came in conflict with the episte-
mological tradition when they undertook their move to a process-oriented perspective in 
their respective domains.  In presenting their respective alternative understandings of 
science and politics (which were not marked by the epistemological tradition) they both 
undertook a Hacking type of shift of perspective from representation to intervening in 
                                                 
60 Andrew Pickering’s (1995) notion of the "dance of agency" provides an interesting attempt to articulate 
a process of mutual adjustment, or what he describes as a process of "interactive stabilisation" of non-
humans and humans.  Pickering pictures a temporal unpredictable process where humans and non-
humans enter into a "dance of agency".  Such a vocabulary indicates that personal commitments and 
desires could be "mangled" in the course of the research process, an understanding that comes close to the 
sort of perspective I seek to articulate here.  It is hard to see, however, how Pickering can avoid slipping 
into some naturalised version of ethics as he stresses the need to understand the dance of agencies from a 
“post-human" perspective.  The metaphor of the “mangle" provides a clue of the problem at hand.  As 
Jasanoff (2004b:24) also pointed out, it is a metaphor that provides a picture of mechanical machinery 
where novelty is produced in some process of interactive stabilisation of natural and social order (like two 
cylinders that come together as they twist off the wetness of cloths).  The important notion of temporal 
actors of Pickering could possibly provide a way to describe how human desires, values and hopes are 
mangled in the process.  Given the metaphor of the mangle however, it is hard to discuss notions of 
values or desires in terms of human reception and identity construction processes, which again could 
explain what committed human action or non-action.  The question of why human actors are addressed 
by a given situation cannot be raised or answered within the frames of the metaphor of the mangle.  
Change just happens as far as Pickering's actor-networkish approach goes; one should simply record its 
movements.   
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the domain of science and politics respectively.  This move represented a stronger claim 
as it expressed a philosophical-metaphysical stance.  In making the shift, they both 
appealed to their respective alternative’s ability to account for the indubitable temporal 
features of science and politics that they took as their point of departure. 
The perspectives of Taylor and Latour are in this picture not in conflict, but may 
rather be seen as two perspectives that mutually complement and support each other 
theoretically and methodologically as they construct their argument in compatible ways. 
 
 
5. The intrinsic linkage between scientific and political activities 
While Latour bracketed off the question of human agency in order to reinvigorate the 
place of non-humans, Taylor have provided the recourses needed in order to reinvigo-
rate the place of humans in Latour's perspective.  In integrating Taylor's insights, one 
may come closer to the ambitious goal of constructing a theory of co-production of the 
sort Jasanoff calls for.  Jasanoff’s short characterisation of what the co-production per-
spective is all about harmonizes well with Taylor’s insights. 
  
Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we 
know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in 
which we choose to live in it.  Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once 
products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot function 
without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social 
supports.  Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality.  It 
both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, 
discourses, and institutions – in short, all the building blocks of what we term the social.  
The same can be said even more forcefully of technology (Jasanoff 2004a:2-3). 
 
In Jasanoff’s vision of a theory of co-production, the activity of producing knowledge is 
understood as intrinsically linked to the ways human choose to live in the world.  Taylor 
has provided means of theorising the social and historic character of the choices humans 
make as they respond morally to the world they transform by means of science and 
technology.  There is here, as I understand Jasanoff, a call for the need for concep-
tualising the spheres of science and politics as two distinct, although intrinsically linked 
spheres.  The two need to be seen as intrinsically linked, but can nevertheless be de-
composed for analytical purposes in discussing the particular features of the two 
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 activities.61  Taylor seems to defend such a position in "Explanation and Practical 
Reason".62  
 
[T]he activity of explaining why things are as they are (what we think of as science) is 
intrinsically linked to the activity of determining what the good is, and in particular how 
human beings should live through attuning themselves to this order.  The notion that 
explanation can be distinct from practical reason, that the attempt to grasp what the world 
is like can be made independent of the determination of how we should stand in it, that 
the goal of understanding the cosmos can be uncoupled from our attunement to it, this 
makes no sense in the premodern understanding.  But notoriously the seventeenth-century 
revolution brought about an uncoupling of just this kind (Taylor 1995:45).  
 
The important thing is that we need to understand the two activities as temporally 
entangled, and not, like the moderns, think of the two activities as basically atemporal 
and uncoupled.  The activity we think of as science is coupled to the activity we think of 
as political.  Scientific activity reconstructs the order of the world we live in, and this 
activity simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the human activity of attunement to this 
order. 
 
 
 
Understanding co-production as a new turn in STS 
 
I seek to summarise my discussion of how Taylor’s insights may be integrated into 
Latour’s by means of a notion of the "ethos of an actor-network".  This third section of 
this chapter aims at clarifying this notion and how it represents suggestions for theoreti-
cal and methodological adjustments of Latour’s perspective.  As a point of entrance to 
the matter, I will start with a story of a controversy that took place in the vicinity of a 
research project at my university.   
 
                                                 
61 Latour (1993) provided an analytical distinction of the sort when he described the activities of the 
moderns in terms of the distinction between the "work of translation" and "work of purification".   
62 Taylor has consistently claimed that the activities of science and politics are intrinsically linked, but 
this claim has often been taken (and possibly also mainly been stated) as a claim about the relation 
between the social sciences and politics.  Understanding Taylor’s philosophy from the angle of incidence 
I have suggested makes this reservation less evident.   
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The ethos of the Norwegian ultrasound screening program    
Every pregnant woman in Norway is offered an ultrasound investigation in the 18th 
week of pregnancy.  The investigation has been justified with a set of differing objec-
tives, such as looking for multiple pregnancies, investigating whether the position of the 
placenta might cause delivery problems, detecting a more accurate pregnancy date and 
detecting possible deviations from normal developmental patterns.63  As most women 
accept the offer, it has in practice become a screening programme.  This screening pro-
gramme has been controversial, and the controversy displays how social realities need 
to be taken into account when accounting for what the screening programme actually 
represents.  The conclusions of a national consensus conference (of medical experts) 
held in 1995 is illustrative.  The medical effect of the programme, as the conclusion 
went, was little or nothing (that is, when it comes to traditional medical goals of pre-
venting or curing illness).  The programme should nevertheless continue because 
"women want it".64  The conclusion did not reflect a general agreement that there were 
only social reasons for maintaining the screening programme.  The explicit reference to 
women’s desires, however, made it visible that social reasons were difficult to distil as 
social in this case, that is, as falling outside the domain of medicine.65   
The consensus conference in 1995 displayed a stabilised medical understanding of 
the programme at that time, where the conclusions made could be understood as a result 
of a compromise between the proponents and the critics of the programme.  The contro-
versy on ultrasound investigation of foetuses goes back to the early 1980s (Sætnan 
1995).  The conference contributed to the maintenance of the programme as a stable 
actor-network (that is the actor-network through which the actions of the screening 
programme were performed).  Such conferences arise when the stability and the further 
                                                 
63 See for instance guidelines provided by the Norwegian Board of Health in 1991.  "Bruk av ultralyd i 
svangerskapet.  Helsedirektoratets retningslinjer" 1-91.   
64 "Bruk av ultralyd i svangerskapet: konsensuskonferanse 28. februar - 1. mars 1995".  Rapport fra 
Komiteen for medisinsk teknologivurdering (9). Oslo: Norges forskningsråd, Området for medisin og 
helse. 
65 For instance, women's desires generally matter in times where medicine seeks to escape its paternalistic 
past.  In this case the well-being of the parents and the future child was at stake.  Diagnostics could make 
a difference for how well parents could be materially and mentally prepared for a child with a possible 
handicap.  In some cases, a medical confirmation that everything looked alright could ease substantial 
stress on the part of parents who for some reason or another were worried about the well-being of the 
foetus. 
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 development of the practice are challenged.  In accounting for the social realities that 
are at play in such situations, one should not let epistemologically biased terms like 
"beliefs" or "preferences" overshadow moral terms like "commitments" or "values".  I 
attempt to accentuate the latter by means of the notion of the ethos of the screening 
programme.  The screening programme embeds human judgements of worth because it 
is a human practice, and the notion of the ethos of the programme is to refer to such 
judgements that together express the point or purpose of the programme.  The consen-
sus conference was one important arena where a verdict was reached of what the ethos 
of the programme had been and what it should be in the future.  Such a discussion of the 
ethos of the program evolves around the question of what conditions the practice as a 
good practice, in terms of medical as well as social standards.   
The ethos of the programme was not completely in the hands of the designers.  In 
terms of the language of actor-networks, the ethos could be seen as referring to histori-
cally embedded evaluations of the worth of the screening programme in which the 
action of the programme is mediated or made possible.  The ethos, then, not only refers 
to explicit and articulated evaluations, nor is it confined to the evaluations made by the 
medical community that executes the programme.  We also need to consider more non-
articulated evaluations, like those expressed in expectations, comfort and excitement on 
the part of users that sustains the programme by their choosing to accept the ultrasound 
investigation offered to them.  The ethos of the programme has a historic and temporal 
character that is too fragmented to be captured by a single value judgement.  We may 
thus think of the ethos as a condensed reference to the spectre of evaluative judgements 
of the programme that make a difference in maintenance and performance.  The very 
existence of a stable screening programme suggests a fairly robust ethos of the sort, 
with a "black-boxed" ethos one would have to contest if one were to question the desir-
ability of the programme.    
The contents of black boxes become particularly visible in times of controversy.  The 
conditions of stability for the ultrasound screening programme depend on ethical as well 
as epistemic considerations.  The attempts to re-stabilise the programme with the con-
sensus conference, for instance, may not have resulted in a very robust actor-network if 
the ethos of the screening programme was not satisfactorily articulated by the represen-
tatives at the consensus conference.  Important stakeholders could have been ignored in 
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the process, stakeholders who potentially could have threatened the stability of the 
programme.  Besides, as time went by, the screening practice as well as the diagnostic 
powers of the technology could develop and cause tensions between the actual practice 
and the grounds for it being judged as a good practice.  I suspect such destabilising 
elements were put in motion as a heated public controversy on the screening programme 
appeared during the spring of 1999 and fall of 2000.  
 
A research project that reopened the question of the ethos of the screening programme  
The controversy evolved around a group of researchers (at the Norwegian National 
Competence Centre for Ultrasound Research at NTNU).  The controversy arose as the 
centre was poised to evaluate novel diagnostic tools that had been developed and used 
abroad.  These developments had the potential to transform the screening programme in 
fairly unpredictable ways.  First, new sensitive diagnostic objectives might be included 
in the programme, which might possibly have eugenic consequences.  The fact that one 
would need to consider moving the ultrasound investigation to an earlier stage of preg-
nancy, in order to exploit the potentials of the tools, reinforced the possible eugenic 
effect.  Second, new powerful tools might increase a woman’s experience of having her 
pregnancy "medicalised" due to the possible increase in the power of the diagnostic 
tools as well as in the increase in the number of investigations performed.  Novel tech-
niques being developed in ultrasound research could possibly lead to a restructuring of 
the screening programme.  This explains why, I believe, the question of the ethos of the 
screening programme was reopened as Norwegian researchers set out to gain more 
knowledge about and evaluate the novel tools.   
A particular diagnostic marker had been detected.  It was a marker best visible in the 
foetus from 11-14 weeks.  A "nuchal translucency thickness" of the foetus during this 
period had been reported to be correlated with a set of different disorders.  The best 
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 correlation value had been shown for embryos with Down’s syndrome.66  This implied 
new possibilities for ultrasound technology, and it was naturally expected that our 
National Competence Centre for Ultrasound Technology should be updated on the 
limitations and possibilities of these new applications of the technology.  In order to do 
such evaluations, scientists needed to acquire first hand information of the technology 
of the sort one acquires through systematic research work.  "We don’t govern, politi-
cians govern, we give advice.  In order to give advice, we need data", the researchers 
argued in a chronicle.67  For example, researchers needed to acquire the observation 
skills necessary to understand the diagnostic significance of the degree of nuchal thick-
ness of the foetus from 12-13 weeks.68  But more importantly, the researchers argued, 
the possible implications of implementing these new techniques in a Norwegian setting 
had to be clarified.  One of the aims of the proposed research project was to investigate 
the pros and cons of moving the screening programme from the 18th to around 12th 
week of pregnancy (as many European countries already had done).  The researchers set 
out to include 6000 pregnant woman in the local region in a research project.  Half the 
group was to be offered an investigation in 12/13th week of pregnancy in addition to the 
one in 18th week.69
It was difficult, however, to get an exact picture of what the focus of the study was.  
When the research project reached the headlines news, the researchers refused to hand 
over their research protocol upon request, and they were likewise reluctant to be spe-
cific about the matter in public meetings.  But the research objective seemed to have 
two focal points.  The project was designed to investigate the potentials of the new 
                                                 
66 The media had referred to these reports in August 1998.  The researchers in Trondheim told the reporter 
that these methods were about to become routine in many places in England, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, and further investigations of the quality, and ethical ramifications of early ultrasound 
investigations were needed before such methods should be considered implemented in Norway.  Lene 
Skogstrøm "Engelsk ultralydstudie med oppsiktsvekkende resultater: Avdekker Downs syndrom 
tidligere." Aftenposten (3.8.1998).  In another newspaper, the Minister of Health commented that he was 
sceptical about early ultrasound investigations due to the possible eugenic consequences. "Tidlig ultralyd 
er betenkelig." An NTB text printed in VG (3.8.1998).   
67 Sturla Eik-Nes, Kåre Molne, Harm-Gerd Blaas, Kjell Salvesen.  "Ultralyd tidleg i svangerskapet – 
styring eller trussel?" Aftenposten (01.11.1999). 
68 Cf. for instance the web page of the British Foetal Medicine Foundation, which has provided standards 
for what could qualify as sufficient observation skills.  The very act of observing here was by no means 
trivial, which called for first hand knowledge of the vices and virtues of the method 
(http://www.fetalmedicine.com/).   
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diagnostic marker, and to carry out a comparative analysis of what could be gained by 
introducing the new tools in the broader context of a screening programme.  The univer-
sity paper (Universitetsavisa), a national and local newspaper (Aftenposten and 
Adresseavisa) as well as locally arranged debates are the main sources for this story, 
since none of the documents in question were official.  One may say it is a story of 
science played out in public debate. 
Every research project that includes people as research subjects needs to gain 
approval from a regional ethical research committee.70  The work of the committee has 
mainly been associated with the principles of the Helsinki declaration, which aims to 
secure individual rights.  This also includes questioning the quality of the research pro-
ject.  One should not distress people if important insights are an unlikely outcome of the 
experiments.  This committee (whose discussions and reasoning are not public) had 
approved the research project when the Minister of Health sparked a public debate by 
publicly questioning the desirability of the research project, on the 15th of October 1999.   
The minister did not try to stop the project through formal channels.  It was naturally 
beyond the minister's formal authority to do so.  He publicly requested the research 
group in Trondheim to delay the project, referring to the ongoing work of a public 
committee revising a law that was, among other things, about to draw general guidelines 
for the scope and limits of foetal diagnostics.71  Local politicians, having political 
responsibility for the hospital in question, immediately responded by putting pressure 
on the researchers to put the project temporarily on ice.  After all, the cabinet Minister 
of Health had become involved, what was at stake? 72  A public debate was trigged dur-
ing which public expression of anger against the cabinet minister erupted.  The majority 
of the delegates of the National Parliament were sceptical about the intervention of the 
Minister of Health and expressed support for the researchers in Trondheim.73  The 
university leaders, represented by the dean of the Faculty of Medicine as well as the 
university president attacked the cabinet minister for his non-legitimate political inter-
                                                                                                                                               
69 Sturla Eik-Nes., Kåre Molne, Harm-Gerd Blaas, Kjell Salvesen.  "Ultralyd tidleg i svangerskapet – 
styring eller trussel?" Aftenposten (01.11.1999). 
70 Cf. their web page (http://www.etikkom.no/REK). 
71 "Vil stanse tidlig ultralyd." An NTB text printed in VG (15.10.1999).   
72 "Bøyde av for helseministeren." Adresseavisen (16.10.1999). 
73 "Politikerne støtter Eik-Nes." Adresseavisen (22.10.1999). 
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 vention in the research process.  The tone was harsh, and we were reminded that the 
freedom of research had to be safeguarded.74  The research community in Trondheim 
also received support from the director of the Research Council of Norway.75  The mes-
sage was supported by reports, broadcasted nationwide, of medical researchers’ lives 
being threatened by anti-abortion extremists, as well as positive interviews with the 
"outspoken" researchers in Trondheim.76
A counter-reaction appeared and critical perspectives on ultrasound screening in 
general popped up in the papers.77  One could sense old conflicts lurking in the back-
ground, demonstrating the mutual distrust between the political and research communi-
ties in question.  The cabinet minister also gained substantial public support by different 
politicians in opposition.78  Due to the character of the debate, the members of the local 
ethical committee announced they would reconsider their decision.  This time, they 
chose to test the quality of the project by submitting their research protocol for peer 
review by an epidemiologist and statistician (Gulbrandsen 2000).  This marked a turn-
ing point.  The result leaked to the press, the quality of the project was said to be not 
satisfactory (according to a method relying on a statistical assessment).79  Suddenly the 
research community found itself without general support in the local press, or from uni-
versity leaders.  Critical articles, attacking the integrity of the researchers in Trondheim 
now followed in the papers as well.80  The committee, discussing the matter on the 17th 
of  December 1999, now found it unacceptable that patients were to be confronted by 
results where, according to the reviewers, 45% of the diagnoses made would be false 
positives (Gulbrandsen 2000).  For their part, the researchers in Trondheim questioned 
the rationale for the new decision made by the ethical committee.  They found the 
                                                 
74 "Ville utsette ultralydprosjekt: NTNU-leder kraftig ut mot helseministeren." Aftenposten (1.11.1999). 
"NTNU støtter Eik-Nes." Adresseavisen (2.11.1999).  Emil Spjøtvoll, "Vitenskap og Politikk.", "Vil ha 
friere tøyler." Universitetsavisa (4.11.1999). 
75 "Fingrene av fatet, statsråd!" Universitetsavisa (18.11.1999). 
76 "Mot Veggen." Universitetsavisa (21.10.1999). "Frittalende forsker." UKE-Adressa (13.11.99).   
77 See for instance Hans Olav Tungesvik "Skal teknikken ein gong gå føre etikken?"  Aftenposten 
(12.11.1999). "To av barna kunne ha vært valgt bort." Adresseavisen (13.11.1999).  Inge Johansen 
"Ultralydprosjektet ved regionsykehuset." Adresseavisen (17.11.1999). "Ultralyd: Frigjørende - eller 
undertrykkende?" Universitetsavisa (18.11.1999).  Torvid Kiserud "Ultralyd i tidlig svangerskap." 
Aftenposten (23.11 1999). "Ultralyd, medier og en mor." Adresseavisen (25.11.1999).   
78 "Ap-folk stør oppgjør med ultralyd-prosjekt." Vårt Land (25.10.99). 
79 "Knuser ultralydprosjektet." Adresseavisen (24.11.1999). 
80 "Ventet på rapport I 20 år.", " - Som en ripe i lakken." Adresseavisen (4.12.1999). 
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expert judgement questionable (claiming it would not stand the test of an international 
review), and indicated that the fact that the report had leaked to the press displayed 
unwarranted scientific and political power struggles.81
The intervention of the Minister of Health was very effective as it sparked a heated 
public debate.  As soon as the minister publicly criticised the researchers, the matter 
was in the hands of others, the scientists, politicians, parents and commentators who 
engaged in the debate.  The controversy was sparked primarily because the minister 
himself interfered with public statements of disapproval of a specific research project 
(one that even had been approved by the local ethical committee): the researchers and 
the university leaders found this intervention, in principle, to be highly unacceptable.  
The controversy was also sustained because the local ethics committee decided that it 
would take a second look at the project due to the heated public debate.  Due to the 
heated nature and duration of the controversy, however, the question of the desirability 
of the specific research project came to be discussed in a broader context.  Simple refer-
ences to the need for securing the autonomy of research could not end the debate, 
although it seemed that the researchers and university leaders thought that it could do 
so.  The research project, the researchers maintained, should continue as planned.82  The  
heated public debate and the fact that the researchers suddenly found themselves with-
out general support, I believe, needs to be understood in light of how the research 
project came to be linked to, and seen as challenging, the established ethos of the 
screening program.       
 
Two strands of the controversy, eugenics and medicalisation  
As Berge Solberg discussed in his analysis,83 there were two different strands of con-
cerns at play in the controversy, which were subsumed under the headings of "eugenics" 
and "medicalisation".  The first strand, which included the opinions of the Minister of 
Health, concerned the question of how new diagnostic tools would influence the 
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 question of the legitimacy of selective abortion.  The combination of better diagnostic 
tools available at an earlier stage of pregnancy would be one of those events that would 
contribute to a reopening of the abortion issue, although in a new form (sometimes 
referred to as the second abortion debate).  Abortion might no longer primarily concern 
the social conditions of the mother, but could now be discussed in terms of the eugenic 
notion of a "well born" child as well.  In addition, parents would obtain important 
knowledge about the foetus close to the legal abortion limit (12th week).  
The problem, it seems, was that the research programme in question suggested a pos-
sible world that people like the cabinet minister did not under any circumstances want 
to see stabilised.  This possible world was seen as a challenge to the perceived uncondi-
tional value of humans.  The research project could possibly have gained important 
experience regarding how parents might actually respond to the different kinds of situa-
tions that might result if knowledge about the foetus was obtained at an earlier stage of 
pregnancy.  But such research questions presupposed the legitimacy of turning the 
question of a woman’s ability to take care of, or want, any child into a question of her 
ability to take care of, or want, a specific child.  One could hardly say that the research 
project would stage, or pave the way for a totally new situation.  Because of the 
increased risk of Down’s syndrome, every pregnant woman over 38 years had already 
been given the choice of taking a amniocentesis.  In spite of the fact that Down’s syn-
drome officially was not accepted as a reason for abortion after the 12th week of preg-
nancy (social reasons must be given), it had become routine to accept any application.  
To a limited extent then, the world the cabinet minister did not want to see realised was 
already there.  But it was not realised to the same degree that it might have been if the 
new diagnostic tools were to be part of the life world of every pregnant couple.  
How could one possibly avoid the effect of having to discuss the unconditional value 
of human life?  One could have, for instance, raised  questions such as, is it not better to 
have an abortion in cases when the foetus is not able to live, or might only live for a 
short period after birth?  In a world where early diagnostic tools are available, the indi-
vidual parent would become more responsible for the well-being of the child they would 
give birth to.  What if, according to the outcome of the diagnostic survey, the child most 
probably would experience incredible suffering?  What about those cases where minor 
defects were diagnosed?  The parents would be forced to draw a line somewhere, and 
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pass judgement on matters that they had not been challenged by before.  The parents 
would have to pass judgement on which life is worth living.  
The burden of responsibility on the parents would become inescapable; the parents 
would have to bear the responsibility even if they would rather not know, because they 
could have known.  Realising new powerful diagnostic powers would simultaneously 
imply a connection of discourses that were not connected before.  The discourses about 
which life is worth living would here be connected to the discourse on what sufferings 
are worth bearing.  If one wanted to defend the inviolability of human life, the question 
of which life is worth living is simply not a question one should ask.  But this would at 
the same time imply that every kind of suffering (as foreseen by the diagnosis) for par-
ents and children would have to be regarded as a non-question.  The separation between 
the two set of discourses was at stake.  The diagnostic tools might, if not create, sub-
stantially enforce such a linkage.  We might therefore understand the minister’s actions 
as attempt to counteract the formation of such linkages.  "This is not about developing a 
new technology" he said, "but about moving the limits of society".84  In Latour’s 
vocabulary, we may speak of such a linkage as an association or relation – or more 
recently as a "proposition" - that we should discuss if we want to allow into the 
collective. 
A screening program, empowered with new diagnostic tools, might therefore 
strengthen the degree of the already heavily "medicalised" pregnancy of women.  In this 
case, medicalisation concerns the way ultrasound investigations have become integrated 
into the very concept of pregnancy.  It has become part of the expectation and 
"happenings" of giving birth to say hello to the foetus and have its picture taken for the 
family album.  However, according to the strand of the proponents concerned with the 
effect of medicalisation, the problem was that the negative effect was often first experi-
enced when it was too late. 
According to statistical measurements, and to expressed desires, women came to and 
seemed to want ultrasound examinations.  Still, the question of whether they really 
wanted the screenings has nevertheless been raised and regarded as a reasonable or non-
patriarchal question to be asked.  In practice, almost every woman accepts the offer, so 
                                                 
84 "Professor avviser kritikk: - Ultralydstudien er helt nødvendig." Aftenposten (4.11.99) 
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 apparently women do want the test.  However, they hardly ever get the chance to think 
about the possibility to turn down the offer either.  Of course, if the medical authorities 
offer you something, there must be a reason for it, so you feel uneasy if you turn down 
such an offer.  Once a woman accepts the offer, however, she enters the medical world 
of uncertainty, where the chance is quite high that she ends up in the large group of 
people living with a "perhaps" diagnosis.   
A suspicion of a disorder from a doctor is hard to erase.  A suspicion tends to stick, 
even after the woman have given birth to a normal child; maybe there was something 
wrong - after all they found a reason to look for something.  Such a suspicion may take 
away the bodily unit of pregnancy; its destiny is handed over to others who investigate 
it by means of some apparatus.  Berit Schei, a medical professor in the field, even sug-
gested (at a public meeting during the controversy) that women, before accepting an 
ultrasound investigation, should be informed about the personal risks one took by 
accepting the offer.  Their personal life-history might be directed into new unpredictable 
and burdensome pathways.85  
Linn Getz (another medical researcher specialising in foetal medicine) made the 
point by telling her own story of personal transformation.86  It all started with an early 
ultrasound investigation she was offered while she was abroad.  She knew very well 
about the unreliability of the investigation, and she was even certain that she would 
accept any baby no matter what the results would be.  But still, she accepted the early 
ultrasound examination she was offered - and was disturbed.  The ultrasound suggested 
a chromosome disorder.  To her surprise, she became desperate to know and made use 
of all the follow-up tests she could get.  None of the tests could eliminate the suspicion 
from the ultrasound investigation - she knew that.  But still, she had to find a way to get 
hold of all the information available.  Her pregnancy was transformed, she described it 
as something she didn’t take part in, as she waited for the outcome of the various tests.   
Her story resembles a personal story of how one’s desires might be transformed 
during the course of interactions with non-humans.  In terms of Pickering's (1995) 
vocabulary, we could say her personal commitments and desires were "mangled" in 
                                                 
85 "Hvor går ultralydforskningen ved NTNU?"  Vitenskapsteoretisk forum, MTFS, Trondheim 
(16.05.2000,).  
86 Seminar on foetal diagnostics at Stortinget, our national assembly, Oslo (20.01.2000). 
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course of the process.  Pickering pictured a temporal and unpredictable process where 
humans and non-humans enter into a "dance of agency".  Getz described a process of 
slow transformation of herself that occurred as she constantly found herself in a new 
situation that she had to deal with, or accommodate.  At the end she was seriously 
confused as to what she wanted, and who she was and wanted to be.  Her question of 
whether or not to terminate the pregnancy had turned into a question of when it would 
be legitimate.  She found herself facing the problem of selective abortion because she 
had been trying to act responsibly to protect the physical well-being of her child.   
 
An ethos one has to deal with 
In light of the two strands of concerns discussed here, we can understand why an ultra-
sound research project might be subject to a heated public debate.  Given the ultrasound 
screening program, the research that set out to improve ultrasound technology had to 
deal with the morally congested field in which the ultrasound technology was entangled.  
The process of formation of power needs to take into account the response of humans 
who even carry with them a memory of the history of earlier events.  In referring to this 
social reality in terms of the ethos of the screening program, it can be seen to be trace-
able in terms of how it affects research and how research is affected by it.  From this 
perspective, research appears to be one of the most ethical and political actions there is, 
since research manages to create new stable connections between discourses, humans 
and non-humans that did not exist before.  Sometimes genuine novelties arise, and cre-
ating such novelty is what research is all about.  This also means, however, that our 
norms and values are under transition in the process as well.   
The controversy provided a situation where the ethos of the screening programme 
was put in motion and scrutinised in light of what ultrasound technology was about to 
become.  Different aspects of the established programme, and the ways in which new 
research might influence the programme came under public scrutiny and critical 
evaluation.  During this period, which lasted about six months, national and local news-
papers and different local debates and meetings mediated different aspects of the ultra-
sound screening programme.  One could almost pick up another trace every week from 
the newspaper and evaluate its importance and relevance.  In fact, it’s possible to say 
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 the controversy triggered a more inclusive process.  More stakeholders were engaged by 
the problem at hand and were in fact mobilised, represented or taken into account.  The 
controversy created a situation where the question of the quality of the political process 
was not sharply separated from the question of the quality of the scientific process.  The 
question of when and how ethical considerations should be incorporated in the process 
of developing and evaluating ultrasound techniques was at the heart of the matter.   
The situation was different three years later.  In the late autumn of 2003, the process 
of revising the law, to which the Minister of Health had referred when he criticised the 
research project, had come to an end.  In the revised decree, the government suggested 
certain restrictions on the diagnostic purposes one should include in the ultrasound 
investigation programme that was offered to every pregnant woman.87  One could say 
the government suggested a conservative reading of the ethos for the ultrasound 
screening programme, recommending that it be confined to the goals that had been 
discussed in official documents and conferences (such as during the consensus confer-
ence of 1995).  As for further information made available in the ultrasound investiga-
tion, the government suggested that the patient should not be informed at this point. 
The subsequent public debate tended to be reduced to a discussion on de-
contextualised knowledge, and was mainly conducted by representatives of the women's 
movement who strongly appealed to the value of a woman's autonomous choice; 
women have the right to know.  Since it was possible to know, as the argument seemed 
to run, someone had to make the choice of what and when knowledge should be made 
available, and this choice should be done by the individual woman.88  The complex 
ethos of the ultrasound screening programme appeared at this point to be closed by the 
spokespersons of women that appeared to return to some argument that "women want 
it".  The technological and social world that came together as a result of the more pow-
erful diagnostic tools of ultrasound technology seemed quite firmly black boxed as the 
knowledge was discussed as intrinsically neutral.  On the one hand was science, 
technology and knowledge, while on the other politics, values and rights.  In this setting 
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the question of who and how choices should be made could be reduced to a question of 
the autonomy of women's choice.  
 
 
Theoretical adjustments; the ethos of an actor-network   
I believe the notion of an ethos of an actor-network can hold together my suggestions 
for how Taylor’s insights may be integrated into Latour’s perspective.  The notion car-
ries three important elements (cf. the last three points discussed in the second section of 
this chapter).  First, reference to ethos may provide a short-cut reference to traces of 
human evaluation embedded in an actor-network.  The ethos is an intrinsic part of a 
network that must be accounted for.  Second, given a temporal perspective, imposing a 
moral asymmetry between humans and non-humans does not need to imply sharp 
boundaries between scientific and political activities.  Third, the notion of ethos may 
function as a "cross-over" term, that is, it may counteract the tendency to discuss moral 
issues in isolation from technical and scientific issues as the term carries an epistemic as 
well as an ethical component. 
1) Ethos is a moral term that goes back to the Greek discussion of the moral charac-
ter of man.  As point of entrance to the notion of the ethos of an actor-network, one may 
say that the term refers to the moral character that a practice like the screening pro-
gramme has qua human practice.  As such, the ethos needs to be seen as part and parcel 
of what the practice is, and how it is performed and maintained.  However, the ethos of 
the screening programme may be more or less articulated and the actual performance of 
the programme may be more or less attuned to the ethos, and able to stand up against a 
trial of scrutiny.  The researchers, in launching their ultrasound research project, had to 
deal with the ethos of the screening programme as it was put into play in the public 
debate.  The controversy had some effect on the course of event of ultrasound research 
in Norway.  We need to account for the way the different elements of the ethos of the 
programme was put into play in the story, I suggest, in order to understand how the 
controversy could become so vivid.  
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 In the world of biotechnology or biomedicine, it is hard not to notice that one has to 
deal with values in order to establish powerful actor-networks.  Integrating a notion of 
ethos into the French perspective may make us better able to understand how moral 
problems are often wrapped up into the process of the constructive work of science and 
technology.  It provides a point of departure for understanding better, for instance, how 
discourses on what kind of life is worth living and what kinds of sufferings are worth 
bearing have come to be brought together.  How and why the old themes of eugenics 
reappeared in the abortion debates, or how the problem we recognise as the medicalisa-
tion of motherhood is affected by and affects the research process.  This brings us to the 
second important element in the notion of ethos, its historical character. 
2) The ethos of a practice like the screening programme has been historically estab-
lished as a result of the history where it was justified and accepted as a good pro-
gramme.  The history of the program draws attention to the role non-humans, technolo-
gies and the emergence of novel diagnostic techniques play in the process of the shap-
ing the ethos.  This is why I find the notion of the ethos of the actor-network more 
workable than the notion of the ethos of a practice.  The ethos of the screening pro-
gramme is difficult to articulate because of the changes brought about by developments 
in ultrasound technology.  The controversy I discussed can be seen as an event that 
contributed to the articulation of the ethos of the screening programme.  An analysis of 
the ethos of the screening programme could also contribute to such an articulation, and 
such accounts may be held together by the method of actor-networks, that is, by the 
commitment to following the process where an actor-network is established.  The addi-
tion of the notion of ethos imposes a sensitivity to the need to articulate how the actor-
network has been constructed as a desirable network.   
Given such an approach, one may better come to grips with how moral problems 
appear, disappear and are temporally shaped during the process of research.  The per-
spective I propose allows us to say in a meaningful way that material agencies are 
morally relevant agencies (without imposing a symmetric descriptive language of 
humans and non-humans).  When it comes to the ethical problems that appear in the 
vicinity of biotechnological innovations, we often experience difficulties in identifying 
and passing judgments on the moral issues at stake.  We, as a culture, often find our-
selves reconsidering our previous moral judgements.  These difficulties may be under-
 155
stood in terms of how science and technology create novel connections between 
humans, non-humans and discourses in ways that may throw us into moral confusion.  
In modern biomedical sciences there are often many criss-crossing connections at play 
that make it very difficult to establish a proper situation analysis of the ethical problems 
at hand.  For example, prenatal diagnostics, in vitro fertilisation, sperm banks, pre-
implantation diagnostic techniques, selective abortion and therapeutic cloning are dif-
ferent techniques and practices with vices and virtues that are difficult to discuss in 
isolation from each other.  Moral judgement of a practice like in vitro fertilisation may 
be destabilised in light of what in vitro fertilisation may become due to novel possibili-
ties that therapeutic cloning and sperm banks represent.   
3) The notion of ethos implies, with respect to Latour's perspective, another shift in 
the very concept of science.  The notion of ethos is to reinvigorate a normative perspec-
tive in the French school, although without reproducing the traditional notion of sci-
ence.  In speaking of an ethos of an actor-network, one may find a way to articulate the 
intrinsic ethical component of science.  The notion of ethos brings to the forefront the 
joint ethical-epistemic character of scientific activities.  This may become visible if we 
pay closer attention to the fact that the notion of ethos may also be seen as having epis-
temic roots.  The notion of ethos has figured as a key notion in rhetorical analysis of the 
construction of convincing argumentation.  The legitimacy of the authority of the 
speaker critically depends on the audience's judgement of the speaker's moral character.  
When one refers to the "ethos of science", this insight may be understood as transferred 
to the context where the legitimacy of the authority of science is discussed.  The 
authority of a scientist's word does not depend on his personal character as long as he 
appears as a spokesperson for science.  In this setting, it is the ethos of science that 
makes the scientist's word trustworthy, where the ethos of science has come to refer to 
science’s characteristic trait as truth seeking.  In the co-production idiom, however, the 
ethos of science cannot entirely be articulated in epistemic terms.   
The ethos of an actor-network, then, articulates the intrinsic historically embedded 
judgments of worth of an actor-network.  The ethos is seen as constructed in and 
through the process of constructing a stable and robust actor-network.  Ethos, as used as 
a technical analytical term in rhetoric, is a temporal term that urges the analyst to scruti-
nise how the speaker’s ethos is constructed, maintained or deconstructed through the 
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 speech act (Andersen 1995:35).  The notion of the ethos of science should likewise be 
connected to the analysis of how the ethos is constructed, maintained or deconstructed 
through the process of establishing or reconstructing a powerful actor-network.   
 
 
Methodological requirements; ethics as a measure of scientific truths 
The suggested notion of ethos has methodological implications for students of science.  
With respect to the French school, the notion of ethos implies an ontological extension 
of what is to be accounted for.  This creates a methodological challenge to the analyst 
that aims at accounting for how the actor-network is established as a desirable and well-
constructed actor-network.  Such an account would aim at capturing the process of for-
mation of immanent normative evaluations that are shaped as the actor-network is 
constructed.  The actor-network is not necessarily well-constructed even though it dis-
plays a high degree of robustness and stability, because the corresponding ethos is not 
necessarily well-constructed in the process nor fully in plain view to the practitioners 
themselves.   
As Keller nicely put it in the following quote, the work of doing science is particu-
larly vulnerable in these regards.  More than any other intellectual activity, she 
observed, the doing of science - when it is performed at its best - is marked by the full 
enchantment of the practitioners.  A scientist’s success then, emerges at the expense of 
reflexive self-understanding of the assumptions that guide his or her reasoning. 
 
The reality is that the "doing" of science is, at its best, a gripping and fully absorbing 
activity – so much so that it is difficult for anyone so engaged to step outside the demands 
of the particular problems under investigation to reflect on the assumptions underlying 
that investigation, much less, on the language in which such assumptions can be said to 
"make sense."  Keeping track of and following the arguments and data as they unfold, 
trying always to think ahead, demands total absorption; at the same time, the sense of 
discovering or even generating a new world yields an intoxication rarely paralleled in 
other academic fields.  The net result is that scientists are probably les reflective of the 
"tacit assumptions" that guide their reasoning than any other intellectuals of the modern 
age (Keller 1992:27).   
 
The object of study is at the centre of attention, and the scientific methods evolve 
around the object of study in the sense that scientists do whatever is necessary in order 
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to reveal the nature of the object under scrutiny.  The need for analysis of how the 
scientific practice is constructed as a good practice seems more important and pertinent 
than in any other intellectual endeavour.   
The analyst that pretends to account for the process where an actor-network is 
created, along with its ethos, needs to be challenged with respect to how well it articu-
lates the ethos.  Such a work of articulation needs to be understood as having two 
components, one of revealing (which appeals to a recognition of how things really are) 
and one of conveying (which carries an invitation to see things differently).  The first 
components follow from the assumption that there is an ethos being established in and 
through the process of creating an actor-network.  The second component follows as a 
consequence of the same assumption.  The ethos, as the assumption goes, articulates the 
conditions under which the constructed actor-network appears as a desirable and justi-
fied actor-network.  If one seeks to articulate such an ethos, one will have to engage 
oneself in the question of what the ethos should be.  
The co-production perspective therefore implies a stance that questions the meth-
odological norm of neutrality or agnosticism that has marked the field of STS.  The 
questioning of the methodological norms of disinterest here is not carried by an ethical 
argument, but by a methodological one.  It appears as a reflexive requirement following 
the inclusion of the notion of ethos in Latour's approach.  The analysis of the students of 
science needs to be put to the test, which comes down to a scrutiny of whether or not the 
analyses actually would improve the practice analysed; in other words, if the analyses 
manage to contribute to the formation of a good and desirable practice.  One may say 
that we need to consider "Ethics as a Measure of Scientific Truth", to quote a title of one 
of Feyerabend’s (1999) later articles.   
The methodological challenges the notion of ethos creates for the co-production 
analyst need to be understood in a broad perspective set by the analyses of the episte-
mological model.  The co-production perspective that I seek to articulate by means of 
the works of Latour and Taylor, represents a shift in the ideals of how to model norma-
tive evaluations of science and technology with regards to how it has been modelled in 
the epistemological model.  Given that the epistemological model is part and parcel of 
the practice of doing science, the co-production perspective also addresses professional 
identities through which the practice of doing science is understood as appropriately 
 158 
 conducted by scientists (and politicians).  The co-production perspective prescribes a 
different perspective under which these professional identities should be reconstructed.  
Simultaneously, however, the co-production perspective claims to provide a better 
descriptive account of the relationship between scientific and political activities (with 
regards to epistemologically modelled accounts).  The co-production perspective then 
claims to be a better perspective, at least given the changes in the way that knowledge 
has come to be produced in modern societies.   
The methodological challenges of the co-production analyst then, following the 
inclusion of Taylor's perspective, may be expressed as having two connected compo-
nents – or two levels.  The co-production analyses should aim at describing and 
prescribing a given practice, or co-production process, which includes a work describ-
ing and prescribing professional identities.  The methodological challenge for the co-
production analyst needs to be understood in light of this dual function.  How can 
analysts find ways of balancing descriptive and prescriptive pretensions, of revealing 
and conveying?   
 
 
 
A summary and conclusion of part I 
 
Part I has discussed three successive "idioms" for thinking about science, technology 
and society.  With reference to Andrew Pickering, we may refer to the first two idioms 
in terms of the "representational idiom" and the "performative idiom".  "The represen-
tational idiom", in Pickering's (1995:5) words "casts science as, above all, an activity 
that seeks to represent nature, to produce knowledge that maps, mirrors, or corresponds 
to how the world really is".  This idiom was discussed in Chapter 1.  Chapter 2 dis-
cussed the emergence of the performative idiom, which emphasised the material and 
technological mediators of scientific performance.  In this idiom "science is regarded as 
a field of powers, capacities, and performances, situated in machinic captures of mate-
rial agency" (Pickering 1995:7).  The performative idiom replaced the representational 
idiom but should now be replaced by what Jasanoff (2004a) has called the "co-
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production idiom".  Part I should be understood as an attempt to contribute to the 
articulation of such a co-production idiom.   
I have portrayed the representational idiom as a normative idiom as it pictured 
science against the normative background order of the epistemological model.  This 
implies that the representational idiom included an understanding of what good science 
was, an understanding that simultaneously articulated what the sciences’ ideal relation-
ships to other social institutions were.  Guston’s analysis of the "social contract", 
discussed in the introduction, captures important aspects of how the ideal relation 
between scientific and political activities has been conceptualised.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Science and politics are 
intrinsically linked. 
 
 
Co-production idiom 
Science clarifies possibili-
ties before politics pass 
judgements on actualities.  
 
Representational idiom 
Science is politics by 
other means. 
 
 
Performative idiom
Epistemological model          Seeing the epistemological model as a model         Alternative model 
The standard 
approach 
Strong 
programme 
Sociology of 
translation 
?  
 
Fig 3.1. Science studies, as a practice, analysed in terms of three different levels of analysis.   
 
 
Taylor’s analysis of the epistemological model has provided a theoretical basis for an 
understanding where three idioms are seen as successive replacements of each other.  
Chapter 2 discussed the history behind the first draft of the co-production idiom.  As the 
story described, the co-production idiom appeared as a result of attempts to articulate an 
alternative to the social contract.  I constructed a line of argument by distinguishing 
three analytical levels of analysis.  There is a theoretical and a methodological level, 
which again appears against a cultural background that is referred to as the epistemo-
logical model.  The story evolved around the formation of three successive methodo-
logical frameworks, (what I called) the standard approach, the strong programme and 
the sociology of translation.  My account places the question of how to understand the 
relation between scientific and political activities at the heart of the matter.  The crucial 
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 question for science studies in general, I suggest, is the question of how to understand 
the relationship between the two activities.   
The co-production idiom for thinking about science, technology and society should 
be seen as a result of a slow and troublesome process of breaking loose from the epis-
temological model.  In searching for further improvements to the co-production 
perspective, given this analysis, one should keep in mind the three normative levels that 
are connected here.  The question of good science (regarding the question of the author-
ity of science) and good politics (regarding the question of legitimacy of action) comes 
together with the question of how to correctly perform the two discussions (a question 
of methodology).  The basic methodological challenge of the co-production idiom may 
here be expressed as a joint epistemic and ethical-political reflexive requirement.  Its 
proponents need to demonstrate that the co-production approaches provide the best tools 
for the jobs at hand, that is, to be able to account for the conditions of where scientific 
as well as political activities are performed well.   
This chapter has juxtaposed the works of Latour and Taylor in order to articulate 
suggestions for how the French school can be taken one step further.  I have summa-
rised my suggestions by means of the notion of ethos of an actor-network, and discussed 
the methodological implications and challenges of this theoretical move.  By undertak-
ing this joint theoretical and methodological move with respect to the French school, I 
suggest, we may take one step further towards a theory of co-production of the kind 
advocated by Jasanoff.   
 
 
Turning to part II 
Part II of this work presents an empirical material in order to investigate the potentials 
as well as the methodological challenges of the co-production analysis proposed in Part 
I.  One could say that the co-production perspective will be put to the test in Part II.  
Such a test amount to a scrutiny of the perspective's potential to describe and prescribe, 
which ultimately is to ask the question of whether or not the theoretical framework of 
co-production really provides good tools for the jobs at hand.  At stake here is the ques-
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tion of whether or not we should accept the co-production perspective as a basis for a 
correct way of dealing with urgent and often risky questions regarding science policy.  I 
believe the best way of testing the co-production approach is to discuss and explore it in 
a context of a normative controversy.   
This is what I intend to do.  I shall argue the case for the co-production perspective 
by comparing a co-production analysis with an epistemologically modelled analysis of 
what has become known as the phenomena of "biologization", "genetization" or "biolo-
gism".  These phenomena has attracted my interest because scholarly analysis of biolo-
gization usually carries a normative diagnosis; biologization phenomena tends to be 
conceptualised and analysed as particularly undesirable phenomena of our times.  
Chapter 4 shows how the literature on biologization has been marked by the 
epistemologically oriented tradition.  These analyses will be referred to as "standard 
analyses".  In Chapter 5 I provide an analysis of a biologization process as it appears 
through the lens of co-production.   
The phenomena of biologization here provides a setting for the testing of the co-
production perspective.  As Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999:Ch. 2) argues, it is not only the 
natural scientists that stage real phenomena in an experimental setting.  I seek to com-
pare how the phenomena of biologization are staged differently in two different epis-
temic cultures of the students of science that study the phenomena of biologization.  The 
difficulty of such a comparison is that the phenomena of biologization is conceptualised 
and investigated differently in the two perspectives.  In Chapter 6 I shall clarify why I 
regard the co-production perspective as the better approach.  
Moreover, such a comparative analysis also provides a way to scrutinise my theoreti-
cal and methodological suggestions for improvements to the French approach.  A 
comparative analysis calls for an attempt to carry out a co-production analysis along the 
lines I have proposed.  The quality of such an analysis will not only be restricted by my 
own personal qualifications but also by the proposed co-production perspective at work.  
In Chapter 5 I explore a way of instilling the notion of ethos into the French approach.  
This account therefore provides recourses for discussing the methodological challenges 
that follow this inclusion, a discussion I shall return to in Chapter 6. 
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 Chapter 4 
Biologization I 
Epistemologically modelled accounts of biologization 
 
 
 
Standard analyses of biologization 
 
Biologization is a term scholars have invoked in order to criticise hegemonic cultural 
positions acquired by the field of biology in western cultures during the last decades, 
following the success of molecular biology.89  The concept of biologization suggests 
some form of biological imperialism, of biology having an illegitimate and unfortunate 
influence on other fields.  Thus, the concept of biologization, as it has usually appeared 
in the literature, carries a normative diagnosis, biologization is something bad.  
According to critics, this influence has resulted from an unwarranted faith in the 
opportunities that lie in adapting other fields so they follow the teachings and practices 
of biologists.  And furthermore, the source of this faith, according to critics, may be 
traced back to flawed epistemological reductive reasoning, which in turn even have had 
a bad influence on biological practice.   
This chapter discuss how the analyses of biologization found in the literature tend to 
be epistemologically modelled.  I will introduce the phenomena of biologization by 
examining three areas of biologization as addressed by the critics; biology itself, other 
sciences and our culture at large. 
 
                                                 
89 With respect to the alternative notions that have been used, the one of genetization or biologism, I 
prefer the notion of biologization.  To my ear, biologization draws attention to the set of influential 
practices where biologization occurs, rather than a set of influential theories or thought-structures. 
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Biology genetized 
'What does the human genome sequence mean for me, my research and my institution?' is 
a question all biologists should be asking themselves (Editorial, Nature 2001).  
 
It seems to me that molecular biology is dead. DNA-based thinking has penetrated the 
whole of biology, and the separate field no longer exists (Gilbert 2003). 
 
Developments in molecular biology have often been understood as having fundamental 
implications for biology in general.  The other sub-fields of biology may solve their 
problems better, as the promise goes, if they restructure their activities around the axis 
of the DNA-molecule.   
The suggestion that biology at large would benefit from such a reorientation has 
faced internal resistance for a number of years.  The promise of molecular biology has 
been highly overstated, critics have charged, typically turning to an analysis of reduc-
tionism in order to substantiate their critique.  The optimism that molecular biology first 
engendered relied on a simplified and reductive account of biological processes.  It is 
from the level of the cell, organs or organism that the concept of "life" may be meaning-
fully applied, and there is a substantial knowledge gap, as the critics have maintained, 
between the biology of a higher order of organisation and biology at the level of the 
DNA molecule (see for instance Rose (1997), Lewontin (2000), Herold (2001)).  
Molecular biology then, as far as these critics are concerned, may lead biology on the 
wrong track.  Where this is happening, one could describe such a process as a process of 
genetization of biology.  The intriguing questions of life, to paraphrase an influential 
work, are Not in Our Genes (Rose, Lewontin and Kamin 1984). 
 
Biologization of the sciences 
We no longer have to resort to superstition when faced with the deep problems: Is there a 
meaning to life?  What are we for?  What is man? [...] Philosophy and the subjects known 
as 'humanities' are still taught almost as if Darwin had never lived (Dawkins 1989:1). 
 
Other scientific fields, in particular the social sciences, constitute the second arena of 
biologization.  In Hilary Rose’s (2000)  view, we have been witnessing a development 
where social science has been "colonised" by biology.  Questions of human behaviour 
or social organisation, traditionally discussed within fields like sociology, anthropology 
or psychology have been reformulated and pursued through the lens of biological theo-
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 ries in fields like sociobiology and evolutionary psychology.  Biologically based theo-
ries of behaviour and social organisation, as extensively described by Ullica Segerstråle 
(2000), were sparked by Edward O. Wilson's (1975) suggestions that human behaviour 
(including moral concerns, religious beliefs and aggressiveness) could be connected to 
our evolutionary heritage.  Richard Dawkins' opening passages of his influential The 
Selfish Gene quoted above, illustrates the level of ambition of the claims that have 
sometimes been made: we no longer need to resort to superstition when faced with 
questions about the meaning of life.   
Developments in molecular biology of the 1980s and 1990s have further strength-
ened confidence in biologically based explanations of behaviour.  The notion of the 
gene has, in many circles, become the crucial and central concept of life itself.  The 
worry of critics here is not that reductive strategies may imply bad biology, but that bad 
sociology as questions of human behaviour have been reduced to a question of biology.  
Given the success of molecular biology, concerns about biologically induced misman-
agement have been discussed in a wide spectrum of other sciences and practices as well, 
which gradually takes us to a third level of biologization. 
 
Cultural biologization  
Some finance analysts are of the opinion that as much as 70% of the industry on shore 
and 40% of total economy will be based on biotechnology in one form or another within 
twenty years (FUGE 2001b:13 - A joint research proposal from molecular biologists in 
Norway). 
 
Molecular biology, we have been told, will become crucial for a wide spectrum of prac-
tices that will secure our future health, food supply and economic welfare in general.  
The expectations of molecular biology are often mediated through other sciences, where 
medicine stands out as particularly important.  Molecular biology holds out expectations 
for simpler, cheaper, safer, and better diagnoses and medicines.  Over a longer time 
span, medicine informed by molecular biology may prevent and eradicate troublesome 
disease phenotypes as we know them today (Collins 1999b, 2001).  And medicine 
seems to be willing to reorient its practices according to the demands of biology.  Gene 
technology, as a strategic pamphlet from The Research Council of Norway went, is 
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already considered as a crucial "motor” in the development of medicine.90  Critics have 
maintained, however, that the optimism of what collective goods molecular biology 
might catalyse in medicine has been highly overstated.  Even though the theoretical 
basis of molecular biology has been promising, the field’s actual practical achievements 
have so far been rather limited.  The impact of the achievements is debatable, as most 
have been in diagnostics, without there being reciprocal therapy.  And moreover, the 
worth of its accomplishments are also debatable.  Modern biomedicine is mainly 
oriented towards profitable solutions for solving health problems that plague western 
societies (see for instance Holzman and Marteau 2000 and Le Fanu 1999 or Olshansky 
et al. 1997).   
The same criticism of overstated optimism would also apply to the promises that has 
been communicated to other fields.  Biotechnology has not only been understood as a 
developmental motor for medicine, it has been presented as the developmental motor 
for the future of economic growth in general.  For instance, in a joint research proposal 
from the biological research community of Norway (to be further discussed in Chapter 
5), biotechnology was presented as a field that could unleash substantial Norwegian 
development in the export of fish and fish products.  The export value was estimated to 
have the potential to increase by a factor of five within 20 years (by accelerating salmon 
growth and development, or developing fish vaccination programmes and suitable fish 
fodder, as some of the most common examples).  Spin-offs from molecular research 
could be substantial in this area since such an increase in productivity would stimulate 
"industry-cluster" networks for the production of fish fodder, as well as developments in 
product refinements and distribution.  The expectations communicated in the research 
proposal were extraordinary high.  The nation, the argument went, would run a serious 
risk if it did not invest in biotechnological research.  In general, as is evidenced in the 
quote above, as much as 70% of the country’s onshore industry could be based on 
biotechnology within twenty years. 
Given such optimistic prospects for the future good of biotechnological develop-
ments, it is not particularly surprising that our small talk, humour, commercials and 
media in general have been increasingly marked by "gene-talk".  We are somewhat all 
                                                 
90 "Medisin og helse anno 2020 – en forskningsodyssé."  Oslo: Norges forskningsråd 2000, p4. 
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 affected on a personal level by biological developments, and we respond in different 
ways to the overwhelming prospects of change that we are shown.  The criticism of 
overstated optimism has become rather difficult to assimilate given the general opti-
mism concerning the prospects of DNA research.  After all, the optimism appears to be 
a well-grounded established common wisdom of the scientific communities.  This 
optimism has been communicated to us by and through the most prestigious researchers, 
research institutions and journals.  Moreover, the press has, during the past decade, 
continually reported biotechnological success stories.  In the 1990s, as Sarah Franklin 
(2001) put it, it was not possible to open a newspaper without encountering a new bio-
medical discovery (most probably a new "gene for" some disorder or human trait).  
Now it is not possible to open a section of the paper without encountering a story that is 
in some way related to biotechnology.  
 
It has become clearer than ever that these changes affect the human condition in its every 
aspect, from the food we eat, to the way we define health, to our national economics, to 
our understandings of the human, the future and ourselves (Franklin 2001:336). 
 
It has become difficult to find any aspect of the human hierarchy of needs that has 
escaped the promise of improvement from modern biology.  Biological reasoning and 
concepts are now not only presented as unavoidable in discussions of how we should 
conceive ourselves as human beings, but also for securing and improving food supplies, 
health conditions and economic welfare in general.  The intriguing questions of life, our 
future health and welfare, seems to have been put into the hands of the biologist.  In as 
much as this is happening, it is possible to talk about a general process of cultural 
biologization or genetization, as Hilary Rose (2000) has suggested.  The Molecular 
Vision of Life, to quote Lily Kay’s (1993) phrase and book title, appears in this analysis 
as an adequate articulation of what seems to have become a culturally integrated vision.   
The analysis of cultural biologization carries a critical message of over-evaluation of 
biological insights and potentials.  Such a normative diagnosis has initiated investiga-
tions to determine what empowered biology to reach such a central cultural position.  
As Kay (1993:3) wrote in the introduction to her Molecular Vision of Life: "The aim of 
this book is to understand the historical process that propelled molecular biology to its 
dominant disciplinary status by uncovering the motivations and mechanisms 
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empowering its ascent".  The answers given to the question of what has empowered the 
hegemony of biology tends to resort to an analysis of reductionism, a pattern that can be 
detected throughout various analyses of biologization.   
The title of Lewontin’s (2000) book may be useful here: It Ain't Necessarily So, The 
Dream of the Human Genome and Other Illusions.  The title suggests we have been 
deceived.  Our hopes concerning what the gene might do for us should be considered as 
empty dreams and illusions.  We have collectively, in Lewontin’s analysis, been influ-
enced by a distorting ideology of reductionism.  This analysis, provided by Lewontin 
and others, has been a very influential.  Nicanor Ursúa (1996:227)  demonstrated the 
point when she equated "what is now known as the biologization of our culture" with 
"biological fatalism, which, as an ideology of secularised counter-enlightenment, makes 
destiny instead of the will of the gods responsible for human hereditary".  Our culture 
has somehow come to be captured, the analysis goes, in some determinist and politically 
dangerous reductive understanding of man.   
The idea that biologization expresses an ideology of reductionist determinism origi-
nated in the 1970s and continued into the 1980s.  This becomes apparent in Segerstråles 
(2000) account.  The critics of sociobiology, and later, the Human Genome Project, 
were dominated by an alliance of social and natural scientists that not only found the 
two projects scientifically unreasonable, but also politically dangerous.  The two 
projects, in their analysis, were carried by the same ideology of biological determinism 
that made the two projects appear to be scientifically sound projects.  But this ideology 
was dangerous in their view, because it had been an important basis for eugenic prac-
tices before and during the Second World War.  Biological determinism could not only 
legitimise racist politics, but could also undermine the critical potentials of sociology as 
social phenomena were reduced to biology (Segerstråle (2000), see also the contribu-
tions of Kevles, Nelkin, and Keller in Kevles and Hood (1992)). 
Given biologization as the phenomena under critical examination, critics have often 
turned to discussions on reductionism in various forms.  The critics, as I shall argue, 
have relied on a traditional epistemological frame when pursuing their critique.  The 
phenomena of biologization was conceptualised as something bad, and was identified as 
such through an epistemological line of argument.  Critics’ accusations of reductionism 
carried an epistemological critique of a number of different practices and discourses.  
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 These practices and discourses were seen as epistemologically flawed as they were 
perceived as having been influenced by a distorting ideology of reductive determinism.   
A problematic feature of these epistemologically modelled analyses, as I shall 
discuss next, concerns the analytical focus on ideas, concepts, beliefs and theories while 
the materiality and technologies involved in biologization processes has escaped 
attention. 
 
 
Biologization as ideology 
Molecular biology is now a religion, and molecular biologists are its prophets  
(Lewontin 2000:137). 
 
I shall take a closer look on how a number of influential analyses of biologization have 
been conducted as epistemologically modelled analyses of biologization.  The studies 
appear to have been designed in order to explain biologization phenomena with refer-
ence to a gene-determinist ideology.  I shall focus on two different lines of arguments 
that both aimed to explain the sources of the belief in the molecular vision of life, inside 
as well as outside the field of biology.  Ideas were seen as either illegitimately trans-
ported out of, or illegitimately transported into the sphere of molecular biology.  This 
understanding of biologization as due to the illegitimate transport of ideas lies at the 
heart of what I refer to as the standard analysis of biologization.  
 
Harm results from ideas out of place? 
Evelyn Fox Keller (1995) has provided a short, powerful and influential analysis of the 
rise of gene-centred and gene-determinist discourses.  Current operative concepts of the 
gene, she has argued, are not purely determined by empirical evidence.  Gene discourses 
of our time carry traces of a persistent historical search for an active causal principle 
that could explain heredity.  In her analysis, the determinist traits of current concepts of 
the gene were established long before the biology of the DNA molecule was estab-
lished.  And these determinist traits embedded in the notion of the gene have further 
influenced the way biologists have gone to work as they further investigated the gene 
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(in terms of the questions they have asked and the evidence they have sought).  As a 
result, competing biological perspectives and research programmes have been set aside 
or neglected (as was the case with Barbara McClintock's work (Keller 1983)). 
The message of Keller’s historical discussions seems clear.  The history of science 
cannot be explained only in terms of factors that are internal to science.   
 
If, as I have been arguing, the ways in which we talk about scientific objects are not sim-
ply determined by empirical evidence but rather actively influence the kind of evidence 
we seek (and hence are more likely to find), we must consider other factors if we are to 
understand the strength and persistence of the discourse of gene action (Keller 1995:35). 
 
What "other factors" then, can explain what has sustained and strengthened the persis-
tence of determinist gene discourses?  Some candidates have been suggested.  Keller (as 
well as Oyama (2000)) links the interest in the contents of the nucleus (and the corre-
sponding neglect of the biology of the surrounding cytoplasm) to a long tradition of 
Aristotelian influenced thinking.  In this tradition, the egg was seen as a passive facili-
tating environment for the activating sperm, and, as Keller argued, the neglect of the 
cytoplasm is understandable in light of this tradition.  The cytoplasm has likewise been 
understood and investigated as a passive environment that facilitates the activity of the 
nucleus.  Keller also added a more pragmatic social explanation.  The gene-centred 
discourse not only prevailed because it was the most promising scientific perspective.  
One would also need to take into the account how the competing perspectives were set 
back in the war-torn Europe after the Second World War.   
Such explanations are offered as “additional” social factors in Keller’s analysis.  
They serve the purpose of “filling in” what was missing, having demonstrated the social 
contingency of history of the formation of the gene action discourse.  The social factors, 
like the Aristotelian tradition or the effect of the Second World War in weakening alter-
native views, are offered as candidates for what readers need to understand in order to 
grasp the strength and persistence of the commitments to the gene action discourse.  
The search for social additional factors has likewise dominated analyses of how the 
gene came to be conceptualised in a “coding” metaphor.  The coding metaphor, as 
Keller (1995), Key (1993, 2000) and Oyama (2000) have argued, has been shaped in the 
process of integrating theoretical, technological and methodological tools of physics and 
informatics.  However, these critics have not paid much attention to the details and 
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 hardships of integrating the technologies and practices of physics and informatics.  
Instead, the analyses have tended to focus on the task of providing social explanations 
of how these fields have influenced biology (for instance through the prestige of the 
vocabulary and methodology of the hard reductive sciences).  Moreover, the biologist’s 
mobilisation of instruments and strategies from other fields tends to be subject to social 
explanations from the start.  Key's stories are organised around social inducements like 
eugenic-inspired visions for social engineering during the pre-war period (1993) and 
military agendas of the post-war period (2000).   
These different analyses share a tendency towards a “not-only-scientific-but-also-
social-factors” argument of the sort also employed by the British school of science 
studies (discussed in Chapter 2).  The argument may be understood as being conveyed 
in a two component analytical strategy, a strategy that relies on and lends support to the 
nature-social and internal-external distinctions.  First, the promise of biology is argued 
or assumed to be unjustified with respect to the evidential reasons provided by biology 
itself.  Second, candidates for what could fill in, or serve as additional social explana-
tions, are then given.  Such candidates should explain what could underlay the strength 
and persistence of the concept of the gene, how it was established, endured and why it 
has been so attractive.  As biological reasoning has become gene-centred, it has become 
contaminated in these analyses by the influence of external ideas at work outside of 
biology.  The very approach and organisation of the analysis has here been marked by a 
focus on social rather than technological and material realities.   
I now turn to analyses that likewise explain a similar but opposite phenomena.  How 
and why have non-biological practices become contaminated by biological ideas?  Even 
well-founded biological reasoning may have had an unfortunate influence on other 
fields.  The most influential argument here are the arguments that appeal to the need to 
clarify the distinction between methodological and metaphysical (or ontological) reduc-
tionism.  Reductionists, the argument goes, tend to confuse a reductive tactic with a 
metaphysical position when, blinded by the success that followed from the reductive 
tactic, they use the gene to explain everything (Levins and Lewontin (1985), Longino 
(1990) and Beckwith (1996)).  Following this, we might understand the process of 
biologization as a result of a widespread conflation between reductionism as a tactic 
with reductionism as an ontological stance.  It is a type of thought mistake that is quite 
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easy to slip into, according to this analysis, and it is a type of thought mistake where 
conceptual clarification may prove helpful.  Given the success of certain reductive 
strategies, the fallacy consists in conflating strategies with realities.  There is a gap 
between introducing theoretical and methodological tools (like postulating entities and 
principles such as the gene or the "central dogma", or successfully applying a gene-
duplicating process called PCR amplification), and introducing corresponding ontologi-
cal claims.  
 
 
Biological pole Non-biological pole 
Biology has been misdirected or unconsciously 
narrowed down due to the illegitimate influence 
of external social ideas. 
Biological ideas have illegitimately shaped non-
biological fields due to conflation of 
methodological and metaphysical reductionism.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1  Two sources of illegitimate biologization processes.  Ideas are illegitimately transported out of, 
or into the sphere of molecular biology. 
 
 
An extreme reductionism follows a conflation of methodological and ontological 
reductionism, a reductionism that lends support to naturalist postures.  We should, 
according to a naturalist view, only stick to causal explanations, which refers to the 
smallest functional units biologists use and have the means to make operational.  This 
subsequently provides legitimacy and plausibility for the search for biological explana-
tions of human behaviour and social phenomena.  After all, one could argue, the genes 
are the fundamental entities of molecular processes that in the end govern physiology – 
at least according to science.  In this way biological reasoning is given priority.  Knowl-
edge obtained from biology serves as a privileged point of reference in relation to other 
investigative perspectives. 
A closing remark of Lars Svendsen's Norwegian book on the "critique of biologism" 
sums up  the message of the two lines of arguments I have discussed here. 
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 The harm of science is not the scientific activity itself, which is highly legitimate and 
necessary, but rather that its methodological ideals and results are transferred to all other 
contexts (Svendsen 2001:158, my translation).   
 
As a polemic remark one could say that harm is analysed as ideas, concepts and strate-
gies out of place.  Harm appears because ideas are either being illegitimately transported 
out of or in to the sphere of biology.  
As a joint explanation of the two-fold movement, the analysis that there is a distort-
ing ideology of reductive determinism at play in our culture has been invoked.  The 
ideology has not been at work exclusively inside biology, due to processes of illegiti-
mate influence on biology from society; this ideology has also been at work outside 
biology due to an illegitimate influence of biology on society as well.    
 
Biologization, political agendas and conceptual contingency 
A feature of the difficulties involved in moving to a co-production type of account of 
biologization may now be clarified.  The scholars I have discussed have provided what 
can be called epistemologically modelled normative analyses of biologization.  Biologi-
zation has been conceptualised and investigated as something bad or illegitimate in 
terms of epistemological standards.  Different practices have been analysed as having 
been influenced by distorting ideologies rather than scientific imperatives.  As a result, 
firm (although unwarranted) beliefs in the molecular vision of life have appeared and 
thrived in many different settings.   
This approach to the phenomena of biologization can be put in perspective with 
reference to the methodological ideals of the strong programme.  Because the standard 
accounts are staged under the epistemological tradition, I believe, they make evident an 
important lesson made by the proponents of the strong programme.  Standard accounts 
of biologization exemplify how normative analyses tend to get linked to asymmetric 
forms of explanations of good and bad science.  The problem with such asymmetric 
forms concerns the assumptions one makes about the object under study; in short, the 
bad or illegitimate is explained with reference to social realities and the good and 
legitimate with reference to natural realities.  
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The main problem with the standard accounts of biologization, I suggest, is that they 
have tended to direct the focus of attention towards ideas, concepts and social context.  
This staging of the phenomena of biologization as an object of research happened 
because the analyses were epistemologically modelled.  And furthermore, I would 
argue, one would do better if one staged the phenomena of biologization in light of the 
French school’s rewriting of epistemology.  The improvements of the French school 
follow from the ways the rewritten epistemology might provide means for the analyst 
engaged in ethical-political discussions to be more sensitive to objects, technologies and 
scientific methods.   
The way that the classical epistemological discourses frame normative investigations 
can be clarified by taking a closer look at arguments made by Hilary and Steven Rose, 
as well as Lewontin’s analysis of biologization.  Their analysis comes quite close to the 
co-production perspective I advocate.91  In their version of co-production, however, 
scientific and political activities are investigated as activities developed in parallel, 
rather than intrinsically linked activities.  Their work conceptualises and explains biolo-
gization from the following basic understanding: Scientific and political activities have 
come to be set on the same unfortunate wrong track.  The activities that take place in the 
two spheres share the same patterns of reductive reasoning.  Since bad science comes 
along with bad politics, the effort to restore good science and the effort to create a more 
just society come together.  Their version of the co-production perspective is quite ex-
plicitly stated in the introduction to Not in Our Genes.   
 
Over the past decade and half we have watched with concern the rising tide of biological 
determinist writing, with its increasingly grandiose claims to be able to locate the causes 
of the inequalities of status, wealth, and power between classes, genders, and races in 
Western society in a reductionist theory of human nature. Each of us has been engaged 
for much of this time in research, writing, speaking, teaching, and public political activity 
in opposition to the oppressive forms in which determinist ideology manifests itself.  We 
share a commitment to the prospects of the creation of a more socially just—a socialist—
                                                 
91 These scholars were associated with what was called the "Radical science movement", where Hilary 
and Steven Rose appeared as leading scholars (Rose and Rose 1979).  The proponents of the movement 
shared a political vision for the works of scientists.  Scientists (including themselves) should understand 
themselves as taking part in a political project of creating a more just society in a world permeated by 
unjust and oppressive social orders.  Because they expressed an explicit normative agenda, their version 
of co-production provides an interesting point of reference for my discussions (which focuses on how 
normative investigations are staged and performed).   
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 society.  And we recognise that a critical science is an integral part of the struggle to cre-
ate that society, just as we also believe that the social function of much of today's science 
is to hinder the creation of that society by acting to preserve the interest of the dominating 
class, gender, and race (Rose, Lewontin and Kamin 1984:ix-x). 
 
Analyses of determinist ideology serve a particular explanatory purpose.  The determi-
nist ideology is the glue that maintains co-existing structures.  It is the vehicle, one can 
say, in which ideas are transported in or out of the territories of biology.  Biological as 
well as non-biological practice fields are understood as distorted by "forms of thinking 
we depend on" that "lead us astray", as Lewontin described it (in a foreword to Oyama 
2000:viii).  Given this perspective, a demonstration of co-existing patterns of thought 
seems to serves the explanatory purpose of demonstrating the presence of the ideologi-
cal glue that maintains co-existing patterns of different practices and discourses.  In 
Hilary Rose’s (2000) analysis, biologizational trends come with unfortunate co-existing 
trends of economic and political neoliberalism, as well as the scientific trends of meth-
odological individualism and reductionism.  The ideology of determinism manifests 
itself in these different activities as they share a pattern of reductive reasoning.   
Therefore, it seems that the work of identifying of co-existing social and scientific 
orders here replaces what the co-production perspective encourages one to do, that is, to 
trace the formation of connections and associations in which social and scientific orders 
are co-produced.  The work of detecting correlations replaces the work of tracing the 
steps of the construction process.  Observations of similar structural features in different 
practices are explained as being due to influences by the same distorting ideology.   
I believe Lewontin’s, Kamin’s and Hilary and Steven Rose’s version of co-
production should be understood as having been marked by the epistemological tradi-
tion, possibly because they had an explicit political agenda.  Catherine Waldby's (2001) 
review of Kay's and Keller's accounts of the history of the gene may provide a point of 
departure for a clarification of the matter. Their line of argument, Waldby argued, is 
marked by the project of demonstrating "conceptual contingency", in which the world 
could have been conceptualised, thought or understood differently.  Such a strategy may 
be seen as methodologically marked by the epistemological model.  In this model, 
ethical discussions would be linked to the work of demonstrating that the world could 
have been perceived differently.  Ethical inquiries, given the normative background 
order of the epistemological model, find their legitimate place as soon as the sources of 
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our concepts are demonstrated to be "not only" caused by nature "but also" by culture.  
In the ideal form, where we find legitimate biologization, we do not trace human agency 
and vice versa (cf. discussions of Chapter 3).  Ethical investigations then become linked 
to the work of questioning the epistemic necessity of the scientific claims made, which 
is done though different attempts to demonstrate that it could have been perceived 
otherwise. In epistemologically modelled normative studies of illegitimate scientific 
influence then, traces of human agency appear as a natural target for the analyst - for 
example, in the form of identification of distorting human ideas or ideologies. 
What the perspective is “unable to think”, as Catherine Waldby put it, or possibly 
better, what the perspective cannot encompass, is the ethical relevance of the contin-
gency of the world, or of asking for sources of diversity in the world, and not only how 
we perceive the world.    
 
What this approach is unable to think is what I would term the contingency of the 
biological, and the inventive power of contemporary biological sciences.  I am referring 
here to biology's power to fabricate new kinds of living systems, rather than simply to 
study nature.  A purely conceptual approach to genetics is unable to come to grips with 
the idea that genetic technologies, by crating workable circuits between living and non-
living systems, produce novel forms of vitality, new bio(techno)logies (Waldby 
2001:790). 
 
Like Kay and Keller, Lewontin, Hilary and Steven Rose, conceptualised and investi-
gated the phenomena of biologization within this epistemologically modelled frame.  
They pictured scientific and political activities as co-evolving.  But as they raised the 
question of how good science and good politics could be jointly realised, they under-
stood that the joint task was a matter of promoting the right ideology, as if good science 
only can be realised within a socialist society.    
A contrasting notion of “material contingency” appears almost counterintuitive under 
epistemologically modelled ethical discourses; the notion of material contingency 
would represent the ultimate relativist position.  Ethical inquiries concern the flexibility 
of perception, not the flexibility of how the world itself is constituted, which would, 
given epistemologically oriented postures, appear as an irresponsible ethical approach 
grounded in relativist postures.  Scholars need to distance themselves from such posi-
tions if they are to be taken seriously.  Steven Rose, for instance, found it important to 
emphasise in his Lifelines that he "view[ed] the world from a strongly materialist 
 176 
 perspective [...], which stresses both ontological unity and epistemological diversity" 
(1997:xiii).  There are different epistemic approaches, but only one world (although an 
unknown 'X' ).  Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994:579) distanced themselves from relativism 
along the same lines when they presented their posture as a form of multi-perspectism.  
A hillside, in their example, cannot fully be grasped within a perspective. Their posture 
was to be understood as one that "enables us to avert the nihilistic implication of post-
modernism by observing that there really is a hillside there, even though no-one 
(including ourselves) can see it as a whole." 
The notion of material contingency captures what Moll (1999) and Latour (2004a)  
considered to be the theory of actor-network’s lesson for ethics.  We cannot frame ethi-
cal discussions purely on the problem of "multiculturalism", they argued; we also need 
to take into account a plurality that is better understood if we refer to it as "multinatu-
ralism".  Multiculturalism invokes a focus on ideas as it urges us to investigate the 
flexibility of perception.  It is the perspective where the history of the concept of the 
gene may be viewed as the most rewarding focus for a critical analysis of biologization.  
Could the gene have been perceived otherwise?  Multinaturalism invokes a focus on 
instruments and material objects.  It asks us not only to look for flexibility in how we 
speak about the gene, but for flexibility in the corresponding epistemic machinery, of 
the world that comes along with a particular understanding of the gene.  The notion of 
material contingency draws attention to the flexibility of the network through which 
action is performed.  Stable networks do not necessarily stay stable all by themselves.  
The notion of material contingency urges one to pay attention to the patterns of this 
work of maintenance, of holding together. 
The question of whether or not we would be better off if we turned to the co-
production perspective is a question that needs to be answered in an empirical context.  
Comparing and evaluating the two perspectives is, however, not straightforward.  Given 
a co-production perspective, biologization would have to be conceptualised and investi-
gated differently.  I shall soon turn to a discussion of how to understand and perform a 
revised analysis of biologization.  But I will first summarise the strengths of the stan-
dard way of articulating, investigating and evaluating the phenomena of biologization.   
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The standard accounts of biologization   
Standard accounts provide important analysis of how and why the hegemony of biology 
can be understood in terms of what Taylor called the naturalist bends of our time.  The 
analytical distinction between methodological and ontological reductionism is very 
enlightening.  Beckwith demonstrates its utility by making the common intuitive basis 
of naturalist postures visible and discussible by means of this distinction.  The insis-
tence on the need to stick to the most fundamental operational units (ontological reduc-
tionism) has unwarranted epistemological consequences.  Likewise, the analyses that 
display science as not driven purely by scientific inducements are also very enlighten-
ing.  It overturns a common intuitive basis of what makes the biologizational processes 
legitimate.  If anyone wants to insist that the hegemony of biology is legitimate because 
it is rooted in justified and evidential biological reasoning, the stories provided by Kay, 
Keller and Oyama, to provide just three examples, will give them trouble.   
The analysis that there is a reductive determinist ideology at play also seems to be a 
plausible observation.  Distinguished scientists often substantiate such an analysis, and 
their determinist rhetoric is sometimes quite striking.  Francis Crick (1994) argued that 
molecular biology carries an "astonishing hypothesis" that all of our interior states, 
including our identity and notion of free will, are a result of nothing but the movements 
of impulses in nerve cells.  Walter Gilbert (1992) characterised the Human Genome 
Project as a carrier of a "vision of the Holy Grail", suggesting that the project would 
provide redeeming and complete insights into the secrets of life.  Francis Collins 
(Collins and Jegalian 1999), the leader of the Human Genome Project, later spoke of the 
project’s goal as one of deciphering the "basic mechanisms of life".  The human 
genome, as he and many others have presented it, should be seen as the "instruction 
book" for life, one that "contains the basic information about how a human body carries 
out its duties from conception until death".  
The critique of determinist rhetoric is important as it discloses a mismatch between 
what is communicated to the public and what is acceptable as standards of presentation 
in the scientific literature.  The reductive determinist message provides an effective 
clear-cut communication to the public, who also need to be convinced of the potential 
wonders of gene research.  The prudent rhetoric of scientific communications is not 
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 visible in the public hype presentations.  Rather, such presentations are striking as to 
how absent the discussions of the complexity of the problems at hand are. 
The bulk of the works I have referred to under the heading of “standard accounts of 
biologization” represents a set of forceful and important critiques of the existence and 
effect of widespread fatalist biological discourses.  These works have provided impor-
tant descriptions and analyses that display aspects of the epistemologically oriented 
character of Western intellectual cultures.  One may perfectly well appreciate the worth 
of these analyses without accepting the conclusions that are reached based on the works 
or the understanding of science and the nature of its relation to society that seem to 
accompany these analyses.  
 
 
 
Revised analysis of biologization 
 
The notion of biologization (as it usually has appeared in the literature) carries a 
normative diagnosis.  Given the analysis of the epistemological model, one should 
expect that the analysis of biologization would be spontaneously theorised and 
performed under the representational idiom, which also seems to have been the case.  I 
shall discuss how biologization may alternatively be conceptualised and investigated 
under a co-production alternative by means of an appeal to methodological reflexivity.  
This discussion recasts the main line of argument of Part I into the discussion of how 
the analysis of the phenomena of biologization is to be executed.  
The standard analyses of biologization are marked by the representational idiom, 
which is revealed in its theory- or idea-oriented analytical focus.  Biologization is con-
ceptualised as a distorting ideology at work inside as well as outside biology.  The 
analysis of biologization is therefore organised as a search for how epistemologically 
flawed reasoning manifests itself inside as well as outside biology.   
By what standards are we to evaluate the quality of this analysis?  The self-
understanding of well-performed epistemologically modelled investigations of science, 
as I have suggested, should be understood in light of what has been called the social 
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contract (discussed in the Introduction).  At the heart of the contract lies what I have 
called the lucky coincidence: Good science and just and wise politics are best jointly 
safeguarded if the two territories are conceptually and institutionally separated.  This 
ideal provides a theoretical and practical task for students of science: they need to iden-
tify and safeguard the borders between political and scientific activities.92    
The distinction between science and politics here, as conceptualised under the repre-
sentational idiom, carries an assumption that the process of illegitimate biologization 
may be conceptualised, and analysed as sharply distinct from what we could call a 
legitimate process of biologization (that is, an acceptable “non-imperialistic” influence 
of biology on other fields).  The analysis of illegitimate biologization is in this idiom 
understood as an ethical-political investigation (and for instance conceptualised as 
“research-ethics”) while the analysis of legitimate biologization is understood as 
epistemological.   
The analyses of biologization performed under the representational idiom tacitly 
carry an important assumption: A proper analysis of legitimate biologization will not 
affect analyses of what conditions illegitimate processes of biologization.  This is a 
questionable assumption, seen from the point of view of the performative idiom, since 
standard analyses of illegitimate biologization are seen to rely on an insufficient under-
standing of the epistemic nature of biological reasoning.  Such analyses of biologization 
would have to be conceptualised and investigated differently, given an adequate account 
of legitimate processes of biologization.  Standard accounts of biologization therefore, 
as the challenge from the performative idiom goes, need to be challenged with respect 
to their own epistemological assumptions.  The critique here is formulated as a call for 
epistemic reflexion. 
The performative idiom makes visible how the accounts of science, as performed 
within the representational idiom, may be challenged with respect to its epistemological 
assumptions.  Latour’s Pasteurization of France (1988a, see also 1983) may here 
                                                 
92 Have politicians or scientists taken over some of the tasks that belong to the job description of their 
counterparts?  Incidents such as the controversy on ultrasound research (where the Minister of Health 
interfered with research process) and ACT's announcement of the first cloned human embryo (where 
scientists created a political firestorm based on biased "facts") may at the outset possibly as reasonable 
exemplar stories that confirm and sustain the ideals of the contract as it may be articulated and 
safeguarded within the frames of the representational idiom. 
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 provide a model exemplar for how biologization may be conceptualised and analysed in 
the performative idiom.  Pasteur’s demonstration of the existence of micro-organisms 
was, in Latour’s analysis, conditioned by the successful enrolment of doctors, farmers 
and beer-brewers.  Given the performative idiom, our culture is now biologized as 
France once was pasteurized.  Knowledge acquisition, from this perspective, is intrinsi-
cally linked to the process of biologization.  Biotechnology, one may say, paves its way 
into the world, and the world has to comply in a material, conceptual and institutional 
way in order realise its epistemic machinery (to borrow Knorr-Cetina's concept).  
Standard analyses appear in this perspective to be insufficient because of the perspec-
tive’s blindness to the material and technological mediators of the biologization 
processes.   
From the point of view of the co-production idiom, the analysis of biologization, as it 
will be conceptualised and performed under the performative idiom, also needs to be 
challenged, now primarily with respect to its ethical-political assumptions.  In the per-
formative idiom, biologization is conceptualised and investigated as neither good nor 
bad.  This follows from the methodological requirement of invoking an agnostic posture 
with regards to whether or not the biologization processes under study are legitimate or 
illegitimate.  The task, given the performative idiom, is to provide the best account of 
how the large and powerful become large and powerful.  The quality of such an analysis 
should be discussed in terms of empirical adequacy - how well does the analysis 
account for the actual process of power formation? 
Such a call for agnostic symmetric accounts, however, carries an assumption that a 
proper ethical-political analysis will not affect epistemic accounts of the process of 
biologization.  Seen from the co-production idiom, this is a dubious assumption.  
Analyses of biologization would consequently have to undertake another transformation 
with regards to how biologization should to be conceptualised and investigated, given a 
proper account of the ethical and political nature of the process where actor-networks 
come into being.  The critique here is thus formulated as a call for ethical-political 
reflexion.   
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Co- 
production  
idiom   
The analysis is 
organised as a 
critique of ille-
gitimate biologi-
zation. The task is 
to unmask how 
flawed epistemic 
reasoning mani-
fests itself inside 
as well as outside 
biology. 
 
The analysis is 
organised as an 
agnostic scientific 
investigation of 
science-in-action.  
The task is to 
provide the best 
account of the 
process where 
stable epistemic 
machineries are 
formed. 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis is 
organised in ways 
that make it 
possible to 
articulate the 
ethos of the actor-
network. The task 
is to provide the 
best account of 
the process where 
a stable, morally 
justified epistemic 
machinery is 
formed.   
Judgements of 
whether or not the 
analysis is a good 
analysis will be 
marked by the 
question of how 
well the analyses 
clarifies and safe-
guards the terms of 
the social contract  
(cf. Chapter 1). 
 
Judgements of 
whether or not the 
analysis is a good 
analysis are to be 
discussed in terms 
of how well the 
analyses contribute 
to the task of con-
ceptualising the 
process of becom-
ing (cf. Chapter 2). 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Judgements of 
whether or not the 
analysis is a good 
analysis will need 
to be discussed in 
terms of how well 
it substantiates a 
process where the 
biotechsociety 
turns out as well 
constructed.  The 
task is marked by 
the question of how 
to understand 
epistemic and 
ethical-political 
questions as intrin-
sically linked 
(cf. Chapter 3). 
The asymmetric focus on 
illegitimate biologization 
relies on an insufficient 
understanding of the 
dynamics and rationale of 
biological reasoning. The 
critique here is formulated 
as a call for epistemic 
reflexion. 
 
 
 
The agnostic posture 
makes it possible to 
articulate an improved (re-
written) epistemic 
understanding of 
biologization processes.  
The agnostic posture 
relies however on an 
insufficient understanding 
of the role human 
respondents play in the 
processes of biologization. 
The critique here is 
formulated as a call for 
ethical-political reflexion. 
   
 
A normative symmetric 
approach calls for 
abandoning the treasured 
norm of agnosticism.  It 
aims at providing better 
redescriptions of (imma-
nent) epistemic as well as 
ethical-political 
evaluations.  To undertake 
such a task the analyses 
needs, for epistemic as 
well as ethical-political re-
flexive reasons, to have a 
joint descriptive and 
prescriptive pretension.   
   
 
Biologization 
phenomena are con-
ceptualised as some-
thing bad.    
Biologization is seen 
as caused by a dis-
torting reducetive 
ideology of biological 
determinism being at 
work inside as well as 
outside biology. 
 
Biologization phe-
nomena are con-
ceptualised as proc-
esses in which actor-
networks are estab-
lished as the field of 
biology is "realised".  
Biologizational proc-
esses are here con-
ceptualised and 
investigated in non-
normative terms.  
That is, the phenome-
na of biologization do 
not exist as good or 
bad phenomena. 
 
Biologization phe-
nomena are con-
ceptualised as proc-
esses in which actor-
networks along with 
their ethos is estab-
lished as the field of 
biology is realised.  
The phenomena 
under scrutiny are 
conceptualised in 
normative terms.  
The pheonemna of 
biologization exists as  
good and bad 
phenomena. 
 
  
What is  
biologization? 
Normative reflexion 
Fig. 4.2. The phenomena of biologization was initially articulated under the frames of the representa-
tional idiom.  The phenomena needs to be rearticulated when brought into the analytical frames of the 
two non-representational idioms in question, which call for corresponding methodological 
reconsiderations.   
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 The methods of the performative idiom, given the co-production idiom, rest on an insuf-
ficient understanding of the political nature of biological research.  In order to provide a 
proper account, one needs to be able to conceptualise how the process of biologization 
is affecting and is affected by entities like human memories, commitments, dreams and 
hopes.  Biologization, in the co-production idiom, is not only conceptualised as a proc-
ess where a stable actor network is constructed, but as a process where the actor-
network is constructed as an acceptable network as well. 
To continue the analogy to Latour's Pasteurization of France, molecular biologists 
now promise to improve on a wide variety of practices of our time – just as Pasteur once 
promised.  This promise offers an invitation: Together we may all contribute to the 
creation of a biotechsociety, an improved and desirable society marked by biotech-
nology.  The practitioners in these fields may resist or welcome biological influence, or 
to put it in a more actor-networkish way, resist or accept enrolment.  Whether they enrol 
or not depends on their professional judgement of whether or not their respective fields 
would benefit from adjusting themselves to the "demands" of molecular biology.  Key's 
notion regarding the "molecular vision of life" may be taken as an observation of the 
fact that a wide spectrum of non-molecular biological practice fields is adjusting to 
these demands.  The vision, or the ethos of molecular biology, addresses human practi-
tioners in that it has become a culturally integrated molecular vision of hope.   
The question of whether or not biologization processes are legitimate is symmetri-
cally discussed in the co-production idiom.  In order to do so we need to pay attention to 
how the ethos of molecular biology is mediated and sustained in sociotechnical prac-
tices.  Moreover, the ethos of molecular biology is negotiated in the process of creating 
and restructuring the field, which cannot be seen in isolation from what and who is 
involved or engaged in the process.  The negation of the ethos of molecular biology 
takes place in many different arenas, where the role of non-humans also needs to be 
taken into consideration.  The ethos may therefore not be uniform, well articulated, 
informed, or reflected.  Normative evaluations of biologization processes will, in this 
perspective, be connected to the work of articulating how the ethos of a particular prac-
tice is shaped.  Such an articulation will serve a double function of revealing and creat-
ing, and it represents a challenge for the analyst to explore ways of doing so.   
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The next chapter provides an analysis of a particular process of biologization as it 
appears through the lenses of co-production.  I shall discuss the process where the field 
of “functional genomics” came into being in Norway.  Functional genomics may be said 
to represent a third phase of biologization, if we consider the first two as having evolved 
around sociobiology and the HGP.  Functional genomics emerged as a field that prom-
ised to cash in on the potential of the HGP.   
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 Chapter 5 
Biologization II 
Functional genomics in Norwegian 
 
 
 
Rearticulating the promises of the molecular vision  
Structural genomics is under way, functional genomics is coming (Duboule 1997).   
 
 
As the Human Genome Project (HGP) approached the completion of its goal – the 
sequencing of the human genome – a new effort, "functional genomics", gradually 
appeared as its heir.  In an article in the 1997 “genome issue” of the journal Science, 
Hieter and Boguski (1997) reviewed the concept of functional genomics that had 
appeared on several hundred websites during 1997.  In their view, “genomics” was 
about to make the move from “structural” to “functional” genomics.  Structural genom-
ics now described the field that used to be referred to as genomics, that is, the field that 
analysed genomes by way of mapping and sequencing DNA molecules.  Functional 
genomics in return, represented the challenges and opportunities of the “next step”.   
Functional genomics represented something new.  It seemed to be difficult, however, 
to articulate the novelty the notion expressed.  The shift from structural to functional 
genomics not only reflected a shift of objective, that one now could truly turn to the 
study of how genes function, but it also reflected a call for a new way to examine how 
genes function, requiring experimental setups that could answer the question.  The first 
presentations of functional genomics typically emphasised that knowledge about the 
functioning of genes did not easily follow from knowledge about DNA structure.  "A 
full description of our genome will not be sufficient to understand its functional organi-
sation neither for individual units nor at a more integrated level", as the editor of the 
 185
1997 genome issue of Science stated. "Hence,” he continued, “novel technologies and 
conceptual tools must be designed that promote a systematic approach to gene function: 
a transition from 'structural genomics' to 'functional genomics'" (Duboule 1997:555).   
Duboule’s comments show how the notion of genomics, as well as the goals of the 
HGP, had somewhat been tied to a simplified understanding of genes and their relation-
ships to functional protein building blocks.  The focus did not lie on theoretical ques-
tions but on methodological ones – on how such investigations were to be done.  Novel 
approaches had to be designed, and it was these novel approaches that first of all legiti-
mized functional genomics as a new descriptive term.  By the time "the first survey of 
the entire human genome” was announced in June 2000,93 the need for new and 
challenging research strategies was even more clearly communicated.  Even though the 
accomplishment of the HGP was celebrated, it was typically stressed that it “only” 
represented the beginning of a research area that now appeared more challenging than 
ever.  These challenges were to be faced under the heading of functional genomics, a 
notion that sometimes simply denoted “everything after the sequencing studies” 
(Kreeger 2000).94   
It was difficult to articulate the novelty of the field because so little had been estab-
lished.  The field was shaped and articulated in the process of working out novel 
approaches to the field.  This chapter provides an account of how functional genomics 
was established in a Norwegian setting during 1997-2002.  I shall discuss the emer-
gence of the field by pursuing the following questions: What did it take to establish a 
robust experimental system for performing functional genomics?  What challenges did 
the researchers face?  How was the field of functional genomics shaped as a desirable 
field through the scientists’ work of overcoming these challenges?  This focus for my 
account needs to be understood in light of my attempt to combine Taylor’s and Latour’s 
perspectives by means of the notion of the ethos of an actor-network.  
The actor-network perspective, as discussed in Chapter 2, assumes research proc-
esses to be goal-oriented, but does not localise the discussions of goals anywhere.  I 
                                                 
93 A press conference held by J. Craig Venter, Francis S. Collins, and Bill Clinton. June 26th, 2000. 
94 The term “post-genomics” has often been preferred to denote the projects that followed the HGP.  I 
stick to functional genomics, since the notion came to function as a heading for the “next step” in 
Norway. 
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 seek to describe the goals as temporally shaped, evolving around the work of establish-
ing the field of functional genomics as a good and desirable field.  I have followed the 
scientist at work in order to identify the challenges they faced.  This strategy has served 
as a point of entrance for my account of how the ethos of functional genomics was 
shaped through scientists’ attempts to overcome these challenges.95   
The chapter is organised in three sections.  I introduce the field of functional 
genomics in the first section by discussing how the field was presented as a desirable 
field.  I emphasise the need for paying attention to how the ethos of functional genomics 
was shaped in the process of, and in places where, novel experimental systems were 
established.  Moreover, I also emphasise the need to pay attention to the role that the 
gene itself played in the formation of the ethos.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Rearticulating the promises of the molecular vision  
(What is functional genomics?) 
The field of functional genomics is introduced.  I discuss the need to pay attention to the 
construction of the experimental system in which functional genomics was to be undertaken.   
2.  Functional genomics established in Trondheim, 1997-2002 
(Establishing microarray-based functional genomics in Trondheim) 
i) Sources and methodological focus of my account are discussed, and the microarray  
technology is introduced. 
ii) Before 2000: Establishing the basic procedures of microarray in local arenas.  
iii) After 2000: Establishing means of analysing microarray data in international arenas. 
3.  Functional genomics as a national initiative, 2000-2002 
(Establishing a national plan of action for functional genomics in Norway) 
After 2000: Functional genomics shaped in a larger set of scientific, technological, 
economical and ethical political arenas.    
 
Fig. 5.1  An overview of the three sections of this chapter. 
 
 
In the second section I discuss how the first experimental platform for functional 
genomics, known as the “microarray technology”, was established at my university in 
                                                 
95 I have postponed a methodological discussion of my field work to the second section of this chapter. 
 187
Trondheim during 1997-2002.  The ethos of functional genomics was initially primarily 
shaped in local settings such as the one in Trondheim, that is, by different microarray 
units working out the basic procedures of microarrays.  By 2000, the basic procedures 
for producing microarray data had been established and researchers were ready to 
analyse the data.  The field now came to be shaped in an international arena as research-
ers within the field came to collaborate with each other at the level of data sharing, 
protocols standardisation, and the construction of knowledge databases.  In this setting, 
the gene itself came to play a central role in the formation of functional genomics as a 
field.   
The year 2000 was a turning point for functional genomics, with the appearance of 
different technological platforms and an acceleration of international interest.  
Following this development a national plan of action was initiated in Norway in 2000 
and established in 2002.  I discuss this initiative in the third section of this chapter.  
Functional genomics was now staged quite differently in Norway.  The scale and 
expenses of the initiative, which proponents argued were necessary to establish the field 
in Norway, implied that the ethos of functional genomics now came to be shaped in a 
more complex technological, scientific, ethical, social, economical and political context. 
  
 
The vision continued 
Describing functional genomics as the “next step” strongly suggested a continuity of the 
legitimising discourse of HGP.  In Kay’s, Keller’s and Lewontin’s analysis, HGP car-
ried a long-term reductive and determinist molecular vision of life.  One could expect 
that functional genomics would be marked by the same reductive vision since the disci-
pline was presented as the HGP’s heir.  This also seemed to be the case, at least in part.   
The reductive molecular vision of life was sometimes quite evident in presentations 
about functional genomics.  A good example can be found in the journal Nature’s 
special “Functional Genomics” issue in June 2000.  Functional genomics was, accord-
ing to the editors, concerned with the question of how genes function, and the physiol-
ogy of the organism tended here, as in the legitimising discourses of HGP, to be 
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 ultimately conceived in terms of determinist gene regulative processes.  The goal of the 
project was to map the bits and pieces of the organisation and control of genetic path-
ways. 
 
This month's Nature Insight focuses on the challenges to biology brought about by the 
avalanche of DNA sequence information. [...] The next step in this biological revolution 
is 'functional genomics', not simply the assignation of function to the identified genes but 
the organisation and control of genetic pathways that come together to make up the 
physiology of an organism (Patterson and Dhand 2000). 
 
According to a number of contributors to the issue, functional genomics did not repre-
sent something radically new, at least in principle.  The newness of the field, as clearly 
stated in Tilghman’s and Vukimrovic’s article, concerned its technological powers, 
which promised to make it possible to draw together information in integral accounts of 
physiological processes.  
 
Although the current research is focused on assigning function to genes and proteins, the 
long-tem goal is just as it is for the child and the black box – that is, to be able to under-
stand sufficiently well how the pieces work together that you could, in principle, put them 
back together and get a functional organism.  The challenge is to describe the collective 
properties of whole organisms in a precise and qualitative way.  This challenge is new to 
biology, and its resolution will require, in addition to existing paradigms of molecular 
biology, new sets of analytical tools (Vukimrovic and Tilghman 2000). 
 
Such a presentation of the task and potentials of functional genomics lends support to 
what Keller has called a century-long determinist and reductive tradition of talking and 
thinking about the role and functions of genes.   
Long before any actual physical theory of the gene was formulated, Keller has 
argued, the physical and functional unit of heredity had been given the name “genes”.  
The confidence in the power and agency of such genes codified what she has called the 
“discourse of gene action”.  By discourse, Keller (1995:3-12) was referring to a way of 
speaking about genes that was connected to ways of seeing, thinking and working.  The 
gene action discourse outlived changes in specific theories about genes, as agency, 
autonomy and causal primacy were attributed to genes.  Genes were here partly under-
stood as a physical object, like the physicists’ atom, and partly as an exemplar pattern, 
like the Platonic idea, constituting an unchanging stable activator.  In modern times, 
Keller argued, the gene action discourse has been retrieved in what has been referred to 
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as "the Central Dogma".96  The Central Dogma articulation of genes fitted into her 
picture since genes were here conceptualised as autonomous, stable and constant enti-
ties.  Furthermore, the gene functioned in the central dogma as the first activators in a 
causal linear chain of reactions from DNA to proteins.   
The gene action discourse then, through the modern Central Dogma articulation of 
the gene, as Keller argued, provided a powerful legitimising recourse for the HGP.  
Functional genomics, as presented in the special issue of Nature, seemed to be a field 
that would continue and would strengthen the traditional gene action discourse.  The 
field would disclose the bits and pieces of the physiology of an organism in terms of 
how genetic pathways were organised and controlled.   
The gene action discourse appeared to be even more evident in popular presentations.  
A future scenario text written by a Norwegian biologist is illustrative.  In her analysis, 
the next step represented a radical shift as “our picture of genes and genetics is changing 
from ideas of destiny to ideas of possibilities” (Stoltenberg 1999:6, my translation).  
This “destiny to possibility” heading relied on a determinist picture of how biological 
organisms function.  The heading carried the hope of being able to intervene in our 
genetic destiny.  Genes rule, but as soon as the genetic code had been cracked, we could 
hope to break out of the prison.  The horror of being trapped by the structural knowl-
edge of the gene, which ultimately controls our body, could be replaced by the hope of 
uncovering the controlling mechanisms.   
Such optimistic descriptions of the next step in genomics reinforced sceptical counter 
arguments that in turn reinforced the gene-action discourse, as the counter arguments 
did not question the reductive premises.  This became clear in Stephen Holland’s 
(2003:Part IV) or Ronald Dworking’s (2000:chapter 13) analysis of the rationale for the 
influential “fiddling with nature” or “playing God” arguments.  Given a determinist 
gene discourse, genes would stand out as particularly important carrier of our notion of 
                                                 
96 The dogma dates back to 1957 when Francis Crick suggested that genes should be articulated in terms 
of two assumptions; "The Sequence Hypothesis" and "the Central Dogma".  The two hypotheses have 
later tended to be jointly referred to as “the Central Dogma”.  The sequence hypothesis stated that the 
"specificity of a piece of nucleic acid is expressed solely by the sequence of its bases and that this 
sequence is a simple code for the amino acid sequence of a particular protein".  The Central Dogma 
strengthened the claim by assuming a one-way information flow from DNA to protein, where 
"information" meant a "precise determination" of protein sequence specified by the sequence pattern of 
the DNA (Judson 1996:333-336). 
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 nature and humanity, and genetic intervention would represent a quite radical interven-
tional practice.  Such intervention, as Holland and Dworking described, has in many 
circles been seen as the ultimate reckless attempts of man to play God.  The line 
between discovering and constructing nature was seen to be at risk, which is a danger-
ous situation since this puts the order of Creation at risk, an order too big for mankind to 
control.97     
It seems then, that the analysis of biological determinism highlights important 
aspects of how the legitimising discourses of functional genomics have been staged.  
The determinist molecular vision of life has been at work in arguments that attempted to 
promote as well as counteract functional genomics.  The determinist molecular vision 
should therefore be considered as part and parcel of functional genomics, since the 
proponents as well as the critics have evoked this vision.   
However, the ethos of the HGP was not smoothly transferred to functional genomics.  
This becomes evident when we take a closer look on the character of the scientific 
opportunities and challenges that legitimised the notion of functional genomics in the 
first place.  The initial vision for functional genomics was not primarily a theoretical 
one, but rather one mediated by both methodology and technology.   
 
 
The vision rearticulated 
Hieter and Boguski (1997) evaluated the legitimacy of introducing the notion of func-
tional genomics in the review referred to in the opening passage of this chapter.  Even 
though they found functional genomics to be an unclear term, one that also functioned 
as a way of "hyping" a research approach, they primarily saw functional genomics as 
the beginning of a novel and exciting research strategy.  Functional genomics, as they 
pointed out, was not only made possible by the completion of the HGP, but also by a set 
                                                 
97 The playing God argument has often been used, in the next turn, as an argument for restricting the 
autonomy of science.  This may substantiate the gene determinist discourses further, due to the nature of 
the controversy the argument has created.  The self-regulating internal processes of the biosciences need 
to be sidestepped and politically regulated, as the argument would typically go, regardless of how well it 
would meet scientific standards.  Given this perspective, biology crosses borderlines that should not be 
crossed since biology would be seen as interfering in God’s own jurisdiction. 
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of novel technologies and approaches.  In their account, functional genomics was pri-
marily defined in terms of these novel approaches. 
 
Functional genomics refers to the development and application of global (genome- wide 
or system- wide) experimental approaches to assess gene function by making use of the 
information and reagents provided by structural genomics [...]. The fundamental strategy 
is to expand the scope of biological investigation from studying single genes or proteins 
to studying all genes or proteins at once in a systematic fashion (Hieter and Boguski 
1997).  
 
Functional genomics was here demarcated in terms of the set of activities that aimed at 
developing and applying genome-wide experimental approaches.  These approaches 
promised to expand the scope of biological modes of investigation from single 
genes/proteins to all genes/proteins.  Two years later, two scientists clarified the impli-
cations of these strategies as they enthusiastically reported from a conference that they 
said had made the spirit of the field of functional genomics fully evident.98  Genome-
wide approaches provided a gateway for experimental studies of the molecular basis of 
life at a higher level of biological organisation.   
 
Probably no scientific field has ever started with greater expectations than functional 
genomics.  The ability to look at cellular, tissue, and maybe organismal molecular biol-
ogy in a comprehensive manner opens up an entirely new way of approaching biomedical 
science and in fact is transforming all biological sciences.  It truly will change the way we 
predict, diagnose, and treat disease, as well as how we develop new therapies and create 
novel therapeutic modalities.  With that said, the technical challenges are also enormous, 
because in order to accomplish the ultimate vision, we need to apply the new vision to 
biological systems that each bring their own complexities.  So we don’t only want to look 
at an organ as the sum of its cellular components; we want to have comprehensive 
molecular knowledge of all the components cells and how they interface to produce over-
all phenotypes (Strausberg and Austin 1999).  
 
In these presentations, functional genomics represented a new biological programme - 
and not just as more powerful tools to pursue the same old programme.   
These presentations of functional genomics carried a different picture of genes with 
respect to the ones associated with the HGP.  It was this picture that comes closest to 
                                                 
98 This was an informal meeting entitled “Functional Genomics: Technology Development and Research 
Applications” held at the Banbury Centre in April 1999.  The Banbury Centre is a conference centre 
located at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, where discussion workshops for topics in molecular 
biology are regularly held.  These are prestigious workshops restricted to 30 to 40 invited scientists. This 
particular conference were organised by the Merck Genome Research Institute and the National Cancer 
Institute’s Cancer Genome Anatomy Project. 
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 what Keller (1995) has called the “gene activation” discourse.  The gene activation 
discourse, in Keller's account, is a discourse that emerged among biologists occupied 
with problems of biological development, like embryologists.  From their perspective, 
genes have been perceived and investigated as something that is being activated, rather 
than as activating.  Given the point of view of the biology of a higher level of organisa-
tion, Keller argued, something crucial had to be added to the simple Central Dogma-
mediated gene action discourse.  Even if one assumed that the genome as a whole 
embodied a complex life regulating "programme", one could not possibly restrict the 
study of actual physiological processes to studies of the patterns of the chains of reac-
tions from genes to proteins.  Such studies would not address the question of why a 
certain gene came to make a particular product in a given process at a given time in a 
particular cell.  In order to address such questions, genetic action would have to be per-
ceived and investigated within the time-space of the biological processes where genes 
were activated.   
The vision of functional genomics described by Hieter and Boguski as well as 
Strausberg and Austin was first of all technologically mediated.  Theoretical reflections 
served a subservient role in the attempt to articulate the exciting and novel character of 
functional genomics.  Their awareness of exciting novelty and ground-breaking possi-
bilities was linked to the emergence of new technologies that could facilitate genome-
wide investigations, where “microarray” technology was particularly important in the 
first phase.  
Microarray technology promised to facilitate genome-wide expression studies by 
providing snapshots of which genes were expressed in a cell or tissue sample at a given 
time.  Since microarray technology was the first genome-wide strategy to be estab-
lished, the notion of functional genomics was linked to microarrays, and vice versa.  
Microarray technology was established as a fairly robust technology at the same time as 
the notion of functional genomics became a popular term.  The technology appears to 
have been an important mind-opener, a tool that provoked and encouraged researchers 
to think in novel and almost unthinkable terms.  And it all happened quite fast.  In 1994, 
as one of the array pioneers Mark Schena (1999:preface) recalled, the "insane idea that 
gene expression might be best studied with DNA chips [...] drew audible laughter from 
a crowd of 500 in Holland".  But after the first report of array experiments appeared in 
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Science the following year (Schena et al. 1995), array technology soon became enthusi-
astically welcomed.  By 1998, reference to the technology had even found its way into 
US President Bill Clinton's "State-of-the-Union" speech with the following promising 
statement; "gene chips will offer a road map for prevention of illness throughout a 
lifetime" (Phimister 1998).   
In January 1999, array technology was featured in a special issue of Nature Genetics 
(The Chipping Forecast).  Even though array technology was here regarded to be in its 
infancy, it was here and elsewhere hailed by scientists as a promising vehicle for the 
next step after the HGP, as expressed in the following titles:  "Everything’s Great When 
It Sits on a Chip" (Sinclair:1999), with microarrays deserving of the designation of 
"Biotechnology's Discovery Platform for Functional Genomics" (Schena et al:1998).  It 
was presented as the “Array of Possibilities” (Marshall and Hodgson:1998) or the 
“Array of Hope” (Lander:1999), that would accommodate "The Next Revolution in 
Molecular Biology" (Gwynne, P. and Page, G. 1999).   
Thus, the call for a transition from structural to functional genomics of the late 1990s 
cannot be fully accounted for in terms of being another manifestation of the reductive 
gene-action discourse.  Nor can it be fully accounted for in terms of a theoretical 
induced interest in the gene-activation discourse.  To understand the vision, one also 
needs to take into account how the proponents of the field were addressed by novel 
technological tools.  It was the novel tools, primarily represented by microarray tech-
nology, which captured the minds of skilled and experienced researchers.  They saw 
promise, hopes and revolution in the field when they looked at arrays.  It was a technol-
ogy that, in their minds, could possibly mediate what Dzau et al. (1999) forecast to be a 
“paradigmatic advance” in how molecular biology was to be done.   
From the experimentalist, rather than the theorist’s point of view, I would say, 
microarrays/functional genomics first of all represented a new empirical programme 
with respect to the one expressed by the Central Dogma.   
 
Escaping the empirical restraints of the Central Dogma 
The importance of the Central Dogma, Crick claimed in an interview with Horace 
Freeland Judson (1996:333-336), was that it represented a way out of stunning 
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 theoretical diversity.  The dogma isolated a specific empirical focus, as it drew attention 
to the questions of what the means and patterns of genetic information flow were.  And, 
as Crick continued, history has proved the utility of the dogma, even though, or possibly 
even because, no one even discussed alternatives. 
 
Because if you didn't believe that, you could invent theories, unlimited theories, whereas 
if you just put in that one assumption, that once the sequence information had got into the 
protein it couldn't get out again, well then, essentially you were on the right track (Crick 
interviewed by Judson 1996:337-338). 
 
Crick acknowledged that the dogma truly put harsh constraints on research activity.  
"Time has shown", as Crick went in an article from 1970 quoted by Judson, "that not 
everybody appreciated our restraint" (Judson 1996:338).   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Postulates of the “Central Dogma” 
(Postulates of the gene action discourse?) 
 
1. "Genes determine characters in linear 
causal chains.  One gene giving rise to 
one character. 
 
 
 
2. Genes are not subject to influence 
from the environment. 
 
 
3. Genes remains stable and constant. 
 
 
 
4. Genes remain within organisms and 
stay where they are put." (Ho. et al 
1998) 
Empirical challenges to the "Central Dogma" 
(Emerging postulates of gene activation discourse?) 
 
1. "No gene ever works in isolation […]. The 
function of each gene is dependent on the 
context of all the other genes in the genome. [..]. 
if the gene is transferred to another species, it is 
most likely to have new and unpredictable 
effects. 
2. The genetic network, in turn, is subjected to 
layers of feedback regulation from the 
physiology of the organism and its relationship 
to the external environment. 
3. These layers of feedback regulation not only 
change the function of genes but can rearrange 
them, multiply copies of them, mutate them to 
order, or make them move around. 
4. And, genes can even travel outside the original 
organism to infect another – this is called 
horizontal gene transfer." (Ho. et al 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2  By the late 1990s, Crick’s empirical restraints on how to study genes and how they function had 
been empirically challenged point by point (cf. also discussions in Hviid Nielsen et al. 2000).   
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the constraint was not appreciated by everybody because it 
enforced a simplistic reductive picture of biological processes.  But, as Crick seemed to 
argue, the restricted focus did at least isolate a doable and quite successful research 
programme within molecular biology.  By the end of the 1990s, however, as one should 
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bear in mind, Crick’s central empirical restrains had been challenged point by point, as 
argued by Ho. et. al (1998), (cf. Fig 5.2).99  Functional genomics then, emerged in times 
where a tension had appeared between doable empirical programmes (which involved 
simplified reductive understandings of the gene) and emerging new theoretical 
understandings of genes (which, however, were difficult to translate into answerable 
empirical questions).  
Seen from the experimentalist point of view, it is not enough to acknowledge the fact 
that the activities of genes are entangled in complex signal systems.  One young biolo-
gist I met at a conference on bio-ethics was so tired of all the critical grumbling voices 
that repeatedly stated that "it's all so complicated".  Without prospects of any empirical 
promising ways of approaching complexity, it seemed to me, the cry for complexity 
appeared to him as a provoking critical attack on his research strategy, which at least 
had the possibility of demonstrating something.  The crucial question for him would be 
the question of whether or not there are reliable experimental systems that would make 
it possible to study such complex patterns.   
The problem at hand has less to do with stunning theoretical diversity and more to do 
with stunning experimental diversity.  The experimentalist’s problem is to create repro-
ducible experimental conditions by shaping a robust experimental system.  Microar-
rays/functional genomics fuelled expectations that it would enable scientists to deal with 
the overwhelming experimental diversity associated with molecular studies of life at a 
higher level of organisation.  With microarrays at hand, one could perhaps create an 
experimental system that was not confined by the restraints of the empirical programme 
of the Central Dogma.  One could possibly answer questions that could not have been 
asked before, regardless of one’s disapproval or approval for Crick’s theoretical 
restraints.  Microarrays made the difference.  Functional genomics then, as it first 
appeared as a field in the late 1990s, was not only articulated through the ethos it 
                                                 
99  The four postulates, Ho et al. claimed, represent a version of "classical genetics which has dominated 
biology roughly from 1930s up to the 1970s when genetic engineering began."  This version is "so 
extreme that no biologist would admit to actually subscribing to it", they noted, but the four postulates are 
still operative when biologists approach the public with promises of solving a wide range of problems 
through genetic manipulation.  The four postulates, they claimed, underlie the typical short descriptions 
that aims at promoting public understanding such as the following, quoted in the article: "Research 
scientists can now precisely identify the individual gene that governs a desired trait, extract it, copy it and 
insert the copy into another organism.  That organism (and its offspring) will then have the desired trait".   
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 inherited from the HGP.  It was also articulated as a promising experimental programme 
mediated though the emerging technology of microarrays.  This was true at least for 
those pioneer researchers who were engaged by the project of functional genomics at 
the time.  Microarrays/functional genomics appeared to be desirable to them as it 
promised to provide an escape route from the empirical restraints of the Central Dogma.   
The gene action discourse however, along with the deterministic reductive visions it 
carried, would not simply go away – the doable experimental systems were always 
marked by the empirical programme of the Central Dogma.  The pioneers of microar-
rays constantly had to face sceptical criticism from the biological community concern-
ing the do ability of the approach.  They also had to confront the way the gene action 
discourse was embedded in the way the practices they sought to work themselves out 
from.  The project of functional genomics was in important ways initiated as a project 
that was to realise the goals of the HGP.  I believe, as will be further discussed in this 
chapter, that the goals were rearticulated through the work of reshaping of the experi-
mental system through which the goals were to be realised.   
Microarrays/functional genomics then, appeared as exciting and desirable to many 
researchers because they addressed a tension that had appeared in molecular biology, a 
tension that could be expressed as a tension between doable empirical strategies and 
emerging new theoretical understandings.  The prospect of resolving the tension hinged 
on the possibility of actually being able to establish a robust experimental platform for 
performing functional genomics.  One could not know beforehand, however, what it 
would take to realise such an experimental system, as researchers would have to over-
come theoretical and methodological hurdles on the way.  Moreover, as I shall argue, 
the tension was also loaded with a number of ethical-political and socio-economic 
issues that would be affecting and affected by the attempt to resolve the tension.  The 
process of making functional genomics doable was entangled in the process of estab-
lishing it as desirable.  I shall discuss the matter by situating the theoretical and meth-
odological discussions of genomics in a wider social context, starting with a return to 
the controversy over the HGP. 
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Doable and desirable experimental systems   
The main criticism of the HGP, as becomes evident in Leslie Roberts (2001) summary 
of the controversy, could be formulated in terms of a simple question: What did the 
proponents actually believed could come out of such an exclusive focus on sequence 
information?  The HGP started out as tool-oriented, Roberts explains, in the sense that it 
aimed at providing a precise and complete map of the human genome in order to serve 
basic research goals.  The critics however, questioned the assumptions that sequence 
information would be of crucial importance for basic research.  It was also a matter of 
priority, and besides, most of the DNA information was considered to be worthless non-
coding areas of “junk” anyway.  Such criticisms did not only concern internal scientific 
matters, as the project demanded huge resources.  The steps taken in order to meet the 
challenge, as I shall discuss, tended to enforce the gene determinist discourse that in 
turn appeared to be more and more problematic.100   
The HGP soon turned away from having basic research aims, to find its legitimacy in 
serving the needs of medicine.  In 1991 J. Craig Venter (while running a sequencing lab 
at the US National Institutes of Health (NIH)) successfully employed a technique that 
focused on churning out the "real goods", the coding fragments of the genome.  NIH 
was so excited by the speed of detecting gene-fragments, that this US federal agency, 
counter to the expressed goal of the early times, actually filed patent applications on 
gene-fragments (so-called ESTs) at a rate of 1000 per month.  Watson, who was the first 
head of the HGP, greatly disliked this development.  But he had a hard time counter-
acting it, as Roberts has reported, since "disease genes captured the public imagination 
and kept the dollars flowing".  Watson lost the fight as well as his position as the leader 
of the project.  And the new head of the project, Francis Collins, "talked about saving 
children's lives" whereas Watson had spoken of creating tools.  And in the first years of 
the 1990s, the media was filled with stories of new discoveries of "genes for" yet 
                                                 
100 The initial general critiques of misplaced priorities became less relevant as the project turned out to be 
far less expensive and time consuming than assumed.  The project was considered extremely difficult 
(efficient technology did not turn up before mid 1990s), time consuming (at first it was estimated that it 
would require 15 years) and expensive (an estimate of $3 billion appeared in many reports).  But these 
objections declined as cheaper and faster technical solutions emerged.  In 1998, a company founded in 
part by J. Craig Venter, Celera, announced that it would sequence the entire human genome in 3 years, 
spending only $300 million.  In the following years the sequential structure of the human genome was 
identified at a pace that exceeded all expectations (Roberts 2001).   
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 another disease.  This "gene for" talk of the 1990s, as Judson's (2001)  analysis explains, 
sold the HGP to "legislative bodies, to the people, to venture capitalists".  It kept the 
project going in times when it was scientifically and politically controversial.   
The “gene for” talk did not only keep the HGP going through doable research tasks 
like detecting correlations between genetic mutations and diseases.  The “gene for” talk 
also lent support to broad and ambitious presentations of the goal of HGP, such as the 
following, found at an official educational web site (put in writing in 1992).101
 
The goal of the Human Genome Project is to provide scientists with powerful new tools 
to help them clear the research hurdles that now keep them from understanding the 
molecular essence of [..] tragic and devastating illnesses, such as schizophrenia, alcohol-
ism, Alzheimer's disease, and manic depression. 
 
These developments lent further support to the critics, because their main question re-
mained unanswered.  How could the outcome of HGP actually aid researchers in over-
coming their research hurdles?   
Displacements in the understanding of genes and how they work, as listed in Fig. 5.2, 
added to the force of the criticism of the HGP, as the project was seen from a wider 
political, social and economical point of view.  Given these developments, as Torben 
Hviid Nielsen et al. (283-90:2000) argued, one could not only explain why the promised 
economic and medical spin-offs had failed to come.102  The developments also 
suggested that the promises would probably never be fulfilled either.  And possibly 
more important, genetic research strategies now appeared as a quite risky and 
irresponsible pursuit.  As Ho et al. (1998) pointed out, the empirical programme of the 
Central Dogma did not only hold out unrealistic economic, medical and industrial 
expectations; it was also blind to the unexpected ecological implications of the 
interventions of biotechnological research.   
                                                 
101Access Excellence, launched in 1993, is a national educational programme in the US that aims to pro-
vide high school biology and life science teachers with access to scientific information.  The account of 
the goal of HGP given here also exemplifies how the HGP programme soon was legitimised though rais-
ing expectations of improvements in the field of medicine (http://www.accessexcellence.org/AB/IE/Intro 
_The_Human_Genome.html). 
102 The expectations for biotechnology was enormous in the 1980s, expectations that were linked to 
expectations of what one could achieve with recombinant DNA technology at hand.  By 1999, however, 
most biotechnological firms had lost money, even in the US.  Of the 20% that were profitable, most of 
them belonged to the pharmaceutical sector.  The situation had not changed dramatically ten years later 
(Hatling 1992, Hviid Nielsen, et al. 2000).   
 199
Thus, the late 1990s could be seen as quite critical times for the proponents of bio-
technology.  Regardless of the fact that the molecular vision of life seemed to have 
become a cultural integrated vision, the growing awareness of the complexity of genetic 
processes gave poor prospects of fulfilling the promises of the vision.  Moreover, the 
broken promises, as Hviid Nielsen et al. (2000:285) indicated, might have contributed 
more to the rising political and public resistance towards biotechnology than ethical 
worries did.  In this setting, functional genomics brought a new way of communicating 
hope, both internally and externally.   
Functional genomics could reset the scene for biotechnological controversies.  The 
field could represent a new response to the old question of how the outcome of the HGP 
could aid researchers in their work.  With functional genomics, the notion of genomics 
would no longer be tied to a specific sequencing programme; this programme was only 
the beginning of a new genomic era.  And moreover, as already discussed, the field 
could more generally address the tension between acknowledged theoretical results and 
existing doable empirical programmes.  In doing so it provided another angle of inci-
dence for addressing economic, environmental, ethical, political and even religious 
affairs that had come to be packed into the tension over the issue.  These issues could 
now be seen as in need of being reconsidered as a result of the appeal of the radically 
new and powerful research strategies of functional genomics.   
One would expect, then, that the work of establishing a methodological platform for 
functional genomics would put at play a wide spectre of norms and considerations that 
matters to people and the activities they are engaged in.  The ethos of functional 
genomics, along with accompanying pathways of co-production, would be expected to 
be temporarily shaped by these different human concerns, in so far as the process of 
establishing the field was affecting and affected by them.   
In discussing functional genomics as a temporarily shaped goal-oriented process, one 
particular actor deserves special attention, although this actor is not a human – it is the 
gene.  The gene came to play a central role in the articulation of the ethos of functional 
genomics since the gene itself was rearticulated in the process.   
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 The gene as an epistemic object and central actor 
Genes were and still are what Hans-Jörg Rheinberg (1997) called “epistemic objects”, 
that is, part of what constitutes the research objects under inquiry.  Since the question of 
what these things called genes were was not settled, it was still an open question as to 
what direction functional genomics would take.  The actor network of functional 
genomics would be shaped through adjusting to the “demands” of the gene. 
The passage below may function as an illustrative point of entrance to the matter at 
hand here.  It appeared in an e-mail exchange I had in March 2001 with the leader of the 
microarray project that was established in Trondheim.   
 
I often feel schizophrenic with respect to how I think and talk about genes.  As a biologist 
I am admittedly very focused on them being the key to biological understanding, to 
understand how a living cell, a living organism functions.  As a human being and a citi-
zen I am at the same time engaged in dismissing the power that genes have upon us.  To 
emphasise that a gene never operates in a vacuum and by itself, but is always governed by 
the environment (partly chemical and other external factors and partly products of other 
genes), is possibly a kind of middle way.  Or it is actually the new way.  The question is 
possibly how one should get this into the language such that this way of talking about 
genes replaces the way where genes are put in the centre as the decisive actors.  And [the 
question is] how one can speak of genes in this way and at the same time recognise that 
some of them are quite wilful in the sense that they produce a certain phenotype regard-
less of what environment they arrive in (my translation). 
 
The passage reveals how the project leader felt committed to speak respectfully about 
genes and represent them adequately.  One should not say something about them that is 
not true.  And it is the experimentalist talking, one who has lived with genes for some 
time and who has tried to get to know them better.  Her knowledge about them was 
expressed in a simplified gene-language she was not comfortable with.  It troubled her 
that this language undermined ways of speaking truthfully about the nature of human 
agency that she, as a citizen, felt committed to be true to as well.  It was possible to 
break out of the habit of using inaccurate language and emphasise that genes never 
operate in vacuum (for instance when they where communicating with the public), she 
noted.  The problem, it seemed, could not be reduced to the task of being more 
conscious about the way one talks about genes; she even felt schizophrenic with the 
existing alternatives she had at hand to think and talk about genes.  And the problem 
could not be reduced to a simple hand waving sort of reference to a holistic posture; the 
wilfulness of the genes would not simply go away.   
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The crucial part that makes the passage above interesting is captured in her sudden 
realisation that, "it is actually the new way"!  The point, as I read it, is not to emphasise 
that genes never operate in vacuum, but to investigate them as being always governed 
by the environment – that is, as activated.  The "new way" she struggled to articulate 
here, should be understood as functional genomics, the field she enthusiastically had 
described as a new field or a new turn in molecular biology.  The new way represented 
to her a promising way out, as it referred to a set of new experimental approaches from 
where the old language could be revised (without abandoning the insight gained as a 
result of the old way of investigating gene activity).  In the "old way", one could stress 
the scientific fact that "genes never operate in vacuum".  But even if no one would 
strongly disagree, the scientific significance of such statements was still limited as long 
as there was no way to pursue them further as empirical questions.   
Functional genomics represented a new way of consulting genes; the question of 
what genes were could be reopened in radical ways.  In the first handbook for microar-
ray methodology,103 Joel Bellenson (1999) reflected on how to understand the notion of 
“function” when it was to be studied at a "new level – that of networks of interactions 
between molecules within biochemical pathways".  In this setting, one could not con-
tinue to comprehend "function" in terms of some straightforward fixed property of the 
gene (like a 'kinase', an 'ion channel', a 'receptor'), he stated.  The notion of “function” 
had, it seemed, been reopened as it appeared to be a “very complex and tentative and 
almost mysterious" concept in the setting of functional genomics.  Without a successful 
establishment of ways of studying function in a comprehensive manner, the question of 
how to talk about "function" would remain a mystery.   
  
Our notion of function is fundamentally rooted in:  
a) The sensitivity of our laboratory methods.  
b) Our ability to co-ordinate, organise, process, pre-digest, and visualise all of the re-
lated reference data about every gene/protein.   
Those data, whether it be sequence or structure or map location, empirically observed 
biochemical function, known chemical inhibitors, algorithmically predicted attributes, 
and the entire network of known or predicted interactions between molecules must all be 
accessible within a common information management and software development envi-
                                                 
103 The handbook was the first comprehensive practical guide to microarrays, a book that provided 
suggestions for specific protocols for different laboratory procedures required by array technology. 
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 ronment. To the extent to which this is not the case, the function of a molecule, and the 
basic biochemistry of life, will continue to be obscured (Bellenson 1999:146). 
 
The exciting thing for Bellenson was that the question of gene function, given the 
microarray platform, now finally could be evaluated as an empirical question.  Earlier 
laboratory instruments had not enabled this kind of sensitivity.  This level of sensitivity 
might possibly be achieved in a microarray platform; however, it implied that the bits 
and pieces of the current knowledge of genetic functional aspects had to be coordinated 
and organised in ways that made it possible to process and represent gene function 
within a laboratory setting.  A crucial problem here concerned the problem of “informa-
tion management”, as Bellenson put it, a phrase that expressed a great challenge, 
because such management could no longer be done or processed in the human mind.   
 
Despite the enormous technical advances in speed, precision, and sensitivity of the labo-
ratory instrumentation, we are still in the infancy of our knowledge of molecular and 
cellular physiology and function.  Only now have we been forcefully presented with a 
sufficient quantity and type of data so that previous hubris about information manage-
ment in our heads can be permanently broken.  And fortunately, only in the last few years 
have the computational abilities of the hardware and software reached a point where the 
tackling of this challenge was reasonably affordable (Bellenson 1999:163-4). 
 
The task at hand, by Bellenson’s account, was to establish laboratory methods that 
could be sensitive enough for the research objectives in question.  Given microarrays, 
the output of the HGP and new developments within computer science, one could now 
hope to create such a sensitive laboratory.  The way biological data were to be pro-
duced, selected, organised and processed would need to be reconsidered if such sensi-
tivity was to be achieved.   
The crucial point here is that the notion of function is intrinsically linked to the 
experimental setup, in which the notion of function can be meaningfully applied.  The 
work of creating an experimental setup is at the same time a work of articulating crucial 
theoretical notions.  Without the creation of new laboratory methods, biologists’ notions 
of function would simply “continue to be obscure”, in Bellenson’s words.  Experimental 
work is a fascinating pursuit for those who perform it, because experimentation may 
provide a means of articulating and pursuing answerable questions.  And, one should 
not forget, experimentalists are not able to pose their questions clearly without 
performing experiments.  As Rheinberger (1997) and others have pointed out, one of the 
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goals of experimentation is to establish a robust reproducible laboratory setting, in 
Rheinberg’s words an “experimental system”, through which questions themselves may 
be articulated and clarified.   
 
Experimental systems are to be seen as the smallest integral working units of research.  
As such, they are systems of manipulation designed to give unknown answers to ques-
tions that the experimenters themselves are not yet able clearly to ask.  Such setups are, as 
Jacob once put it, 'machines for making the future'.  They are not simply experimental 
vehicles for materialising questions.  They inextricably co-generate the phenomena or 
material entities and the concepts they come to embody. Practices and concepts thus 
“come packed together”(Rheinberger 1997:28).  
 
The vision of functional genomics was not (consciously nor unconsciously) already 
articulated in the minds of its proponents.  This vision was tied to the notion of the gene 
that was to be investigated, and researchers even had to articulate their questions in the 
course of establishing an experimental system for pursuing them.   
In the following, I shall take a closer look on how an experimental system for 
performing functional genomics was established in a Norwegian setting.  The gene itself 
carried an important role as the system was to be arranged in ways that could make it 
possible to pose answerable questions about how they function.  Given the decisive 
position genes played, they can be seen as holding a crucial ethical relevant position, 
because the research process had to be attuned in accordance to the “demands” of the 
genes, so to speak.  To investigate genes would at the same time result in a process 
where centres of power would possibly be displaced, as the significance of some actors 
would be de-emphasized and new actors enrolled.  The field of functional genomics, I 
shall argue, was articulated in the process of not only establishing a doable experimental 
system.  It was also articulated in the process of negotiating the desirability of the 
experimental system.  One needs to take into account the universe of moral realities, in 
Taylor’s sense, that were being affecting and affected by the work of establishing a 
doable experimental system.  
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 Functional genomics as established in Trondheim 
 
Functional genomics was established in Norway during 1997-2002.  In this period, 
functional genomics evolved from a marginal to an important research field.  Public 
funding increased from 100 thousand to 100 million NOK, and while a handful of 
people would identify themselves as involved in the field of functional genomics in 
1997, the number would come closer to one thousand in 2002.  In 1997, there were only 
two or three small-scale local initiatives involving functional genomics.  In 2002, func-
tional genomics had become embedded in a national initiative involving all important 
Norwegian biological research communities.  The last two sections of this chapter 
reflect this transition from a local to a national initiative.   
The second section of this chapter analyses a microarray pioneer project at NTNU in 
Trondheim.  During the years from 1997 to 2002, the paramount objective of the project 
was, as organisers said, to “establish the method” for microarray research, which for 
them was understood as a work of simultaneously introducing and establishing the field 
of functional genomics in Norway.  I have followed the work of establishing functional 
genomics/microarray in Trondheim, discussing what challenges the researchers faced 
and how the field emerged through the work of overcoming these challenges.   
This section i) clarifies my methodological focus and sources of my account, ii) 
provides an introductory presentation of microarrays, iii) discusses the work of estab-
lishing an experimental platform for microarrays in Trondheim in two parts, before and 
after 2000 and iv) summarises how functional genomics was shaped as a desirable field 
in and through the experimental system of microarrays.  
 
 
Arenas and experimental systems 
I have found the analytical notion of experimental systems to be a useful tool for spot-
ting the challenges that researchers faced and the arenas they entered in order to over-
come them.  As Rheinberger defines them in the quote above, experimental systems can 
be considered to be the smallest integral working unit of experimental biologists.  They 
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are systems of manipulation that serve the dual function of question articulators and 
answering machines.  These systems are emerging systems that constitute the arenas of 
research.  Biological research may be seen as directed towards establishing such sys-
tems.  By following the emergence of the system, these arenas can be displayed and 
vice versa.  By following the arenas the researchers enters, one may trace the formation 
of the experimental system.  It is in these arenas that different processes of co-
production take place.   
The notion of experimental systems appears to have been a notion of choice for STS 
scholars who have studied biological research (like Fujimura (1996), Rheinberger 
(1997) and Knorr-Cetina (1999)).  This is understandable, as the notion of experimental 
systems fits quite well as a descriptive term.  Molecular biologists have gained control 
over complex systems through the creation and study of standardised “model” organ-
isms and systems (like the fruit fly, the Arabidopsis plant, different onco-mice or stan-
dardised cell and tissue lines).  The notion of experimental systems, as I understand it, 
provides a way to delimit the boundaries of the actor-network though which biological 
research is done.  In speaking of "model systems" one should not only have in mind the 
standardised organic material being studied, one should also include the set of stan-
dardised means of studying these systems, such as standardised technologies, reagent 
packages (like the ‘kits’ one can buy from different firms) and protocols.  Joan 
Fujimura, for instance, referred to this totality as a "standardised experimental system".   
The notion of experimental systems appears as a notion that provides means of 
tracing biological research as directed research.  Research objectives and research 
objects are articulated and shaped in the process of establishing such experimental 
systems.  Because biologists chose to create standardised experimental systems, as 
Fujimura describes, they managed to establish transportable standardised “packages” 
that could travel in between laboratories, allowing for reproducibility and common 
discourses.  She studied how standard model systems were accompanied by standard-
ised technological tools and experimental protocols that emerged in order to establish a 
common discourse on cancer genes.  The transportable standard packages carried a 
minimum of stability needed in order to do replicable research, compare results and 
pursue specific questions.  In producing such “packages”, researchers found ways of 
staging the arena of research in ways that co-constructed problems and solutions.  As a 
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 phenomenon of research, cancer was, according to her account, constituted by the way 
recombinant DNA technology of the 1970s made it possible to create a "cancer object" 
that could be studied in a replicable manner.  Researchers could work on the "same" 
tumours since they worked on the "same" cloned mice, or the "same" cell lines having 
the "same" genes including the "same" tumour promoting gene variants.   
Functional genomics carried a vision of staging genetic research better by creating 
better and more sensitive experimental systems, where microarray based functional 
genomics was of crucial importance in the initial period.  Biological research, as the 
promises went, would take one step forward.  This step was sometimes even described 
as representing a paradigmatic and revolutionary change in how biology was to be done.  
New experimental systems would have to be created in order to improve upon the state 
of the art of biological research.  This would imply a different way of staging research 
objectives and objects.  Cancer, for instance, would be constituted differently as a 
research object, hopefully in ways that could articulate the phenomena of cancer better.  
I have chosen then, to account for how the field of functional genomics was established 
in Norway by following the steps of how the field was constructed as a well-performed 
practice in and through the experimental system being shaped.  
 
 
Sources for my account 
My interest in this project goes back to 1998, when I was trying to pull together a 
research proposal that could finance a PhD programme.  I observed the project more 
systematically from summer 1999 to the fall 2001, being most active as an observer 
during the first year.  In the fall of 2000 and spring of 2001, the project was marked by 
the initiation of a national plan for research on functional genomics.  The research group 
then changed from understanding itself as a group that encompassed a comprehensive 
functional genomics platform, to understanding itself as a node in network of national 
laboratories.  Being affiliated with the microarray group in Trondheim, I also had the 
opportunity to observe the early stages of the local and national working groups and 
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meetings, where the national plan was discussed and worked out (to be discussed in the 
third section).  
As I did not have any biological training, I had to obtain basic knowledge about 
molecular biology.  The project leader recommended selected lectures and seminars and 
provided specific guidelines for what to read (such as elementary textbooks, websites, 
articles and books).  And she even found time to give specialised introductory lectures 
for non-biologists who were involved with the project she was establishing.  I also bene-
fited from a general willingness by the research group to answer questions and explain 
their individual tasks and roles in the project.  This included guided tours around the 
laboratory where the steps of the procedures were demonstrated and explained.  As the 
microarray project emerged as a multidisciplinary field (consisting of practitioners from 
the field of molecular biology, clinical medicine, pathology, informatics and instru-
mental engineering), I also learned a lot from their internal discussions.   
The group started off with weekly group meetings that functioned as a place where 
the members of the group were updated and mutually educated.  I attended these group 
meetings, which gave me an overview of the current status and challenges facing the 
programme.  The meetings also provided insight into which arenas the members of the 
group were entering as the members discussed problems they had faced and what they 
had done in order to overcome these challenges.  They also informed one another of 
latest news and trends in the international community, such as was discussed at interna-
tional conferences.  These meetings gave me an idea of what public, administrative and 
political arenas members entered as they also discussed which steps that should be taken 
in order to raise money and convince university leaders of the importance of the project.   
The group meetings gave me an overview of what arenas I could benefit from enter-
ing as well.  The project leader also often took the initiative and invited me to attend 
particular working sessions she thought might be of interest to me, such as discussions 
between computer scientists and biologists.  I benefited a lot from her interest and 
understanding of my project, as she displayed good judgment in suggesting interesting 
literature and arenas I should pay attention to (as well as providing access to these 
arenas).  I also followed the steps of a particular sub-project of the group in order to get 
an understanding of the different steps and challenges of array methodology.  The group 
meetings stopped being a crucial meeting place during the fall of 2000, and weekly lab 
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 meetings were substituted for them.  The organisation of the lab and the technical 
hurdles facing the lab were discussed in these meetings.  I occasionally attended these 
meetings during 2001, as they provided a feeling of the development of the project and 
the challenges the researchers faced at a technical level.  
The literary sources from the project are first of all confined to research proposals, 
concentrating on the first initial phase of the project.  I have also assigned priority to 
published communications between the group and their peers as well as handouts from 
internal seminars along with my own minutes and observation notes. 
 
 
The experimental system of microarrays   
Microarray technology had two main applications; sequential variation analysis (geno-
typing) and measurement of gene activity (gene expression analysis).  The group in 
Trondheim pursued the latter.  Gene expression analysis is a method of studying the 
process of producing a protein from its DNA and mRNA sequences.  The analysis may 
be presented in terms of the Central Dogma, which postulated a process by which DNA 
was transcribed into mRNA (messenger RNA), which was further translated into 
proteins.104  A cell typically express a fraction of its genes at a given time and the activ-
ity of the genes in a cell were to be studied in terms of measuring the mRNA present in 
the cell; that is, which genes were turned “on or off” and whether or not they were “up 
or down” regulated.  The mRNA transcripts could be harvested from the tissue under 
study, of which microarray analysis would provide a quantitative measure.105  
I shall introduce the experimental system of microarrays by drawing a map of the 
experimental setup and experimental stages of performance of microarray approaches.  
The arrays looked like, and were the size of, a microscope slide.  A prepared array 
would consist of thousands of identified (single) strands of nucleic acid (DNA) depos-
                                                 
104 Some RNA transcripts are not translated into proteins, e.g., transfer and ribosomal RNA. 
105 The amount of sample mRNA from any given gene was not given as absolute measures.  The readouts 
were calculated as relative measures from the comparison of two targets (i.e. biological samples).  The 
most common design of such analyses is to compare the mRNA signals from a control (or normal) sample 
with the mRNA signals from the biological condition being investigated (e.g. disease, perturbed model 
system, or other). 
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ited or “printed” on spots within about 6-14 cm2 of the array slide by a high-precision 
robot.  The DNA in these spots was to serve as the "probes" that represented genes 
whose functions were known to different degrees of precision.  The probes were to be 
hybridised, or matched with the "target", that is, free strands of nucleic acid from the 
biological samples being analysed.  A solution containing labelled targets was drained 
over the array under conditions that ensured that matching strands of nucleic acids from 
the test material found their way to the identified nucleic strands (the “probes”) attached 
to the array.  The labels on the target nucleic acid in solution were fluorescent markers 
in the Trondheim system.  After a process of washing, stable double strands of nucleic 
acids consisting of the probes attached to the microarray and their matching genetic 
material from the biological sample remained on the array ready to be measured as fluo-
rescent light.  A "reader” provided a digital readout for each spot on the array and this 
readout was then transferred to the last stage of the experimental process, where the 
experimental data was analysed.  In Trondheim, a laser scanner, that could excite the 
fluorescent markers from the test sample and register released photon intensity, was 
built to serve the purpose of reading.  In sum, there were four basic steps to the microar-
ray analyses; printing, hybridisation, reading and analysis.  
Prior to the process of manufacturing and analysing microarrays, however, the 
probes and the targets had to be prepared, a process that was dependent on the choice of 
a technological prototype.  By the end of 1997, there were two types of array technolo-
gies that had been experimentally proven to be satisfactorily robust (and which have 
also remained the main options of choice).  The prototype developed by Stephen Fodor 
and his colleagues at Affymetrix offered high-quality arrays, where small strands of 
synthetically produced gene-specific short strands of nucleic acids, oligonucleotides, 
were manufactured on the array directly from sequence databases.  The researchers in 
Trondheim chose the other prototype that was initially developed by Patrick Brown and 
his colleagues at Stanford.  This prototype made use of a high-precision robot to deposit 
(print) solutions of strands of nucleic acids directly on a glass surface.106   
                                                 
106 The Stanford prototype was often referred to as a microarray while the Affymetrix prototype was 
referred to as a DNA-chip.  For early review articles on array technology see Ekins and Chu (1999), 
Gwynne and Page (1999) and Marshall, Hodgson (1998) and Lander (1999).  See also links provided by 
Lenning  Shi (http://www.gene-chips.com/).  For a Norwegian presentation see Sandvik, et al. (2001). 
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 In contrast to the Affymetrix prototype, the Stanford prototype required a quite 
extensive local library of probes, consisting of cDNA (constructed through a process of 
reverse-transcription of mRNA to DNA and cloned into bacteria).  This prototype there-
fore involved extensive need for traditional wet-lab work in the manufacturing of 
arrays. It called for time-consuming procedures involving the cultivation of bacteria that 
contained the cloned cDNA, the purification and amplification of this cDNA from the 
bacteria, and quality control including sequence verification of what would eventually 
appear as thousands of spots of cDNA on the arrays.  Amongst other challenges, the fact 
that the material to be deposited as spots on the arrays was in a solution represented a 
cluster of technical hurdles, and it limited the density of the probes on the array as 
well.107
The important drawback of the Affymetrix prototype was that it required high-
technological apparatus that was in the hands of Affymetrix.  There was a huge price 
tag for every set up and another price for each array.  At the time, the company 
marketed 20-30 ready-made array set-ups.  In contrast, choosing the Stanford prototype 
meant that researchers could produce flexible in-house manufacturing of arrays at a 
comparably much lower cost.  In-house preparation of arrays had other advantages than 
economic ones.  It provided a “hands on” control of the entire process that could make 
the researchers better equipped to know where to look for background distortions when 
things did not work out. The flexibility of array production, local control of the process 
and low cost of production seemed to make the Stanford model the main microarray 
technology of choice for a basic research laboratory, like the one in Trondheim.  The 
printer had to be locally constructed however, since it was not commercially available at 
the time. 
Finally, the output of the reading of the data from the experimental runs also had to 
be prepared before analysis.  The experimental setup could be divided into traditional 
wet-lab and computer based dry lab where the analyses were to be performed.  The 
                                                 
107 The question of density was not a primary concern of the researchers all the time.  There were more 
urgent basic technical problems to be solved.  But the issue seemed to be an important part of the presen-
tations and discussions of array technology.  It concerned the fascination of the prospects of fitting the 
entire genome (about 100 000 genes) on one single chip, which could ultimately facilitate a global analy-
sis. 
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latter section called for work that could be called dry lab preparation.108  Since the 
human mind cannot juggle thousands of factors at a time, these readouts had to be 
further sorted and organised with computerized analytical tools before they would 
appear as meaningful data.  Such tools had to be made, and such tools called for the 
construction of data warehouses for storage and analysis of data.  Furthermore, as indi-
vidual runs were complex, time-consuming and expensive, each individual laboratory 
could not produce sufficient experimental runs.  The data warehouse had to be 
constructed in ways that could make raw data produced elsewhere locally accessible 
and compatible.  Moreover, as the analysis had to rely on existing knowledge about 
hundreds or thousands of genes, this knowledge had to be made accessible to the analyst 
and locally represented in the same data warehouse.   
 
Research objectives  
The research group in Trondheim was established as a research group that aimed at 
developing diagnostic tools for medicine.  One of the research aims was to detect char-
acteristic disease expression patterns for different stages of tumour genesis in the 
alimentary tract.  In this case, expression patterns could turn out to give a precise early 
diagnosis crucial for the positive prognosis of the patients.  The work of constructing a 
microarray-based experimental system for pursuing such research objectives required 
the cooperation of researchers from different fields who were engaged in different parts 
of the experimental process.  The experimental system also included extensive coopera-
tion with other microarray research groups at an international level in order to build up 
the dry lab section of the system.  As this work was intensified after 2000, I have chosen 
to postpone the discussion of the challenges involved in establishing the dry lab section.  
The first phase, before 2000, was marked by the work of establishing a research group 
and the basic steps of the procedure in a local setting in Trondheim. 
                                                 
108 The distinction between dry and wet lab appeared in the literature following the need for integration of 
computer based analytical tools into the experimental system. 
 212 
 An outline of the experimental system   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.3  The experimental system for the array group in Trondheim.  The group included representatives 
from the whole process - from the harvesting of samples to electronic analysis.  In 1999 there were three 
PhD students, one post-doc. fellow and twelve senior researchers who were engaged on a daily basis 
(along with their duties as employed by NTNU).  The participants came from 3 faculties and 7 different 
institutes.  
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Local arenas 
The array technology emerged through the late 1980s and early 1990s, but did not have 
its breakthrough before 1997-98.  As the technology started to show signs of stability, 
numerous companies and academic groups started to work their way into array 
technology, with the group in Trondheim among the first.  But researchers who wanted 
to be a part of the early development of array technology would have to start from 
scratch.  This especially went for those who did not choose the Affymetrix prototype.  
As David Botstein (Phimister 1998) from Stanford put it, they would have to “roll up 
their sleeves and get intimate with nuts and bolts by building their own equipment”.   
The challenges of microarray communities world-wide seemed in this initial phase to 
be overshadowed by basic tasks of getting intimate with the technological challenges of 
the wet lab: of preparing arrays, constructing the printer and establishing protocols for 
the printing and hybridisation process (cf. three first steps in Fig. 5.3).109  Moreover, 
local microarray research units had to be established which required local recognition 
and funding.  The work of establishing the field of functional genomics, it seems to me, 
initially took place in different locations, like the one in Trondheim, where microar-
ray/functional genomics research units were established.  I shall first concentrate on the 
local challenges and opportunities that shaped the initial phase of establishing such a 
unit at NTNU from 1997 to late 1999.   
Establishing microarray technology was a risky, costly, time-consuming and trouble-
some game because a new experimental system had to be built from scratch.  I shall in 
the following discuss how functional genomics emerged in the local setting in four 
respects.  i) The group in Trondheim was established in order to constitute a complete 
research unit that could, in the long run, unleash the promising potentials of the novel 
approaches of functional genomics.  Local expertise was recruited in ways that could 
also bring funding and define feasible and interesting short-term goals.  ii) Medicine 
turned out to be a useful place for establishing functional genomics in Norway and in 
Trondheim in particular, both financially and socially.  Funding opportunities followed 
                                                 
109 The group was from the start also engaged in working out the dry lab section of the system.  The dry 
lab seemed nevertheless to capture the array communities’ full attention at a later stage (in Trondheim as 
well as abroad) when the challenges of the wet lab appeared less pertinent.   
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 medicine in general and NTNU in particular has been assigned a national responsibility 
for developing medical technology.  And moreover, medicine could in many respects 
staunch moral scepticism regarding gene research.  iii) Trondheim/NTNU also turned 
out to be a useful place for fostering a microarray group because the group could posi-
tion themselves at the centre of what NTNU, itself newly created, aspired to be; a 
university with an interdisciplinary profile.110  The interdisciplinary character of the 
project contributed in and by itself to the establishment of the project as a good, which 
was further strengthened as ethicists were recruited to join the research group.  iv) 
Scarce economic and personnel resources meant that the group had to position itself as 
an “obligatory passage point” (Latour 1983) for anyone interested in array research in 
Norway.  
 
Establishing a research group, long-term and short-term goals 
If the microarray project in Trondheim had to be assigned a single starting point, it’s 
possible to identify that point as an international conference in functional genomics held 
in London in 1997.  Microarray technology was presented at the conference, and Astrid 
Lægreid, a molecular biologist at NTNU, was among the participants.  Having worked 
on molecular signalling pathways within and in between cells, she was excited by the 
promises array technology had for her research field.  And moreover, she figured that 
because of the university’s technological expertise, Trondheim had all it would take to 
establish this exciting technology in Norway.   
Back in Trondheim, Lægreid pulled together one of the first academic microarray 
research groups world-wide.  The work of constructing the printer was launched during 
the spring of 1998, and the research group, consisting of 11 members, gradually formu-
lated a more specific research proposal during the same year.  A research project called 
"DNA microarray technology for the design of new medical diagnostic tools" was 
                                                 
110  In 1996 NTNU appeared, created as a merger between the small university in Trondheim and the 
city’s larger and more prestigious technical educational establishment in Norway.  The idea was that 
NTNU should have, as stated in early versions of NTNU's web portal, "a solid foundation in the natural 
sciences", but these fields should at the same time be "interwoven with broadly based expertise in the 
classical university disciplines of the humanities, medicine and the social sciences".    
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formulated in the summer of 1998, and later launched under the heading of "Genomic 
Classifier Research" in January 1999.111
The goals of the research group could be divided into long- and short-term goals.  
The long-term goal was to establish the field of functional genomics, or “physiological 
genomics” as a new and promising research area that bridges the knowledge obtained 
though the HGP with the function of cells, organs and organ systems."112  The research 
group viewed functional genomics as a novel field that aimed at providing a molecular 
gateway for the study of higher levels of biological organisation.  Creating a microarray 
research platform was at the same time constructing a vehicle for accomplishing the 
transition from genomics to the physiological and pathophysiological level of clinical 
practice.  The work of building a microarray research platform was also understood as a 
work of establishing functional genomics in Norway.  This was reflected in the compo-
sition of the research group that was established.113
The gap between DNA sequence and physiological states was to be bridged at the 
intersection of four different fields of expertise.  On the one hand were researchers with 
expertise in molecular processes and who knew how to handle the output of the HGP 
(like molecular biologists).  On the other hand were researchers with expertise in 
physiological and pathophysiological processes (like medical scientists).  The third and 
fourth groups, consisting of mechanical engineers and computer scientists, would pro-
duce the crucial instruments and research tools that would mediate between these two 
domains of the life sciences.  The engineers (who constructed the printer and later the 
                                                 
111 During this period, the group collaborated with another microarray research group being simultane-
ously established at the Radium Hospital, University of Oslo.  The collaboration between the two pioneer 
groups in Norway was important in the initial phase when the printer was constructed and cDNA probe 
collections were purchased – both on a collaborative basis.  It was not only in Trondheim then, that 
microarrays were established in Norway; a parallel story can be told from Oslo. 
112 DNA microarray based analysis of gene expression and mutations, April 1998.  An early research 
proposal from what came to be the Genome Classifier Research group. 
113 Functional genomics or physiological genomics marked a crucial selection of names used in presenta-
tions by the research group.  By 2000, functional genomics was the term of choice in research proposals 
from the microarray group in Trondheim.  The research proposals described the "new field" as the field 
that would "bridge the gap" between structure and function.  And microarrays were presented as the 
crucial entry to this field.  "Recent technological developments that use the DNA microarray technology”, 
as one research proposal stated, “open up for large-scale data acquisition and allow a significant increase 
in the amount of data obtainable from biological systems.  These efforts form the basis of Functional 
Genomics research" (Research proposal April 1999.  Applying for funding from the Norwegian Cancer 
Society).  
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 reader) had to reproduce equipment that already existed.  However, the task was techni-
cally difficult because the technology was not at all stable, and improvements and 
adjustments of prototypes had to be made in order to avoid the limitations of the first-
generation technology.114  The computer scientists however, had a more crucial 
theoretical and methodological role, as they had to produce tools for selecting, 
presenting and analysing biological data.   
 
 
Fig 5.4  A picture of the printer-robot that was constructed in Trondheim.  The robot collected probes 
from the wells of the 96-well microtiter plates seen in the foreground and printed eight probes at the time 
on each array slide (96 arrays could be printed in parallel).  The robot had to be very precise.  Each 
printed spot contained about 10-12 litre of probe solution and occupied a space with a diameter of 100-150 
μm, at a density of 2500 - 10 000 probes per cm2 (Sandvik et al. 2001).  
 
 
Thus, the group was established as a complete research unit in functional genomics.  
The goal of realising functional genomics as a field in Norway operated as a regulative 
principle in the process of constructing the research unit.  The identity of the research 
group was tied to some vision of functional genomics, even if it was not clear to the 
participants how functional genomics actually was to be done.  Such long-term goals 
however, had to be supported by more specific short-term goals when approaching their 
peers, and funding agencies.  The ethos of functional genomics, as the field developed 
                                                 
114 Intertwined technical and scientific choices had to be made along the way.  For example, the groups in 
Trondheim and Oslo chose for different strategies with regards to the reader.  The group in Oslo bought a 
commercial reader when it became available in 1999, while the group in Trondheim chose to stick to the 
plan to build their own reader from scratch.  Such a reader, they figured, would not only be more precise, 
it would also be more flexible as it could be adjusted to the rest of experimental setup as it evolved.  
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in a local setting in Trondheim, was in turn shaped through the group’s short-term 
goals.115   
The short-term goals of the microarray project in Trondheim were expressed in 
medical terms.  Medicine soon came to overshadow functional genomics as the main 
research headline when the group presented itself.  "The aim of the project", as the 
ingress of the group’s web-homepage said in 1999, "is to describe genomic classifiers in 
the form of gene expression patterns that characterise given physiological or patho-
physiological conditions".  Specific emphasis came to be placed on the genesis of 
cancer in the stomach and alimentary tract.  This was one of the few areas where 
Trondheim had internationally recognised expertise in terms of knowledge about how 
genes work at a physiological level.  The medical researchers in question had been 
enrolled in the group, and the authority of their work was an important ingredient of the 
ethos of the microarray/functional genomics project in Trondheim.   
 
Enrolling the ethos of medicine 
Medicine (and in particular cancer research) was a very useful place for promoting 
functional genomics.  Money followed the good reputation of medicine, and moreover, 
there were strategic reasons why a biotechnologically innovative – and possibly contro-
versial – research project would also benefit from being associated with medicine.   
Initially, the microarray project was partly promoted under the heading of medical 
technology.  Since 1992 there had been a "programme for medical technology" at 
NTNU (Lindmo 1994), and in April 1998, this programme took a large step forwards 
with an eight-year, 122 million kroner plan, initiated by the Research Council of 
Norway (NFR).  The Research Council’s initiative could be seen as part of a national 
research strategy of preserving the role Trondheim had historically acquired as the 
                                                 
115 A research group for such a risky and expensive project needed to document that they had the neces-
sary expertise, and confirm this by reference to actual results along the way.  Short-term goals that would 
to be achieved in the not-too-distant future had to be constructed so that progress could be documented.  
Establishing the field of functional genomics, at least at that time, could not be presented as a sufficient 
research goal in and of itself.  However, this was a time-consuming effort that generated frustration as 
such work had no inherent academic merit.  Such work was primarily regarded as something one had to 
do before starting the real work of performing functional genomics.  The Trondheim group’s novel func-
tional genomic strategy was to be evaluated in terms of how well the group addressed medical short-term 
goals.   
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 “technology capital” of Norway.  NFR wanted to encourage research that could tap the 
promise of the technological/scientific/medical interface in Trondheim.  And moreover, 
NFR grant makers surmised that Trondheim’s medical technology research community 
should eventually be self-supporting.  The microarray technology fitted perfectly into 
this picture because the technology offered the possibility of economic spin-offs in the 
pharmaceutical industry sector. 116   
Governmental funding was limited, however.  By 2000, a private cancer research 
agency, the Norwegian Cancer Society, had become the main funding agency for the 
microarray research group in Trondheim.117  Given the high costs of microarray re-
search, as well as the limited funding from governmental agencies, the group seemed to 
be dependent on the good will of the Cancer Society.  There were no solid biotechno-
logical companies in Norway at the time, and they were unlikely to engage the powerful 
Swedish company Astra Zeneca, which they considered to be the foreign investor most 
likely to be interested.  The problem was that the medical researchers in the group had 
been in conflict with the company since 1999, after having questioned the effects of the 
long-term use of one of their most profitable products.118   
Medicine provided financial opportunities for functional genomics, it should be 
noted, because the proponents of the field of medicine had high expectations for what 
biotechnological innovations could ultimately offer.  Seen from the perspective of pro-
ponents of medicine, as briefly discussed in Chapter 4, molecular biology was consid-
ered to be a crucial motor for changing the field of medicine.119  But medicine 
simultaneously seemed to function as an important motor of biotechnological change, 
given the controversial character of the field.   
Given the general worries about the safety and ethics of genetic interventions, public 
and political scepticism appeared to be a threat to the scientific community.  Medicine 
                                                 
116 ”Seminar i medisinsk teknologi.”  Program for Medinsisk Teknologi ved NTNU, Hotell Prinsen, 
Trondheim, 2.4.1998. 
117 The Norwegian Cancer Society is a non-governmental organisation that among other activities raises 
money for cancer research.  
118 The researchers had suggested that the long-term use of a strong acid-reducing medication called 
Losec could lead to stomach cancer, and recommended that doctors be cautious about prescribing the 
product to the extent that had been the common practice at that time.  Losec was the top-selling acid-
reducing medication in the world; about 350 million users used the drug at the time of the debate (Tveter 
2001).   
119 Medisin og helse anno 2020 – en forskningsodyssé.  Oslo: Norges forskningsråd. 2000, p4. 
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was not only important because it channelled funds; it also seemed be a useful place for 
promoting functional genomics as a desirable biotechnological project.  The scepticism 
towards biotechnological interventions was counteracted by medicine.  Ethical worries 
about genetic interventions in biology seemed to be neutralized when these were con-
ducted in the name of medicine.  The 1992 conclusion of an ethical board created by the 
Research Council of Norway is illustrative.  “In principle”, the board wrote, “gene ther-
apy that aims at treating serious inherited illness is ethically justifiable” (Hatling 
1992:96, my translation).  What was seen as highly questionable in some contexts could 
be justified with reference to arguments in a medical context, and moreover, question-
able innovations could even be supported by moral imperatives.  The leader of the ethi-
cal board of the Norwegian Association of Medical Doctors illustrated this issue 
perfectly when she was asked about her views on the morality of research on embryos 
(which was banned in Norway).  “I’ve been in doubt for a long period of time” she 
stated, “but the perspectives that this might some day help someone with Parkinson’s 
disease, for example, makes it almost impossible to say no [to the research] (my trans-
lation)”.120  At the time, other ethical boards often expressed similar attitudes as they 
pointed out that it would be unacceptable to leave the dirty work to researchers abroad, 
since we would, in turn, make use of all the positive results such research might 
generate.   
By recruiting medicine, one could say, functional genomics was able not only to 
hook up to the money flow associated with medicine, but also with its legitimizing 
ethos.  Functional genomics was a potentially controversial field; after all, it presented 
itself as the field that would release the interventional potentials of genes by making the 
move from “destiny” to “possibility”.  The ethos of medicine, however, had the possi-
bility of neutralising moral hindrances, so that it appeared almost "impossible" or even 
immoral not to pursue biotechnological research.   
 
                                                 
120 ”Fostervev kan bety mye for pasienter.”  Interview with Reidun Førde. Aftenposten (1.4.00). 
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 Interdisciplinarity as a good, ethics enrolled 
At the time that the functional genomics group was first created, NTNU itself had also 
been newly crafted out of existing universities and colleges in Trondheim.  One of the 
goals of this new university was to be at the Norwegian forefront of using an interdisci-
plinary approach for research and education.  This aspiration made NTNU well-suited 
as a host for a microarray research group.  By establishing the array technology as an 
interdisciplinary project within the area of medical technology, the group had both 
attuned themselves to NTNU's interdisciplinary profile and also reinforced and influ-
enced it.121  NTNU’s interdisciplinary profile had an interesting consequence as it 
facilitated an explicit enrolment of ethics into the microarray project.   
The NFR initiative in medical technology was also framed as an incentive for NTNU 
to exploit its interdisciplinary potential.  In this setting, the idea of facilitating innova-
tive interdisciplinary collaboration accompanied by the idea that such a interdisciplinary 
collaboration would benefit from including “meta-perspectives” as well.122  Presenting 
the programme in medical technology,123 the university leadership of NTNU as well as 
the representatives of NFR stressed that meta-perspectives had to be included if the 122 
million kroner plan was to be realised.  In this setting then, it had actually become 
advantageous for a research project to recruit a professional ethicist, as was done by the 
microarray project group.  
A PhD student from the Department of Philosophy, Berge Solberg, was enrolled into 
the project at an early stage.  Solberg was funded by the NFR initiative in medical tech-
nology and was to address the ethical ramifications posed by the powerful diagnostic 
tools of microarrays.  The paradigmatic illustrative case concerned the possibilities that 
microarrays created for global testing of all known genetic disorders on a single array.  
                                                 
121 Medisinsk teknologi i NTNUs profil. 19.11.99. A proposal to turn medical technology into one of the 
main priority areas of NTNU. 
122 The call for meta-perspectives seemed on the one hand to respond to the possibly problematic ethical 
and social impacts resulting from a powerful medical technology, and on the other hand a general trust in 
the virtue of broad-spectrum multidisciplinary approaches.  An explicit analysis of why, where or how the 
inclusion of meta-perspectives should be effectuated and evaluated was not provided, and the notion of 
meta-perspectives was not evident either.  However, the call for inclusion of meta-perspectives was often 
seen as another way of expressing the need for recruiting relevant expertise from the humanities and the 
social sciences.   
123 ”Seminar i medisinsk teknologi.”  Program for Medinsisk Teknologi ved NTNU, Hotell Prinsen, 
Trondheim, 2.4.1998. 
 221
By including an ethicist, the microarray group argued, one would be better prepared 
when such diagnostic tools became commercially available.124   
 
 
Fig. 5.5 A figure used in self-presentations offered by the research group in Trondheim.  This figure 
appeared on their web page.   
 
 
The external pressure to include meta-perspectives (from NTNU as well as NFR) was 
welcomed by the project leader of the microarray group.  It seemed to me that the pres-
sure had an effect of offering relief.  The group sensed that the field they saw coming, 
and that they themselves were promoting, had ethically problematic ramifications, 
although they had difficulties in articulating the rationale behind their worries, intuitions 
and uneasiness.  As a group, they could now also address ethical issues of their research 
without having to defend their priorities in funding a PhD student in philosophy rather 
than in molecular biology.  Besides, it gave the project an important image that could be 
helpful in raising money in the future.  Ethics was also promoted as one of the main 
goals of the project (along with biomedicine and bioinformatics).125   
                                                 
124 The group argued along these lines in a research proposal dated 13.03. 1998 (in an application for 
university-local funds reserved for interdisciplinary research at NTNU).  The scientific literature seemed 
to suggest that the prospect of a global gene test was one of the most challenging ethical aspects of the 
technology.  Automated gene tests that used arrays and a single drop of blood were reported to be possi-
ble, although not feasible and profitable (Marshall and Hodgson 1998).  However, the research group was 
investigating expression studies, not genotyping.  The diagnostic tools they were about to develop never-
theless also imposed similar problems.  Such diagnostic tools would most likely provide sensitive infor-
mation for questions not raised in the diagnosis.  In other words, the problems posed by information 
management of microarrays also had an ethical component.  Solberg (2003) came to analyse the question 
in a broad social and technological context.  He focused on clarifying which questions should be consid-
ered to be interesting and well founded with regards to the generation of children that would be born 
when large amount of critical information about the child could be available.   
125 A research proposal made to the Norwegian Cancer Society in 2000. 
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 Technical hurdles, scarce resources, local and national positioning 
The group in Trondheim figured that a small country like Norway could not accommo-
date too many microarray research centres.  Human and economic resources were 
limited.  The technical hurdles were not only overwhelming; they constantly changed 
character due to the rapid development of microarray technology.  Every step of the 
array methodology, its instrumental makeup, reagents, materials and protocols were 
constantly under development and evaluation.  Any change at any point in the chain of 
procedures could provoke unknown problems at another point (like in choice of label-
ling procedure, preparation of the array glass surface or type of printing pens).  There 
were so many different sources of error, a PhD student explained, that there would be 
no time for thorough systematic testing all of them.  Moreover, he continued, some 
array procedures were also tissue-sensitive, so that the procedure would have to be 
worked out in every case and one would have to rely on one’s own skill and judge-
ments.126  In general, as a laboratory assistant put it, they had to keep working while 
hoping or "waiting for a miracle" when everything would simultaneously fall into place 
–  that is, when there would be manageable day-to-day, tissue-to-tissue, array-to-array 
and person-to-person variations.   
The international laboratories that were the group’s natural competitors could do all 
of these kinds of tests much faster and more systematically due to access to economic 
and human resources on another order of magnitude.  Nonetheless, in the late autumn of 
1999, the research group in Trondheim seemed quite optimistic.  Coming home from 
one of the first conferences for researchers who were starting to operate array tech-
nology (December 1999), the researchers reported a general feeling of discouragement 
and frustration among the participants of the conference.  But this general report of 
frustration actually seemed to encourage the group; they were not at all worse off than 
                                                 
126 For example, one researcher was disturbed to learn that the rest of the staff was hybridising at 65 
Celsius, while she was hybridising at 60 Celsius.  She decided however not to change her temperature, 
and was given support by the senior researcher on her decision.  Why should she change something what 
worked out for her?   It was too risky.  Different tissues would most likely require different procedures as 
different tissues posed a different set of challenges.  Some tissues are easier than others to produce beauti-
ful results from.  For example, the quality of the RNA was generally accepted to be extremely important, 
but there were different ways of extracting RNA that would work out differently for different tissues.  
And besides, methods of RNA extraction could be sensitive to other sets of chemicals used elsewhere in 
the procedure as well.   
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the others.  In fact they were doing quite well compared to other laboratories.127  They 
figured they had two advantages.  First, they had a lead on many other groups, as they 
were one of the first to be created.  Second, they had gathered all the necessary exper-
tise to do functional genomics in one research group. 
It seemed clear, however, that it would be difficult to maintain more than one com-
petitive microarray/functional genomics community in Norway, and the Trondheim 
researchers would of course like to see their initiative realised within this community.  
This required group members to work extremely hard.  They also had to position them-
selves with respect to researchers who were interested in array technology.  The group 
employed an open and inclusive strategy.  During the first two years, the group was 
constantly expanding, embracing individuals who showed interest in the project and 
who represented important research expertise for functional genomics.  In expanding 
the group as much as possible as soon as possible, which was the outcome of their open 
strategy, they would become a group that could not be neglected.  By October 1999, the 
group had more than doubled its number of members to 26, according to a status report 
to NTNU.128  
The microarray pioneers also had to confront their critics, along with people who 
were either wholly uneducated or uninterested in microarrays.  They had to put effort 
into the work of making a persuasive case for the potential of microarray/functional 
genomics in general, and that it was particularly important for Norway to build research 
expertise in this new field.  For example, it was essential for the group to gain recogni-
tion from the hosting university.  The project had to be given priority, and three differ-
ent faculties within the university were subsequently asked to state their support for the 
project in writing.129  Such moral support was considered crucial for obtaining external 
                                                 
127 The state of the art of microarray research abroad provided the yardstick for what a sufficiently 
competitive robust laboratory procedure was at the time.  Their own methodology was fragile, but that 
went for array methodology in general.  One of the senior researchers described the times as golden times 
for getting papers published, if you could justify having “microarray” in the title, you would easily slip 
through.   
128 The list did not include laboratory assistants.  But it included as many as five researchers appearing 
under the heading of "ethics". 
129 The researchers were lobbying their respective institutes, and support was also given in the form of a 
letter from the deans of the Faculties of Medicine, Arts, and Physics, Informatics and Mathematics 3.12. 
99 “Støtte til prosjektet ‘Genomic Classifier Research’ ” (99/1979-1/451/EHH). 
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 funding as well as getting acceptance for internal priorities that had to be made within 
the different faculties.  
 
The year 2000 as a turning point 
I believe my account of the early phase of the microarray project in Trondheim reflects 
how the field of functional genomics in general was primarily shaped in such local 
settings.  Notions like functional genomics or post-genomic technologies seemed to 
make little sense to others than those involved in the practical details of microarrays.  
Most biologists, not to mention of non-biological researchers, were not paying much 
attention to what the developments of genomics would mean for their research ques-
tions and strategies.  The field of functional genomics came slowly into being as a 
doable technological platform for performing functional genomics, and the year of 2000 
seems to me to have been a turning point in this regard.   
Up until late 1999, functional genomics, along with its attractiveness as a research 
field, was shaped by local forces.  The microarrays/functional genomics project in 
Trondheim was framed by the available expertise, the university profile and research 
priorities as well as the overall financial opportunities in Norway at the time.  Microar-
rays primarily seemed desirable because the technology fit into and strengthened the 
university profile, offered potential for producing important medical therapeutic tools, 
and represented a biologically powerful and economically promising technology.  Thus, 
the microarray project was not primarily perceived as good because of its ability to 
provide a gateway to an all-embracing new area of biological research, although such a 
vision was important for the leading proponents of the project.   
The situation changed during the year 2000, when functional genomics suddenly 
seemed to be a high priority for everyone.  I shall discuss how this happed by focusing 
on three aspects of this development.  First, different microarray units around the 
Western world had finally established a basic methodological platform for performing 
functional genomics – without which the notion of functional genomics could not have 
thrived.  Second, functional genomics was no longer intimately linked to microarray 
technology.  Third, functional genomics suddenly appeared to be an important field 
because “every” Western country, along with other wealthy countries such as Japan, put 
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lots of resources into it.  A Norwegian plan of action for functional genomics was, 
against this background, hastily pulled together during a couple of months towards the 
end of 2000.  I shall postpone a discussion of these developments until the last section 
of this chapter.   
In the following I shall concentrate on international developments regarding the state 
of the art of microarray based functional genomics that affected the research group in 
Trondheim in crucial ways.  During 2000 it became more and more evident that the 
research group in Trondheim could not remain nor constitute a complete research unit in 
functional genomics.   
 
 
International arenas  
The microarray group in Trondheim was affected by international developments in two 
important ways.  First, the international competition hardened and the competitive abil-
ity of the group in Trondheim was seriously threatened.  Second, by 2000, the trouble-
some challenges of information management had become the main focus of the interna-
tional array community.  The group in Trondheim found collaboration with other mi-
croarray groups to be the proper response to these two challenges.  On the one hand 
they argued that it was necessary to unite the national microarray community in order to 
preserve one competitive microarray unit in Norway.  On the other hand they argued 
that one could not overcome the challenges of information management without exten-
sive international collaboration between microarray research units.  Although the need 
for international collaboration had been stressed from the start by the microarray pio-
neers, such collaborative structures did not emerge before late 1999.  I shall discuss how 
these two forms of collaboration implied a restructuring of the experimental system the 
researchers in Trondheim tried to establish.  In doing so, I shall concentrate on the latter, 
returning as needed to developments that took place before 2000. 
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 International threats – national unity  
In October 1999, the group leader set the standard at a research group meeting by esti-
mating their funding needs at about 50 million Norwegian kroner.  This estimate came 
as a result of a comparison with the resources made available for a research group that 
was about to establish a Swedish array centre.  Only a few million NOK had so far been 
raised in Trondheim, and it seemed quite unlikely that the research group could raise 50 
million kroner.  Half a year later the group was shocked by the financial opportunities 
made available for the Swedish national research communities who undertook func-
tional genomics.  While they were fantasizing about tens of millions of kroner, 
researchers in Sweden got one thousand!  Gathering at a group meeting in May 2000, 
Norwegian researchers expressed their concern.  The Swedes had managed to pull to-
gether a grand national plan for functional genomics research that certainly was felt as a 
serious threat to Norway’s ability to compete and hold on to their expertise.   
Limited economic and personal resources triggered a unification of the existing array 
communities in Norway.  During the spring of 2000, the existing collaboration between 
the group in Trondheim and the group at the Radium Hospital in Oslo was strengthened 
and extended to a group at the University of Bergen.  The Norwegian Microarray 
Consortium, as it was called, aspired to establish a “virtual centre” for microarray 
research in Norway, where the three groups agreed to share resources and divide the 
work among them.130   
The work of establishing microarray/functional genomics in Trondheim, was thus no 
longer linked to the unity and integrity of the local research group, and the pioneer 
identity of the group gradually dissolved.  That is, they gradually ceased to see their 
research group as a self-contained complete research unit in microarrays/functional 
genomics.  Their research unit no longer came to be shaped around the work of 
constructing and running a complete microarray/functional genomics research unit.  The 
                                                 
130 The group in Bergen did not have a printer.  They could now get access to arrays via Oslo and Trond-
heim, in return they could supplement the bioinformatics expertise to the consortium.  Oslo and Trond-
heim could for their part share the work of producing probes from the acquired cDNA collection, which 
was a time-consuming work as they aspired at the time to produce probes from 40 000 human cDNA 
clones.  The Trondheim and Oslo group had collaborated since 1998, and had obtained a joint grant from 
the Norwegian Cancer Society to finance cDNA probes, running costs for methodological development 
and some technical assistance. 
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borderlines of their experimental system, as they now tried to establish it, had become 
fuzzier as the system itself was no longer confined to a geographic spot, or a single 
research unit.  Moreover, as a national initiative in functional genomics was imple-
mented in 2002, the Norwegian Microarray Consortium won some level of financial 
security and was endorsed as an important and valuable project.  Whatever functional 
genomics was about to become, it was no longer solely shaped around the task of estab-
lishing a robust and desirable experimental system for microarrays.  The fate of the field 
became less linked to the need to demonstrate its potential for being a motor of change 
for medicine as well.  In fact, the microarray platform was about to be embraced as a 
desirable research platform even before the novel approach it represented had demon-
strated its utility. 
Thus, Norway’s experimental system for microarrays was geographically decentral-
ised in order to meet the demands of international competition.  In the rest of the second 
section of this chapter, I shall discuss how the experimental system for microarray-
based functional genomics came to be further decentralised through the scientists’ 
attempt to overcome the challenges of information management.   
 
Three dry lab challenges, genes rearticulated - laboratories united   
In January 2000, after more than two years of hard work, the project leader stated at a 
group meeting that the array methodology was finally in place in Trondheim (and she 
kept restating the claim with growing confidence during the spring).  The methods were 
by far as robust as ordinary methods they were acquainted with (and that they still had to 
rely on), the laser-scanner hadn’t even been installed and they had not conducted any 
elaborate experimental runs.  But she was now confident that the basic steps of the proce-
dure were in place and that the group would now be able to produce meaningful, repro-
ducible data.131  
                                                 
131 In stating that the method was established, the researchers were referring to a number of different 
accomplishments.  They had for instance established a cDNA library of 2500 clones from their own bio-
banks, constructed and installed the array printer, established preparation protocols for targets and the 
printing as well as hybridization process on glass had been made fairly reliable.  They had also started to 
establish a database to accommodate information regarding the 2500 clones along with a pilot software 
programme for analysing readouts of the arrays were in place as well.  In other words, a methodological 
baseline had been locally established for all the different steps of the experimental process.  Confidence in 
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 A methodological baseline was not in place in Trondheim before 2000, and the state 
of the art of microarrays in Norway seems to coincide with the international state of the 
art.  By this time, the microarray community was generally ready to pay more attention 
to the difficult methodological work of knitting the experimental system together into a 
workable research unit.  The dry lab section of the experiment, where interpretation and 
analysis of the data would take place, had from the start been identified as the bottle-
neck of challenge for the microarray research platform.  
Three related dry lab challenges came in focus as the microarray signals came ready 
to be analysed.  First, current knowledge about genes had to be gathered, organised and 
made locally available in a machine-readable format.  Second, the researchers had to 
find ways of handling the data overload produced by individual experimental runs.  
Third, individual laboratories could not produce enough experimental runs in order to 
secure statistically significant inferences.  There was too much data – and there was too 
little data.   
These three challenges were faced and handled under the heading of bioinformatics, 
as I shall discuss at some length in three subsequent sections.  Two important changes 
followed from the work of overcoming these challenges.  First, the very notion of the 
gene was rearticulated as physical and theoretical means of representing genes was 
restructured.  As a consequence, a variety of different moral discussions might be 
affected and restructured in course of these developments.  Second, in this setting, these 
“things” called “genes” seemed like morally relevant actors, because the experimental 
system came to be reorganised around the work of reshaping gene representations.  
Microarray-based functional genomics gradually came to be shaped and performed in 
and through a number of different microarray laboratory units established worldwide.  
The very size and shape of this experimental system structured the way biological 
research as a functioning and desirable activity would be staged and discussed.  It was 
now possible to say that the experimental system, to a greater extent, came to be shaped 
around the task of controlling the gene, or “consulting” the gene.  As researchers now 
sought to make biological inferences based on the way the experimental system had 
                                                                                                                                               
their method had been gained by having their printed arrays scanned elsewhere, exchanging experiences 
with others at conferences, visits to the U.S. National Institutes of Health and applying their analytical 
tools on data obtained in experiments done at Stanford. 
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been shaped, it reopened the question of how to physically represent genes on the array 
as well as how to represent knowledge about how these object functioned.   
In the following I shall discuss how the experimental system for microarrays was 
further shaped in the work of consulting genes by overcoming the three related dry lab 
challenges.   
i) The microarray approach represented new ways of staging gene research.  The 
researchers had to move away from the traditional approaches to investigating and 
conceptualising genes.  From the researcher’s point of view, existing knowledge about 
genes was inaccessible.  Years of hard work in gene research could not be taken into 
account unless the knowledge was retraced and translated into a machine-readable 
format.  A slow process of rearticulating genes followed the process of establishing 
feasible modes of representing genes and knowledge about them - representations that 
were developed in order to make it possible to analyse microarray data.   
ii) Analytical tools for data were established in order to process what researchers no 
longer could process in their minds due to the data overload from individual experi-
mental runs.  The work of selecting relevant raw data and ordering them into meaning-
ful information was shaped by the tools computer scientists were able to offer.  This 
enrolment of computer scientists counteracted the conceptualisations of genes in terms 
of the information metaphor of coding .  
iii) Microarray analyses, in order to meet basic demands of statistical significance, 
had to be based on more data than an individual laboratory could produce by itself.  The 
need for sharing data required a process of international standardisation of the experi-
mental system of microarrays.  Different microarray units initiated processes of knitting 
together their various units to form one decentralised virtual laboratory. 
 
1. Collecting and systemising biological knowledge  
Functional genomics turned traditional genetic approaches upside down.  The way 
researchers represented genes, theoretically and physically, had to be reorganised as 
these representations supported the traditional approaches that had to be reworked.  It is 
a point William Gelbart  (1998) made in discussing the need for a new approach to the 
organisation of genomic databases.  Gelbart argued that a classical concept of the gene 
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 was embedded in the way genomic data were being organised, and that this organisation 
would serve as an effective barrier to preventing genomics from developing.   
 
The classical concept of the gene ultimately forms a barrier to trying to understand phe-
notypes in terms of encoded functional products. This is not a purely abstract discussion 
but may well demand that we re-examine how we are organising data within genome- 
related databases. In most or all of these databases, much biological data is attached to 
these suspect units called genes. Although some aspects of these phenotypes might be 
associated with different subsets of alternative products of these genes, the databases 
might not support the most rigorous parsing of this phenotypic information (Gelbart 
1998). 
  
Theory and experimental strategies come packaged together, and the challenges of 
establishing new theory and method packages involved a process of simultaneously 
reshaping experimental systems and theoretical tools.  Scientists had to work them-
selves out of current theory and method packages, because the “classical concept of the 
gene” marked the ways people had worked with, talked about and validated knowledge 
about genes in the early phases of genomics.   
The existing knowledge of genes had typically been acquired through the investiga-
tion of gene regulative patterns of particular biological processes.  These investigations 
were based on fairly simple and experimentally controllable models of the biological 
process, which assumed that regulative patterns were modelled with a limited amount of 
genes.  For example, the medical researchers in the group in Trondheim had studied the 
role hormones like gastrin and histamine played in the regulation of gastric acid secre-
tion.  Their knowledge of the handful of genes involved in their models of the process 
can be compared to the way we know our friends.  They knew the patterns of behaviour 
of these genes quite well, at least when it came to the role the genes played in the 
context where the researchers had first encountered them.  They could spot unusual 
genetic action and they would know what hardships one had to encounter if one tried to 
understand their behaviour better.  Few people in the world could evaluate other 
researchers’ claims regarding the dynamics of gastrin responses better than they could.  
In short, their knowledge of genes was linked to their entire research carrier of studying 
normal and pathological levels of gastrin responses in the stomach and alimentary tract 
in vivo as well as in vitro.  They would think in terms of their model of the regulation 
patterns of gastrin when they were speaking of genes and how they worked.   
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They now set out to broaden their research horizon using microarray strategies.  The 
ultimate dream was to be able to provide a genome-wide glance of the cell activity 
involved in gastrin responses.  Such an approach, however, required access to physical 
representations of all the genes on the array, along with theoretical representations of 
current knowledge about these genes.  As there was no comprehensive means of 
modelling the activity of genes at the cellular level, a bottom-up strategy was required.  
That is, instead of thinking of genetic activity in terms of the patterns modelled, 
researchers would search for ways of finding patterns in the genetic activity recorded in 
the experiment.  
Traditional approaches were thus inverted, and microarray researchers handled this 
new experimental situation by consulting computer scientists.  The next ten pages will 
focus on the set of practical problems that resulted from trying to represent and organise 
knowledge about genes.  How could one possibly master the entire literature on the 
current knowledge of all genes printed on the array?  The answer, as I shall discuss, was 
to represent knowledge of genes in a machine-readable format.  I shall trace a shift in 
the gene concept that accompanied the work of gaining control over what could confi-
dently be said to be true about these things they were printing on the arrays.  The 
researchers worked themselves out of existing conceptualisations that were marked by 
the traditional empirical programme of the Central Dogma.  The classical concept of the 
gene was embedded in the early practices of performing microarray analysis.  I believe 
this becomes evident if we consider the way genes were initially represented as physical 
objects on the arrays, as well as how these objects were discussed by researchers.   
Following the HGP, a distinction between “known” and “unknown” genes appeared 
as a pertinent distinction.  If one only knew the molecular constituents of the gene, the 
gene would be referred to as an unknown gene.  The unknown gene thus became a new 
ontological category, particularly because the HGP mainly produced unknown genes, 
that is, the project identified coding segments of the DNA as genes or fragments of 
genes about which no knowledge was available.  Unknown genes were generally 
referred to as "open reading frames" (ORFs) in genomic databases, where the status of 
the unknown genes as genes was (usually) considered as uncertain.  While known genes 
would have a name, unknown genes would be referred to by an ORF number depicting 
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 it as a potential gene, because it consisted of a string of codons bounded by “start” and 
“stop” codons.132
To qualify as a known gene and be honoured by a name, I was told, required some 
knowledge of what protein the gene synthesised or what biological processes it 
appeared in.  The gene then would be conceptualised in terms of how well one could 
specify the relationship between a sequence on the genome and other molecules or 
physiological states.  The question of whether or not a given DNA sequence really 
could serve as a physical representation of a gene or not, or how well established the 
object was as a gene, ultimately hinged on how much knowledge one had of the gene’s 
functional counterparts.  The way researchers referred to different strings of DNA 
sequences reflected the degree of knowledge of the strings.  There were known genes, 
like the DNA sequences which had been thoroughly studied in their role in the regula-
tive patterns of gastrin hormone responses.  But there were also unknown genes, like 
DNA sequences that were produced through a process of reverse transcription of a 
random sample of mRNAs.  These strings were called cDNAs or ESTs (expressed 
sequence tags), where cDNAs were most often used as a reference to sequences 
believed to be complete genes (although not thoroughly studied) and ESTs were most 
often used to refer to sequences believed to be fragments of genes.133   
                                                 
132 An ORF was, for example, defined in the following way in a dictionary provided by Stanford Univer-
sity  (defining the glossary of a particular database of saccharomyces genome data base). “An OFR (Open 
Reading Frame) corresponds to a stretch of DNA that could potentially be translated into a polypeptide or 
RNA; i.e., it begins with an ATG "start" codon and terminates with one of the 3 "stop" codons. For an 
ORF to be considered a good candidate for coding a bona fide cellular protein, a minimum size require-
ment is often set, e.g., many of the systematic sequencing groups define an ORF as a stretch of DNA that 
would code for a protein of 100 amino acids or more. An ORF is not usually considered equivalent to a 
gene or locus until there has been shown to be a phenotype associated with a mutation in the ORF, and/or 
an mRNA transcript or a gene product generated from the ORF's DNA has been detected.” (http://www. 
yeastgenome.org/help/glossary.html)  
133 In 1998, as the microarray group in Trondheim was launched, the group presented the status of knowl-
edge of genes at one of the first seminars. Known genes, cDNAs and ESTs represented three ways of 
talking about these things one could print on the arrays.  At that time, some thousand DNA strings 
believed to represent complete genes were available where less than 5000 could confidently be referred to 
as known (out of an estimate of at least 100 000 genes).  The ESTs were part of the temporally output of 
the HGP, and fragments believed to constitute a gene were clustered together (such clusters numbered 
about 80 000 at the time). Even if ESTs were fragments of genes, an EST fragment (from one of the 
clusters of ESTs) could nevertheless represent genes on the array since they would bind the gene it repre-
sented in the hybridisation process.  The group in Trondheim initially printed primarily DNA strings on 
the arrays that came from their own local bio-banks.  Establishing and maintaining a local “gene library” 
involved the time-consuming work of extraction, multiplication and sequence verification of strings of 
DNA. 
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Given a one gene, one protein tradition, these different physical representations of 
the genes could be treated as different representations of the gene on the genome.  The 
theoretical tradition of the Central Dogma framed the way researchers physically and 
theoretically represented genes.  These forms of representing genes would be chal-
lenged as microarray researchers set out to find ways of gathering and organising cur-
rent knowledge about genes. 
 
Rediscovering and recycling knowledge  
It is a simple and obvious requirement that scientists need to take current knowledge 
into account when drawing scientific inferences.  However, the Trondheim group soon 
found this requirement to be a practical problem.  In studying thousands of genes at a 
time, knowledge about thousands of genes would need to be gathered, which meant that 
the researchers had to move outside their fields of expertise.   
At some point, as the group members were testing their pilot analytical software 
tools, the researchers in Trondheim needed to collect up-to-date information about 
roughly 500 genes.  Every known gene had its own pile of fast growing literature, and 
functional aspects of unknown genes were constantly being reported.  The best they 
could do were to pick one or two abstracts from a wealth of search results that the 
medical database Medline would provide on each gene.134  They then had to rely on 
their accumulated general expertise in understanding and evaluating the correctness and 
importance of the reports of gene function.  Sitting around a table in January 1999, two 
senior researchers described one gene at a time, glancing at abstracts and consulting the 
other’s opinion.  They were clearly uneasy with the strategy as they joked about how 
fragile and incidental science must look like to an observer such as me.  Given the vast 
amount of literature produced it became a hopeless task to sort out the state of the art for 
each gene.  At this point they had already presented and discussed their problem with 
the computer scientists, who had suggested quite surprising approaches.  I shall, in the 
following, discuss the work that also came to interest the scientific publication Nature 
Genetics (Jenssen et al. 2001, see also Komorowski et al. 2001).   
                                                 
134 Medline is the main literature database covering the biomedical sciences. 
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 The computer scientists’ strategy was marked by a newly established sub-field of 
computer science known as "Data Mining" and or "Knowledge Discovery".135  A feel-
ing for the approach can be had by considering its main initial application.  The field 
had developed around the question of how to exploit large databases to solve business 
decision problems.  Data mining software used historical information to build a model 
of customer behaviour that could be used to predict which customers would likely 
respond to a particular new product.  The programme could "learn" or "extract" patterns 
of consumers' responses to products (by extracting patterns around factors such as sex, 
age and income).  Even though the prospects of providing comprehensive theories of 
customer behaviours were low, the databases would detect actual traces of customer 
behaviour, extracting patterns by using computational methods (Fayyad 1996).136   
The computer scientists considered Medline to be a database to which they could 
apply their methodology.  In the eyes of the trained “knowledge discoverer” Medline 
could be considered a place where reports were stored after they had served a certain 
purpose in a certain setting, much like old business records that tracked customer 
behaviour.  These databases contained knowledge that could be "rediscovered" and even 
“recycled” by using data mining methods.   
The computer scientists’ report to Nature Genetics had the traditional structure of an 
experimental report.  That is, their work was reported using the template of an introduc-
tion-results-discussion and method scheme, including a discussion of possible back-
ground noise.  But their communication reported an unusual experiment, because it 
evaluated knowledge stored in Medline as the research object.  The computer scientists 
treated the laboratory reports much as they would treat a salesman’s reports.  Literature 
databases contained traces of action as well, not of customer’s behaviour, but of genetic 
behaviour.  Abstracts and titles in Medline were exposed to search engines.  They 
                                                 
135 The Journal Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery was established by Kluwer Press in 1997, and the 
sub-field, carrying the same name, was a recently established field at the time the microarray group in 
Trondheim was pulled together.  During the two first years of the Trondheim project, computer scientists 
worked to establish a bioinformatics platform based on this emerging sub-field of informatics.   
136 See also "Introduction to Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery" (2. ed.) by Two Crows Corporation.  
(http://www.twocrows.com/).  Bioinformatics, everybody agreed, was of crucial importance for the 
microarray platform.  But microarrays, one should not forget, were also important for the new field of 
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery as the field came to constitute a crucial part of bioinformatics.  
Having mainly had business related issues as their point of departure for the field, the field could now 
associate itself with the far more exciting and scientifically prestigious field of genomics.   
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searched for gene names and functional terms in order to automatically record gene-
gene relations or gene-function relations.  If two genes were mentioned in the same title 
or abstract, a gene-gene relation was recorded, assuming the article reported some 
biological connection between the two.  Furthermore, a functional term appearing in the 
abstract would be assigned to both of them.  In making such a connection they assumed 
that the article reported traces of gene action in a particular functional context.137  
Through such procedures they had created "a literature-wide as well as genome-wide 
view of the current knowledge about human genes".  Ten million Medline articles had 
been browsed, a fact that provided not only statistical weight to the results; it virtually 
covered the entire literature (Jenssen et al. 2001).   
"No one has bothered to do this before because there has not been a need for it 
before", the project leader explained as she, back in 1999, responded to a PhD student in 
computer science who was astonished to learn that genetic information was not 
systematised and available.  But their work here did not simply result in a straightfor-
ward systemisation of current knowledge about genes; it also transformed knowledge as 
their work displayed knowledge in new ways.  I find their choice of language in their 
publication interesting in these regards.  They constructed words like “recycling” and 
“rediscovering” knowledge as well as “manual interpretations” and “background 
knowledge”.  I believe these terms reflect the scientists’ struggle to come to grips with 
the research challenges they were facing in re-organising the way molecular biology 
was to be done.   
The use of the word recycling indicated that the knowledge stored in the databases 
had to be represented in new ways in order to serve the needs of another research prac-
tice or purpose.  Without such recycling, their language suggested, the knowledge 
stored in Medline would be wasted.  Years of hard work of investigating genes would 
be as useless for genomics as old business records were for business.  A process of 
                                                 
137 The literary genre of publishing in biomedicine is quite formalised.  One could therefore assume that 
the abstracts of the articles, which were generally included since 1975, focused strictly on the crucial 
knowledge of the work reported.  Besides, positive results are generally accepted in the genre (with quite 
strict criteria for what counts as a result), not negative (we tried to find an effect, but failed).  So if two 
genes are mentioned in the same title or abstract, there would be reasons to believe that a biological 
connection between them had been reported. 
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 “rediscovering” of knowledge was necessary because one simply could not leave to “the 
user to incorporate background knowledge" in manual interpretations.138
The notion of background knowledge indicates a concern that there might be some 
decisive knowledge out there that has not been taken into account.  When background 
knowledge here appeared as an explicit notion, I suggest, it articulated a wholly new 
problem that had cropped up for researchers, because, in principle at least, up-to-date 
knowledge was now considered to be inaccessible for any one particular user of 
genome-wide studies.139  Decisive knowledge was somewhere out there, but it could not 
be taken into account unless it was taken out of its context and translated into a 
machine-readable format.  Knowledge became something that could not be captured 
and processed in the human mind – knowledge was transformed into something that had 
to be controlled or manipulated in and through instruments and built into the experi-
mental system for microarrays.  In the following I shall discuss how the concept of the 
gene gradually was transformed in the work of overcoming the problems and challenges 
of representing and handling massive amount of knowledge.  
 
 
Representing background knowledge, rearticulating genes 
The work of systemising the current knowledge of genes, then, was not a trivial task.  A 
systemised account presented in a machine-readable form, one should note, would 
appear to have been "black boxed" as common knowledge – presented without refer-
ence to methods, persons, laboratories and machinery where functional knowledge 
about genes had been produced.  A representation of current knowledge would have to 
be shaped by some form of consensus building in the international community.  And 
such a consensus building process called upon a standardised vocabulary and taxonomy 
as data were collected from different sources and across different research communities.  
                                                 
138 Their attempt to collect knowledge about 500 genes provides an illustration of the hardships involved 
in time-consuming and potentially erroneous manual interpretation. 
139 Background is something that creates worries for the experimentalist; it is something they need to 
control.  Experiments are carried out against a background that may deceive them.  Background is 
"noise", understood as disturbance, what may conceal the signal.  But background may also be noise 
understood as illusion, what scientists take as a real effect may be caused by the apparatus. 
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Such a standardised representational mode for genes had been attempted in the so-called 
“Gene Ontology Consortium” that was established in the late 1990s.140   
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Fig. 5.6  The Gene Ontology Consortium traced and represented a one-to-many relation between gene 
products and functions within a three-dimensional catalogue. 
 
 
This consortium aimed at providing a standardised representational mode for referring 
to genes, by placing the gene product within a three-dimensional catalogue: 1) The 
biological process the gene product enters (like cell growth), 2) its molecular function 
(like being an enzyme) and 3) cellular location or component (like being part of the 
ribosome).  The classical concept of the gene assumed one-to-one relationships between 
the gene, the gene product and the gene’s function.  But the gene product had many 
functions, which were to be taken into account in the Gene Ontology mode of repre-
senting genes (i.e. by creating a catalogue that could capture current knowledge about 
the DNA sequence in question).  The gene product – function relation had to be under-
stood as a one-to-many relation, as the proponents of the consortium stressed when 
presenting the project in 2000 in Nature Genetics. 
 
The relationships between the gene product (or gene-product group is) to biological proc-
ess, molecular function and cellular component are one-to-many, reflecting the biological 
reality that a particular protein may function in several processes, contain domains that 
carry out diverse molecular functions, and participate in multiple alternative interactions 
with other proteins, organelles or locations in the cell (Ashburn et al. 2000).   
 
Thus, the three-dimensional Gene Ontology catalogue represented a way to map current 
knowledge of gene function in the context of the cell.  Genes were to be articulated in 
                                                 
140 The project was proposed in 1998, discussed in conferences through 1999 and ready for public 
presentation by 2000  (Ashburn et. al. 2000, cf. also the homepage of the consortium: http://www. 
geneontology.org/#groups ). 
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 terms of their functional counterpart at the level of the protein.  The Gene Ontology 
initiative could be understood as an attempt to create a way to systemise knowledge 
about genes in a standardized way.  By doing so, as the telling heading of “ontology” 
suggests, they could provide a standardized way of displaying what the gene is and a 
way to establish a common frame for how the genes could be better articulated (through 
discussions of how genes could be better represented).   
 
                     
1.1 cell growth and maintenance 
         1.1.1 metabolism 
            1.1.1.1 carbohydrate metabolism 
               1.1.1.1.1 polysaccharide metabolism 
                  1.1.1.1.1.1 glycogen metabolism 
                     1.1.1.1.1.1.1 glycogen biosynthesis 
                        1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1 glycogen biosynthesis regulation 
                     1.1.1.1.1.1.2 glycogen catabolism 
                        1.1.1.1.1.1.2.1 glycogen catabolism regulation 
                  1.1.1.1.1.2 starch metabolism 
                     1.1.1.1.1.2.1 starch catabolism 
               1.1.1.1.2 disaccharide metabolism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5.7 Extract from the Gene Ontology catalogue designating, in this case, what annotation was to be 
given to a particular gene if it was reported as having been involved in the process of cell growth and 
maintenance. 
 
 
The Gene Ontology catalogue displayed the one-to-many relationships between a gene 
product and how it functions.  The catalogue provided a way to represent genes that 
were disassociated from any particular biological process, the catalogue aimed at repre-
senting a summary of all the reported traces of gene action.141  The Gene Ontology 
catalogue then, conceptualised genes in terms of knowledge about possible pathways of 
information flow, calling attention to how the gene was activated and the possible 
mechanisms governing why a particular path was taken.  The classical concept of the 
gene does not call attention to these matters.   
There were, however, still traces of the classical concept of the gene to be found in 
the Gene Ontology representational mode, because the catalogue did not reflect the 
                                                 
141 The literature-wide survey of current knowledge of genes the group published in Nature, annotated 
their findings in accordance to the notations agreed upon by the Gene Ontology Consortium. 
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complexity of the relationship between the gene, as found on the genome, and the gene 
product, as it appeared at the level of a protein.  At the turn of the millennium the theo-
retical picture of how genes function appeared to be even more complicated, because 
the gene-protein relation also was displayed as a one-to-many relation.  In addition to 
the empirical challenges to the Central Dogma already discussed (cf. Fig. 5.2), two 
other empirical challenges were now being recognised as pertinent: the so-called phe-
nomena of "alternative splicing" and "post-translational modifications”.   
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Fig. 5.8 Alternative splicing.   
 
 
Alternative splicing was long considered to be a marginal phenomenon, that is, the 
genes were mainly associated with the original order of the coding regions (exons) on 
the DNA segment found on the chromosome.  Messenger RNA is formed as exons are 
uncoupled from the non-coding regions (introns) and then spliced together to form a 
long string of continuously coding regions.  The order of this splicing may take place in 
alternative ways.142  By 2002, as Modrek and Lee (2002) observed, the understanding of 
the phenomena was about to be recognised as crucial for the understanding of functional 
complexity of the human genome.  More than half of all human genes had been shown 
to be alternatively spliced, and some researchers even expected that alternative mRNA 
                                                 
142 Alternative spliced variants may make a crucial biological difference.  Such variants may have the 
same activity as the original (i.e. the spliced version where no exons have been skipped in the splicing 
reaction), a completely different activity, or no activity at all.  Furthermore, they may have the opposite 
regulative function, instead of upregulating the activity of another protein for instance, they may serve the 
function of down regulating it. 
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 splicing would be responsible for the generation of more than 90 percent of all human 
proteins. 
Furthermore, although the phenomenon of post-translational modifications had been 
studied for a number of years, it had been difficult to study the phenomenon in a 
comprehensive manner.143  Novel post-genomic technologies made such studies possi-
ble however, which probably contributed strongly to draw full attention to the 
phenomenon. The characterization of post-translational modifications in proteins was 
even sometimes considered to be one of the major tasks of the post-genomic era (Pandy 
et al. 2000, Kalume et al. 2003).   
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Fig.5.9  The process of transcription and translation also needs to be mapped in terms of a one-to-many 
scheme.  
 
 
In other words, the same string of DNA that had been referred to as a gene could result 
in different kinds of mRNA, which in turn could produce various proteins that had 
different functions in different places in different processes.  Thus, there were many 
different pathways from a DNA segment on the genome to a protein found to have a 
particular molecular function in a particular process.  This meant that representing genes 
in terms of tracing current knowledge of them was now an enormous task.   
In 1990, the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH) decided to organise current 
knowledge of genes by listing or linking together different information about a 
particular gene.  This approach to organisation was presented under the heading of 
                                                 
143 The function of the proteins where known, depends on the particular three-dimensional folding of its 
polypeptides (sequences of amino acids).  But this folding was understood as not completely determined 
by the order of the amino acids as encoded in the mRNA (and gene) sequence.  Once the information in 
the mRNA was translated into polypeptides it could undergo post-translational modifications resulting in 
proteins having different functional activities.   
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Locuslink (Maglott et al. 2000).144  Current knowledge of genes were here given with 
reference to the “address” of the coding DNA region in question, or its “locus” in the 
genome.  Each locus had been given its own entry point in the database, which 
functioned as a portal to all information that could be linked to this locus.  Such 
information included information such as the locus’s position on the chromosome, its 
DNA sequence, gene-names used, linkages to known homologies to other species, 
detected mRNA sequences and reference to functional relations as had been annotated 
in the Gene Ontology Consortium.   
Following these new ways of representing (knowledge about) genes, it became less 
evident what it would mean to print genes on the array.  It had become a practical 
problem to know what one was printing on the array since these entities were defined in 
terms of how knowledge of these entities were represented in databases.  The difficulty 
at hand was a matter of controlling these entities or rather, to have control over what 
one could possibly conclude from the signals produced as DNA material was hybridised 
to these entities on the array.  In late 2000 and early 2001, the group in Trondheim 
started the difficult work of stabilising protocols for oligonucleotide arrays in parallel 
with cDNA arrays in order to obtain such a control.145  Thus, what was printed on the 
array as gene representations was primarily adjusted to the newly emerging forms of 
representing and organising knowledge about genes.   
These developments had somewhat dissolved the traditional notion of the gene, that 
is, as an object that could be conceived as a DNA string on the chromosome.  One could 
possibly still define genes as a coding segment with a start and stop codon, but it would 
not remain an interesting definition when the concept of the gene were linked to its 
various context dependent functional counterparts.  It could continue as a practical defi-
nition, however, considering the ways that genes had been conceptualised and knowl-
edge about them organised in terms of understanding genes as a locus on the chromo-
some.  Current knowledge could be represented by the listing of various reported 
                                                 
144 Locuslink was a gene database established by the US National Center for Biotechnological Informa-
tion (NCBI) that was organised as a part of NIH.  Locuslink was later replaced by “Entrez Gene” (http:// 
www.ncbi.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?db=gene)     
145 Oligonucleotides are short-stringed synthetic DNA sequences.  One of the problems with long string 
cDNA was that it could possibly hybridise to different DNA strings (from different genes) harvested from 
the sample being under investigation (although not with a perfect match).   
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 functional linkages of the gene/locus.  This form of representing genes nevertheless 
provided a catalogue that established an abstract “structural” functional map of the 
locus.  The locuslink, one could say, provided a map of potential functional counterparts 
for a DNA segment on the genome that have usually been referred to as the gene.  In 
short, one could say, the shifts in ways of representing genes and our knowledge of 
them enforced and reflected what Keller has called the transition from a gene action to a 
gene activation discourse.   
The transition happened during the years when functional genomics came into being, 
which may be illustrated by the gap that appeared between the number of genes and the 
number of proteins.  The gene action discourse operates with a simple assumption of 
how a gene acts through the gene product it encodes.  A determinist picture of how 
genes works had been embedded in some idea of the need for describing the physical 
and chemical relations of the chains of translations from genes to proteins.  A good 
indicator of changes in the concept of the gene, I believe, is found in how the relation 
between the number of genes and proteins changed during the turn of the century.  In 
1998 and even in 1999, we were told that the number of genes and proteins numbered 
around 100 000.  It seemed generally to go without saying at the time that the number of 
genes and proteins would be the same.146  The numbers one could hear in 2003 how-
ever, varied from 20 000 - 40 000 genes and 300 000 – 1 000 000 proteins.147 And the 
question of how many genes there are gradually appeared to be far less important and 
informative as it once was believed to be.148   
                                                 
146 In 1999, in an editorial of an issue of Nature Structural Biology ((6), 707), for example, editors used 
the number 100 000 to describe the number of proteins that would need to be considered in a follow up 
programme to the HGP that would to determine the structure and function of each encoded protein.  The 
point here is no so much the estimate of the number of genes, but that the one gene, one protein dogma 
generally seemed to be taken for granted in the literature up to 1999. 
147 Such an estimate was provided by the leader of the proteomic project in Norway in 2003 (Flatmark, 
FUGE seminar, 9. 2003, April Realfagbygget NTNU).   
148 It is quite striking how the estimates of the number of genes have varied; especially when one takes 
into consideration the authoritative presentations of the estimates given.  The Oxford English Dictionary 
referred to an article in Scientific American that, in Oct. 1970, estimated that the human genome possibly 
consisted of as many as 10 million genes (http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/gene_def.asp).  
Thirty years later, however, it seemed well established that the number had to be around 100 000, or 
possibly as many as 140 000.  The announcement of the first draft of the human genome, in 2000, was 
therefore quite surprising because the number turned out to be around 30 000 - 40 000 (Lander et. al. 
2001, Venter et. al. 2001).  The news created numerous questions in the press about how it could be the 
case that we, human beings, had a number of genes that were on the same order of magnitude as a worm.  
The low number tended to be explained with reference to the complexity of gene regulation, which in turn 
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I believe this transition can be best understood as a joint theoretical and methodo-
logical move that needed to be taken in order to establish functional genomics as a 
genome-wide research strategy.  In the context of microarrays, as I have discussed, a 
one gene, one protein assumption was the initial baseline for how genes were conceived 
and investigated.  Researchers had been printing known and unknown genes, assuming 
to some extent that the objects printed on the arrays were a place holder for the gene-as-
found-on-the chromosome.  Essentially, the work amounted to investigating unknown 
genes in terms of what unknown functional aspects they represented.  But new 
approaches called for new ways of conceptualising and investigating genes.  In essence, 
two displacements took place in parallel.  Theoretically there was a movement toward 
more interest in the biology of the cell, but methodologically, the constituents of the 
nucleus of the cell were the priority, because with all genes at hand, a genome-wide 
study of their activity could take place.  However, the gene came in this setting, no 
longer conceptualised in terms of how its actions were modelled in particular processes, 
but in terms of what its action could be in some as-yet unspecified context.  The new 
representational mode was constructed to serve the purpose of genome wide studies of 
gene action.  Along the way the focus on genes were deemphasised.  The complexity of 
the relation between genes and functional counterparts became not only more visible in 
this perspective.  But it also became more important to find means for representing the 
complexity in a comprehensive manner.   
 
2. Too much data: Handling data overload in individual experimental runs  
The first reason for constructing a dry lab section was because of the problem of 
handling and representing massive amount of information about genes, while the second 
                                                                                                                                               
enforced a shift of attention away from the activity of the genes to the process where they were activated.  
And the number of genes seemed at the same time to be perceived as less interesting.  It depends on how 
you count, a group of scientist explained in The Scientist as they later provided an estimate of about 70 
000 genes (Hollon 2001).  The same year, a joint research proposal from leading molecular biologist in 
Norway reflected the current openness of the question by providing a rough estimate of 40-100 000 genes 
(FUGE 2001c:6).  In 2003, the scientific community seemed to have little problem with settling the mat-
ter by vote.  As there had been a bet on how many genes there were, the number of genes was according 
to the New York Times (3..June 2003) chosen to be 21 000 at a 2003 annual meeting for the genome pro-
ject. 
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 reason concerned the problem of handling massive amount of data produced in experi-
mental runs.   
The situation for microarray based genomics of the late 1990s had some similarities 
to the situation that arose in high-energy physics in the 1960s and 1970s.  As Galison 
(1985) has described, the high flux of data that was produced by physicists’ powerful 
new accelerators created an information management problem.  In order to extract 
information from experimental runs, physicists had to develop and rely on automated 
machine procedures in collecting, sorting and analysing data.  High-energy physicists 
needed to learn how to reason with analytical data tools as they lost their "hands-on" 
control over their experimental equipment.  
Array scans likewise produced massive amount of data.  A scan delivered data of 
relative expression values of thousands of genes in a particular sample, where each of 
these genes could be linked to different genes in different processes.  It would not be 
possible for the human mind to extract patterns by glancing at the data, or keep track of 
the current knowledge of all these genes needed to make biological inferences based on 
the data.  The data needed to be ordered by computers before they could be transformed 
into information.  Biologists thus experienced similar kinds of challenges as physicists 
had before them, but unlike physics, biology could not provide a powerful theoretical 
basis to guide the ordering of computer programmes.   
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery offered a possible way to handle a situation 
where there were lots of data and little theory.  In a textbook, the field was described as 
providing a set of "machine-learning approaches […] the fundamental idea behind these 
approaches is to learn the theory automatically from the data, through a process of 
inference, model fitting, or learning from examples" (Baldi and Brunak1998:xi).  These 
quite bold statements underscored an important point with regards to the type of prob-
lems faced in analysing array data.  The large amount of data meant that one had to 
resort to some sort of automated procedures of pattern recognition if any sense were to 
be made of the data at all.  Theory had to be “learned” through automated procedures.  
In some cases, such as searching for drug targets, one could say that computer analysis 
of array data could generate hypothesis that one could pursue further using traditional 
methods.  In establishing arrays as a genome-wide research tool, however, the hypothe-
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sis generated through automated procedures would have to be further investigated and 
validated through computer analytical tools as well.   
We can get a sense of the computer-based ordering tools used for microarrays by 
considering “cluster analyses”, which were the basic analytical tool used.  Cluster 
analyses provided an automated procedure for grouping gene expression patterns – a 
grouping that, if successful, would reflect biological realities.   
 
 
Fig.5.10 A graphical representation a cluster of temporal expression profiles presented in Komorowski et 
al. (2001). 
 
 
For instance, Figure 5.8 shows a graphical representation of a cluster of genes with 
similar temporal expression profiles.  These eight genes were grouped together accord-
ing to some general measures of similarity of expression profiles provided by the biolo-
gist.  Four of the genes in this cluster of eight genes were unknown.  The name of the 
four remaining known genes suggested these genes played a role in cholesterol synthe-
sis.  Assuming that genes coding for the same biological process would be up and down 
regulated in a coordinated manner, the unknown genes in the cluster could be presumed 
to play a role in cholesterol synthesis as well.  Furthermore, the group as such might 
provide clues as to how the expression patterns of genes behaved in cholesterol synthe-
sis.  By treating the members of the cluster as a "training set", the computer could 
"learn" or "extract" a model pattern from the members of the cluster that in turn could 
be used to predict functions of unknown genes.   
In clustering expression patterns, it would be preferable to have a biologically 
informed yardstick to guide the clustering procedure.  Through iterative procedures, it 
was possible to gradually come closer to a yardstick being shaped by biological reali-
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 ties.  Models created by means of computer tools could be used to adjust and possibly 
improve the yardstick used in the cluster analysis.  The biological models and hypothe-
ses generated could then be tested and further investigated through a new cluster analy-
sis applied to other data.149   
The biologist thus had to learn how to reason with and make inferences by means of 
computer-based analytical tools.  Genes came to be articulated within a new machine-
readable representational mode in order to facilitate new modes of biological reasoning.  
The way genes were represented and investigated here would not, I believe, encourage 
the same tendency to speak of genes as autonomous physical objects in determinist 
terms.  These new forms of representing and investigating genes were mediated by 
computer tools, but this increased influence of computer science weakened instead of 
increased the “coding” or “information” metaphor one often associates with computer 
science.150  The picture of genes mediated by and through the computer tools in ques-
tion is closer to a chaotic image of the human consumer rather than a reductive picture 
of a mechanical “coded” organism. 
The challenge in producing a robust experimental system, however, did not only 
concern the problem of handling data overload in individual experimental runs.  Lots of 
individual experimental runs would be needed if researchers were going to have any 
hope of establishing reliable yardsticks by pursuing microarrays as a research strategy.   
 
3.  Too little data: Sharing and warehousing scarce experimental data 
The first and second challenge for the dry lab section of the microarray experimental 
system concerned the problem of handling too much knowledge and data.  The third 
challenge concerned the problem of having enough data and knowledge at hand to 
obtain statistically significant biological inferences.   
                                                 
149 The graph in Fig 5.8 appeared in a presentation of the data analytical method developed in Trondheim 
presented by Jan Komorowski et al. (2001), and the biological arguments were later more thoroughly 
presented in Lægreid et al. (2003).  These two publications relied on array data produced at Stanford by a 
group that had printed known and unknown genes on the array.  The first analysis based on array data 
produced in Trondheim was presented in Nørset et al. (2004), where cluster analyses were used in a study 
that aimed at detecting similar expression patterns in different cancer tissues in a search for diagnostic 
markers. 
150 Computer science has often been considered to be a field that has enforced the reductive gene-for 
discourse through the coding metaphor of informatics (Key 2000, Oyama 2000, Keller 1995).   
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It was an important strategy of the innovators of the Stanford prototype to spread the 
technology as widely as possible as soon as possible in order to accelerate the rate of 
production of publicly available data.  “More data is good” the Stanford group repeat-
edly stated - making data publicly available should be considered to be as an essential 
part of the process of genomic exploration (Brown and Botstein 1999).  What was 
needed, as another commentary stated, was an era of data collection “equivalent to 
nineteenth century zoologist and botanist who travelled the world collecting everything 
they could lay hands on" (Stewart 2000).  In clarifying the matter to me in August 2002, 
the project leader listed three related reasons for why a public depository for array 
expression data was considered necessary. 
First, as discussed by Brazma et al. (2000), expression data from one laboratory 
should be available for other laboratories in order for them to verify their own means of 
analysis or to complement their own data.  Global expression measurements were not 
only expensive and hard to produce (most array analyses only relied on single experi-
mental runs), they were also essentially fuzzy and relative.  Expression analysis gave a 
snapshot of the contingent state of a cell (or rather an expression level average of a 
whole population of cells sampled) in a given process at a given time.  In other words, 
there would always be a wide gap between the set of possible variable parameters of an 
experimental run and the number of experimental runs made available for data analyses.   
Second, because the computer based data analysis stood out as the critical phase of 
the experiment, research communities were more sceptical about analyses done by other 
laboratories than the quality of the raw data they based their own analyses on.  They 
would like to have the opportunity to use their own analytical tools if they had to rely on 
the works of others.151  There were also signs of a new division of labour among 
researchers, the group leader explained.  Some units had been specialising in producing 
data (selling them to private companies), and some units were specialising in electronic 
analysis of data without having any hands on the messy laboratory machinery of wet lab 
preparation, printing and reading.   
                                                 
151 The group in Trondheim had themselves relied on raw data delivered by the microarray unit at 
Stanford as they developed and tested their own analytical tools.  The work of Iyer et al. (1999), which 
the group in Trondheim relied on, was published in Science along with the raw data that were simultane-
ously published on their homepage (http://genome-www.stanford.edu/serum/).  On this support page are 
pictures, raw data and the computer programme used in analysing data.   
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 Finally, the project leader said, some researchers were also worried that array 
research would become an art that only could thrive within private (mainly pharmaceu-
tical) companies.  The worry she referred to was expressed by scientists interviewed by 
Kreeger (2000), who pointed out that the advanced technological nature of functional 
genomics made it more difficult for academics to compete at the same level as commer-
cial labs, making functional genomics predisposed towards the private sector.  Fodor 
(representing the Affymetrix prototype) estimated that as early as 1999, they were 
already involved with "90 percent of the top pharmaceutical companies, and we’re 
placing about two systems a week” (Gwynne and Page 1999).152  In making data public, 
it was possible to initiate an open academic counter movement to the closed industrial, 
mainly pharmaceutical, companies that were racing into array methodology.  The issue 
of data sharing was much less vital to the private sector, because private companies had 
the means to produce massive amounts of data.   
Thus, there were a number of important reasons for sharing data, as it was crucial for 
establishing a robust microarray platform in academia.  But sharing expression data was 
by no means easy, as it required a coordination of the different procedures and protocols 
of the individual microarray units.  An international meeting, the first in a long series of 
meetings, resulted in an agreement to establish a shared data basis for the repository of 
gene expression data; the Trondheim group attended this conference.  The meeting was 
held at the "European Bioinformatics Institute" (EBI) in the UK in November 1999. 153  
Array data would only be meaningful in relation to a particular sample preparation 
(representing a particular biological process that took place at a given time, harvested in 
a particular organism).  Sample specifications then, needed to be attached to data.  The 
following passage, discussing the problem of creating a controlled vocabulary for the 
                                                 
152 The pharmaceutical companies were mainly rushing into microarray technology for the purpose of 
acquiring more powerful and effective tools for searching for drug targets (Gwynne and Page 1999). 
153Reports of the meeting can be found at (http://www.mged.org/).  The European Bioinformatics Institute 
(EBI) presents itself as on its web site as "a non-profit academic organisation that forms part of the 
European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) [...] The mission of the EBI, as described on its web 
page, was to ensure that the growing body of information from molecular biology and genome research 
was placed in the public domain and was accessible freely to all components of the scientific community 
in ways that promote scientific progress (http://www.ebi.ac.uk/Information/index.html).  Brazma et al. 
(2000), in presenting the initiative, described it as a result of a grassroots initiative that aimed at coordi-
nating academic and commercial users of the two array prototypes. 
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experimental conditions, gives a sense of how standardised their common experimental 
platform had to become in order to realise the idea of sharing data.   
 
Initial solutions to the second difficulty – describing experimental conditions – will be a 
mixture of the formal and the pragmatic.  Some parameters will be obvious and may be 
described quite precisely, probably by using documented experimental protocols and 
controlled vocabularies, for example, for gene names, organisms, developmental stages, 
tissues or cell lines (although most of these vocabularies have still to be developed; see 
http://www.geneontology.org/).  Creative experimentation will explore how gene expres-
sion responds to a range of treatments and exposure to various compounds, and expres-
sion may be measured over a time series.  However, incidental and uncontrolled aspects 
of experimental conditions may also affect expression: for example, the time of day, air 
humidity, or even the noise level in the laboratory.  To build a formal structure describing 
this would be to anticipate all the niceties of future experimental design – clearly impos-
sible.  A realistic solution is to describe experiments largely in free text, while imposing 
as much structure as practicable (Brazma et al. 2000). 
 
Sharing data meant coordinating the activity of different laboratories.  Researchers 
needed to agree on 1) what information was essential 2) how to represent information 
and 3) how to store information in databases, and finally 4) what type of computer-
based analytical tools to use in order to compare and conduct sophisticated queries 
(Brazma 2000).   
Such standards had to be established along the way.  To simply settle for some stan-
dard for an experimental platform at this point would simply beg the question of how to 
produce reliable data.  The validity of the experimental runs researchers were about to 
conduct were thus wholly dependent on the fruitful mutual adjustments of each other’s 
experimental conditions.  It would not be possible to know beforehand what would be 
the critical elements in the creation of a stable joint experimental platform.  Sharing data 
meant that one had to imitate a process that aimed at standardising laboratory protocols 
in which different laboratories would continuously adjust their methodological 
approaches to each other.154   
                                                 
154 The data depository came to exist under the name of “ArrayExpress”.  The details of what information 
was to be specified were called Minimum Information About a Microarray Experiment (MIAME), 
defined by the Microarray Gene Expression Database (MGED) consortium (http://www. 
ebi.ac.uk/arrayexpress/).  The goal was to work out a shared standardised means of representation in a 
complicated structure called Microarray Gene Expression Markup Language (MAGE-ML).  MAGE-ML 
describes microarray designs, microarray manufacturing information, microarray experimental set-ups 
and execution information, gene expression data and data analysis results.  An American counterpart for 
gene expression data (and other genomic data) was established at the US National Center for Biotechnol-
ogy Information (NCBI).  It was called Gene Expression Omnibus (GEO), which is a MIAME-compliant 
database that has been operational since summer 2000 (GEO, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geo/).  NCBI 
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 This work turned out to be quite difficult to pursue, in part because it assumed that 
researchers would work to construct a methodological platform for the common good 
without knowing if or how well the work would pay off in terms of academic merit.  
According to an analysis put forward in 2004 in a joint EU research proposal from a 
number of microarray units in Europe, sewing together the practices of different labo-
ratories had not been given enough priority.155  The technology had generally been 
widely embraced before it had become mature.  Efforts had to be made to strengthen the 
structural quality conditions for array research, the joint proposal argued, as most users 
were preoccupied with short-term innovative goals rather than the long-term goals of 
quality assurance.  The project proposal was for coordinating European microarray units 
and establishing a Europe-wide microarray user community.  The initative was tellingly 
submitted under the heading: Empowering the Microarray-Based European Research 
Area to Take a Lead in Development and Exploitation (EMERALD).  The proposers 
were not simply concerned about the robustness of array-research; they were also con-
cerned about the competitive ability of the microarray research communities in Europe 
with respect to the American research communities.  Having the commercial potential 
of the technology in mind also meant it was important to empower the European 
research community, so that the European community could take the lead in the field.  
Even though microarray units were in competition, cooperation and coordination 
was, for various reasons, in the common interest of different laboratories.  This also 
contributed to the spread of the technology.  Small research groups at the periphery, like 
the one in Trondheim, were helped and encouraged to take part in developing the tech-
nology, a role earlier reserved for prestigious research centres.  And genomics could at 
the same time be seen as being democratised in the sense that the building of the 
experimental system of microarrays had to rely on a process of consensus formation. 
                                                                                                                                               
is an American national resource for molecular biology information that was established in 1998 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/).  The American data base has had a lead on the European data base, 
because the American microarray community in general has had a lead on the Europeans.  An example of 
a submission from the group in Trondheim, published March 2003, can be found at http://www. 
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geo/query/acc.cgi?acc=GSE335
155 The project leader of the microarray group in Trondheim was in the core group that initiated the 
proposal, which was signed by 115 array researchers from 20 different European countries.  “Microarray-
Based European Research Area to Take a Lead in Development and Exploitation (EMERALD)” 04.08 
2004.   
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The individual laboratories could be seen as nodes in a bigger network of laboratories 
that had to be built up in many different locations in parallel.  Biologists were trying to 
knit together different individual laboratories in ways that could make individual labo-
ratories seem to be different workstations in one enormous virtual laboratory.   
 
Shaping biology in silico  
Computers, computer tools and the persons who worked with them were seen as crucial 
in establishing functional genomics in general and the microarray platform in particular.  
Computer science offered tools for collecting and organising background knowledge, 
offered tools for ordering and selecting experimental data, and facilitated ways of knit-
ting together individual laboratories for validating purposes.  The crucial role of com-
puter science was reflected in the pretentious new term of “in silico biology” that now 
popped up in the literature.  The term clearly indicated that computer analytical tools 
were to be considered to play a new and crucial role in the shaping of biological knowl-
edge.   
The notion of in silico added another twist to the traditional in vivo (in the living 
system) - in vitro (in the test tube) distinction.  The practice of in vitro experimentation 
is based on a conviction that it is possible to learn more about the state of living biologi-
cal systems if the system is translated into a laboratory world of test tubes, reagents and 
centrifuges.156   The notion of in silico suggested the need for another step in the chain 
of translation.  Researchers could learn more about in vivo states, the idea suggests, if 
one took on the next step from the test tube to the silicon chip of the computer, and 
thereby disentangled the analysis completely from direct treatment of organic material 
altogether.   
The notion of in silico biology appeared to be closely related to the understanding 
that functional genomics represented something radically new, both theoretically and 
methodologically.  This connection became evident in 1998 as a new journal called In 
Silico Biology was promoted.  In bringing biological reasoning to the silico world of the 
computer, proponents argued, one could “bridge the gap” or facilitate an “integrated 
                                                 
156 See for instance Roger Strand (1998) for a discussion of these issues. 
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 approach” for the joint theoretical and methodological move toward functional genom-
ics.157  The matter was quite clearly spelled out by a keynote speaker at conference 
arranged by the German association that established the journal.  In his view, in silico 
strategies would unveil no less than the true “holy grail” of the HGP. 
 
Only recently, and unnoticed by the majority of the scientific community the full impact 
of the genome projects in toto has become obvious. Whereas most researchers - and 
rightly so - are mainly concerned with the new possibilities to learn about genetically-
caused diseases, about the transcription process, to understand the details of the organisa-
tion of genetic information the real new holy grail of research in the 21st century slowly 
comes into focus, so far mainly for the scientists in the field of bioinformatics: The 
simulation of whole cells, whole cell clusters, whole organs, whole organisms 
(Schomburg 1999). 
 
The reference to the holy grail seems to allude to Walter Gilbert’s (1992) characterisa-
tion of the HGP as offering “A vision of the Grail”.  Lewontin (2000, reprinted) made 
the article famous as he referred to Gilbert’s phrase in exemplifying how the HGP was 
driven by a deterministic reductive vision.  But the real holy grail, Dietmar Schomburg 
maintained, would only come into focus through bioinformatics tools, albeit so far 
mainly for scientists in the field of bioinformatics!  Schomburg’s analysis seems to say 
that the biologist was not equipped to see through the lens provided by bioinformatics 
tools, and thus was not able to see the real revolutionary opportunity that lay in the 
HGP. 
 
 
Distributed ethos shaped in large experimental systems 
The story of how functional genomics appeared in the vicinity of the microarrays tech-
nology could be put in perspective with reference to Fujimura’s story of how cancer 
research was shaped through the recombinant DNA technology of the pre-genomic 
times of the 1980s (cf. my introduction to the second section of this chapter).  In the 
                                                 
157 Cf. the homage and early articles of the Journal In Silico Biology. An International Journal on 
Computational Molecular Biology.  http://www.bioinfo.de/isb/index.html  The notion of in silico first 
appeared in the literature as computer tools became an integrated part of information collection and veri-
fication of DNA sequences in the HGP.  It became an important term however, as the challenges and 
opportunities of the "next step" were articulated and it became evident that a dry lab section was inevita-
ble. 
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microarray-shaped post-genomic area, one could say, cancer research held out expecta-
tions for establishing even more powerful research strategies by extending what was 
included in the transportable standardised “packages” that travelled between (wet) labo-
ratories and allowed for reproducibility and common discourses.  There would still be 
standardised reagent packages and standardised research objects travelling between 
laboratories, of course.  However, now standardised electronic packages of knowledge 
and raw data would be travelling between laboratories, too.  Laboratories would no 
longer deal with complexity by working on the same research objects (like cloned mice 
or cell lines), applying the same reagents and mobilising the same set of genes.  In 
addition, biologists now set out to deal with complexity by having the same data, the 
same protocols, the same genome, the same knowledge and possibly even the same 
laboratory!   
The work of establishing functional genomics/microarrays could be seen as a goal-
oriented process in light of the notion of experimental systems that biologists produce to 
deal with complexity.  The field of functional genomics was moreover also directed 
towards a process of establishing the field as a good and desirable field.  Following the 
scientist, one may see how the ethos of functional genomics was negotiated in all parts 
of the work of establishing the experimental system, whether it took place in a local or 
international arena.  This process could take the form of the enrolment of medicine or 
ethics or as an appeal to the intrinsic desirability of multidisciplinary approaches.  It 
could also appear as an appeal to the need for the enforcement of the autonomy of 
academic research on microarrays. given that the private sector, through powerful 
pharmaceutical companies, threatened to limit functional genomics to a commercial 
venture.  The process of establishing array research could even be seen as entangled in 
the political and economic battlefield between Europe and the US.  Moreover, with 
regards to ongoing normative negotiations, special attention should be given to the 
process of rearticulating the notion of the gene, as a number of ethical concerns regard-
ing biotechnological practices have evolved around the notion of the gene.  In the in 
silico mediated experimental system of microarrays, the concept of the gene appeared to 
have been transformed in ways that would counteract gene determinist discourses.  The 
very size of the experimental system of microarrays is also important to take into 
account when considering how microarray-based functional genomics has been framed 
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 as a good undertaking, if the goal is to critique and improve the ways in which microar-
ray research is to be performed.      
The process where the ethos of microarrays/functional genomics was shaped needs to 
be seen as part and parcel of the work of establishing a robust and extensive experi-
mental system.  Important normative issues were being negotiated in the process even 
before the stage where any specific research project and the ramifications of the results 
produced could be discussed.  In the following I shall discuss the process where func-
tional genomics was further shaped in a Norwegian context by taking a closer look at 
how international competition affected the Norwegian research community at a critical 
phase in 2000.  Functional genomics was then placed into a wider social and economic 
context, where it came to function as a new heading for biotechnology in general that, 
as I have discussed in the first section, could be seen to be in a state of crisis.  Func-
tional genomics lent new hope to the socio-economic promise of biotechnological 
strategies, and thereby raised the inherent social, economic, ethical and political contro-
versies surrounding biotechnology. 
 
 
 
Functional genomics as a national initiative 
 
Two important circumstances need to be taken into consideration in order to clarify 
what functional genomics was about to become in Norway after 2000.  First, functional 
genomics was at the time represented by different technological portals reflecting 
different genomic gateways, which made the field appear to be far more complex and 
fragmented than it actually was.  Second, international interest and reliance on the 
potentials of post-genomic strategies were at this point overwhelming.  In this setting 
the economic and political considerations became increasingly more important in the 
process that shaped functional genomics .   
This third and last section of the chapter discusses how a number of different scien-
tific, technological and social issues affected a national plan for upgrading Norwegian 
research communities within functional genomics, and how the plan in turn affected 
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these issues.  The very scale of a functional genomic initiative, which proponents 
argued was necessary for maintaining competitive and robust research in Norway, 
involved a number of challenges that had not been faced before.  Functional genomics 
in Norway would now to be realised primarily with a general appeal to socio-economic 
urgency of biotechnology.  Like it or not, we were as a society moving towards a bio-
techsociety, or at least that was the message of a conference promoting the plan (as 
discussed in the introduction).  The question was who and what would shape our 
common future.  Functional genomics, through the national initiative, now came to be 
shaped in Norway thorough a process of negotiation between the various concerns of 
stakeholders enrolled or affected by the initiative.  The complex set of ethical, political, 
social, scientific, environmental and religious controversies inherited from the discus-
sions around the HGP were now at play (cf. discussion of the first section of this 
chapter).   
This section has three parts: i) a discussion of the scientific and social background 
for the initiative.  Functional genomics came to mean a general upgrading of the coun-
try’s programme in biotechnology.  ii) a discussion of the social, ethical, political and 
technological constraints of the plan through a description of a crucial meeting where 
the initiative was discussed by scientists and science administrators.  iii) a presentation 
of an outline of what functional genomics had come to be in a Norwegian setting by 
2002.    
 
 
Evolving terminology for emerging technologies 
At the turn of the 21st century, it became difficult to keep track of the developments in 
the field of functional genomics.  A web page established by the Cambridge Healthtech 
Institute (CHI) at the time is illustrative.  This was a literature-based genomic dictionary 
invented by the CHI in order to aid scientists in their attempt to keep track of the field 
of genomics.  The web page, with the telling title "Genomics Glossaries & Taxonomies 
– Evolving Terminology for Emerging Technologies", traced and displayed the usage of 
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 crucial genomic glossaries as they appeared in the scientific literature.158  The terminol-
ogy of genomics evolved around a set of novel emerging technologies and research 
strategies.  One way to keep track of the field, then, was to display how genomic terms 
were being used in clear or unambiguous ways, and how they related to other terms, 
technologies and research objectives.159   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The DNA sequence structure  
basically time-space independent 
 
Part of genome turned on/off in a 
given time-space 
 
Actual proteins synthesised  
in a given time-space 
Increasing 
complexity  
Molecular chemistry: Dead objects 
Cellular biology: Living objects 
Sequencing machines 
 
 
 
DNA Microarray 
 
 
X-ray crystallography 
NMR spectroscopy 
Mass spectroscopy
Phenotype 
Genotype 
Sequence  
genomics 
 
Transcriptomics 
 
 
Proteomics 
DNA 
 
 
mRNA 
 
 
Protein 
 
Fig. 5.11 Three genomic gateways accompany the three steps in the classical path of information flow; 
DNA sequence - the mRNA - the protein.  The investigation of the relation between genotype to 
phenotype would be staged differently and perceived differently depending upon the choice of these three 
gateways.   
 
 
By 2000, “proteomics” had become a particularly important heading in genomics.  
Proteomics represented a genomic gateway that primarily took proteins as its point of 
departure, rather than mRNA.  If global mapping of mRNA transcripts levels was 
referred to as “transcriptomics”, a corresponding global mapping of active proteins now 
fell under the heading of “proteomics”.  The technologies that facilitated proteomics 
                                                 
158 The website emerged around 2000 but changed its main heading to “Biopharmaceutical Glossary and 
Taxonomies” in 2004 (http://www.genomicglossaries.com/). 
159 As becomes clear on this web site, the distinction between functional and structural genomics that 
appeared around 1997 was only the beginning of a steady increase of "-omes"  and "-omicses".  In addi-
tion to the more broad terms such as post-genomics, transcriptomics and proteomics, a wealth of more 
narrow terms had emerged like pharmacogenomics, oncopharmacogenomics, biomics, cellomics, 
clinomics, cytomes, expressome, functome, chromonomics, cellome, complexome, crystallomics, epige-
nomics, fluxomics, functomics, immunomics, integromics, pseudogenomics, RNomics and one could go 
on and on.  The point is that each of these terms represents ways of articulating different research objec-
tives and research tasks within genomics.  The objectives of the next step soon became fragmented in 
ways that made it difficult to keep track of what functional genomics had become, even for the scientists 
themselves. 
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were not particularly new as such (x-ray crystallography, NMR spectroscopy, and mass 
spectroscopy), but they had been dramatically improved during the last decade to serve 
genomic interests.  The proponents of proteomics argued that a genome-wide snapshot 
of the proteins present in a cell at a given time would provide a far more accurate 
picture than a global snapshot of mRNA.  After all, as Eisenberg et al. (2000) said in 
Nature’s special Functional Genomics issue, proteins are the main molecular actors of 
interest since "proteins are the main catalysts, structural elements, signalling messengers 
and molecular machines of biological tissues".    
By 2000 genomics was in a peculiar state.  The further away from sequencing infor-
mation that one got (in the flow of information from DNA to proteins), one would 
arguably get a more accurate picture of genes and how they function.  As the project 
leader of a proteomics project in Norway later stated; "DNA tells us what can happen, 
mRNA what might happen, while proteins what actually happens".160  But unfortu-
nately, the further one got from the genotype, the more complicated and challenging the 
approach of functional genomic seemed to get. The exclusive focus on sequence 
information that had marked the HGP seemed to be gradually deemphasised in the 
rhetoric of the proponents of genomics.  At the same time, the promise of what one 
could achieve through genomic research strategies was successively pushed from the 
study of DNA to mRNA and finally to protein.  This movement represented 
simultaneously a successive increase in terms of complexity.  The realisation of the 
molecular vision of life appeared to be more difficult and challenging than ever.  In 
light of these developments, the HGP seemed like a rather easy, cheap and – in and by 
itself – a quite uninteresting project.  Functional genomics had by 2000 become a 
fuzzier concept since its first appearance in 1997.  The notion encapsulated a wider set 
of approaches that were simultaneously being developed.   
Moreover, in 2000, functional genomics was not a particular well-established con-
cept in the public’s perception, or in the scientific community.  Before late 2000, func-
tional genomics was primarily something that microarray researchers discussed.  
Microarray researchers in turn reported that they were having severe difficulties in con-
                                                 
160 Kari E. Fladmark, presentation at a FUGE seminar. "FUGE 2003 – infomøte om teknologiplattfor-
mene". Realfagbygget, NTNU, Trondheim (9.4.2003). 
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 vincing their colleagues of the field’s potential.  This should not come as a surprise at 
all, because microarrays represented new research strategies that were unfamiliar even 
to the array researchers themselves.  "It's hard to integrate this approach in my world, 
it's a new way of thinking", a senior researcher sighed during one of their workshop 
sessions back in 1999.  Array researchers had to work themselves into a way of thinking 
and working in genomics because their traditional approaches had been turned upside 
down.  "It takes three to four years to get used to array research" another researcher, 
Kåre Nielsen, told me at a seminar in 2002.  He had his basic Ph.D. array training from 
Stanford, and the difficulties of performing and thinking in terms of arrays kept puz-
zling him.  He still had problems with pinpointing what the difficulty of "getting used 
to" array research was all about. 
 
If I knew, I would know better how to do my job.  It's about seeing possibilities and limi-
tations, about thinking biology.  I have five to ten thousand genes to handle!  The chip 
has such a straightforward appearance.  It looks so understandable.  But it is a new biol-
ogy.  One needs to think in terms of the cell.  Have you seen any of those maps of signal 
pathways of a biological process? …. It's quite astonishing that we can make a salmon 
grow faster – and it supports all that "gene-for" talk.  But you see - no one speaks of the 
fact that we do not know how to talk about the biology when the effect of transferring one 
gene to another organism is celebrated (my translation). 
 
It appears to me that it was a part of the work of establishing a reliable methodology to 
actually work in array research and thereby learn how to think differently and see its 
possibilities and limitations.  And as long as functional genomic strategies still appeared 
to be an exotic and hyped-up activity, it was difficult to communicate the potential that 
researchers saw in the field to their colleagues as well as to funding agencies. 
By 2000 it was difficult to get a sense of what functional genomics was all about, as 
the field was about to dissolved into many different practices.  Moreover, functional 
genomics as a field had not yet been established or recognised as important in Norway.  
Yet, in this setting, functional genomics suddenly emerged in the form of a grand 
Norwegian national plan that came to engage most biologists in one way or another.  I 
believe the notion of functional genomics came to function as a notion that united the 
Norwegian research community at a time that they felt was critical.  Not only was bio-
technology in general in a social and scientific state of crisis, as discussed earlier, but 
the Norwegian research community as such now felt it was being closed out of the new 
international discipline of biotechnology.   
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Norway lagging behind – again   
The small array community in Norway was quite frustrated by the priorities of the 
Research Council of Norway (NFR).  In their view, the research council had not under-
stood the opportunities that had been missed by not providing any substantial support to 
functional genomics in general and array research in particular.161  There was simply no 
understanding of functional genomics as a new research field that demanded invest-
ments of another order of magnitude.  Coming back from a meeting with the NFR in 
May 2000, researchers in Trondheim rallied against the NFR, which had created a 
committee to evaluate the need for large investments in post genomic research at a time 
when the "rest of the world" had made massive investments in the field.  One of the 
researchers found it quite outrageous that "functionaries" in a small country like 
Norway felt the need to review decisions that had already been made by every prestig-
ious research institution in the Western world.  Norwegian researchers felt that time was 
short. 
A new situation emerged early autumn 2000.  Three important research institutions 
presented a joint proposal, called “SAMGEN ”162, for the realisation of "post genomic" 
research in Norway.163  It was an 800 million kroner, five-year plan that sketched out an 
ambitious plan for research in functional genomics in Norway.  The plan outlined a 
centralised model, with the centre of functional genomics research localised in a limited 
geographic area connected to the most important research institutions in the life 
sciences around Oslo.  This initiative could be seen as a turning point in terms of inter-
est in functional genomics in Norway, and the SAMGEN initiative articulated important 
aspects of how functional genomics would be presented in the times to come. 
The initiators had made an unusual move.  They had bypassed the Research Council 
of Norway (NFR) and had addressed the Norwegian government directly.  In a letter to 
the Prime Minister, the consortium used headlines that sent a clear message.   
 
 
                                                 
161 In 2000, the group in Trondheim received 100 000 NOK from the NFR. 
162 A literary translation of SAMGEN would be something like “together-gene”, or “co-gene”, indicating 
a project that set out to study the gene by initiating collaboration among scientists that could draw 
together material and personnel resources in the central region around Oslo.   
163 The University of Oslo, The Agricultural University of Norway and The Norwegian School of Veteri-
nary Science. 
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 Research of great strategic and economic significance for Norway   
• 70 % of the world industry economy and 40% of the total economy will within a few 
decades be based on molecular biological research (my translation). 164   
 
The question was not if Norway could afford post-genomic research, but if Norway 
could afford to leave this research in the hands of others.  Internationally, post-genomic 
research was regarded as a good investment, the consortium explained in the letter to 
the Norwegian Prime Minister.  Most countries were making massive investments to 
respond to the “start of a new era [following the HGP] for the research community as 
well as for society at large”.  The amount that was requested for post-genomics research 
in Norway would only represent one-third of the annual functional genomics budget of 
a single American university such Berkeley, and half the budget of universities like 
Stanford or Harvard.   
In this setting, functional genomics came to represent a term that could unite 
researchers by appealing to a common concern.  Functional genomics engendered a 
feeling that history was about to repeat itself.  Norway was, as it had before, lagging 
behind international developments.  And, as before, a general upgrading was needed.  In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s two successive national action plans had promoted bio-
technological research in Norway.  In 1984 there were only about 35 people concen-
trated in few laboratories that could be said to be applying recombinant DNA technol-
ogy (Hatling 1992).  Fifteen years later, the same could be said about functional 
genomics.  The expectations for molecular biology in the early/mid 1980s were enor-
mous following improvements in techniques using recombinant DNA and PCR amplifi-
cation, along with the steady increase in available standard reagent packages.  Fifteen 
years later, the expectations of molecular biology were regenerated and the argument 
was repeated.  Norway needed in to take part in the developments in molecular biology, 
and in order to so, the fields had in many ways to be built from scratch.   
The vision of functional genomics now tended to be articulated in socio-economic 
terms rather than biological terms, since functional genomics was promoted through a 
situational analysis of socio-economic urgency.  The dream of a biotechnological revo-
                                                 
164 Nourm, K.R.  "Notat til statsminister Jens Stoltenberg.  Forskning av stor strategisk og økonomisk 
betydning for Norge" ( 27.9. 2000). 
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lution for the control of life itself was revitalised.  The real revolution would not follow 
from recombinant DNA technology, but from post-genomic technologies.  Much as had 
been the case in the late 1980s, gene research or now functional genomics came to be 
promoted through attempts to introduce biotechnological reasoning into different practi-
cal fields (such as medicine and genetic improvements in plants or fish).  And as in the 
late 1980s, this happened at a point when there were hardly any well-established scien-
tific robust practices that could easily be picked up and transferred to a Norwegian 
context.  
Thus the situation for functional genomics was quite different in 1997 and 2000, 
following international developments in the field.  I will describe the Norwegian 
response to these developments by providing an outline of the process that was used to 
establish a plan for the scaling-up of functional genomics in Norway.  About the same 
time as the SAMGEN  initiative was delivered to the Prime Minister, NFR summoned 
researchers to a meeting where a possible plan for functional genomics in Norway 
would be discussed.  Evind Hiis Hauge, NTNU’s rector, would later make the apt 
comment that "It was a striking demonstration of what someone with the right leader-
ship can accomplish in making people cooperate across institutional and geographic 
barriers."165  The initiative was also a striking illustration of how science, technology 
and society sometimes are being co-produced at a high speed by scientists and adminis-
trators through clever and careful coordination of powers. 
 
One voice 
In a letter dated September 18, 2000, the Research Council of Norway (NFR) invited 
the country’s central research institutions to send representatives to a meeting that 
would be held in Oslo on November 3.  The letter demonstrated how important this 
meeting would be.   
 
Many countries have put considerable resources into post-genome research.  From an 
international perspective, Norwegian contributions to this area are low.  There are there-
                                                 
165 Hiis Hauge had taken part in the initiation phase of the national plan, because at the time he was the 
Dean of the Faculty of Physics, Informatics and Mathematics.  He was later asked to open an informa-
tional meeting on the FUGE project 9.4 2003. Realfabygget NTNU. 
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 fore reasons to be concerned that Norway may lag behind in developing expertise in basic 
biological and biomedical research.  Such developments may have unfortunate conse-
quences for the quality of our health services as well as for industrial opportunities for 
commercialisation in biotechnology (my translation).166
 
Functional genomics/post-genomics served here as a placeholder for new forceful 
developments in the field of biotechnology.  But the release of financing on the order of 
magnitude in question would not only be a matter of goodwill on the part of NFR, as the 
letter further explained. 
 
There is a current tight public finance politics in force.  The possibilities of achieving a 
breakthrough with the political authorities will depend on an offensive plan from an 
assembled research-Norway, preferably with support from other significant actors in our 
society.  The goal for the meeting is to initiate a process that will make it possible to 
shape a common initiative that can achieve enough political strength to achieve a break-
through.  We would also like to use the conclusions of the meeting to marshal the 
Research Council’s own input to the field (my translation). 
 
In establishing such an ambitious initiative, the meeting would need to clarify a number 
of different issues, and NFR asked the researchers to be prepared for questions such as:  
What expertise does Norway already possess?  What kind of expertise does Norway 
need?  Should such a programme aspire to cover the entire field, or should the research 
be more focused?   
When the researchers in Trondheim were gathered to discuss what the NTNU 
response to the NFR initiative should be, they all agreed that the time was critical, as the 
future of biology was linked to the powers of new technologies.167  The possibility of 
realising a competitive biological research community in Trondheim would be in jeop-
ardy, from their perspective, if the centralised SAMGEN initiative was implemented.  
The number one goal for the Nov. 3 meeting in Oslo would be to counteract centralisa-
tion.  The discussion of what should be understood by the notion of functional genomics 
lurked in the background of these local meetings as well.  Naturally, the answer to the 
question would guide the direction the money flow would take.   
NFR had prepared carefully for the meeting in Oslo.  A set of possible political, 
financial and scientific disagreements had to be faced and handled through strategic 
                                                 
166 Letter from NFR.  Dæhlen, M, Aukrust, L.E., and Stene-Larsen, G. 18.9.00.  Functional Genomics – 
invitasjon til møte den 3.november kl. 11-16.   
167 Two successive local meetings were held in Trondheim before the meeting in Oslo, on October 11 (at 
Medisinsk teknisk forskningssenter) and November 1 (at Hovedbygningen, Gløshaugen).  
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moves to be made. A package of proposals was to be offered to the around 70 research-
ers and university administrators, a package that was presented first of all by Geir 
Stene-Larsen, but also by Lars Aukrust from the NFR.168  The NFR presumptions they 
presented were similar to those of the SAMGEN initiative:  Norway stood in danger of 
being “shut out” of international developments.  After a Swedish representative had 
opened the meeting with a presentation of the almost breathtaking Swedish 
accomplishments, the standard was set.169  If Norway was to achieve something similar, 
determined, ingenious and uniform actions had to be made quickly.   
A constructive atmosphere of collaboration soon emerged during the meeting.  This 
atmosphere was kicked off with the rector of the University of Oslo’s assurance that the 
SAMGEN initiative had been abandoned, and that a centralised model would not be 
advocated.  The powerful Oslo alliance actually called for collaboration on a national 
scale, a message that was repeated by representatives from the other research institu-
tions in the subsequent presentations.  Everyone stressed the need for national 
collaboration, probably as a result of relief on the one hand and their prepared focused 
message of counteracting centralisation on the other hand.  The scheduled order of 
presentations had been changed.  Instead of starting out with NTNU as planned, the 
University of Oslo was first called upon, indicated a well-orchestrated meeting.  It was 
indeed a successful move to allow the University of Oslo to call off the SAMGEN 
initiative from the start, because this neutralised the most important internal 
disagreement in the scientific community that had gathered that day. 
The constructive atmosphere was furthered by Stene-Larsen’s appeal to the group’s 
common interest in counteracting external, and unfortunately, not well-informed 
counter forces.  Everyone was important, and they would have to appear united if they 
could hope to bring functional genomics to Norway.  It was not only the personal and 
institutional interests of the scientific community that were at stake here.  The task of 
realising the field was a noble task because functional genomics would be of critical 
importance for the future health and welfare of Norwegians in general.  Time were criti-
                                                 
168 Stene-Larsen and Aukrust were respectively in charge of the Division of Medicine and Health and 
Bio-production and Refinement. 
169 The Swedish community had been in the same position as Norway, but they had already initiated an 
impressive plan (with an annual budget of about 225 million kroner per year). 
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 cal, and the nation was desperately in need of functional genomics, although the nation 
did not seem to realise this fact.   
As an atmosphere of internal unity emerged, the meeting was conducted in a relaxed 
and jocular manner, which enabled a sharp message to be communicated; the group’s 
strategy had to be based on two premises.  There were two “dark shadows” in the hori-
zon, as Stene-Larsen put it; these were public scepticism about biotechnology – and the 
Department of Finance.  Social scientists had documented that Norway was home to 
one of the world’s most “gene-sceptical” populations.  And then there were the politi-
cians.  If they were armed with even the most minimal sceptical argument, they would 
use it to deny grants.  The only language that would fly, like it or not, was the language 
of profit.   
Consequently, as Stene-Larsen further argued, a strong university and national politi-
cal process had to be initiated.  The process had to be pushed all the way to the budget 
negotiating table of the Norwegian Government.  So, internal disagreements would have 
to stay internal.  If not … social sanctions should be made (a comment that brought 
scattered laughter of approval).  The fights should take place internally.  Local commit-
tees should be established in order to make sure that everybody had the chance to raise 
their voice, and as many as possible should take part of the process and feel that they 
were a part of it.  As much as possible of the priority discussions should be put to rest.  
One of the participants spontaneously supported this strategy, arguing that if the plan 
was too detailed, the entire old (non-molecular) biologist community could mobilise 
and resist the plan.  The point was first of all to lay the foundations of how one should 
organise the research and what the main focus of such research should be in Norway.  
Researchers should stick with the main issues that could be agreed on and have all those 
messy discussions afterwards - when researchers had acquired the money. 
Researchers also had to make sure that everyone who held important positions were 
informed.  Individuals that were in some way involved in formal decision making 
procedures needed to be prepared when the democratic decisions within the university 
systems were about to be taken.  Dissent should be avoided.  Only by being united as a 
research group, together with a united research council (which already had internally 
clarified the matter), would the project have the chance to be realised.  The possibility 
of reaching their objectives was critically dependent on unity.  They had to appear as if 
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“Research Norway” had only one voice.  Clearly, if the scientist community appeared to 
be a unified front, it would communicate a solid rational basis for a plan that had been 
thoroughly peer reviewed.   
Thus, the country’s biotechnological communities confronted ignorance and irra-
tional fear as well as complex democratic decision-making structures that the nation did 
not have time to wait for.  Time was short due to the fact that the biotechnological 
development would soon be part of our lives whether we liked it or not.  The research-
ers present recognised both the NFR leadership and strategy as appropriate choices.   
Even though detailed priorities and internally conflicting issues had to be de-
emphasised, the plan needed to be substantial and specific enough in order to communi-
cate a clear political message.  As such it needed to be identified as a part of existing 
long-term programmes that had already been approved by political authorities.  Three 
existing priorities were well suited to a plan for functional genomics; medicine, the 
marine sector and informatics.  Functional genomics could be described as an umbrella 
term that could strengthen these three research fields.  Communication with the public 
also needed to be taken seriously.  The resistance of the general public could, according 
to NFR, overturn the plan.  The time and place and form of public information about the 
initiative needed to be discussed carefully, and “certain words and certain arguments 
should not be used”.  The information flow to the media should if possibly be controlled 
and the media should not be informed at an early stage.   
Aukrust presented the idea of division of labour between the NFR and the scientific 
community.  The content would be formulated by scientists, and the NFR would “sell” 
the plan.  Part of this selling would be to stage how functional genomics was to be 
perceived in the political and public arena in order to make it acceptable.  Aukrust 
argued that the NFR could handle the social realities better than the scientists could.   
Researchers from the humanities and the social sciences also appeared as a possible 
threat.  “We have to be careful so that we do not get the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty 
of Social Sciences against us”, the rector of the University of Oslo said in his speech, in 
which he argued that the scientific community had “problems with communicating gene 
technology in a good way”.  The understanding was that there were elements within 
these groups that had the power to mobilise the sceptical masses.  This did not mean 
that “ethicists” were unwelcomed.  On the contrary, it was clearly stated by a number of 
 266 
 participants that “ethics should be included” as worries were expressed regarding the 
ethical and social impact of genetic research in general.  The enrolment of ethics did not 
seem to be controversial at all.  Such enrolment could partly be seen as necessary due to 
the ethical problems posed by the field and partly because acceptability and public trust 
were considered to be crucial for the realisation of the programme.  
The two counter forces that had been identified by the NFR – public scepticism and 
the Finance Department –  called for unity and internal loyalty.  This construct of an 
external enemy also functioned as a way to deal with a possibly greater threat to the 
realisation of functional genomics in Norway; that is, internal scientific disagreement.  
The need for internal unity required researchers to wait to answer the question of what 
functional genomics actually meant.  If these discussions were set off too early, Aukrust 
warned the biologists, future possibilities of realising functional genomics (whatever it 
was) in Norway could be in jeopardy.   
A very short planning period was presented as necessary.  It was already November, 
and in order to have the plan financed in the 2002 budget, a plan had to be handed over 
to the Government three months later.  Such a rapid planning process was not only 
important because it was a critical phase for biology, but it would also be an advanta-
geous strategy because, as Stene-Larsen put it, too much discussion only would under-
mine decisions and firm actions.  A national interim board had to be established along 
with local working groups. The board was constituted at the meeting within minutes.  
Stene-Larsen proposed a small board with representatives from four regions of the 
country together with a strong leader.  Objections like the one that informatics should 
have a special representative because of its new and unfamiliar role in biology, or that 
the central Oslo region should have two representatives because of its size and impor-
tance, were immediately criticised by representatives who accused the proposers of 
trying to divide the group from the very start.  The bioinformatics researchers found this 
accusation quite unreasonable; from their perspective, biologists did not acknowledge 
and perhaps did not even understand the crucial role bioinformatics would come to play 
in functional genomics.  As the question of leader was raised, a loud and clear voice 
from the audience shouted "we need to elect you here today".  As the assembly sponta-
neously applauded, the question was settled.  And delegates from the different regions, 
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on the spot, quickly appointed their respective representatives to the board.  The meet-
ing even ended an hour ahead of schedule. 
 
 
The FUGE plan 
The strategy worked well in the sense that a plan of action was actually implemented, a 
plan that soon came to run under the name of FUGE (functional genomics).  A docu-
ment was approved on January 16, 2001 by the same ad hoc general assembly of 
researchers that initiated the plan.  They proposed a five- to ten-year national plan in a 
document that was prepared and handed over to the Prime Minister January 29.170  The 
process of establishing the plan had a bottom-up planning structure with a coordinating 
national board at the top.  Notes had circulated, and had been sent back and forth 
between the central board and local committees.  Notes had been circulating in “ethical” 
circles as well.  The document to be prepared was to represent a draft of “what func-
tional genomics should be in Norwegian” as one of the researchers described it in a 
local preparation meeting.  The field, functional genomics, as it was articulated in 
Norwegian, was shaped through discussions that needed to take social, technical and 
scientific considerations into account.  
The process exemplifies what Brian Wynne (1996) has pointed out; science is also 
shaped through the scientific communities’ interpretations of what the preferences of 
the political communities are.  In the work of shaping the plan for functional genomics, 
the demands and needs of the politicians and general public were kept in mind and the 
plan was adjusted and presented as the pressing national needs that they believed would 
"sell" in political circles.  If it was true that the sceptical mood of the Norwegian popu-
lation had the potential to undermining the plan, the sceptics had been effectively 
bypassed, silenced or persuaded – at least if judged by the public attention, or lack of 
attention, the plan received.  When the plan got publicity, it was presented in a 
                                                 
170 The document was split up into three publications made publicly available by NFR: A résumé and a 
larger presentation of the plan designed for non-scientists as well as a document that laid out more 
detailed scientific objectives and strategies (FUGE 2001a,b,c). 
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 controlled positive way, mostly defined by the self-understanding of the scientists.  The 
plan was primarily mentioned in the media when a press release was provided (as when 
it was reported that the FUGE plan had been handed over to the Prime Minister) or 
when they presented it themselves (as when the four university rectors together with the 
head of NFR co-authored a letter to the press praising the initiative).171  In contrast, 
existing biotechnological controversies, such as the one raging around stem cells that 
had been reported in the media while the FUGE was being released, were not linked to 
the Norwegian functional genomics effort.   
  
2001 October.  A 100 mill NOK budget is approved by the Norwegian National Assembly. 
2002 January 15.  Call for proposals.   
2002  March 11.  Closing date for applications.  
2002 June.  Funding released. 
2000 September 18.  The Research Council of Norway (NFR) invites researchers to a meeting.  
2000 November 3.  First meeting.  A national interim board was constituted.  
2001 January 16.  Second meeting.  A five (to ten) years national plan was approved.  
2001 January 29.  The plan was handed over to the Norwegian Prime Minister. 
2001 June 5.  "Biotechsociety - where are we heading?"  Conference arranged by NFR.   
2000 September.  SAMGEN is proposed to the Norwegian Prime Minister.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5.12  Some important dates during the first two years of a Norwegian national functional genomics 
research programme, the FUGE plan. 
 
 
With a strategic plan in hand, different groups explored the possibility of establishing 
centres in their regions during 2001.  While the researchers asked for 300 million kroner 
per year, the plan received 100 million in October 2001, and the need for sharing 
instruments and competence became consequently even more a matter of necessity.172  
The Trondheim region alone had made plans for a 100 million kroner budget.  For 
example, every region wanted to establish its own extensive proteomics centre. 
                                                 
171 Kåre R. Norum et. al. "Kraftinnsats for genforskningen". Dagbladet (16.3.01).  This letter began with 
a bold statement. "This is about research that will without doubt become no less than one of the most 
important motors in future industry and commerce" (my translation). 
172 This amount was increased to an annual 150 million kroner per year in 2003.  
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Fig. 5.13 A first draft of the research structure for functional genomics in Norwegian.  The representation 
above is based on categories described in the plan of action for FUGE in 2002.173  The plan was 
organised in four regions.  The northern region was represented by the University of Tromsø (UiT), the 
middle region by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), and the western region 
by the University of Bergen (UiB).  The eastern region was represented by three institutions, the 
University of Oslo (UiO), the Norwegian University of Agriculture (NLH) and the Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health (NIPH).   
 
 
The FUGE plan emerged as ten different resource centres or "platforms" during the first 
year of the plan.  In addition, 3 to 5 percent of the total budget was to be reserved for 
studies of ethical, legal and social aspects of the project (in what were called ELSA 
studies).  Within five to ten years, Norway aspired to reach an internationally recog-
nized level of expertise by distributing tasks, competence and recourses.  In this way, a 
small country like Norway could hope to establish an experimental setting that could 
compete with what big universities abroad could establish all by themselves.  These 
centres were to build up a specialised expertise that other researchers could benefit 
from, and their expertise and instruments were to be available for the Norwegian 
research community. 
The plan was implemented in six different research institutions, organised in “ten 
platforms” during the first year of the plan.  The Norwegian Microarray Consortium 
                                                 
173 "FUGE – Funksjonell genomforskning i Norge.  Handlingsplan 2002".  Oslo: NFR. 
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 was now integrated as one of the ten platforms.  Basic technological platforms were 
likewise established for genome-wide sequence variation analysis and protein studies.  
In addition to technological platforms, three platforms were established in order to 
facilitate the integration of post-genomic strategies into more traditional studies of 
model organisms.174  
The FUGE plan was also linked to particular research objectives, because it was 
associated with the political plans of reinforcing medicine, the marine sector and 
computer science.  Biotechnology could, the promise went, simultaneously reinforce the 
activities in these three practical fields (which would in turn also reinforce and facilitate 
the proliferation of biotechnology).  The FUGE plan was presented as a field that would 
release Norway’s substantial potential in terms of fish and fish product export (the 
export value of the sector was said to have the potential to increase by a factor of five 
within 20 years).  Thus, the plan also offered an opportunity to support and maintain the 
country’s treasured fishing culture as well as to provide work in regions outside of the 
central Oslo district.  An additional research objective of the FUGE plan was also 
integrated during the process of establishing the plan.  “Biobanks” became one of the 
ten platforms of the FUGE plan because an international advisory board of experts, 
summoned to review the plan on functional genomics in Norway, had urged the Norwe-
gian research community to exploit the unique national resources found in the country’s 
health registers and biobanks.175
The FUGE plan of action represented a process of genetization or biologization at 
different levels.  The plan intervened in a number of practices through the appeal of 
what gene researchers could do for biology, other sciences and society at large.  The 
plan was, however, also realised through the process of attuning to political, economic 
and scientific objectives.  Functional genomics found its way into Norwegian society 
                                                 
174 One platform was to serve a pure service function, providing the Norwegian community with 
transgenic mice (charging 20% of what commercial companies would charge).  The other two platforms 
were primarily involved in research on particular model organisms and were to build networks and offer 
post-genomic expertise.  The leader of the Arabidopsis platform explained, for example, that the entire 
genetic “plant community” in Norway had been involved in the process of establishing the platform (Atle 
Bones, presentation at a FUGE seminar: "FUGE 2003 – infomøte om teknologiplattformene". Realfag-
bygget, NTNU, Trondheim. 9.4.2003). 
175 Steinar Bergeth, FUGE coordinator at NFR.  A presentation at a FUGE seminar. "FUGE 2003 – 
infomøte om teknologiplattformene". Realfagbygget, NTNU, Trondheim (9.4.2003)).  
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and was itself simultaneously transformed in the process.  As the field was primarily 
promoted under a socio-economic heading, functional genomics now came to serve as 
an umbrella for a set of new powerful technological tools representing a general 
upgrading of biotechnological research in Norway.  In this setting, for instance, the 
long-term (socio-economic) goal of establishing methodological platforms for func-
tional genomics was seen as important in its own right (regardless of what long-term 
biological visions the field expressed).  In contrast, the short-term goals of the microar-
ray group (such as developing diagnostic tools for cancer) had provided a scientific 
setting for control, adjustment and verification of their long-term goals (of establishing 
a radical new way of doing biology).  In short, the notion of functional genomics had 
become a fuzzy concept, because a wide set of scientific, political and economic issues 
were affected and were being affected by the plan.   
 
Functional genomics in Norwegian, co-production and biologization  
The establishment of functional genomics in Norway could be seen as an extensive co- 
production process that took place in an increasing number of places.  The question of 
what functional genomics was, of its point or purpose, was simultaneously increasingly 
difficult to answer.  Functional genomics started out as a project that articulated a new 
vision of biology that scientists who identified themselves with the field struggled to 
articulate.  Functional genomics gradually became a heading for a number of activities 
that could not be said to be united by the same as-yet unarticulated vision.  The process 
of establishing functional genomics co-produced entities and issues like technologies, 
theories of genes, gene-ethical discourses, gene research practices, visions and hopes, 
the field of medicine, computer science, patterns of research collaboration, personal and 
professional identities, the fishing industry, economic expectations for biotechnology, 
university politics, national and even international politics.  The phenomena we would 
recognise as biologization took place in the process of realising - and blurring of - the 
research field of functional genomics.   
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 Chapter 6 
Best account of biologization 
 
 
 
Putting co-production to the test 
 
In Part I, I discussed the co-production perspective’s ability to accommodate normative 
discourses as I pursued the question: With respect to unsatisfactory standard approaches 
(those staged within the epistemological model), can the co-production approach 
provide better ways of conducting normative discourses on science and technology?  By 
viewing the co-production approach through the lenses of Charles Taylor’s philosophy, 
I have suggested ways to improve on the co-production perspective as it has been 
articulated in the French approach.   
This version of the co-production perspective was to be put at test and further 
explored in Part II.  I have juxtaposed the views of the standard and the co-production 
perspective by focusing on how the phenomena of biologization is conceptualised and 
investigated given the two perspectives.  I portrayed epistemologically modelled ac-
counts in Chapter 4 and performed an alternative co-production account of a particular 
process of biologization in Chapter 5.  The co-production perspective, I would say, 
offers a better, richer and more refined normative analysis of the phenomena of biolo-
gization.  In this closing chapter, I shall identify some issues in support of this claim.  I 
shall first start by displaying weaknesses in the standard accounts, which become evi-
dent from the point of view of the co-production perspective.  I then discuss how the 
alternative co-production perspective may provide a better frame for analysing and 
dealing with the normative issues raised by the phenomena of biologization.   
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The insufficiency of standard accounts 
The analytical focus on reductionism that marked the standard analyses of biologization 
was both important and illuminating.  It served a purpose for criticism, designed and 
suited for pinpointing important flaws in epistemologically oriented discourses that 
legitimised biologization processes.  The weaknesses of these accounts follow from the 
way the phenomena of biologization were conceptualised and investigated, which 
displayed how these analyses themselves were marked by the epistemological tradition.  
Biologization was conceptualised as something bad, and the badness was in turn identi-
fied in terms of epistemological standards.  In short, biologization occurred when dif-
ferent practices were seen as being influenced by “external” distorting ideologies rather 
than “internal” scientific imperatives (cf. Chapter 4).  The biologization processes was 
constituted as objects of normative investigation through these epistemological stan-
dards.   
In Chapter 5, I tried to demonstrate that this analytical strategy relies on an internalist 
understanding of (good) science.  Even well performed research, however, cannot be 
accounted for in terms of purely science internal affairs; on the contrary, science has 
success, not in spite of, but because of its socio-technical character.  The realisation of a 
robust methodological platform for functional genomics involved an effort where 
adjustments to a wide spectrum of natural and social realities had to be made.  The work 
of overcoming the challenges of functional genomics included the work of connecting 
and disconnecting biological, instrumental, medical, industrial, social, financial, ethical 
as well as national and international political issues.   
My main objection to the normative analysis of the standard accounts concerns the 
way the focus of attention is directed towards argumentative fallacies, distorting ideas 
and social influences.  This focus makes the analyst less sensitive to the moral relevance 
and impact of the temporal work of establishing robust experimental systems.  This 
becomes evident when biologization is analysed through the lenses of co-production.  I 
shall emphasise two aspects.  Firstly, legitimising motive powers and moral discourses 
is shaped and transformed through the very process of research.  Secondly, material 
objects and technological artefacts are morally relevant agencies as they stage the world 
we live in and mediate our actions.   
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 Ethos and the experimental system  
Given the standard analyses of biologization, discussed in Chapter 4, one would expect 
that the gene determinist ideology of the HGP would be transferred to functional 
genomics.  But the gene reductive ideology, as discussed in Chapter 5, was not 
smoothly transferred to functional genomics.  The notion of the gene along with the 
hopes and dreams of what the gene could do for us were also shaped by the respective 
experimental systems of the pre- and post- genomic era.  There is an intrinsic linkage 
between experimental systems, theoretical concepts and hopes and dreams associated 
with these concepts and experimental systems.   
Seen from the working biologist’s point of view, the prospects of creating a robust 
experimental system are first of all in focus.  If molecular biology "discovered" the 
organism, as Keller (1995:117) once put it, this first of all happened in the field of 
genomics because certain questions now seemed possible to pursue as empirical ques-
tions.  Empirical questions are scientifically preferable since such questions offer the 
possibility of being answered.  One could call it a technologically meditated vision, 
because technology offered expectations for realising the vision.  The vision of func-
tional genomics, however, could not be articulated properly prior to the actual estab-
lishment of the experimental system in which functional genomics was to be performed.  
The vision had to be temporally shaped in the process of establishing a robust experi-
mental system. 
Analyses of the biologist’s discovery of the organism, or analyses of why it took the 
biologist so long to discover it, should not be encapsulated in a pure cognitive frame.  
One should also pay attention to the work of establishing the experimental systems in 
which scientific questions are articulated and pursued.  The process of rearticulating 
genes was difficult and time-consuming as it involved the work of reconfiguring bio-
logical practices – of how proper biology should be done.  Researchers had to work 
themselves out of the classical concept of the gene, because it was embedded in the way 
they knew how to think about and represent genes, as well as how to go about studying 
them, and pursue investigations by means of them, in the laboratory.  The question of 
how empirical questions are formed and transformed cannot be made into a question of 
a more or less intellectual clear-sightedness or discussed by tracing what ideas the 
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researchers who formulated them were influenced by.  To say that biologists had an 
incorrect concept of the gene is at the same time to levy a verdict on the practice in 
which genes were studied.  Analyses that do not pay attention to the constraints of the 
experimental system are insufficient, or possibly even in the worst case, they may them-
selves represent another ideologically or dogmatically informed analysis of good and 
bad.176   
Post-genomic technological platforms like microarrays may induce a shift from a 
gene action to a gene activation discourse, thereby counteracting gene determinist 
reductive discourses.  Since the very concept of the gene is at stake, this may restructure 
dominating ethical and political discussions on biotechnology (cf. the discussions on the 
ideology of reductionism referred to in Chapter 4).  Functional genomics as a field, 
however, may not necessarily counteract gene determinist discourses.  The visions of 
functional genomics, along with the concept of the gene the vision carries, will also be 
shaped in a larger scientific and socio-economic setting that conditions or makes func-
tional genomics possible.  Functional genomics, as discussed in Chapter 5, appeared at a 
time when the field of biotechnology was at a critical phase, where the molecular vision 
of life showed signs of having been weakened.  I believe functional genomics in this 
situation also came to prolong the gene determinist vision of life, as it communicated a 
hope of finally being able to realise the promises of molecular biology.  In Norway, 
functional genomics was promoted as a general national up-grading program in 
biotechnology, and it was shaped as such in order to secure public, scientific, political 
                                                 
176 Keller’s analysis may be instructive here.  As she surprisingly noted, “contrary to all expectations, 
instead of lending support to the familiar notions of genetic determinism”, functional genomics carried 
“critical challenges to such notions” (Keller 2000:5).  In “the recent calls for a functional genomics”, 
Keller (2000:9) found “an acknowledgement of the limitations of the most extreme forms of reductionism 
that had earlier held sway”.  Although gene-determinist ideas were important for the launching of the 
HGP, as Keller observed, the "next step" did not seem to be imprisoned by those ideas, because the con-
cept of the gene had been transformed.  Developments within genomics itself had, in Keller’s (2000:5) 
words, “radically undermined their core driving concept, the concept of the gene”.  What I find interesting 
is the way she explained the shift.  When Keller (1995) earlier provided explanations of why the determi-
nist gene concept prevailed she tended to resort to social explanations of what enforced determinist 
ideologies.  When functional genomics later seemed to undermine the driving determinist concept of the 
gene, she tended to describe the shift as a victory of good reason, or possibly as nature’s own rejection of 
determinist forms of explanations.  "It is a rare and wonderful moment" as she put it, "when success 
teaches us humility" (Keller 2000:7).  Keller resorted to asymmetric forms of explanations of good and 
bad visionary motives, which do not encourage closer investigation of how such motivations change.  The 
case is closed in the demonstration of the victory of good visionary motives, which should have prevailed 
all along.   
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 and financial support.  In this setting it was important to argue the socio-economic 
importance of biotechnology, which in turn would enforce a gene-determinist discourse, 
simply because the success stories one could refer to were the doable and profitable 
“gene-for” strategies.177   
 
Biologization materially mediated 
Functional genomics may accelerate questionable biologization processes independent 
of whether or not it counteracts gene determinist ideologies.  We need to pay more 
attention to the material and technical world that comes along with theoretical 
discourses of the gene.  The process of biologization is not only conceptually mediated 
(as it has been analysed in the standard accounts), but is also materially, technologically 
and institutionally mediated (as shown in the co-production perspective).  Exclusive 
focus on conceptual mediators of biologization provides a too narrow focus for discus-
sions of illegitimate biologization, or to put it differently, whether, how and why biol-
ogy came to acquire an illegitimate hegemonic cultural position.   
My point here may be put in perspective by means of contrasting societal responses 
to physics and biology.  The notion of biologization also reflects a displacement of 
scientific, economic and public interest from physics to biology starting in the late 
1980s and continuing into the 1990s.  The exhilarating stories of science, as well as the 
hopes and dreams of social, economic and medical goods were gradually associated 
with biology rather than physics.  At the same time, however, the turn towards biology 
was accompanied by scepticism about the legitimacy of the authority of biology and the 
position it had acquired in our society.  I cannot see that there was a similar public and 
scholarly scepticism about the authority of physics in the 1980s.  I believe this 
                                                 
177 For instance, one of the common stories of economic success that circulates in Norway is the story of 
the Swiss pharmaceutical company that extracted an enzyme from a fungus found in Norway’s Hardan-
gervidda region.  The enzyme proved to be very useful in preventing the rejection of organ transplants 
(Svarstad et al. 2000). The income the company released from “this single gene”, as was said at the 
second FUGE meeting, “could match the income of the entire fish-farm industry of Norway”.  It is an 
amazing story, but the tale mainly illustrates an account of economic success, not the success of under-
standing biological mechanisms.  And such stories certainly enforce a simple reductive picture of genes 
and how they work. 
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difference may be understood with reference to the difference between the conditions of 
realisation of the experimental systems of biologist and physicist.   
High-energy physics provides an interesting contrast to functional genomics.  Such a 
contrast displays the complex world that comes along with the realisation of functional 
genomics.  The prestige, expectations and excitement of the two scientific projects may 
be seen as linked to similar scientific strategies.  The macro levels of experience was to 
be explained on the micro level of particles or molecules.  In considering the work of 
realisation of these two “reductive fields”, a kind of paradox appears: the smaller the 
explanatory objects are (like quarks or genes), the larger the accompanying socio-
technical network becomes.  The more one seeks to explain the macro world in terms of 
simplified theoretical entities, the more one needs to change the macro world in order to 
establish the experimental machinery needed in order to perform the theoretical reduc-
tion.  The smaller the explanatory theoretical focus gets, the larger the methodological 
magnifying glasses become.  The mere size of these magnifying glasses changes the 
world in and by themselves.   
With genomics, the notion of “big science” also came to be used in the context of 
biology and not only in physics, even though biology had not yet been as extensively 
studied by students of science as physics.  In physics, big science has been associated 
with expensive basic research involving large-scale experimental apparatus and the 
need for co-ordinating large groups of researchers from different fields of expertise 
(Galison and Hevly 1992).  I shall rely mainly on Peter Galison (1987, 1997) in con-
trasting the experimental system of high-energy physics with elements from my account 
of functional genomics in Chapter 5.   
When it comes to high-energy physics, as described by Galison, it seems possible to 
provide a description of the epistemic activity that comes close to an internal account.  
Galison’s main focus lies in the way reasoning in physics was performed and trans-
formed inside the laboratory, while confronting nature.  When it comes to functional 
genomics, however, it is more difficult to provide accounts of a stabilisation process 
that resemble internal accounts.  The process of realising functional genomics could be 
seen as more political in the sense that more ethical and social issues have been entan-
gled in the process as a result of mobilising and recruiting objects, technologies, institu-
tions and discourses.   
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 While the large-scale high-energy physics laboratories are centred around a few 
impressive big-scale facilities like CERN, large-scale projects in biology consist of 
many interconnected laboratories with far less extensive equipment.  The rigid laborato-
ries of high-energy physics allow little flexibility in terms of what kind of questions one 
could possibly raise.  And the questions asked have been highly theoretical (like the 
testing of the standard quantum theoretical model).  In the case of microarray based 
functional genomics, there are lots of different laboratories involved.  These laboratories 
could be seen as work stations that depend on the successful connection of many labo-
ratories.  These work stations are, however, flexible as they allow different research 
groups to pursue different research questions.  And furthermore, the research performed 
in these laboratories often has practical or innovative goals that directly affect our lives 
(like finding diagnostic markers and searching for genetic therapies or facilitating plant 
and animal breeding).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical focus / curiosity driven  
Few social institutions are engaged 
Long time-span before research 
affects our daily life 
Article driven
High-energy physics Functional genomics 
Many connected laboratories Few isolated laboratories 
 
Practical focus / innovation driven 
Many social institutions are engaged 
Short time-span before research 
affects our daily life 
Patent driven
 
Fig 6.1  A comparison of the stabilisation process in big science projects in physics and biology 
 
 
High-energy physics engages few institutions and discourses apart from the ones linked 
to financing needs, appeal to basic research and cosmological interests.  The process of 
establishing functional genomics engages a much wider spectrum of institutions and 
discourses within biology, other sciences and society at large.  Functional genomics’ 
appeal to basic research is overshadowed by its appeal to what it may provide for medi-
cine, agriculture, fish farming and the different associated industries.  As such, func-
tional genomics also engages patient groups, environmental NGOs, national and inter-
national legislation, ethical committees and politicians.  A wide spectrum of interests 
and values are put at play by functional genomics in ways that induce different games of 
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strengthening or weakening of different aspects of the research process.  The process of 
creating stability in functional genomics will therefore be more complex and difficult 
than in high-energy physics.178  
In particle physics it takes a long time before the result affects our daily life.  This is 
not the case in functional genomics, where projects often have an innovative goal to 
begin with.  And besides, the very research seems to intervene in our understanding of 
ourselves in ways that by far exceeds the intervention of the physicist’s cosmological 
discourses (something that becomes apparent in controversies on cloning, genetic ther-
apy or genetically modified organisms).   
Galison describes the research process as evolving around publication.  Money flow, 
personal careers as well as the prestige of the laboratory were at stake by virtue of pub-
lications in ways that seem radically different in the world of genomics.  Following 
changes in the relations between industry and science, the field has become increasingly 
marked by the dynamics of the patent.  The controversy of patenting biological material 
became a hot issue in Europe at the time when functional genomics was about to be 
established as a field.  The debate in Norway revealed interesting lines of alliances 
between industrial investors and scientists on the one hand and environmentalists, 
development aid officers, medical doctors and religious groups on the other.179  It may 
possibly be that the patent dynamics create and enforce power structures that are not 
seen in physics.  The controversy surrounding patenting appeared to be very complex.  
At stake were questions like the risks of reducing biodiversity, the status of local rights 
to genetic resources, the relation between the pharmaceutical industry and medical 
research priorities, and general concerns about our respect for life, as living objects 
became patentable as intellectual property.   
By comparing functional genomics to high-energy physics, I believe it becomes evi-
dent how the stabilisation process in functional genomics engages, intervenes with and 
                                                 
178 Jenny Reardon (2001) confirms the case in her study of The Human Genome Diversity Project.  This 
project is international and seeks to understand the diversity and unity of the entire human species with 
respect to genomic differences.  The project has been redesigned and changed since it was proposed in 
1991, but the project had nevertheless failed to get started ten years later.  The reason was, Reardon 
argues, that one would need to stabilise and control highly controversial issues entangled in the research 
process, like north/south relations, colonisation, intellectual property rights and the origins of human 
diversity.  The project has a web page at: http://www.stanford.edu/group/morrinst/hgdp.html 
179 Frode Rønningen, "Leger og forskere uenige om patent.", Klassekampen (20.9.1999). 
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 needs to attune itself to a wide spectrum of institutions and discourses.  Many of these 
features of the field of functional genomics became apparent in a Norwegian context 
through the process of establishing the FUGE plan.  The plan was tailored to economic, 
ethical, social, technological and scientific challenges and opportunities that facilitated 
or challenged the existence of the plan.  
The central cultural position biology has acquired needs to be seen in light of how 
the field, as a result of the process in which it came into being, affected affairs that 
matter to people in ways that evoked resistance and compliance.  The standard accounts 
of biologization-as-ideology cannot come to grips with the wealth of embedded scien-
tific and ethical-political issues entangled in the field of functional genomics.  The ana-
lytical tools of the standard accounts of biologization are too coarse for the normative 
analytical jobs at hand.  Because the standard account primarily traces how ideas are 
transported, crucial aspects of the biologization process, possibly the most important 
ones, are in danger of being left unanalysed.  In fact, by lending support to the inter-
nal/external distinction, standard accounts legitimise the biologization processes that 
they criticised.  In Latour’s terminology, these accounts substantiate the natural and 
social pole of the modern constitution, which in turn facilitates the proliferation of 
hybrids, because the work of purifying the two poles conceals the “work of translation”. 
 
  
The alternative of co-production 
Standard analyses serve the purpose of allowing for the critique of the biologization 
process.  These analyses, however, are not sufficient.  Moreover, they cannot provide 
the guidelines needed if the critique is accepted.  Can a co-production analysis like the 
one I have presented in Chapter 5 possibly provide guidelines of this sort?  In evaluating 
the matter, we need to keep in mind that a co-production analysis primarily aims at 
facilitating better and more just co-production processes, not settling the question of 
right and wrong in particular cases.  This closing part of the chapter seeks to clarify the 
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normative aspects of a co-production account and discuss the role of the analysts as well 
as the methodological challenges of the perspective.180
 
The normative perspective of co-production  
A co-production process could take different approaches.  Because scientific and politi-
cal judgements are analysed as intrinsically and temporally linked, questions of legiti-
macy need to be discussed in terms of how the co-production process should ideally 
take place.  In Latour’s (2001) words, it is a matter of discussing how well-constructed 
the “collective” becomes as a whole.  And scientific projects, like the FUGE project, 
need to be seen as a "collective experiment" as the project was a part of a national plan 
for transforming and empowering Norwegian society to become a biotech society.   
Experiments are qua experiment open ended.  The FUGE project might possibly 
result in a biotech society we might not like to see realised.  Our natural environment 
could, for instance, be put at risk as a result of new genetic breeding strategies, and 
stem-cell research could possibly introduce irreversible changes in our moral attitudes, 
including our readiness to safeguard the value of life and human dignity (cf. the discus-
sion on cloning in Chapter 2).  The FUGE project could even lead a number of different 
practices astray.  This would happen if the respective biologized restructuring of these 
fields were unwarranted (cf. Chapter 4).  On the other hand, our national economic and 
medical welfare could be jeopardised if Norway did not act to enter the post-genomic 
era.  Without a competent research community in Norway, the country might not have 
the national expertise needed to judge the medical developments such research could 
generate.  The proponents of the FUGE plan even argued that it would be risky to slow 
down the speed of the planning process (which normally is seen as crucial in the quality 
of deliberative processes) because the international biotechnological train was about to 
                                                 
180 My co-production analysis presented in Chapter 5 cannot fully bear the burden of demonstrating how 
the biologization process of functional genomics should be accounted for.  The analysis in Chapter 5 is 
itself marked by its critical focus on standard accounts of biologization and the corresponding attempt to 
demonstrate the need for an alternative.  One could say that the analysis in Chapter 5 needs itself to be 
understood as an analysis that is marked by an attempt to find a way out of the epistemologically oriented 
tradition, searching for ways to incorporate a normative perspective in the French approach.  My analysis 
in Chapter 5 is marked by this theoretical pursuit. 
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 leave.  If the planning process were delayed, the Norwegian biological community, our 
national economy and health politics would be at risk. 
A crucial challenge for normative discourses on science and technology, given the 
co-production perspective, concerns the temporal and open-ended character of research.  
Realising – or not realising – the FUGE plan was a bold task.  My Taylorean objection 
to Latour’s (2004a) solution concerns the way ethics appears to be inscribed in some 
variant of the stability theses.181  The direction of the co-production stabilisation proc-
ess, Latour suggested, is justified in terms of procedures that are in line with the ideals 
of a liberal democracy.  The process of formation of power would be seen as justified if 
all engaged actors, non-humans as well as humans, are represented, empowered and 
allowed access to, on equal terms, the scene where decisions are made, power structures 
are formed and the world is constructed.  Latour imposed a sort of democratic symmetry 
between humans and non-humans by emphasising that all “propositions” (associations 
or connections between entities) should be considered (cf. Chapter 2).  The problem is 
that epistemic and ethical-political activities are thereby analysed symmetrically in 
Latour’s model, that is, in the same way.  Latour's understanding of normative dis-
courses appears to be modelled on his re-conceptualisation of science.  Latour is there-
fore at risk of imposing a naturalised model of politics.182   
Stengers’ demarcation criteria may provide a point of entrance for a clarification of 
the difficulties of this strategy.  Stengers, to recall, understands good science as “risky 
constructions” (Latour 1997, 2004b).  The Stengerian demarcation criteria extended the 
Popperian call for putting scientific theories of the world at risk.  In the Stengerian ver-
sion, the world itself – and not only words – needs to be seen as put at risk in the very 
process of producing and testing scientific knowledge.  Scientific projects, like in the 
case of the FUGE project, are somewhat trapped in the tension between the gamble of 
                                                 
181As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, various scholars have articulated different versions of a stability 
thesis where science is conceptualised and investigated as if it was a directed process. 
182 One could say that Latour seeks to extend the ideals of representative democracy to include non-
humans.  Nowotny et.al. (2001) argues the other way around, arguing not that one needs to re-think 
politics, but that one needs to, as in their book title, Re-think Science.  Politics is a part of a picture where 
the laboratory is seen as extended into society.  Science is not described as directed towards establishing a 
robust experimental system within the walls of the laboratory, it is also directed towards a process of 
establishing a “socially robust” experimental system that extends into society.  In both cases, the concep-
tualisation of ethics appears to be modelled on their respective understanding of science. 
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following and not following a particular research path.  The solution lies in continuous 
surveillance.  The process where the collective is constructed needs to be continuously 
challenged and put at risk of being destabilised.  Asking whether the FUGE project was 
a good scientific project would be to question and scrutinise how and whether the actual 
pathway taken was put at risk of being destabilised or reoriented.  This also amounts to 
challenging the motive powers, norms and values at play in the formation of the co-
production process.  In order to do so, however, we need to incorporate a perspective 
that understand how norms and values are temporally shaped by human respondents. 
I have suggested we conceptualise and investigate the research process in a moral 
frame in order to articulate and challenge the normative aspects of research.  In Chapter 
5, I discussed how organisers attempted to establish functional genomics as a good 
project, by paying attention to the promises it articulated, the vision it carried and the 
spectrum of challenges it faced – socially, materially, politically and economically.  The 
research process was seen as a directed process that evolved around the work of 
realising functional genomics as a good and desirable research field.  The notion of the 
(decentred) ethos of functional genomics provided a way to conceptualise and investi-
gate how the project of functional genomics was established as a good project.   
Such accounts may provide an overview of how immanent constitutive norms of the 
project were being embedded in the project.  As these norms become better articulated 
and clearer to view they may be more susceptible to critique and reconsideration since 
claims are made of how the field was constructed as a good field.  Such accounts then, 
could contribute to the process of normative clarification of what functional genomics 
should be.  Ethics would provide the measure of truth of such accounts; each account 
should be evaluated in light of how well it could contribute to the improvements of the 
practice accounted for.   
The point or purpose of co-production accounts like the one in Chapter 5 is to con-
tribute to the work of establishing a well performing collective.  By following the proc-
ess by which the field was realised, it is possible to identify arenas of co-production and 
trace what actors were enrolled and what role they played in shaping the process.  In 
doing so, we may get an overview of what is at stake in the process of establishing a 
field like functional genomics.  We would also be in a better position to discern what 
arenas and actors are missing and could thereby discuss how the co-production process 
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 could have taken a different pathway  Because such accounts seek to articulate how 
functional genomics was constructed as a good field, they will address constitutive self-
understandings of the practitioners in question.  This may in turn lead to a better, well-
argued, just and well-constructed collective.  
 
The analyst as a co-constructor 
Analyses of the construction of a project like functional genomics as a good project 
provides descriptions with normative assumptions.  Such accounts call for some norma-
tive engagement of the analysts.  The analysts need to raise questions such as; was 
functional genomics established as a good project - and how could it be improved upon?  
It is a matter of seeing what is at stake, subjecting one’s own account to criticism as 
well as searching for ways of putting the research process at risk.  Co-production ana-
lysts should not raise normative questions because they have some privileged analytical 
standpoint, but because they don’t, and should intervene in order to facilitate desirable 
and legitimate pathways of co-production.   
The process of establishing functional genomics appeared to be a good and accept-
able process as it seemed to have been thoroughly deliberated in a wide social, scientific 
and ethical-political context.  From the very start, social, economic and ethical aspects 
of the Norwegian way of performing functional genomics were taken into account.  
This was especially evident in the process of realising and carrying out the FUGE pro-
ject.  For example, existing scepticism towards biotechnological research was empow-
ered in the process, because the promoters of the FUGE plan believed that the mobilisa-
tion of the various critics could overthrow the plan.  As the plan was accommodating its 
goals and strategies to these critics, the critique could in a pragmatic sense be under-
stood as having been taken into account.  It is possible to assume that the scepticism 
was fairly well represented as well.  The relevant Norwegian research communities 
from the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences had been invited to articulate 
the rationale behind public scepticism.  Invitations were sent out to allow for the articu-
lation of possible risks and threats of realising functional genomics.  These invitations 
were sent through informal channels.   
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In contrast to what the scientists and science administrators feared, the plan did not 
face much resistance.  The project received grants from the Department of Finance and 
was mainly described in a positive way by the media.  Scientists and scholars from the 
social sciences and the humanities did not seek to counteract the plan in any way, even 
though they were informed.  One would at least expect that the plan would be publicly 
questioned if the plan were seriously flawed in their view.  In the process of establishing 
the plan, every potential mediator of the research project was to be consulted.  An inter-
national board of scientific experts was summoned in order to address the matter.  
Everyone who would affect or be affected by the programme was to be taken into 
account while addressing the question of what the scientific, ethical and economical 
potentials and ramifications of the project would be.  One may assume that the robust-
ness of the plan, given its peculiar way of securing transparency and including a wide 
spectrum of participants, reflected an accompanying thorough deliberation of the 
project.   
Such a conclusion obviously presupposes the integrity and good will of the partici-
pants.  If the lack of normative controversy regarding the FUGE plan is to be taken as a 
sign of the legitimate robustness of the plan, one would not only have to rely on the 
integrity of the participants of the process.  One would also need to assume that the 
participants were truthfully engaged in assessing every important aspect that could 
potentially destabilise the scientific and political rationale for the plan.  More impor-
tantly, however, one would have to assume that constitutive norms and values were 
clearly articulated and thereby put in motion during the deliberation process.  The diffi-
culty at hand concerns what in scientific language could be called “background” values, 
commitments and beliefs.  This background needs to be articulated, and the research 
process needs to ensure that it is articulated.  As argued in Chapter 3, this calls for a 
philosophical anthropology of the sort offered by Taylor.  The co-production analysts 
can, by incorporating such a philosophical anthropology, contribute to a proper articu-
lation of the normative background for the project and the process in which it was 
established.  Descriptions of the sort presented in Chapter 5 could, for instance, provide 
points of entrance for further critical engagement in these regards.   
From this perspective, the analyst needs to take on a responsible role of being a co-
constructer of the project studied.  The point is not that analysts necessarily need to take 
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 a normative stance, but that analysts need to be engaged in the search for desirable 
pathways of co-production.  The need for analysts to understand their role as co-
constructors becomes further evident in Stengers’ line of argument.  The crucial ques-
tion any constructor should ask themselves, Stengers (1999:71) argued, is captured in a 
simple question; who are my fellow experts?  Who may have something important to 
say regarding how the collective as such can be well constructed?  This imperative does 
not only require those in power to raise the question and invite fellow experts.  The task 
of establishing a good, dual scientific and political process could not be realised if the 
relevant experts do not participate.  Science and technology analysts also need to take a 
more responsible role as co-constructers, especially when they are invited to participate, 
as they for instance were in the case discussed in Chapter 5.   
“Ethics” was from the start a part of the FUGE programme and was presented as an 
integrated part of the programme.  Ethics was involved in terms of enlisting scientists 
from the humanities and the social sciences, and a heavy burden was laid on their 
shoulders.  The FUGE plan of action said the project "shall contribute to the building of 
the national expertise needed to ensure that functional genome research is conducted 
within the ethical frames that our culture is built upon” (2001b:17, my translation).  
Fields like sociology, philosophy and law then, were enlisted as participants as their 
good name was used to ensure the ethical quality of the FUGE programme.  These 
research fields did not seem to object to this enlistment.   
Seen from the co-production perspective, such enlistment is a good thing; scholars 
who claim they have something important to say about science should enlist.  I take it as 
a simple reflexive requirement of the co-production perspective that those involved 
understand their role as co-constructors in a more participatory way than they would 
without such an invitation.  The call for understanding the students of science as co-
constructors is a call for understanding their role as critical contributors to the process 
of construction of well-constructed collectives.   
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An invitation to enlist, however, should not be accepted under all circumstances.183  
The imperative of enlistment presupposes some form of empowerment.  It represents a 
problem if ELSA studies (studies of ethical, legal and social aspects) of the FUGE 
project, by their very presence, provide a way to legitimise functional genomics without 
having any effect on the course of events.  The co-production perspective presupposes a 
mutual recognition of the participants’ roles as co-constructors. 
 
Enrolment, empowerment and experimental attitudes 
One of the main problems for the analyst concerns the way the co-production perspec-
tive calls for analyses and interventions during the early stages of research projects.  
Seen from a co-production perspective, the early stages of research projects are crucial, 
as nicely described by Shelia Jasanoff: 
 
The possibility of critical engagement is perhaps most apparent when a co-productionist 
eye is brought to the analysis of emerging orders.  It is at the point of emergence, before 
things are completely stabilized or black-boxed, that one most easily observes the mutual 
uptake of the social and the natural.  It is also at this moment of flux that processes of co-
production are most influential in setting the stage for future human development.  
Important normative choices get made during the phase of emergence: in the resolution of 
conflicts; the classification of scientific and social objects; the standardization of techno-
logical practices; and the uptake of knowledge in different cultural contexts.  Once the 
resulting settlements are normalized (social order) or naturalized (natural order), it 
becomes difficult to rediscover the contested assumptions that were freely in play before 
stability was effected (Jasanoff 2004c:278-9). 
 
The co-production process unfolds sometimes in irreversible ways as it sets the future 
course of human development.  Post-fact co-production accounts come too late, as they 
can hardly make a difference in the processes being accounted for.   
The situation calls for a more experimental attitude, where the analyst searches for 
new ways of performing normative interventional practices without losing sight of his 
or her analytical distance.  Such experiments presuppose cooperation between the 
analyst and the scientists in being engaged in each other’s respective pursuits.  One 
                                                 
183 It is hard to see what the imperative of enlistment implies with respect to projects one would find 
totally unacceptable, irrelevant, or misplaced.  Like other scientists, one would need to consider one’s role 
in realising research that expresses an ethos one seriously wants to counteract.  Some projects are proba-
bly better intervened in at a distance, by not enlisting.  The issue at stake here is first of all the rationale 
for the professional identity linked to the idea that one performs better analyses if one does not enlist. 
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 could imagine cases where social scientists and philosophers took part in the discussion 
of the scientific experimental design in order to facilitate the work of articulating the 
ethos of the research project in question.  Such investigations could take place in the 
form of comparative analyses of the relevant differences between the experimental 
systems one needs to establish in order to realise different stem-cell sources.  Such a 
comparison could contribute to the clarification of how and what social and natural 
realities would be at stake in the research process.  Or, one could consider different 
ways of provoking human responses as part of the experimental system, such as what 
seemed to happen after the preliminary announcement of ACT or the action of the 
Minister of Health as he publicly criticised the research project in Trondheim.  The 
objective of such provocation would be to spot and put in play the various norms and 
values that are affected and affecting the research process.  
There will also be a need for more specific analyses following a collective experi-
ment like FUGE.  Powerful technologies come at the price of moral confusion, which 
may have different impacts in different settings.  The FUGE project may induce unpre-
dictable and possibly irreversible changes in our moral discourses in different areas.  
We may possibly have to accept this as part of the human condition in a world perme-
ated by science and technology.  Kuhn (1970:24) described the character of the work 
most scientist do most of the time as “mop-up” work (as well as “puzzle solving”).  I 
find the notion well-suited in characterising the kind of moral mop-up work that often 
needs to be done following the introduction of new technologies.  Berge Solberg’s 
(2003) discussions are illustrative.  Solberg was enrolled as an ethicist in the microarray 
project discussed in Chapter 5.  He chose to investigate the effect powerful diagnostic 
tools like microarrays would have on discussions about reproduction.  Microarrays and 
other tools like ultrasound diagnostics, he argued, will make a crucial difference in the 
sort of questions and choices all parents, whether they are aware of it or not, will be 
confronted with in the process of having children.  A new “gene-ethical reality” is 
emerging, and this reality needs to be rearticulated, which, among other things, amounts 
to better articulating the questions, feelings of uneasiness, fear, delight, hopes and 
dreams of human respondents of the remade world.  Solberg spotted, traced, articulated 
and challenged arguments, questions and spontaneous emotive responses and moral 
duties of politicians, parents and scientists who were engaged in debates over 
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reproduction, in the media, in political discourses, in the laboratory or in scholarly 
writings.  In doing so, he set out to clarify what the interesting and well-founded moral 
questions are with respect to the emerging technologies that interfere in established and 
ethically digested practices.  His work demonstrates how the work of rearticulation also 
may benefit from taking place at the point of emergence, before things are completely 
stabilised or black-boxed, as Jasanoff put it. 
 
Rearticulating professional identities 
One of the ethical problems of the FUGE project was that the scientists from the 
humanities and social sciences themselves did not seem to be prepared to accept the 
invitation to enlist, that is, to understand their role as co-constructors.  In as much as the 
ELSA group of scientists confine their role to providing theoretical descriptive analyses, 
or possibly, functioning as whistle blowers when something is wrong, they are at risk of 
violating the Stengerian criteria of good science.  These criteria imply seeing that the 
construction process is at risk of being destabilised, and thereby, next, improved upon.  
The point is not the destabilisation or destruction as such, but the task of contributing to 
the formation of a well constructed collective.184   
It seems to me that the field of science studies at large has had difficulties in adjust-
ing to the changes brought about by developments within the sciences.  The self-
understanding of scholars of science has been dominated by a professional identity of 
being observers or critics.  And this is a kind of investigation these scholars know how 
to do.  This identity is also confirmed in the field as the constant expectation of ethicists 
to clarify or foresee “ethical problems” that would appear in the context of application.  
In a situation where science analysts are asked to participate, it is not only the profes-
sional identity of the analyst that is cast into confusion; the identity of those who have 
offered the invitation, or are for different reasons forced to “include meta perspectives”, 
is challenged as well. 
                                                 
184 The problem appears, as seen from the co-production perspective, when the role of the analysts is not 
understood as co-constructors, which seems to be the general case.  I find it symptomatic, for instance, 
that ELSA studies were not organised as a FUGE platform; that is, as a part of the experimental system of 
functional genomics in Norway. 
 290 
 Part of the challenge the ethicist faces here lies in the simultaneous work of redefin-
ing his or her own professional identity as well as providing suggestions for how those 
who involve ethicists should redefine their professional identity.  On the one hand there 
is the problem of knowing how to perform proper analyses differently in a situation 
where one has been enrolled.  On the other hand there is the problem of articulating how 
the co-production perspective depicts normative evaluations as ideally performed. 
We may find a point of entrance to this last problem by considering Nowontny’s 
(2001) notion of the ideals of socially robust processes.  In Knut Sørensen’s (2001) 
reading, Nowonty and her colleagues argued that modern forms of knowledge produc-
tion have induced a shift in the ways science and technology have come to be evaluated 
and assessed.  Science assessment has come to be an integral part of the scientific proc-
ess.  Knowledge producing processes have become in and by themselves more socially 
robust.  During the last two decades, Nowonty and her colleagues claim, research has, 
to a growing extent, become organised in multidisciplinary research programs.  And 
these research programs are performed in a setting where scientific, industrial and 
political institutions have become more entangled than they used to be.  As a result, 
scientists have been forced to take social, economic and ethical aspects of their research 
into account when designing and carrying out their research programmes.  Sørensen 
argues that Nowotny et al. claim that new criteria for what should count as good 
research has emerged following the changes in what scientific activity has become.   
This notion of socially robust science appears to be a quite optimistic view of what 
science and technology assessment has come to be in modern scientific research pro-
jects.  Due to the nature of the challenges of modern scientific projects, ethical aspects 
of research are being addressed in and through the research process itself.  The more 
controversial, ethically and politically, a scientific project gets, the more the project will 
be attuned to various ethical and political concerns in the design and performance of the 
project.   
This reading of the claims of Nowotny and her colleagues could be put in perspective 
by Taylor’s analysis of how prevailing ideals of the relation between scientific and 
political activities have been epistemologically modelled.  Given Taylor’s analyses, one 
could anticipate that new forms of knowledge producing processes would be accompa-
nied by a process of reconstruction of professional identities.  Practitioners and admin-
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istrators of science, as well as political authorities, may have attuned themselves to the 
new forms of knowledge producing practices by searching for ways of ensuring that 
science is established as a socially robust activity.  Their professional identities would 
then have to be recast accordingly.  The work of Nowotny et al. could, from this per-
spective, be seen as the work of articulating these sets of transformations, and a pro-
posal of an account that could be subjected to self-evaluation by both science practitio-
ners and administrators.   
In providing such accounts, analysts need to question what good science is and 
whether new emerging forms of science assessment are acceptable.  The co-production 
perspective should lay claim to the role of providing a theoretical framework that could 
facilitate the effort of re-building the professional identities of scientists, politicians and 
science administrators.  The perspective may facilitate such an effort if it adequately 
articulates transitions in scientific practices along with the norms that are embedded in 
these practices.  In theorising these changes, scholars of science propose ways of 
articulating and challenging the practitioner’s reasons for changing their practices.  This 
perspective simultaneously provides a measure of critique for the science analysts’ 
accounts.  The rationale for the emerging new standards of how to ideally perform 
science may not have been clear to practitioners; it may not have been well articulated 
by analysts either.  As new standards are proposed, however, the proposal may be 
discussed in light of how such proposals may lead towards improvements.185  
In addition to more experimental studies, then, I believe we need more studies of the 
sort that scholars of science know how to do, such as a) studies of the extent of, how 
and why new forms of knowledge production has led to the enrolment of ethics and b) 
what effect this enrolment has had.   
 
                                                 
185 For instance, in the process of establishing the FUGE project that I have described, it seemed that the 
scientist’s professional identities were not clearly articulated and consistent.  There seemed to be a gen-
eral agreement that it was correct to encourage a process of attuning, inclusion, enrolment and adjustment 
that could result in a socially robust program.  In staging the process, however, the organisers aimed at 
presenting their proposal from within traditional conceptualisations of science.  The point of the “one 
voice” strategy (discussed in Chapter 5) was to present a powerful proposal that could not be rejected 
because it would appear to be well founded, thoroughly peer-reviewed scientific advice for political 
authorities.  In displaying such a mismatch between justified and actual lines of argumentative strategies, 
the scientists could be challenged to better articulate their rationale for their own legitimising strategy.   
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 Best account of biologization 
The co-production perspective challenges the epistemologically modelled social con-
tract that has staged normative investigations and marked the professional identities of 
the participants involved.  On the one hand the co-production perspective is a daring 
invitation as it itself is a call for a collective experiment regarding ways of performing 
good science and good politics.  On the other hand, the perspective is a way of articu-
lating changes that have taken place in the way normative discourses on science and 
technology have come to be performed.  The perspective then should be evaluated 
according to its descriptive as well as its prescriptive suggestions.   
In my view, the current challenge of the co-production perspective is to demonstrate 
that it can provide the best available theoretical framework for performing such norma-
tive investigations of scientific projects.  The present work is marked by the preliminary 
theoretical step of arguing the case for the advantages of articulating the ideals of good 
science within the co-production idiom.   
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